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I. INTRODUCTION

Following the invasion of Iraq, the Coalition Provisional
Authority ("CPA") unilaterally imposed economic restructuring on
the country when international law strictly forbids altering legal
institutions of an occupied territory, and Security Council Resolution
1483, which authorized the U.S. and U.K. to undertake administrative
and fiduciary responsibilities, also did not sanction the reforms. 1 In
March 2013, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
produced its final report2 and the investigation acknowledged that
occupation operations were "frequently in the breach," but
underscored the lesson that institutional transformations can be painful
while also ultimately contributing to stability in fragile states. 3 With
societal divisions and an insurgency in Iraq in 2014, Iraq is now less
stable than before the 2003 invasion. Also, a rudimentary lesson in
reconstruction and reform is conspicuous from assessing the cause of
the drastic fluctuations and economic viability of the Iraqi population.
The following chart depicts the positive correlation between oil
revenue and per capita income over the past thirty years. 4

1. See infra Parts III, IV.
2. SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION (SIGIR), LEARNING
FROM
IRAQ
(Mar.
2013),
available
at
http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/sigir/20131001083907/http://www.sigir.mil/le
amingfromiraq/index.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2015) [hereinafter SIGIR].
3. Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., A Golden Moment: Applying Iraq's Hard Lessons to
Strengthen the U.S. Approach to Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, 34
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 17, 17-18 (2010).
4. Iraq's average daily revenues per year constructed with Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries ("OPEC") ASP data for annual production
multiplied by average yearly price per barrel from 1970 to 2012. See generally Table
3.6: Daily and Cumulative Crude Oil Production in OPEC Members, Organization
of
Petroleum
Exporting
Countries
(2014),
available
at
http://www. opec. org/library/ Annual %20S tatistical %20 Bulletin/interactive/current/
FileZ/Main-Dateien/Section3.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2015) (providing Iraq's
average annual oil production); U.S. Dep't of Energy, Petroleum & Other Liquids:
Cushing, OK WT! Spot Price FOB, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., available at
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeatHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=RWTC&f=A (last
visited Nov. 20, 2015) (providing annual per barrel price in US dollars from 1986 to
2012); see Per Capita GDP at Current Prices - U.S. Dollars, U.N. DATA, available
at
http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=SNAAMA&f=gr1D%3A101 %3Bcurr1D%3AUSD
%3BpcF1ag%3Al (last visited Nov. 20, 2015); Historical Oil Prices Chart,
FORECASTCHART, available at http://www.forecast-chart.com/chart-crude-oil.html
(last visited Nov. 20, 2015) (providing monthly per barrel price of oil in US dollars
from 1970 to 1985).
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Iraqi per capita income plummeted after 1990 5 and by 2003
Iraq was ranked seventy-first out of ninety-four developing countries
for economic well-being on the U.N. Poverty index in 2003. 6 Over
80% of the Iraqi population lived in poverty. 7 The astounding plunge
in income that began in the early 1990s was a direct consequence of
the severe economic sanctions that the Security Council placed on the
Iraqi people for over a decade following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. In
his 2006 book, former U.N. Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq Hans
C. Von Sponeck, documented the misery inflicted on the Iraqi people
as "cold blooded" and explained that U.S. and U.K. leaders politically
manipulated foreign relations with propaganda so that few decisionmakers outside of Iraq were willing to cease the suffering. 8 The
5. Steve Shifferes, Iraq's Economy Declines by Half, BBC (Oct. 10, 2003, 3:02
PM), available at http:!/news. bbc.co. uk/2/hi/business/3181248 .stm (last visited
Nov. 20, 2015) (using alternative measures, reporting that Iraqi income went from
$3600 in 1980, to $770-1020 in 2001, and to $450-610 by the end of2003).
U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME [UNDP], HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT:
6.
MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS: A COMPACT AMONG NATIONS TO END HUMAN
POVERTY 247 (2003).
7. Hamada Zahawi, Redefining the Laws of Occupation in the Wake of
Operation Iraqi Freedom, 95 CAL. L. REV. 2295, 2327 (2007) (citing UNDP ARAB
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT: CREATING OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE
GENERATIONS (2002)).
8. H.C. VON SPONECK, A DIFFERENT KIND OF WAR: THE UN SANCTIONS
REGIME IN IRAQ 13 (2006); see also CHALMERS JOHNSON, BLOWBACK: THE COSTS
AND CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN EMPIRE 9 (2000) (noting that U.S. officials were
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sanctions arguably violated humanitarian law 9 as hundreds of
thousands of Iraqis were estimated to have died as a result of
malnutrition and inadequate medical care. 10 Iraqis did not believe that
they should have been punished for Hussein's act of invading
Kuwait, 11 and scholars have long debated the uncertain effectiveness
of unilateral and third-party sanctions on altering the objectionable
policies of a target-govemment. 12
The economic juncture occurred after the 2003 war. Security
Council Resolution 1483 lifted economic and trade sanctions on Iraq,
but real economic conditions for common Iraqis worsened after the
invasion because of the chaotic economic, civil, and political
conditions plaguing the country several years into the occupation. 13
Despite that it was a decade of U.S.- and U.K.-led sanctions that were

cognizant of the suffering, with National Security Advisor Sandy Berger stating that
the UN sanction program was "unprecedented for its severity in the whole of world
history"). See generally Reem Bahdi, Book Review, 25 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS
JUST. 365, 366-67 (2007) (reviewing HANS C. VON SPONECK, A DIFFERENT KIND
OF WAR: THE UN SANCTIONS REGIME IN IRAQ (2006)). During the sanction period,
the US tried to block watertankers from reaching civilians but the UN condemned
the move and noted that "access to clean drinking water" was "the major cause of
child deaths," and the US was concerned that vaccines for infant diseases could be
used for chemical weapons, but UNICEF and the World Health Organization
protested and European biological weapons experts remarked that such a claim was
"flatly impossible" scientifically. NOAM CHOMSKY, HEGEMONY OR SURVIVAL 128
(2004) (citing Joy Gordon, Cool War: Economic Sanctions as a Weapon of Mass
Destruction, HARPER'S, Nov. 2002, at 43-49).
9. RICHARD FALK, THE COSTS OF WAR: INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE UN, AND
WORLD ORDER AFTER IRAQ 46-47 (2008).
10. Stefan M. Brooks, Economic Effects of the Persian Gulf War on Iraq, in
THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MIDDLE EAST WARS: THE UNITED STATES IN THE PERSIAN
GULF, AFGHANISTAN, AND IRAQ CONFLICTS 400 (Spencer C. Tucker ed., 2010) ("[I]t
is estimated that anywhere from tens of thousands to hundreds of thousandsperhaps even 1 million-Iraqis, disproportionately children, died under the
sanctions regimes during 1990-2003. ").
11 . See Aida Dabbas & Jillian Schwedler, Protesting Sanctions Against Iraq:
A View From Jordan, 208 MIDDLE EAST REP. 37, 37 (1998).
12. See GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
RECONSIDERED: HISTORY AND CURRENT POLICY 8 (3d ed. 2007); see also Jeffrey
A. Meyer, Second Thoughts on Secondary Sanctions, 30 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 905,906,
924-25 (2009); Peter L. Fitzgerald, Pierre Goes Online: Blacklisting and Secondary
Boycotts in U.S. Trade Policy, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 91 (1998) ("[A]n
international consensus does appear to be building that the unilateral extraterritorial
application of these controls to third parties is impermissible .... [T]he international
community is coming to regard the blacklisting of third parties, or secondary
boycotts, as 'unreasonable,' and therefore an unjustified intrusion upon the
sovereignty of the neutral state.").
13. Zahawi, supra note 7, at 2298.
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solely responsible for impoverishing the Iraqi people, after the
invasion, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld stated that "Iraq [has] a
completely failed economy." 14 The Bush Administration's CPA
initiated a rhetoric campaign that linked Iraqi prosperity to the need to
impose market and capitalism reforms 15 even though merely dropping
sanctions and permitting Iraqis to freely export oil would have raised
per capita income fivefold. This post-war boon was particularly
noticeable because long-term trends in the per barrel market price
more than quadrupled during the occupation. 16 Oil-rich countries
prospered while the rest of the world hit a recession. 17
The U.S.-led war in Iraq in 2003 devastated infrastructure 18
and the impact on U.S. taxpayers was scandalous. Prior to the
invasion, the Bush Administration represented to the American public
that the war would cost approximately $50 to $60 billion and
repeatedly evaded inquiries from reporters about deeper and
prolonged cost estimates, which were expenditures that may have also
been relevant to the American economy proceeding into a recession. 19
14. L. PAUL BREMER III, MY YEAR IN IRAQ: THE STRUGGLE TO BUILD A
FUTURE OF HOPE 114 (2006).
15. See infra Part II.
16. See Robert Bejesky, Geopolitics, Oil Law Reform, and Commodity Market
Expectations, 63 OKLA. L. REV. 193, 273-77 (2011) [hereinafter Bejesky,
Geopolitics] (noting also that the drastic surge in oil prices was partially due to the
uncertainty and turmoil in the oil market which reverberated after the invasion and
from the indeterminate impact on other OPEC and oil-producing countries).
17. Alaalhsan Salloom & Yibing Ding, Macroeconomic Effects of the (200809) Global Financial Crisis on the Arab Countries, 2 BERKELEY J. Soc. Sci. 1, 1-3
(2012) (stating that the 2008-09 "financial crisis has been described as the worst
global financial crisis ... since the Great Depression in the 1930s" but also noting
that "annual GDP growth in real terms reached 5.9% for the Arab region as a whole"
from 2006 to 2008).
18. Conor McCarthy, The Paradox of the International Law of Military
Occupation: Sovereignty and the Reformation of Iraq, 10 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY
L. 43, 62 (2005) (explaining that the Hague Conventions make it clear that it is "not
permissible for an occupying power to allow an occupied territory to fester in a state
of economic, social, political and infrastructural retardation created by the conflict
from which the occupation has resulted."). Hostility may be intense when civilians,
cultural items, and infrastructure are inadequately protected during conflict as the
laws of war require. See Wayne Sandholtz, The Iraqi National Museum and
International Law: A Duty to Protect, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 185, 203-05
(2005).
19. See Robert Bejesky, Politico-International Law, 57 LOY. L. REV. 29, 8491 (2011) [hereinafter Bejesky, Politico] (discussing the Bush administration's
evasion of costs and neglect of economic consequences); Michael Boyle, How the
US Public Was Defrauded by the Hidden Cost ofthe Iraq War, GUARDIAN (Mar. 11,
2013,
8:30
AM),
available
at
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Due to the near nine-year occupation, expenditures mounted, and may
cost American taxpayers $3. 7 trillion when considering continuing
medical expenditures for American troop injuries. 20 Despite the
astronomical figure of $3. 7 trillion, the Special Inspector General for
Iraq Reconstruction stated that $60 billion was spent on reconstruction
and only about $21 billion of that amount was clearly earmarked for
construction projects, with the rest predominantly being spent on
construction-related security objectives. 21
Congressional debate was waged over the extent that Iraq
should have funded its own reconstruction, 22 but it now appears that
Iraq has paid in another way. The Bush Administration continued to
maintain that the Iraq War was not executed over an interest in oil, but
affirmed that the U.S. would "protect Iraq's natural resources" from
Hussein's regime, 23 and stripped the pre-war oil contracts that China,
France, and Russia had consummated with Hussein's regime. 24 In
April 2013, CNN reported on Iraq's metamorphosis from a
nationalized oil industry prior to the invasion to a privatized industry
that is now dominated by W estem oil companies: "Yes, the Iraq War
was a war for oil, and it was a war with winners: Big Oil." 25 Iraqis
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/mar/11/us-public-defraudedhidden-cost-iraq-war (last visited Nov. 20, 2015) (stating that prior to the war "the
Bush administration estimated that it would cost $50-60 [billion] to overthrow
Saddam Hussein and establish a functioning government . . . Some estimates
suggest[] that it may even eventually cost as much as $3.7 [trillion.]").
20. Boyle, supra note 19 (noting that during the occupation, the extent of
expenditures allocated for the Iraq War was not clearly designated on the American
budget).
21. SIGIR, supra note 2, at 9; Boyle, supra note 19 (estimating $90 billion).
22. Albio Sires, Iraq Should Pay for Its Reconstruction, HILL (Mar. 14, 2007,
11 :40 AM), available at http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/28785-iraqshould-pay-for-for-its-reconstruction (last visited Nov. 20, 2015) ("American
taxpayers have already paid $379 billion," and H.R. 1325 was introduced to
"require[] the Iraqi government to match all U.S. funds spent for reconstruction in
Iraq.").
23. In the President's Words: The Rights and Aspirations of the Iraqi People,
WHITE
HOUSE
(July
8,
2004),
available at http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/iraq/rightsandasp.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2015)
(citing President George W. Bush, Address at the Washington Hilton Hotel (Feb.
26, 2003)).
24. See Bejesky, Geopolitics, supra note 16, at 209,221, 226-27.
25. Antonia Juhasz, Why the War in Iraq was Fought for Big Oil, CNN (Apr.
15, 2013, 7:42 AM), available at http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/19/opinion/iraqwar-oil-juhasz/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2015); Christopher Layne, From
Preponderance to Offshore Balancing, in THE USE OF FORCE: MILITARY POWER
AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 283, 285 (Robert J. Art & Kenneth N. Waltz eds.,
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were not left aghast over this outcome because seven years earlier a
University of Michigan Institute for Social Research poll revealed that
76% of Iraqis believed that the invasion was "to control Iraqi oil."26
Antonia Juhasz, author or The Tyranny of Oil (2008) and The Bush
Agenda (2006), emphasizes that "ExxonMobil, BP and Shell were
among the oil companies that 'played the most aggressive roles in
lobbying their governments to ensure that the invasion would result in
an Iraq open to foreign oil companies. 27
The extraordinary per capita income surge for Iraqis in recent
years is unrelated to the CPA's capitalist legal transplants, and, over
the long-run, it is not apparent that Iraqis should be grateful to the U .K.
and the U.S. after being punished economically for over a decade
6th ed. 2004) (calling access to Persian Gulfoil a vital U.S. security interest); Nafeez
Ahmed, Iraq Blowback: Isis Rise Manufactured by Insatiable Oil Addition,
GUARDIAN
(June
16,
2014,
12:17
PM),
available
at
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/earth-insight/2014/jun/ 16/blowbackisis-iraq-manufactured-oil-addiction (last visited Nov. 20, 2015) ("The meteoric rise
of Isis is a predictable consequence of a longstanding US-led geostrategy in the
Middle East that has seen tyrants and terrorists as tools to expedite access to regional
oil and gas resources."). France, China, and Russia, all permanent Security Council
members, also recently were awarded contracts in Iraq. Press Release, Technip,
Technip awarded FEED contract in Basra, Iraq (Apr. 10, 2014), available at
http://www.technip.com/en/press/technip-awarded-feed-contract-basra-iraq
(last
visited Nov. 20, 2015); Tim Arango & Clifford Krauss, China Is Reaping Biggest
Bene.fits of Iraq Oil Boom, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2013), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/03/world/middleeast/china-reaps-biggestbenefits-of-iraq-oil-boom.html ?pagewanted=all&_r=O (last visited Nov. 20, 2015);
Andrew Critchlow, Russia's Lukoil Opens Giant Iraq Oil Field, Adding to Crude
Glut,
TELEGRAPH
(Mar.
29,
2014,
4:58
PM),
available
at
http://www.telegraph.co. uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/oilandgas/ 10731708/Rus
sias-Lukoil-opens-giant-Iraq-oil-field-adding-to-crude-glut.html (last visited Nov.
20, 2015). These later oil concessions would presumably increase the interest of
these key countries in ensuring support for the investment-friendly government and
legal structure. Peter Ford, Why China Stays Out of Islamic State Fight, For Now,
CHRISTIAN
SCI.
MONITOR
(Sept.
26,
2014),
available
at
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2014/0926/Why-China-stays-outof-Islamic-State-fight-for-now (last visited Nov. 20, 2015) (raising the fact that
China has significant oil contracts in Iraq but did not want to get involved as a
member of any "coalition" after the US began bombing ISIS because China has
"mistrust of US intentions.").
26. Iraqi Attitudes: Survey Documents Big Changes, U. MICH. NEWS SERV.
(June
14,
2006),
available
at
http://web.archive.org/web/200607 l 40223 l 5/http://www.umich.edu/news/index.ht
ml?Releases/2006/Jun06/r061406a (last visited Nov. 20, 2015).
27. Dahr Jamail, Western Oil Firm Remain as US Exits Iraq, AL JAZEERA (Jan.
7,
2012,
6:45
PM),
available
at
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011 /12/20 l l l 22813134071641.html
(last visited Oct. 4, 2015).
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during Hussein's rule. Moreover, despite that Iraq's per capita income
has significantly increased in recent years, some percentage of the
improved domestic production represents value collected by
multinational oil companies. Select individuals and groups in Iraq
have also enriched themselves while the common Iraqi is destitute,
and it is this desperation and hostility toward Prime Minister Maliki,
a twenty-three year Iraqi defector-exile who monopolized oil revenues
and licenses, 28 that are underlying causes of the uprising that swept the
country with violence in 2014. 29
This current framework unfolded gradually in a country with a
population subject to a humanitarian catastrophe and initiated with
28. Christopher Helman, How Iraq's Kurds May Be The Unlikely Losers in the
Chaos, FORBES (June 12, 2014, 5:51 PM), available at
http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2014/06/12/how-iraqs-kurds-maybe-the-unlikely-losers-in-the-isis-chaos/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2015) ("For years the
Kurds have been at loggerheads with the oil ministry in Baghdad" because Kurds
want freedom to export oil but "Baghdad insists that only the federal government
can license exports and that unilateral exports are blatantly illegal."). Maliki is an
Iraqi exile of twenty-three years and was ironically personally welcomed into that
leadership position by George W. Bush. Michael Abramowitz, Bush's Gut Feeling
On Maliki Is Positive, WASH. POST (June 18, 2006), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/06/17/AR2006061700662 .html (last visited Nov. 20,
2015).
29. Analyzing Potential Challenges of Fighting the Islamic State, PBS
NEWSHOUR
(Sept.
11,
2014,
6:22
PM),
available
at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/analyzing-potential-challenges-fighting-islamicstate/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2015) ("ISIS emerged because of certain conditions in
this region, disorder, dysfunction, alienation, the residue of European colonialism"
and the "key facts are that efforts on the part of the United States to use military
power to bring ... stability [and] democracy to this region ... have actually fostered
greater instability."); Shashank Bengali & Patrick J. McDonnell, Resignation of
Prime Minister Maliki Gives Rise to Hope in Iraq, L.A. Times (Aug. 15, 2014, 5:28
PM), available at http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-iraq-malikiresignation-relief-20140815-story.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2015) ("Sunni leaders
accuse Maliki' s Shiite-dominated government and security forces of marginalizing
members of their sect as well as carrying out unlawful abductions and other abuses.
Those policies, they say, have fueled support for the Islamic State militants.");
Michael Stephens, Iraq Crisis: How Extreme Are the Fighters in Isis?, BBC (June
21, 2014), available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27945954
(last visited Nov. 20, 2015) ("Travelling around the country in recent days, I have
been shocked at the levels of deprivation that some of Iraq's citizens have endured.
[The recent insurgency is not driven by a jihadist mentality but] is a more general
uprising of large groupings of disaffected communities throughout north-western
Iraq and a product of years of social exclusion, poor governance and corruption by
the Iraqi government."); Iraq in Ruins: Post-War Life Overshadowed by Crumbling
Infrastructure, Corruption, Poverty, RT TV (May 17, 2013, 9:56 AM), available at
http://rt.com/news/iraq-poverty-war-crisis-414/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2015) ("Iraqi
infrastructure is constantly failing and people are forced to beg.").
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Bush Administration and CPA rhetoric that promoted basic market
economic reforms and evolved to deeper capitalist reforms with tacit
acceptance akin to the same reason a frog meets its fate by not leaping
out of a pot of hot water as it progressively gets hotter. The period of
CPA governance and its dictates are critical to the present status of
Iraq's political and economic system because for the past eight years
Prime Minister Maliki became a dictator, established a mafia to
terrorize society, suppressed political dissent, corruptly benefited
himself and his cronies, and consequently locked in reforms without
the democratic process functioning. 30 Part II begins with the initial
rhetoric, which was that Iraq needed a market economy to nourish
democratization and Part III discusses how the CPA transplanted new
capitalist codes wholesale on Iraq.
Part IV emphasizes how
privatization programs were advocated and how unrestricted foreign
investment rules were instituted in conjunction with a free-for-all
dollarization of the Iraqi economy, which furnished purchasing power
and surreptitiously enhanced favoritism for the occupation due to
humanitarian dependence. Part V discusses reconstruction contracts
in Iraq, which was the occupation's paramount obligation because of
the devastation wrought by bombing and war operations. However,
funding allocated to rebuilding represented only one-half of one
30. See Zaid Al-Ali, How Maliki Ruined Iraq, FOREIGN POL'Y (June 19, 2014),
available

at

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/06/19/how_maliki_ruined_iraq_armed
_forces_isis (last visited Nov. 20, 2015) (writing of Maliki's suppression of dissent
and killing, torturing, and jailing ofprotestors); Lord Maginnis, A Fictitious !SIL to
Scare Us Away From the Truth in Iraq, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 15, 2014, 10:59
AM),
available
at
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/lord-maginnis/iraqisil_b_5494529.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2015) (explaining that "Corruption in the
government and those affiliated to the government is almost unimaginable with
billions of dollar embezzled and laundered, thus crippling the country's economy"
and a member of the UK House of Lords writing that "Maliki has created a Mafialike network of criminals and assassins to eliminate the voice of opposition at every
level" and estimated that an average of a thousand Sunnis have been killed every
month for the past decade by Maliki's assassins); Arwa Damon & Mohammed
Tawfeeq, Iraq's Leader Becoming a New 'Dictator,' Deputy Warns, CNN (Dec. 13,
2011, 6:33 PM), available at http://www.cnn.com/2011/12/13/world/meast/iraqmaliki/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2015) (reporting that Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Saleh
al-Mutlag expressed to CNN that he was "shocked" to witness President Barack
Obama address Maliki as "the elected leader of a sovereign, self-reliant and
democratic Iraq" when Maliki had been ignoring power-sharing institutions and
when the US left Iraq "with a dictator" who systematically suppresses dissent with
impunity, and further stating that the country is "going toward a dictatorship" and
"[p ]eople are not going to accept that, and most likely they are going to ask for the
division of the country. And this is going to be a disaster").
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percent of the actual total U.S. taxpayer spending for the Iraq war and
occupation31 and the functioning of the procurement process provides
lessons of an abysmal application of the Rule of Law.
II. SIMMERING: IMPOSING AN AGENDA BY INITIATING LESS
CONTROVERSIAL DISCOURSE
The Bush Administration's rationale for invading and
occupying Iraq was to disarm the country of supposedly existing
chemical, biological, and nuclear weapon programs, which ultimately
did not exist. 32 Yale Law Professors Ackerman and Hathaway
punctuate that the Authorization for the Use of Military Force was a
limited authorization to use the U.S. military conditioned on there
being an actual imminent threat, which means that when the White
House began offering additional rationalizations after the war,
particularly of humanitarian intervention, "such talk was blatantly
inconsistent with the plain language of the 2002 resolution. 33 In
2008, after the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence ("SSCI")
completed its five-year investigation, the SSCI Chairman remarked:
"In making the case for war, the Administration repeatedly presented
intelligence as fact when it was unsubstantiated, contradicted or even
nonexistent. ... Sadly, the Bush Administration led the nation into
war under false pretenses." 34 The post facto rationalization of
"liberating" the country was not a legitimate justification for war, but
political liberalization under }us post helium can reasonably be
31. Using the $21 billion of actual construction contract spending divided by
an estimated $3. 7 trillion in war and occupation spending. Boyle, supra note 19.
This means that the other 99.5% paid by US taxpayers represented direct and
derivative costs for the near nine-year military occupation and suggests that
quibbling over whether Iraq should pay for its own reconstruction was almost
incidental relative to costs borne by American taxpayers for non-reconstruction
operations.
32. Robert Bejesky, Intelligence Information and Judicial Evidentiary
Standards, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 811, 875-82 (2011).
33. See Bruce Ackerman & Oona Hathaway, Limited War and the Constitution:
Iraq and the Crisis ofPresidential Legality, 109 MICH. L. REV. 447,464 (2011); see
also Robert Bejesky, Weapon Inspections Lessons Learned: Evidentiary
Presumptions and Burdens ofProof, 38 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 295, 350-69
(2011) [hereinafter Bejesky, Weapon Inspections].
34. Press Release, Senate Intelligence Committee, Senate Intelligence
Committee Unveils Final Phase II Reports on Prewar Iraq Intelligence (June 5,
2008),
available
at
http ://web.archive.org/web/2008060616203 3/http://intelligence.senate.gov/press/re
cord.cfm?id=298775 (last visited Nov. 21, 2015).
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interpreted to mean establishing institutions for democracy, holding
elections, and instituting human rights protections. 35 These reforms,
during a foreign occupation, are particularly logical because it is the
citizenry who will live under the laws and should have the selfdetermination right to choose the market structure, the degree of
economic openness, and protectionist measures. Instead, the CPA and
Bush administration officials assumed a much deeper prerogative by
dictating a unilaterally-chosen economic reform agenda for Iraq and
did so piecemeal by commencing with discourse that annexed less
controversial market principles with democratization and eventually
progressed to an assumption that complete economic openness and
unrestricted capitalism are inseparable from democratization, which is
not a mainstream or consensus international community norm. 36
35. RICHARD N. HAASS, INTERVENTION: THE USE OF AMERICAN MILITARY
FORCE IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD 13 (rev. ed. 1999) (arguing when states
violate minimum standards by committing, permitting, or threatening intolerable
acts against their own people or other nations, then some of the privileges of
sovereignty are forfeited); Robert Bejesky, Pruning Non-Derogative Human Rights
Violations into an Ephemeral Shame Sanction, 58 LOY. L. REV. 821, 829-31 (2012)
(noting that ensuring adequate human rights standards are met is a legitimate
occupier prerogative as universal standards are required in a number of human rights
agreements). With respect to assisting the emergence of institutions of selfgovernment, self-determination permits a people with a common connection to a
given territory to have the right to govern their own affairs, which might include
state sovereignty, as was critical during the era of decolonization. See G.A. Res.
2625 (XXV), at 121 (Oct. 24, 1970); G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, art. 21 (Dec. 10, 1948) ("The will of the people shall be the basis
of the authority of government."); International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights art. 1, opened/or signature Dec. 19, 1966, S. EXEC. Doc. No. 95-20, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) ("[a]ll peoples have the right of selfdetermination," the right to "freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social, and cultural development.").
36. James Thuo Gathii, Commerce, Conquest, and Wartime Confiscation, 31
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 709, 737 (2006) (stating that not even the US has such a laissez
faire economy as the one that the CPA imposed on Iraq); Edwin Villmoare, The Fog
of Nation Building: Lessons from Kosovo?, 18 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 25, 26 (2004)
(mentioning that from the perspective of domestic institution building, "there can be
no genuine progress in any one of these initiatives [of democracy, economic
development, and nation building] if there is not progress in all," but also
recognizing the fairly universal failures outside the West). Markets are the dominant
ideology but no country in the world is completely open to foreign investment and
trade, and no newly emerging market economy would likely abruptly open its
banking industry without some foreign ownership restrictions or protectionist
regulations. James R. Barth, Gerald Caprio, Jr. & Ross Levine, Bank Regulation
and Supervision in 180 Countries from 1999 to 2011, 5 J. FIN. ECON. POL'Y 111,
177 (2013) (noting that in a study of 180 countries over the 1999 to 2011 period,
"[t]here is substantial heterogeneity of bank regulatory and supervisory policies
across countries" but there has been some convergence over the past dozen years).
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For example, the Bush Administration's September 2002
National Security Strategy states: "America will encourage the
advancement of democracy and economic openness in . . . nations,
because these are the best foundations for domestic stability and
international order." 37 CPA Administrator Paul Bremer stated: "A
free economy and a free people go hand in hand. History tells us that
substantial and broadly held resources, protected by property rights,
are the best protection of political freedom. Building such prosperity
in Iraq will be a key measure of our success here." 38 These
propositions are not inconsistent with basic reform agendas; even
communist systems floundered when they endeavored to completely
abolish market mechanisms 39 and the U.S. and Europe traversed
several decades in which socialism, the welfare state, and more public
utilities were the norm. 40
Even the most ambitious World Trade Organization ("WTO") members traversed
intense domestic political debates over how certain industries and commodities
would react to freer trade. Joel I. Klein, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, A Note of Caution with Respect to a WTO Agenda on Competition Policy,
Presented at The Royal Institute oflntemational Affairs (Nov. 18, 1996) (noting the
"intense interest at the intersection of trade and competition policy" at the time of
WTO negotiations).
37. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF
THE UNITED ST ATES OF AMERICA, fwd. (2002).
38. Robert Looney, The Neoliberal Model's Planned Role in Iraqi's Economic
Reconstruction, 57 MIDDLE E. J. 568,574 (2003).
CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD'S
39.
POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 11 (1977) (stating that the Soviet Union, Cuba, and
other communist system relied on markets, money, and prices as a method of
organizing transactions in society for consumer spending). Communist and
capitalist systems are predominantly distinguished by the former's authoritarian role
in generating production plans, but even the Russian people were able to accumulate
savings and hold rubles in bank accounts. PHILIP ROEDER, RED SUNSET: THE
FAILURE OF SOVIET POLITICS 152-53 (1993).
40. THOMAS PIK.ETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 154 (Arthur
Goldhammer trans., Belknap Press 2014) (2013) (stating that Europeans in the postWorld War II era believed that capitalism was being eradicated); PAUL PIERSON,
DISMANTLING THE WELFARE STATE?: RAEGAN, THATCHER AND THE POLITICS OF
RETRENCHMENT 23, 39 (1994) (stating that welfare states became the norm across
advanced industrialized democracies, with 30% to 60% of GNP circulating through
government programs).
Keynesian economic principles balanced complete
socialization of the economy and unbridled capitalism. Peter A. Hall, Conclusion:
The Politics of Keynesian Ideas, in THE POLITICAL POWER OF ECONOMIC IDEAS:
KEYNESIANISM ACROSS NATIONS 361, 364-66 (Peter A. Hall ed., 1989). Every
capitalist democracy committed itself to providing public goods and social insurance
and engaged in macroeconomic management to avert "working-class
ROBERT FRANZESE, JR., MACROECONOMIC POLICIES OF
radicalization."
DEVELOPED DEMOCRACIES 2, 9, 14 (2002) (further noting that only six of the 21
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A population surely desires economic prosperity, which will
yield more societal stability, 41 but it is crucial for the population to
rationally choose its own market formulation because the population
could later be offended by the manner in which reforms are imposed
and how inequalities manifested, which may undermine effective
political institutions. 42 In her book, World on Fire, Yale Law
Professor Amy Chua states that "contrary to conventional wisdom,
markets and democracy-at least in the form in which they're
currently being promoted-may not be mutually-reinforcing in the
developing world. " 43 Creating a market system with new laws in a
developing country does not decidedly translate into imposing
unrestricted capitalism, favoring privatization of available public
assets, and promulgating undue "shock treatment,"44 all of which are
not congruous with the gradual capitalist evolutions of developed
Western economies. Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel Laureate in Economics
and former Chief Economist at the World Bank, published an editorial
responding to the Bush administration's use of "shock therapy"
capitalism in Iraq. Stiglitz wrote:
[T]here is a broad consensus that shock therapy, at least at the level of
microeconomic reforms, failed, and that countries (Hungary, Poland,
and Slovenia) that took the gradualist approach to privatization and the
economically advanced democracies studied kept total public flows below 60% of
their Gross Domestic Product ("GDP") through 1990). Socialism was a middle
ground between strict capitalism and communism.
41. See 148 CONG. REC. HI 773-05(daily ed. May 1, 2002) (statement of Rep.
Watts) ("[W]e must reach out to developing nations across the globe, often beset by
forces of terror, and demonstrate how free markets, open trade, and private enterprise
under the rule of law can lead to prosperity for their citizens. Our national security
improves when global stability prevails."); Office of the Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stabilization, U.S. DEP'T STATE, available at http://20012009.state.gov/s/crs/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2015) (espousing that its mission was "to
prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct
societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable
path toward peace, democracy and a market economy."). Market mechanisms and
capitalism are effective at developing society and wealth by delegating economic
ordering and emphasizing personal responsibility, but the problem is that imposed
laws and processes without regard to the desires of the Iraqi people and generating
socioeconomic turmoil undermined what market reforms were designed to achieve.
42. See JOHNFINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 174 (1980)(stating
that in societies where there is private ownership and excessive disparities in wealth,
inequalities without redistribution from the rich can lead to significant dissent).
43. Amy Chua, The Profitable and the Powerless: International Accountability

of Multinational Corporations: The Sixty Annual Grotius Lecture: World on Fire,
19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1239, 1240 (2004).
44. See generally NAOMI KLEIN, THE SHOCK DOCTRINE (2007).
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reconstruction of institutional infrastructure managed their transitions
far better than those that tried to leapfrog into a laissez-faire economy.
This record suggests that one should think twice before trying shock
therapy again. But the Bush administration, backed by a few
handpicked Iraqis, is pushing Iraq towards an even more radical form
of shock therapy than was pursued in the former Soviet world. Indeed,
shock therapy's advocates argue that its failures were due not to
excessive speed - too much shock and not enough therapy - but to
insufficient shock. 45

Despite the evidence available in case studies indicating that
shock therapy failed to quickly blossom into prosperity, the U.S.
occupation reduced criticism for its own lack of conscientiousness
over the abrupt and sweeping capitalistic dictates by presenting the
reforms as mainstream and blessed by international economic
institutions. The CPA reportedly submitted drafts of CPA orders to
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund ("IMF") for
comment46 and the World Bank and IMF "strongly urged" that Iraq be
made "one of the most open economies in the world" for foreign
investment. 47 Besides the fact that a handful of the most economically
powerful countries, led by the U.S., have traditionally been able to
leverage voting power and compel policies within the Bretton Woods
Institutions ("BWl'') 48 and the fact that there was actually no public
45. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Iraq's Next Shock Will Be Shock Therapy, PROJECT
SYNDICATE
(Feb.
12,
2004),
available
at
http://www.projectsyndicate.org/commentary/ iraq-s-next-shock-will-be-shock-therapy (last visited
Nov. 21, 2015).
46. Brett H. McGurk, Revisiting the Law ofNation-Building: Iraq in Transition,
45 VA. J. INT'L. L. 451, 460 (2005).
47. Financial Reconstruction in Iraq: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int'/
Trade & Fin. of the Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs., 108th Cong. 53
(2005) [hereinafter Financial Reconstruction in Iraq] (statement of M. Peter
McPherson, former CPA Director of Economic Development) (commenting that the
CPA's investment laws made Iraq "the most open economy in the region - and
frankly one of the more open economies of the world" and that those initiatives were
"strongly urged" by the World Bank during briefings with CPA).
48. See Kristen E. Boon, "Open for Business": International Financial
Institutions, Post-Conflict Economic Reform, and the Rule of Law, 39 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 513, 574 n.222 (2007); ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC LAW 503 (2002); PATRICIA ADAMS, ODIOUS DEBTS: LOOSE LENDING,
CORRUPTION, AND THE THIRD WORLD'S ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY 67 (1991)
(noting that the IMF and World Bank, at creation, were required to be "beyond
political influence of any one country" and not be "unaccountable"). Responsibility
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record of the World Bank and IMF advice and therefore no certainty
that this advice was incorporated into the orders adopted by the CP A, 49
the CPA was not beholden to the World Bank's advice and
international economic institutions cannot exempt the CPA from
adhering to restrictions of occupation law. The CPA owed its
fiduciary obligations to the Iraqi people. However, what more can be
said about the prospect for compromising the integrity of an
international institution after Bush appointed Paul Wolfowitz, the
same neoconservative war hawk who advocated false claims that led
to the Iraq War50 and who lacked experience in economic
development, 51 to the position of president of the World Bank. 52
The 1990s "Washington Consensus" pressured countries to
fortify the free flow of investment and prodded structural adjustment,
austerity, and privatization programs, which proved controversial and
manipulative. 53 The U.N., IMF, World Bank, and other international
can be shirked when the institution or the state is employed as the unit of analysis
without recognizing that both the dominate state and the institution can also be
perceived as one in the same or at least incorporate the same interests, values, and
assumptions. What was implemented for Iraq appears to go well beyond published
World Bank Guidelines to support market economies. Alan K. Audi, Iraq's New

Investment Laws and the Standard of Civilization: A Case Study on the Limits of
International Law, 93 GEO. L.J. 335, 350-51 (2004).
49. Boon, supra note 48, at 550.
50. See Bejesky, Politico, supra note 19, at 38-52 (discussing advocacy of the
neoconservative group that planned for and advocated for the Iraq War long before
the invasion).
51. See Liam Halligan, The World Bank Will Be Hated, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 20,
2005, 12:01 AM), available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/2912396/fheWorld-Bank-will-be-hated.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2015) (reporting that Nobel
Laureate in economics Joseph Stiglitz stated about Wolfowitiz's appointment that
"[ t]he World Bank will once again become a hate figure" and his concern is that "the
World Bank will now become an explicit instrument of US foreign policy"); see
generally PETER J. HAMMER, CHANGE AND CONTINUITY AT THE WORLD BANK:
REFORMING PARADOXES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 163 n.13 (2013) (reporting
that after Wolfowitz's candidacy for the World Bank position was announced,
Columbia University Economics Professor Jeffrey Sachs stated that "it's time for
other candidates to come forward who have experience in development ... This is
a position on which hundreds of millions of people depend for their lives").
52. Mark Tran, Bush Picks Wolfowitz to Head World Bank, GUARDIAN (Mar.
at
available
AM),
7:35
2005,
16,
(last
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2005/mar/16/usnews.paulwolfowitz
visited Nov. 20, 2015).
53. See generally JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS
(2002); Antonio Perez, Prescriptions for Iraq, Predictions for Russia and

Performance for China: Legal Frameworks for Economic Transition in Iraq Occupation Under the Law of War vs. Global Governance Under the Law ofPeace,
18 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 53, 53 (2004) (stating that the Washington Consensus
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institutions were never authorized to impose lawmaking on foreign
countries 54 and must instead respect the domestic economic and
political sovereignty of countries. 55 Becoming a member of the IMF
and promising to adhere to principles of "good governance," to
implement transparent financial and economic policy, and to assure
financial accountability, 56 has never clearly granted the IMF a right to
impose austerity and privatization programs. 57 Instead, the IMF
resolutely impels ultimatums as conditions on loans, 58 including when
consistently was under attack); Audi, supra note 48, at 360 (noting discontent with
the Washington Consensus); John Williamson, What Should the World Bank Think
About the Washington Consensus?, 15 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 251, 251-52,
255 (2000) (scholar who coined the term "Washington Consensus" explaining that
he intended the term to apply to "market fundamentalism," that the policies that were
implemented by the Bank may have been more expansive than his definition, and
that it is incorrect to presume that the policies implemented correctly represent the
standards that do garner significant unanimity).
54. See NDIVA KOFELE-KALE, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF RESPONSIBILITY
FOR ECONOMIC CRIMES: HOLDING STATE OFFICIALS INDIVIDUALLY LIABLE FOR
ACTS OF FRAUDULENT ENRICHMENT 396 (2006) (noting the traditional role of the
World Bank and IMF that changed from merely lending to a law-making role by
using conditionality).
5 5. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund art. IV, § 3(b),
July 22, 1944, 60 Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39 (stating that in exchange for member
countries permitting the IMF to consent to monitoring of a member country's
financial flows, the IMF must "respect the domestic social and political policies of
members."); Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development art. IV,§ 10, opened for signature Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440, 2
U.N.T.S. 134 ("The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of
any member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character
of the member or members concerned.").
56. Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Fiscal Policies:
Declaration of Principles, INT'L MONETARY FUND 5, 13-15 (Sept. 26, 1999),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/mft/code/eng/code2e.pdf (last
visited Nov. 21, 2015).
57. See generally Naomi Klein, Bomb Before you Buy: The Economics of War,
2 SEATTLE J. FOR Soc. JUST. 331, 332-334 (2004) (noting that countries across the
world have banded together in dissent to IMF recommendations and rejecting
privatizations).
58. See Dustin Sharp, The Significance of Human Rights for the Debt of
Countries in Transition, in MAKING SOVEREIGN FINANCING AND HUMAN RIGHTS
WORK 47, 50 (Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky & Jernej Letnar Cernic eds., 2014)
(emphasizing that the IMF and other international financial institutions have
intensely influenced country spending and set conditions for loans, such as with
structural adjustment programs); see Boon, supra note 48, at 526-28 (noting that
while nothing in the World Bank and IMF Charters, as agreed upon by member or
as official policies, authorizes the economic institutions to engage in lawmaking,
since the late-1990s, the World Bank and IMF have explicitly advocated legal and
judicial reform projects and have provided advice and even draft laws on banking,
taxation, finance, telecommunications, commercial law, and other fiscal matters).
The programs generally advocate liberalization, minimal government regulation,
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the borrowing country may not have been primarily to blame for the
economic distress ultimately leading to the reliance on BWis. 59
Experts have maintained that the BWis' neoliberal dictates
compounded the global financial crisis in the late-1990s 60 and
relegated poor countries to a state of financial dependency. 61
Consequently, one might conceive that the Bretton Woods institutions
would relish the opportunity to render similar counsel just a few years
later and introduce neoliberal reform on a developing country with an
enormous financial potential that could be achieved by lifting
sanctions on oil exports and tapping more oil wells to service future
debt obligations. However, instead of permitting Iraq to reach a point
of self-sufficiency, early dependency was implanted and conditions
were imposed even though it was a decade of external sanctions that
crippled Iraq's economy. In September 2004, a United Nations World
Food Program investigation discovered that 6.5 million Iraqis, or 25%
and max1m1zmg incentives for investment and clearly promote self-interested
purposes of the institutions. See id. at 529, 532; but see IBRAHIM F. I. SHIHATA, THE
WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD 82 (1991) (former World Bank General
Counsel noting that there are limits to recommendations).
59. See generally Robert Bejesky, Currency Cooperation and Sovereign
Financial Obligations, 24 FLA. J. INT'L L. 91, 104-24 (2012) [hereinafter Bejesky,
Currency Cooperation] (expressing that a country's financial and economic distress
may have been caused by or intensified by global economic conditions or odious
regimes (rather than a regime with a legitimate nexus to the populace), that the IMF
may grant loans to alleviate a crisis to prop up the currency and place conditions on
receipt of loans, and that the conditions may leave the populace with permanent
institutions even if the populace or a legitimate government did not cause the
conditions requiring the economic aid).
60. See Perez, supra note 53, at 53; Graciana del Castillo, When the Fighting
Stops: Economic Reconstruction of War-Torn Countries: The Role of the
International Financial Institutions, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 1265, 1267 (2008)
(noting that the post-Cold War reconstruction agenda has not been that successful);
see e.g. Joseph E. Stiglitz & Martin Guzman, Argentina Default? Griesafault is
Much More Accurate, GUARDIAN (Aug. 7, 2014, 11 :37 AM), available at
/argentina-default-griesafaulthttp://www.theguardian.com/business/20 l 2014/aug/07
more-accurate (last visited Nov. 21. 2015) ("For Argentina. the oath to its 2001
default started with the ballooning of its sovereign debt in the 1990s. which occurred
alongside neoliberal 'Washington Consensus' economic reforms that creditors
believed would enrich the countrv. The exoeriment failed. and the countrv suffered
a deeo economic and social crisis. with a recession that lasted from 1998 to 2002.
Bv the end. a record-high 57.5% of Argentinians were in poverty, and the
unemployment rate skyrocketed to 20.8 %.").
61. Fantu Cheru (Independent Expert), Effects of Structural Adjustment
Policies on the Full Enjoyment of Human Rights, 30, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/50
(Feb. 24, 1999) ("The countries of sub-Saharan Africa, with their poor credit rating,
have largely been turned into an IMF 'macroeconomic guinea pig' since they depend
largely on resources from the multilateral institutions.").
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of the population, "remain highly dependent on [government] food
rations," 62 but three months later, Iraq's Interim Vice President Abdel
Mahdi extemporized about IMF austerity conditions being imposed on
Iraq in exchange for loans: "We really need to work on our subsidy
side. Subsidies are taking almost 60 percent of our budget. So this is
something we have to work on." 63 The IMF agreed to loan Iraq $2.5$4.3 billion over three years providing its budgetary directives were
implemented. 64 IMF conditions were introduced to slash food
subsidies and other public benefits, as they were in other countries. 65
III. GETTING HOTTER: IMPOSING NEW ECONOMIC LAW

REFORMS
Over its fourteen month existence, the CPA adopted over thirty
new economic laws, 66 which were predominantly skeletal capitalist
frameworks installed wholesale on Iraq. For example, modem
banking laws can span hundreds of pages with provisions that promote
reliable and efficient banking institutions, punish wrongdoing, and
protect consumers (and the CPA mentioned concern over these
dangers), 67 but the CPA' s banking law scrapped the preexisting
framework and adopted a 66-page law that was quite devoted to

62. Survey Shows High Prevalence of Food Insecurity in Iraq, WORLD FOOD
PROGRAMME (Sept. 28, 2004), available at http://www.wfp.org/news/newsrelease/survey-shows-high-prevalence-food-insecurity-iraq (last visited Nov. 21,
2015).
63. Emad Mekay, Challenges 2004-2005: U.S. to Take Bigger Bite of Iraq's
Economic Pie, INTER PRESS SERVICE (Dec. 24, 2004), available at
http://www.ipsnews.net/2004/ 12/challenges-2004-2005-us-to-take-bigger-bite-ofiraqs-economic-pie/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2015) (reporting that there were hundreds
of Americans working in Iraqi government agencies and "helping the interim Iraqi
government continue to make major economic changes, including cuts to social
subsidies").
64. Id.; Mahmoud Hmoud, The Use of Force Against Iraq: Occupation and
Security Council Resolution 1483, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 435, 452 (2004) (stating
that "the vast majority oflraqis depended on O.F.F. [Oil-for-Food program]").
65. Mekay, supra note 63. Country after country has been individually
pressured into this system because of many decade-long debt crises and now Iraq
was being coerced as well. See Bejesky, Currency Cooperation, supra note 59, at
104-24.
66. Boon, supra note 48, at 544.
67. Bank Law Order No. 40 of 2003 art. 2 (Coalition Provisional Authority
[CPA], Iraq) [hereinafter Bank Law] (stating that the "primary regulatory objective
of this Law is to maintain confidence in the banking system," and that secondary
objectives are "promoting public understanding of the banking system ...
protect[ing] ... depositors, and ... reduc[ing] financial crime ... ").
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opening Iraq to foreign banking institutions with branches,
subsidiaries, and representative offices. 68
Countries have routinely insulated their banking sector from
foreign dominance during globalization initiatives, 69 but Iraq's Bank
Law contained no provisions that restricted foreign banking
investment in Iraq in terms of acquiring domestic banks or as a
percentage of the banking economy. 70 In fact, the law eliminated
existing protections and endowed foreign banks with "national
treatment" as domestic banks, 71 placing Iraqi banks, with weaker
financial positions and without powerful parent offices in foreign
countries, at a competitive disadvantage. 72 The CPA-appointed Iraqi
68. See id. art. 1-23.
69. JAMES A. CAPORASO & MARY ANNE MADEIRA, GLOBALIZATION,
INSTITUTIONS AND GOVERNANCE 158 (2012) (affirming that developing countries
have relied on protectionism in their banking industries and noting that "[l]arge
American or European banks can ... easily drive local banks out of business and
dominate the banking industry."). See generally MALCOLM COOK, BANKING
REFORM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: THE REGION 's DECISIVE DECADE (2008) (discussing
history of protectionism in banking sector in Southeast Asia); GERHARD FELS &
GEORGE SUTIJA, PROTECTIONISM AND INTERNATIONAL BANKING (1991).
70. Bank Law, supra note 67, art. 4, §§ 6-7 (CPA limiting the number of wholly
owned foreign banks to six until 2008 and permitting up to 50% foreign ownership
in "an existing or new domestic bank").
71. Id. art. 4, § 5; Financial Reconstruction in Iraq, supra note 47, at 101
(statement of John B. Taylor, Under Sec'y of the Treasury for lnt'l Affairs) (noting
that preexisting laws only permitted Arab banks to operate in Iraq).
72. See Financial Reconstruction in Iraq, supra note 71, at 101 (stating that
Iraqi banks "lack technology" and "a modern, efficient financial sector," but also
that "Iraqi authorities decided that it would be important for foreign banks to operate
in Iraq because of the experience, technology, and resources they can offer."). One
example of a competitive disadvantage is that a handful of Iraqi banks required 200
to 800 percent collateral for the amount sought to be obtained in a loan. Arlyn
Tobias Gajilan, Entrepreneurs in Iraq Tangle in U.S. Red Tape, CNN (Nov. 1,
2004 ),
available
at
http:!/money .cnn.com/magazines/fsb/fsb_ archive/2004/ 11/01 /8190934/index.htm
(last visited Nov. 21, 2015). With respect to "Iraqis" making choices for the banking
industry, Iraqi authorities at this point consisted of an Iraqi Governing Counsel with
25 members who were appointed by the CPA and who were not accepted by the
populace. See generally Governing Council oflraq Regulation No. 6 of2003 pmbl.
(CPA, Iraq); Monroe E. Price, Foreword: Iraq and the Making of State Media
Policy, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 5, 15 (2007) ("The Iraqi Governing
Council . . . [was] largely appointed or selected by the CPA, [and] lacked
legitimacy."); Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Death Starks an Experiment in Democracy,
WASH. POST (June 22, 2004), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wodvn/articles/A58888-2004Jun21.html (last visited Nov. 21. 2015) ("But Iraais
criticize the local councils and the interim national government as illegitimate
because their members were not elected."). Americans were appointed to Iraqi
government agencies, ran the agencies, and implemented economic reform. See
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agency heads possessed the authority to grant licenses to foreign banks
for an "indefinite" period of time 73 and the general policy for the
banking system was driven by the fact that the Central Bank of Iraq
was required to adhere to the transnational integration mandates
contained in Order 56. 74
On April 26, 2004, CPA Order 81 imposed legal protections
for trade-related intellectual property. 75 The policy, cited in the third
sentence of Order 81, asserts that Iraq's intellectual property laws
were deficient and that the Governing Council affirmed that
"significant change in the Iraqi intellectual property system [is]
necessary to improve the economic condition of the people of Iraq." 76
The CPA spoke on behalf of the Iraqi people even though many of
these provisions were rejected outright by developing countries when
they were introduced as WTO side agreements in 1995. 77 Iraqis were
not in a position to chum out inventions to utilize the reciprocal
monopoly rights that intellectual property protections afford, but the
law instead behooves the owners of intellectual property attached to
imports and foreign investments.
The CPA's dictates, premised on extrapolations in the
occupation's mandate, were accordant with the agenda and rhetoric of
the Bush White House. At a May 9, 2003 commencement address,
President Bush promoted the notion of a U.S.-Middle East free trade
generally Mekay, supra note 63.
73. Bank Law, supra note 67, art. 4, § 2 ("[L]icense[s] or permit[s] granted
under this Law shall be granted in writing for an indefinite period of time.").
74. See generally Central Bank Law Order No. 56 of2004 art. 2 (CPA, Iraq).
75. See generally Patent, Industrial Design, Undisclosed Information,
Integrated Circuits and Plant Variety Law Order No. 81 of2004 pmbl. (CPA, Iraq).
76. Id.
77. See generally id. § 1, 54 (providing for the gamut of IP protections,
including the "Plant Variety Law," to protect patent rights in genetically-modified
plant species); see GREG GRANDIN, EMPIRE'S WORKSHOP: LATIN AMERICA, THE
UNITED STATES, AND THE RISE OF THE NEW IMPERIALISM 160 (2006) ("'Iraqi Order
81' even prohibited Iraqi farmers from saving heirloom seeds from one year to the
next, obliging them to buy them anew each season from corporations like Monsanto
and Dow Chemical . . . "); ERIC HERRING & GLEN RANGWALA, IRAQ IN
FRAGMENTS: THE OCCUPATION AND ITS LEGACY 240 (2005) (noting that the CPA
adopted Order Number 81 that banned Iraqi farmers from saving genetically
modified seeds from year to year and the Protection of New Plant Varieties had only
48 members); Thomas A. Wathen, Trade Policy: Clouds in the Vision of
Sustainability, in BUILDlNG SUSTAINABLE SOCIETIES: A BLUEPRINT FOR A POSTINDUSTRIAL WORLD 76 (Dennis C. Pirages ed., 1996) (stating that in the case of
intellectual property protections, developing countries were wary of the protections
but were given a ten year grace period to implement rules).

Published by SURFACE, 2015

27

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 43, No. 1 [2015], Art. 1

2015] How the U.S. Occupation Imposed Economic Reforms

21

agreement and ostensibly presumed that "liberty," "freedom,"
"justice," and "democracy," were byproducts of the expansion of
capitalism. 78 One month later and concomitant with experts predicting
that Iraqi businesses would be unable to compete with the newlyappearing deluge of inexpensive imports, Bush administration
officials were declaring a need to promptly "hammer[] out a free-trade
agreement between Iraq and the United States" 79 and of sponsoring
WTO membership for Iraq. 80
The CPA scrambled to expeditiously open Iraq's economy at
the domestic level, including by waiving and disposing of preexisting
Iraqi laws designed to protect domestic industry, 81 overhauling Iraqi
corporate law and securities law, suspending major pre-invasion
economic frameworks with the addition of new market regulations, 82
78. George W. Bush, President of the U.S., Commencement Address at the
University of South Carolina (May 9, 2003) ("Across the globe, free markets and
trade have helped defeat poverty, and taught men and women the habits of
liberty . . .. [W]ith free markets and fair laws, the people of the Middle East will
grow in prosperity and freedom."); Susan L. Sakmar, Globalization and Trade
Initiatives in the Arab World: Historical Context, Progress to Date, and Prospects
for the Future, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 919, 920, 925 (2008) (noting that Bush proposed
that the United States take steps to create a Middle East Free Trade by 2013, which
would involve negotiating "comprehensive bilateral [Free Trade Agreements]" with
the US and "all countries in the region"); id. at 927 (noting that Bush further stated
that free trade would decrease poverty and make some countries less "vulnerable to
terrorist networks.").
79. Edmund L. Andrews, After the War: The Economy, N.Y. TIMES (June 1,
2003), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/01/world/after-war-economyafter-years-stagnation-iraqi-industries-are-falling-wave.html (last visited Nov. 21,
2015).
80. From the later declassified Future of Iraq Project reports, produced before
the invasion, the reports actively postulated and planned the steps needed to get Iraq
into the WTO. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FUTURE OF IRAQ PROJECT: OIL AND ENERGY
WORKING GROUP 66-70 (2003) (see section entitled Iraq: Economic Development,
the Oil Sector, and Membership of the WTO). In February 2004, Iraq attained
observer status at the WTO. Press Release, CPA, Iraq Achieves Observer Status at
the WTO (Feb. 12, 2004), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/cpairaq/pressreleases/20040212_WTO.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2015).
81. See Audi, supra note 48, at 335.
82. Amendment to the Company Law No. 21 of 1997 of2004 pmbl. (CPA, Iraq)
("[S]ome of the rules concerning company formation and investment under the prior
regime no longer serve a relevant social or economic purpose ... "). The CPA's new
securities law eliminated the Baghdad Stock Exchange, removed all previous
government oversight, created a new Iraqi Stock Exchange, and then formed a new
Interim Iraq Securities Commission with core rules. Interim Law on Securities
Markets Order No. 74 of 2004 pmbl. (CPA, Iraq) ("Recognizing that some of the
regulations concerning securities markets under the prior regime are not well-suited
to a modern, efficient, transparent and independently regulated securities
market .... ").
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and lifting Iraqi trade protections, tariffs, and customs to permit the
free flow of foreign products into Iraq. 83 The CPA reduced tariffs on
imports to 5% and the Trade Bank of Iraq was constituted with an
initial capitalization of one hundred million dollars earmarked to
stimulate exports and imports. 84 A glaring negative impact of the
breakneck capitalist reforms was a long-term increase in the
unemployment rate, 85 which would predictably gall workers.
Apparently to marginalize dissent from the working class, the
combination of occupation initiatives and early Iraqi governments
classified state workers and civil servants and denied them the right to
organize and participate in collective bargaining, 86 arrested labor
leaders, blocked strikes, and even enacted new laws that would restrict
the right of labor to organize and strike in the future. 87
83. Trade Liberalization Policy Order No. 12 of 2003 § 1 (CPA, Iraq)
(suspending all tariffs and trade restrictions).
84. Trade Bank oflraq Order No. 20 of 2003, §§ 1, 4; Jeff Madrick, Economic
Scene; The Economic Plan for Iraq Seems Long on Ideology, Short on Common
Sense,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
2,
2003),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/ 10/02/business/economic-scene-economic-plan-foriraq-seems-long-ideology-short-common-sense.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2015)
(noting the 5% tariff level and 15% corporate tax rate); see also Audi, supra note
48, at 335.
85. ANTHONY ARNOVE, IRAQ: THE LOGIC OF WITHDRAWAL 15 (2006)
(remarking that three years into the occupation, approximately half oflraqi workers
were unemployed).
86. Shiva Falsafi, Civil Society and Democracy in Japan, Iran, Iraq and
Beyond, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 357,425 (2010).
87. GRANDIN, supra note 77, at 159 (emphasizing the crackdown on organized
labor); Falsafi, supra note 86, at 425 (noting that after the CPA dissolved and in
August 2005, the Iraqi government passed Decree 8750 which permitted the seizure
of union assets, which further weakened labor movements); Matthew Harwood,
Pinkertons at the CPA, WASH. MONTHLY (Apr. 2005), available at
http ://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2005/0504 .harwood.html (last visited
Nov.21.2015) (describing the massacre ofunion officials and that "Americans have
largely left the Iraqi unions to fend for themselves, and in some cases actively
undercut them."); Rajiv Chandrasekaran, U.S. Back Off On Plans to Reform
Economy, WASH. POST (Dec. 28, 2003), available at http://articles.sunsentinel.com/2003-l2-28/news/0312270356_1_iraq-s-reconstruction-iraqis-civiloccupation (last visited Nov. 21, 2015) (stating that a 60% unemployment rate in
Iraq has infuriated labor and that Bremer's intention to sell off state-owned
enterprises further antagonized workers). In June 2005, Prime Minister lbraim Jafari
planned to shed public sector jobs according to neoliberal dictates even as
unemployment approached 50% and commentators believed that unemployment
was breeding insurgencies. Jonathan Finer & Omar Fekeiki, Tackling Another
Major Challenge in Iraq: Unemployment, WASH. POST (June 20, 2005), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/06/19/AR2005061900729 .html (last visited Nov. 21,
2015). Shrinking the size of the state to favor corporate and private ownership has
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The Bush administration appointed top Iraqi officials and crafted Iraqi
foreign economic policy, while labeling it Iraqi foreign policy, and
dispatched hundreds of American economic advisors to work in all
Iraqi government ministries. 88 U.S. advisors were making critical
economic decisions and sponsored the country's economic changes,
including by emphasizing privatization and slashing social
expenditures. 89 Imposing new rules and undermining the voice of
labor may have also truncated organized dissident to the economic
reform agenda. The treaty obligations and accords with BWis
leverage congruent domestic reform as an effective directive or cogent
obligation. The Bush administration and its CPA were quickly
"locking" Iraq into international treaties and foreign policies and
setting trajectories for domestic laws, to which Iraqis would later be
required to adhere, and this all transpired before elections were held. 90
IV. SCALDING: PROFFERING PRIVATIZATION
A. CPA Privatization Initiatives

Consistent with the general rhetorical position of the White
House, CPA Administrator Bremer' s discourse also conveyed the
significance of interaction among elements of reform, which included
emphasizing the importance of democratization, market prices,
foreign investment, efficient allocation of resources in the economy,
and ensuring strong property rights. 91 On July 8, 2003, Bremer
remarked:
long been promoted by the IMF and may benefit those who acquire privatized assets.
88. Mekay, supra note 63.
89. Id.
90. Despite much Bush administration rhetoric about quickly allowing selfrule, that was not the case. The Bush administration brought in its own government
and the result of this razzle-dazzle babble of "transition" authorities merely affirms
that institutional and legal choices were not the product of democratic choices. See
generally Robert Bejesky, The Enigmatic Origin of the CPA: An Attribute of the
Unitary Executive, 51 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 269, 279-291 (2015). The Bush
administration was entrenching pre-selected loyalists into power for long-term
allegiance to the occupation and locking in the rules.
See generally CPA Official Documents, CPA, available at
91.
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/#Orders (last visited Nov. 21. 2015) (list of
orders specifies the focus). For an example of assuming that the CPA possessed all
of the answers for Iraqi prosperity when political choices of the people should have
governed see Paul Bremer, Operation Iraqi Prosperity, WALL ST. J. (June 20, 2003,
12:01 AM), available at http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB105606663932885100
(last visited Nov. 21, 2015) {"The central lesson from past transitions is that the
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Privatization is obviously something we have been giving a lot of
thought to. When we sit down with the governing council. .. it is going
to be on the table. The governing council will be able to make
statements that could be seen as more binding and the trick will be to
figure out how we do this. Everybody knows we cannot wait until there
is an elected government to start economic reform. 92

The CPA's appointed members of the temporary Iraqi
governing bodies were powerless 93 and it is not true that "everybody
private sector must be encouraged to rapidly allocate resources to their most
productive uses. In other transition economies, the switch from value-destroying
public enterprises to value-creating private ones has been accomplished by
stimulating the growth of small and medium-sized private enterprises, which are best
able to create jobs quickly. This encouragement takes place by reducing the
subsidies to state-owned firms and establishing a clear and transparent commercial
code (as well as honest judges to enforce it). More generally, a well-established
system of property rights must be established in order for the economy to grow....
Opening Iraq to the rest of the world also promises to pay big dividends.").
92. Looney, supra note 38, at 574.
93. Bremer endowed himself with a veto power over all IGC decisions and
appointments. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Post-Conflict Justice in Iraq: An Appraisal
of the Iraq Special Tribunal, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 327, 352-53 (2005); Gregory
H. Fox, The Occupation of Iraq, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 195, 206 (2005); Kristen A.
Stilt, Islamic Law and the Making and Remaking of the Iraqi Legal System, 36 GEO.
WASH. INT'L L. REV. 695,695 (2004); Associated Press, Bremer Suggests US May
Block Islamic Law in Iraq, USA TODAY (Feb. 17, 2004, 3:22 AM), available at
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2004-02-l 6-islam-law_ x.htm
(last visited Nov. 21, 2015) (reporting that amid speculations that the IGC could act
independently and exercise legislative authority, Bremer remarked that "it can't be
law until I sign it."); Feisal Amin al-Istrabadi, Reviving Constitutionalism in Iraq:
Key Provisions of the Transitional Administrative Law, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 269,
270 (2005) (Iraqi Ambassador to the UN accentuating that "nothing became law in
Iraq unless it was signed by ... Bremmer. ... It was the Civil Administrator, not the
IGC, who had the power to legislate.") (citing S.C. Res. 1483 (May 22, 2003));
SIGIR, IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS fN HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 11
(Jan. 2006) ("[The] CPA was the de facto government of Iraq that oversaw the
reestablishment of Iraqi ministries, consulted with an advisory 'legislature,'
promulgated laws and regulations, provided diplomatic links with foreign
governments, and coordinated with the coalition's military leadership."). The
CPA's authority over local Iraqi interests was recognized in Security Council
Resolutions, but the resolution did not permit unilaterally dictating Iraqi political
choices and laws. S.C. Res. 1483, pmbl. (May 22, 2003) (U.S. and U.K. were
represented as "the Authority"). Also, the General Accounting Office noted that the
"CPA assigned U.S. advisors from various agencies, including the Department of
State and the Department of Defense, to work directly with the Iraqi interim minister
appointed by the Governing Council. According to a former senior advisor, the
advisor had broad managerial authority, including the authority to hire and fire
ministry employees, determine ministry budgets, change ministry structures and
functions and make policy decisions." U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF. (GAO),
GA0-04-902R, REBUILDfNG IRAQ: RESOURCE, SECURITY, GOVERNANCE,
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knows" that unilaterally imposing economic agendas, locking in rules
that could foster economic and political distress, and shaping the
dynamics of new property rights were required before the Iraqi people
could choose legal institutions and socioeconomic change for
themselves. 94 Nonetheless, the CPA did wrongfully dictate 95 an open
capitalist economic system on Iraqis 96 and decrees were not only
inconsistent with Iraqi tradition, culture, and morals, 97 but also
originated from an even more coercive process than the milieu of
pressures that dominant states had placed on other states to quickly
adopt laissez faire practices and which periodically erupted into
societal dissent throughout the developing world. 98 The CPA
dramatized the existence of failings in bedrock Iraqi institutions as the
basis for contending that institutional transformations were imperative
to countenance a market economy, but in fact the first and foremost
infrastructure necessary for a market economy is effective contract
and property rights institutions, which were contained in the Iraqi
Civil Code, but the CPA did not modify the Civil Code. 99 The Iraqi
ESSENTIAL SERVICES, AND OVERSIGHT ISSUES 75 (2004).
94. Ash U. Bali, Justice Under Occupation: Rule of Law and the Ethics of
Nation-Building in Iraq, 30 YALE J. INT' L L. 431, 443 (2005); David Harvey,
Political and Economic Dimensions of Free Trade: Neobalism as Creative
Destruction, 610 ANNALS 22, 25 (2007) (reporting that an Iraqi member of the CPA
protested the forced imposition of "free market fundamentalism" as "a flawed logic
that ignores history").
95. James Gallen, Jus Post Bel/um: An Interpretive Framework, in Jus POST
BELLUM: MAPPING THE NORMATIVE FOUNDATION 58, 62 (Carsten Stahn, Jennifer
S. Easterday & Jens Iverson eds., 2014) (stating that occupation law was "designed
to be palliative, such that major issues or redistribution of land or legal rights would
take place in a peace agreement that would end the occupation and regularize the
situation").
96. Harvey, supra note 94, at 25-26; ANDREW J. BACEVICH, AMERICAN
EMPIRE: THE REALITIES AND CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. DIPLOMACY 88 (2002) (stating
generally that American capital "movement of goods, capital, people, and ideas"
create an "integrated international order conducive to American interests, governed
by American norms, regulated by American power, and, above all, satisfying the
expectations of the American people for ever-greater abundance."); Naomi Klein,
Baghdad Year Zero: Pillaging Iraq in Pursuit of a Neocon Utopia, HARPER'S (Sept.
2004) (noting that the CPA policies were ideologically neoconservative).
97. See Haider Ala Hamoudi, Money Laundering Amidst Mortars: Legislative
Process and State Authority in Post-Invasion Iraq, 16 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 523, 543 (2007) (explaining that Iraq and other Islamic countries have had
traditional and cultural traits that have regarded usury practices and exploitive
capitalism akin to thievery).
98. See generally OSWALDO DE RIVERO, THE MYTH OF DEVELOPMENT: THE
NON-VIABLE ECONOMICS OF THE 21st CENTURY (2001).
99. See Dan E. Stigall, Comparative Law and State-Building: The "Organic
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Civil Code fully comported with Western notions of property
ownership and an owner's absolute right to dispose, use, and exploit
property. 100 The CPA was more concerned with adopting new bodies
of law that would structure unconstrained capitalism, oblige foreign
investment, and urge for privatization of public assets.
Accordant with the archetypical advice rendered by BWis, in
June 2003, Bremer began announcing that Iraq possessed bloated,
inefficient, and unsustainable state enterprises as a justification for
privatization. 101 On September 19, 2003, Bremer promulgated four
orders that included "the full privatization of public enterprises, full
ownership rights by foreign firms of Iraqi businesses, full repatriation
of foreign profits ... the opening of Iraq's banks to foreign control,
national treatment for foreign companies and . . . the elimination of
nearly all trade barriers." 102 However, it is not clear that the appointed
and impotent members of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) ever
officially ratified any of the CPA's open market reforms. 103 The IGC
later expressed that members unanimously rejected the CPA' s

Minimalist" Approach to Legal Reconstruction, 29 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 1, n.231 (2007).
100. Civil Code of 1990 art. 1048-49 (Iraq); see also Dan E. Stigall, A Closer
Look at Iraqi Property and Tort Law, 68 LA. L. REV. 765, 772-73, 788 (2008).
During the 1980s, Iraq followed liberalization and privatization simultaneously,
which included the government privatizing agricultural land that reduced holdings
from 50% public ownership during the mid-1980s to only 12% by 1989, and Iraq
privatized seventy large construction, mineral extraction, and food processing
factories. Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, Economic Liberalization and the Lineage of the
Rentier State, 27 COMP. POL. 1, 8 (1994).
101. Looney, supra note 38, at 574.
A fundamental component of this process will be to force state-owned enterprises to
face hard budget constraints by reducing subsides and special deals . .. Iraq will no
doubt find that opening its borders to trade and investment will increase competitive
pressure on its domestic firms and thereby raise productivity.

Id. (citing Edmund Andrews, Overseer in Iraq Vows to Sell-OjJGovernment-Owned
Companies, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2003, at A13).
102. Harvey, supra note 94, at 25; see also Zahawi, supra note 7, at 2328.
103. Audi, supra note 48, at 355 (noting that Kamel Al-Gailani, the CPAappointed Iraqi Minister of Finance, publicly reiterated the series of changes that
would be made to Iraq's foreign investment laws).
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privatization program, 104 but the CPA pushed forward with the
privatization agenda. 105
Two months later, Bush appointed Thomas Foley, his 2000
election campaign chairman and a Harvard Business School
colleague, 106 for the mission of privatizing over two hundred stateowned industries, including chemical, mmmg, and cement
companies. 107 Assets owned by the state, on behalf of the people,
would be relinquished through a large-scale privatization process, 108
but the program was placed on hold. 109 Instead, on May 1, 2004, CPA
Order 76 was adopted and stated that State Owned Enterprises
("SOEs") would be transferred to Iraqi ministries and that the
enterprises "shall no longer have a separate legal identity and shall
cease to exist" after the transfer. 110 SOEs were placed under the
control of Ministry heads who were CPA appointees and who
possessed the authority to control the ministries and the budgets, set
policy, hire and fire ministry employees, 111 and ultimately, pursuant
to Order 76, to consolidate, merge, or sell SOEs. 112 Years later, but
still while under the U.S. military occupation, Maliki's dictatorial
104. Klein, supra note 96. Bremer met with Iraqi Communications Minister
Haider al-Abadi and Minister of Industry Mohamad Tafiq and al-Abadi recalls of
this meeting: "I said, 'Look, we don't have the mandate to do any of this.
Privatization is a big thing. We have to wait until there is an Iraqi government." Id.
Tafiq stated even more directly: "I am not going to do something that is not legal,
so that's it." Id.
105. Bali, supra note 94, at 442-43.
106. Thomas B. Edsall & Juliet Eilperin, Lobbyists Set Sights on MoneyMaking Opportunities in Iraq, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 2003, at A21.
107. Id.
108. See ZACHARY SHORE, BLUNDER: WHY SMART PEOPLE MAKE BAD
DECISIONS 206 (2008) (discussing comments by Foley allegedly stating that he did
not care about international law restrictions but he instead promised the President
that he intended to privatize all of Iraq's SOEs within 30 days); GRANDIN, supra
note 77, at 159; Klein, supra note 96.
109. Paul Krugman, Who Lost Iraq?, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2004), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/29/opinion/who-lost-iraq.html (last visited Nov.
22, 2015).
110. Consolidations of State-Owned Enterprises Order No. 76 of 2004 § 4
(CPA, Iraq).
111. GAO, supra note 93, at 75("[The] CPA assigned U.S. advisors from
various agencies, including the Department of State and the Department of Defense,
to work directly with the Iraqi interim minister appointed by the Governing Council.
According to a former senior advisor, the advisors had broad managerial authority,
including the authority to hire and fire ministry employees, determine ministry
budgets, change ministry structures and functions and make policy decisions.
112. Consolidations of State-Owned Enterprises, supra note 110, § 4.
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government 113 announced plans to privatize over two hundred SOEs
over the next three to four years. 114 The institutional framework to
promote privatization and to maintain the CPA' s legal reforms had
been set before the CPA dissolved.
Antonia Juhasz succinctly described what unfolded and how
the new laws were adopted and enforced before there was an elected
government to approve of the laws. 115 The CPA referred to directives
as a single codified source of foundational law, referred to as
"Transitional Administrative Law" ("TAL"), 116 which had a
potentially permanent effect because of the inordinate procedures
required of a future Iraqi government to scrap the TAL:
Laws governing banking, investment, patents, copyrights, business
ownership, taxes, the media and trade have all been changed according
to U.S. goals, with little real participation from the Iraqi people .... The
TAL [laws] can be changed, but only with a two-thirds majority vote in
the National Assembly, and with the approval of the prime minister, the
president and both vice presidents. . . . The constitutional drafting
committee has, in tum, left each of these laws in place. 117

113. Al-Ali, supra note 30 (expressing that Maliki has alienated both Kurds and
Sunnis, been corrupt, deemed himself the "preeminent military leader," dispatched
security services to suppress peaceful protests by calling protestors "terrorists," hired
thugs to beat and kill dissenters, and had security services arrest and torture
dissenters until protests ended); Damon & Tawfeeq, supra note 30 (stating that Iraqi
Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlag expressed to CNN that he was "shocked" to
witness President Barack Obama address Maliki as "the elected leader of a
sovereign, self-reliant and democratic Iraq," when Maliki had been ignoring powersharing institutions and when the US left Iraq "with a dictator" who systematically
suppresses dissent with impunity).
114. Charlie Welsh & PK Semler, Iraq Government to Restructure and
Privatize Some 200 Industrial Companies, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2010, 8: 15 AM),
available
at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/d0b9b9fe-dlel-1 ldf-965c00144feabdc0.html#axzz3CwbtUjaZ (last visited Nov. 22, 2015).
115. See generally Antonia Juhasz, Bush's Economic Invasion of Iraq, L.A.
TIMES
(Aug.
14,
2005),
available
at
http://articles.latimes.com/2005/aug/l4/opinion/oe-juhasz14 (last visited Nov. 22,
2015).
116. Zahawi, supra note 7, at 2329-30 (noting that the TAL was even to be
regarded as Iraq's interim constitution, suggesting that it should take precedence
over all other law); Note, Democracy in Iraq: Representation Through Ratification,
199 HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1203 (2006).
117. Juhasz, supra note 115. Yet, at the time TAL proposals were launched, it
was only intended to remain in effect until an elected government took office
(nation-wide elections were scheduled for January 31, 2005).
Law of
Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period of Mar. 8, 2004 art.
2 (CPA, Iraq). Then, in the same law, it states that the laws would "remain in force
until rescinded or amended by legislation duly enacted and having the force oflaw."
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The CPA codifications were also validated by the CPA' s final
order (Order 100), which replaced "the names of new Iraqi institutions
and officials for those of the CPA" in order to "protect the [CPA]
The CPA included language to
reforms into the future." 118
mendaciously designate that the reforms were the product of Iraqi
government institutions. 119 Lawyers and foreign officials warned that
Security Council Resolution 1483 only authorized the occupation to
"administrate," that the Hague Regulations of 1907 prevented the
occupation from altering the laws of the occupied country, and that the
reforms could be annulled. 120 Not one word in Resolution 1483
See id. art. 26( c ). Theories that have permitted overruling foreign occupation
dictates in the past have included asserting that the laws were not consistent with
international law (i.e. the doctrine of postliminy) or that the occupier exceeded its
See generally ERNEST H. FEILCHENFELD, THE INTERNATIONAL
authority.
ECONOMIC LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATIONS 145-50 (1942); ROLAND R.
FOULKE, 2 A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LA w 289-90 ( 1920). This could have
been a justification vis-a-vis foreign interests and might have reversed illegally
attained property rights, but new codifications can change the law.
118. Zahawi, supra note 7, at 2332 (citing Gregory H. Fox, The Occupation of
Iraq, G36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 195, 245 (2005)).
119. Bali, supra note 94, at 435 (noting that the CPA's occupation strategy is a
"use of local proxies [the IGC and then the Interim Government] to attenuate its
direct administration of Iraq by force."); see also Bartram S. Brown, Intervention,
Self-Determination, Democracy and the Residual Responsibilities of the Occupying
Power in Iraq, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 23, 43-44 (2004). To assume that
Iraqis favored and chose institutions without knowing anything about them or that
the impotent CPA interim authority appointees could somehow legitimately assent
on behalf of Iraqis is foolish. Nonetheless, the rules were bestowed with a robust
effect as T AL.
120. Gathii, supra note 36, at 736 ("It is scarcely arguable that the powers
exercised by the CPA in signing privatization contracts lacked legitimacy among a
broad range oflraqis and potentially may be subject to reversal by a post-occupation
Iraqi regime ... "); Audi, supra note 48, at 336, 353 (stating that major economic
reforms imposed by the CPA could be deemed invalid under international law and
could be subject to reversal); Klein, supra note 96 (remarking that a future Iraqi
government could declare Bremer's orders illegal and foreign companies could have
investments nullified). Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War
on Land and its annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, arts 3, 43, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter Hague
Regulations] (stating that the occupier must "respect[], unless absolutely prevented,
the laws in force in the country" and that breaches make the occupier "liable to pay
compensation."); see Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 47-54, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (stating the importance to disseminating the Conventions rules
and that those in breach are to be penalized). See generally Bali, supra note 94, at
439-40, 466-67. States and the Security Council required the US and UK to adhere
to Geneva and Hague law. S.C. Res. 1472, 1 (Mar. 28, 2003); S.C. Res. 1483,
5; U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4726th mtg. , U.N. Doc. S/PV.4726
supra note 93,
(Mar. 26, 2003); U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4732d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.4732 (Mar.
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referred to sanctioning the occupying "Authority" or any faction of the
occupation to engage in any semblance of "legislating." 121 In the
seven times that the Security Council Resolution refers to
"institutions" and law-making initiatives
the language is
circumscribed by affirmations that the Iraqi people will determine
their "own political future" and that all U .N. members, U .N. organs,
and "the Authority," which was the U.S. and U.K., were sanctioned to
assist Iraqis in establishing their own institutions. 122
With respect to the CPA's attempted privatization agenda, it is
true that colonial powers confiscated property and governed over
foreign lands due to the ability to subjugate in conquest, 123 but
intemational laws 124 and U.S. Supreme Court precedent have rebuked
this norm. 125 Restrictions prohibit the occupier from appropriating
28, 2003).
121. See S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 93,, 5.
122. See id.,, 1, 4, 5, 7, 8(c), 8(i), 9.
123. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 587, 590-95 (1823) (holding that
conquest and discovery legitimated title over lands previously inhabited by Native
Americans and because they lived in "tribes," incapable of governing themselves,
and attained "subsistence ... chiefly from the forest"); see Bejesky, Currency
Cooperation, supra note 59, at 143-44; James Thuo Gathii, Foreign and Other
Economic Rights Upon Conquest and Under Occupation: Iraq in Comparative and
Historical Context, 25 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 491, 496-97 (2004) ("[T]he
extinction of private property rights and contracts upon conquest is ... a systemic
expression of the hegemonic power of conquering states that goes back decades in
the history of international law.").
124. See Hague Regulations, supra note 120, art. 46. ("Private property cannot
be confiscated"); Bejesky, Currency Cooperation, supra note 59, at 138, 149, 155
(noting that decolonization has particularly served as a basis for upholding the right
of sovereign self-determination).
125. Early US Supreme Court cases emphasized the right of locals to expel a
foreign aggressor and confiscate the aggressor's property. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S.
199, 226 ( 1796) (holding that in expelling the British from American borders,
"enemies, by every right, may be plundered, and seized upon" and that "whatever
effects of the enemy are found with us who are his enemy, should change their
master, and be confiscated, or go into the treasury"); see Miller v. United States, 78
U.S. 268, 304-05 (1870) (upholding the power of confiscation as a legal sovereign
act pursuant to Congress's authority to declare and prosecute war); see also Haycraft
v. United States, 89 U.S. 81, 94 (1874); United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51, 51
(1833) ("Even in cases of conquest, it is very unusual for the conqueror to do more
than to displace the sovereign and assume dominion over the country. The modern
usage of nations, which has become law, would be violated; that sense of justice and
of right, which is acknowledged and felt by the whole civilized world, would be
outraged; if private property should be generally confiscated, and private rights
annulled."). Legislation upholding confiscation was also enacted during the Civil
War as both the Confederate government and Congress passed retaliatory legislation
permitting confiscation of enemy property. James G. Randall, Captured and
Abandoned Property During the Civil War, 19 AM. HIST. REV. 65, 65 (1913).
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private property and public assets of the occupied population. The
Hague Regulations state that an occupying power can "take
possession" of assets temporarily but cannot sell or transfer ownership
of the property. 126 Article 55 explicitly addresses public property
rights when it affirms that the occupying power "shall be regarded as
an administrator and usufructuary" of public assets and that the
occupier must "safeguard the capital of these properties, and
administer them in accordance with the rules of usufruct." 127 Article
53 of the Geneva Convention states that "[a]ny destruction by the
Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging individually
or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public
authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations, is
prohibited ... " 128 With the explicit language incorporated into these
Another example is the seizure of foreign vessels on the high seas when ships were
suspected of piracy or involvement in supporting an enemy. Act of June 24, 1795,
1 Stat. 572 (authorizing the defense of U.S. merchant vessels against French
depredations)
126. Hague Regulations, supra note 120, art. 53, 55; see Eyal Benvenisti &
Eyal Zamir, Private Claims to Property Rights in the Future Israeli-Palestinian
Settlement, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 295,313 (1995).
127. Hague Relations, supra note 120, art. 55 (emphasis added) (listing public
assets that include "public buildings, real estate, forests and agricultural estates
belonging to the hostile State, and situated in the occupied country."); see also
Kristen Boon, Legislative Reform in Post-conflict Zones: Jus Post Bel/um and the
Contemporary Occupant's Law-Making Powers, 50 McGILL L.J. 285, 304-05
(2005); R. Dobie Langenkamp & Rex J. Zedalis, What Happens to the Iraqi Oil?:

Thoughts on Some Significant, Unexamined International Legal Questions
Regarding Occupation of Oil Fields, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 417, 432-33 (2003)
(suggesting that an occupying power might appoint a private firm to temporarily
manage public property or state-owned industry if the occupier does not have a selfenrichment intention and the appointment is in good faith and is economically
sound).
128. Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War art. 53, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth
Geneva Convention]. During the 1949 diplomatic conference, which led to the
adoption of the Fourth Geneva Convention, the US, UK, and Canada had no qualms
with protecting private property from pillage but claimed that there was no basis for
protecting public property owned by a defeated state and even maintained that
victorious armies should be able to take government property to pay off debts. Lea
Brilmayer & Geoffrey Chepiga, Ownership or Use? Civilian Property Interests in
International Humanitarian Law, 49 HARV. INT'L L.J. 413, 425-26 (2008).
Alternatively, the Soviet Union and China contended that "the destruction of [State]
property affected not only the interests of the State but also those of individuals"
since civilians relied on state-owned property for sustenance; the socialist
governments contended that all tvoes of orooertv should be orotected during
warfare. Id. at 425-26 (citing 2A Final Record of the Diolomatic Conference
Convened bv the Swiss Federal Council for the Establishment of International
Conventions for the Protection of War Victims and Held at Geneva from April 21st
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prohibitions, the CPA's blatant hypocrisy, after devising a program
and attempting to sell off SOEs, is encountered in Article 16 of the
CPA's TAL, which states: "Public property is sacrosanct, and its
protection is the duty of every citizen." 129
B. Foreign Investment

Historical occupations with exploitive intentions have been
condemned, 130 but even if the occupier does not possess a profiteering
motive, codification of new investment rules can transfer domestic
resources to foreign interests 131 and produce domestic economic
winners and losers. 132 Beneficiaries are apt to soundly support
reforms and the foreign entities ostensibly correlated to that fortuity, 133
while the disenfranchised will be hostile to the reforms, feel politically
ostracized, 134 and be distinctly unwilling to assent to a foreign power
unilaterally dictating new laws.
to August 12th, 1949, at 649 (2004)).
129. Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period,
supra note 117, art. 16. The CPA did take Ba' ath party assets and recognized public
assets on behalf of the people of Iraq. Management of Property and Assets of the
Iraqi Baath Party Order No. 4 of 2003 § 3(1)-(3) (CPA, Iraq) (dictating that all
property and assets of the Baath Party were to be seized and transferred to the CPA
"for the benefit of the people of Iraq"). Given the circumstance, this order was
probably not controversial.
130. Ralph Wilde, From Trusteeship to Self-Determination and Back Again:
The Role of the Hague Regulations in the Evolution of International Trusteeship,
and the Framework of Rights and Duties of Occupying Powers, 31 LOY. L.A. INT' L
& COMP. L. REV. 85, 97 (2009).
131. M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 89 (3d ed. 2010).
132. Judith S. Kullberg & William Zimmerman, Liberal Elites, Socialist
Masses, and Problems of Russian Democracy, 51 WORLD POL. 323, 324 (1999)
(writing of polls several years into the Russian reforms and noting that elites liked
the system because "[ s]upport for liberalism is causally related to the ability of
individuals to participate in the new economic order: those who are 'locked out' of
the new economy and are constrained by circumstances and context from improving
their conditions will be more likely to express antiliberal values and attitudes," but
only a small segment of the Russian population dramatically benefited with the fall
of the socialist economy, but a majority of the Russian population has been harmed).
133. A percentage of the domestic polity will support capitalist reforms and
multinational corporations, particularly those segments that perceive that they will
be better off as a result of open market laws or those sectors that assimilate an
ideology of favoring the foreign authority or its new economic laws. However, the
level of popular support at the time new laws were adopted was likely weak.
134. See Duncan Kennedy, Shock and Awe Meets Market Shock, BOSTON REV.
(Oct. 1, 2003), available at http://www.bostonreview.net/world/duncan-kennedyshock-and-awe-meets-market-shock (last visited Nov. 21, 2015) (listing the
capitalist reforms applied to Iraq and noting that "[ e ]conomic development is a
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Unlike Iraq, countries possessing actual sovereignty, selfdetermination, and a voiced citizenry have adopted assorted
investment vehicles to protect domestic interests 135 and have chosen
gradualist approaches to liberalization and foreign investment, but the
CPA passed Order 39, a six-page law, that "replace[d] all existing
foreign investment law" and opened up "all economic sectors in Iraq,
except ... natural resources" to complete foreign ownership. 136 Order
39 endowed investors with the right to take a 100% ownership interest
in Iraqi enterprises or sectors, required no obligation to partner with or
structure joint ventures with Iraqi businesses, 137 and bestowed a rare
privilege of plenary "national treatment" so that foreign investors
could not be subject to discrimination and would, by law, be treated as
domestic businesses. 138 Despite the fact that it was a CPA directive,
section 2 provides: "This Order promotes and safeguards the general
welfare and interest of the Iraqi people by promoting foreign
investment through the protection of the rights and property of foreign
investors in Iraq and the regulation through transparent processes of
matters relating to foreign investment in Iraq." 139
The CPA' s omnipotence was again on display with CPA Order
39's categorical certification that the CPA knew Iraqi desires, despite
the fact that Iraqis did not select the initiatives or the appropriate role
for foreign investment. In fact, local Iraqi businessmen began
expressing shortly after the invasion that they were excluded from the
political process and that they would be unable to compete with
foreign businesses that moved to Iraq, 140 but the Bush administration
dynamic process in which small initial disadvantages often translate into massive
permanent inequalities").
135. See generally SORNARAJAH, supra note 131, at 97-99. The three main
vehicles for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) are Greenfield investments, mergers
and acquisitions, and joint ventures, and the details of ownership and applicability
of taxation, licensing requirements, and other applicable regulations are determined
by local laws and relations with local government officials.
136. Foreign Investment Law Order No. 39 of2003 §§ 3, 6 (CPA, Iraq); Bali,
supra note 94, at 442; Audi, supra note 48, at 346-47.
137. See Foreign Investment Law, supra note 136, § 7.
138. Id. § 4 (stating that foreign businesses were "entitled to make foreign
investments in Iraq on terms no less favorable than those applicable to an Iraqi
investor"); Bali, supra note 94, at 442 (noting that very few countries permit absolute
national treatment for foreign business entities).
139. Foreign Investment Law, supra note 136, § 2.
140. See Falsafi, supra note 86, at 425 (stating that labor unions suffered in Iraq
because the occupation and the new Iraqi government used violence to suppress
labor leaders, which is indicative of"the Bush Administration's disdain for workers'
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pushed for an intense implementation of Order 39 by declaring that
Iraq was "Open for Business" 141 and by initiating programs inside the
U.S. that urged American corporations to invest in operations in
Iraq. 142 Political patrons of the Bush administration were reportedly
directly involved in their own rent seeking activities in Iraq following
None of this was serendipitous; the Bush
the invasion. 143
administration specifically planned for and sponsored such reforms
with the two thousand page White House Future of Iraq Project,
which was led by select Iraqi defectors and U.S. government officials
who were impaneled for the operations in early 2002, over a year
before the invasion. 144
rights, as demonstrated by its aggressive support for oppressive labor laws," and the
weak status of labor unions at the time of the invasion); see also Timothy Mills,
Panel Response, Panel 3: The Development ofa Market Democracy, 33 GA. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 195, 196 (2004) (remarking about the author's thirteen trips to Baghdad
and meeting with Iraqi businessmen, political leaders, and former government
officials, and explaining that stakeholders complained that they were excluded from
the political process); Jeff Madrick, An Extreme Plan for Iraq, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2,
2003 ), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/ 10/02/business/02SCEN .html
(last visited Nov. 22, 2015) (stating that the CPA reforms "immediately make Iraq's
economy one of the most open to trade and capital flows in the world, and put it
among the lowest taxed in the world, rich or poor"). Moreover, the adverse
consequences of a rapid and deep foreign investment policy could include a higher
unemployment rate and a difficulty in competing with cash-endowed and
experienced multinationals.
141. Boon, supra note 48, at 533.
142. See generally IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION TASK FORCE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE, DOING BUSINESS IN IRAQ: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2003);
GRANDIN, supra note 77, at 261 n.2, (citing Naomi Klein, Risky Business, NATION,
Jan. 5, 2004) (reporting that the Bush administration offered sub-market price
corporate insurance to American companies through the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation to further reduce the risk of launching business operations
in Iraq).
143. Douglas Jehl, Washington Insiders' New Firm Consults on Contracts in
Iraq,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
30,
2003),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/30/politics/30LOBB.html (last visited Nov. 22,
2015) (stating that a group of businessmen, lobbyists, and former assistants to Bush
and his father established New Bridge Strategies, a firm that boasts of"being created
specifically with the aim of assisting clients to evaluate and take advantage of
business opportunities in the Middle East following the conclusion of the U.S.-led
war in Iraq"). The founder, Joe Allbaugh, former Bush-Cheney campaign manager,
remarked: "Getting the rights to distribute Proctor & Gamble products can be a gold
mine ... One well-stocked 7-Eleven could knock out thirty Iraqi stores; a Wal-Mart
could take over the country." Klein, supra note 96.
144. Farrah Hassan, New State Department Releases on the "Future of Iraq"
NAT'L
SEC.
ARCHIVE
(Sept.
1,
2006),
available
at
Project,
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB 198/index.htm (last visited
Nov. 22, 2015); see also Erick Schmitt & Joel Brinkley, The Struggle for Iraq:
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CPA Administrator Bremer announced that foreign firms
doing business in Iraq would receive 15% to 45% tax breaks 145 and
the CPA dropped the top Iraqi corporate tax bracket to 15%, when the
pre-invasion rate was 40%. 146 Without restrictions on foreign
investment or business operations, U.S. corporations had a pecuniary
motive to shift certain operations to Iraq and lower the U.S. tax bill. 147
The Wall Street Journal explained that new laws, with virtually no
restriction on foreign investment or movement of capital, made Iraq's
economy "one of the most open to trade and capital flows in the world,
and put it among the lowest taxed in the world, rich or poor." 148
Professor Greg Grandin explained the impact of resource shifting:
"[T]he US occupation has imposed on Iraq a massive [U.S.]
intervention on behalf of multinationals, insured by US taxpayers and
subsidized by the US defense budget." 149
Many foreign corporations reaped staggering profits, 150
particularly entities associated with the U.S. military-industrial

Planning; State Dept. Foresaw Trouble Now Plaguing Iraq, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19,
2003), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/19/world/struggle-for-iraqplanning-state-dept-study-foresaw-troub le-now-p laguing-iraq .html (last visited
Nov. 22, 2015) (stating that the 13 volumes and over 2,000 pages of the Future of
Iraq Project was not released until "several House and Senate committees" had
requested them).
145. Klein, supra note 57, at 340.
146. Tax Strategy Law Order No. 49 of 2004 explanatory note (CPA, Iraq); see
also Tax Strategy Law Order No. 37 of2003 § 4 (CPA, Iraq); ARNOVE, supra note
85, at 17.
147. For example, existing business operations could be commingled (as
opposed to new operations that may not have been undertaken "but for" Iraq's new
laws) and this opportunity could impact the income statement of US companies or
reduce the U.S. tax bill if profits were retained in offshore accounts. See Joshua
Smith & Thomas L. Hungerford, Cutting Tax Rates Not the Answer: Opposing View,
USA
TODAY
(May
1,
2014,
8:20
PM),
available
at
http://www. usatoda y. com/story/opinion/2014/05/01 /pfizer-corporate-taxeconomic-policy-institute-editorials-debates/8583 713/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2015).
See
also,
Corporate
Tax
Rates
Table,
KPMG,
available
at
https ://home.kpmg. com/xx/en/home/ services/tax/tax-too ls-and-resources/tax -ratesonline/corporate-tax-rates-tab le.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2015).
148. Madrick, supra note 84; see also Kennedy, supra note 134 (noting the
Washington Consensus prescriptions on Iraq and the interest in foreign investment
if MN Cs expect highly profitable returns and an ability to remove profits from the
country).
149. GRANDIN, supra note 77, at 159-60.
150. Bali, supra note 94, at 443.
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complex, 151 and there was no constraint on repatriation of profits. 152
The system of corporate benefit was called "war profiteering," 153 but
apparently from the perspective of the Bush administration, negative
reverberations were regarded as inconsequential or legitimate
consequences of the CPA' s economic ultimatums. Professor Gathii
remarks:
In seeking to remake Iraq into the most idealistic type of free market
economy, the United States has placed the interests of its leading
multinational corporations at the forefront in transforming public and
private wealth into engines of new profit for the United States. Thus,
the apparently enlightened occupier mission of ending a dictatorial
regime by replacing it with idealistic visions of free markets and liberal
democracy may be nothing more than an excuse to legitimate new
forms of oppression in Iraq. 154

Order 39 and the CPA's attempted privatization agenda were
overwhelming rejected by Iraqis, including by members of the IGC at
the time of adoption, 155 and Order 39 could have been perceived as a
violation of international law because the Hague Regulations mandate
occupying powers to protect, safeguard, and administer the occupied
territory in accordance with the rules of usufruct. 156 Nonetheless, the
151. CONRAD MOLDEN, WHAT WERE THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE IRAQ WAR
CONTRACTS?: FROM EISENHOWER'S WARNINGS TO HALLIBURTON'S PROFITS 11-12
(2012).
152. Foreign Investment Law, supra note 136, art. 7(2)(d) (investors can
"transfer abroad without delay all funds associated with its foreign investment,"
including profits and sale of the foreign investment); GRANDIN, supra note 77, at
159 ( stating that foreign corporations were given the right to "unlimited repatriation
of profits"); Adam Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws
of War and Human Rights, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 580, 615 (2006) (stating that Order
No. 39 did not require reinvesting profits into the country).
153. See Kevin J. Wilkinson, More Effective Procurement Response to
Disasters: Maximizing the Extraordinary Flexibilities ofIDIQ Contracting, 59 A.F.
L. REV. 231,240 (2007).
154. Gathii, supra note 123, at 512-13.
155. See id. at 736; see also Audi, supra note 48, at 355; Chip Cummins, StateRun Oil Company Is Being Weighed for Iraq, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 7, 2004, 11 :37 PM),
available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB107343427082371300 (last visited
Nov. 22, 2015) (stating that there are "political sensitivities about foreign
interference in the oil sector" and that the intentions of Iraq's leaders have inflamed
many inside Iraq).
156. Hague Regulations, supra note 120, art. 55; Naomi Klein, Bring
Halliburton
Home,
NATION
(Nov.
6,
2003),
available
at
http://www.thenation.com/article/bring-halliburton-home (last visited Nov. 22,
2015) (stating that Bremer's reforms were illegal with the Security Council

Published by SURFACE, 2015

43

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 43, No. 1 [2015], Art. 1

2015] How the U.S. Occupation Imposed Economic Reforms

37

foreign profiteering still occurred and TAL provisions were still
operative after the CPA dissolved. Granted, overturning TAL
provisions would have been conceivable through legislative reform
(after a two-thirds vote of parliament and the authorization of the
cabinet), 157 judicial processes, or systematic transnational public law
litigation, 158 but invalidating or materially altering the occupation's
institutions and influence can become more difficult after a new status
quo has been set, the foreign military enforces the occupation, new
rights become entrenched, and more time passes, 159 particularly when
Iraqis were more concerned with survival during civil war-like
conditions than with overturning CPA ultimatums. 160 Property rights
can be directly enforceable and may have permanence by socialization
and the advocacy interests of new respective owners and similarly
situated stakeholders.
C. Constitutionally Locking in Reforms

International law and Iraqi law could have permitted
overturning CPA reforms and imposing liability, 161 but these rights
specifying the applicability of The Hague Regulations and the Geneva Conventions).
157. Juhasz, supra note 115.
158. See generally Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation,
100 YALE L. J. 2347 (1991); see also Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Bosco,
Plaintiffs Diplomacy, 2002 FOREIGN AFF. 102 (1991).
159. Bali, supra note 94, at 443. Order 39 was repealed, but, while still under
occupation, the new Iraqi government enacted a National Investment Law that
provided a tax free status for U.S. foreign direct investment in Iraq. Iraq MPs Pass
Law to Encourage Foreign Investment, FINANZNACHRICHTEN (Oct. 10, 2006, 5:10
PM), available at http://www.finanznachrichten.de/nachrichten-2006-10/7117497iraq-mps-pass-law-to-encourage-foreign-investment-020.htm (last visited Nov. 22,
2015).
160. One can assuredly remonstrate that there was a representative government
at the time the Constitution was adopted, which means that Iraqi democratic will
could have curbed disputatious provisions from being incorporated into the
Constitution, but one can also rebut that the Iraqi public intention was probably more
transfixed on survival as the country was consumed by violence and near-civil war
conditions. See generally Robert Bejesky, A Ripe Foundation for the Formation of
ISIS: Tit-for-Tat Hostilities and Contingently Contained Violence (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Syracuse Journal oflnternational Law and Commerce).
161. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 128, art. 47 (providing that
occupied inhabitants are protected and "shall not be deprived, in any case or in any
manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention by any change
introduced, as a result of the occupation"); Law of Administration, supra note 117,
art. 22 ("If, in the course of his work, an official of any government office ... or the
local administrations, deprives an individual or a group of the rights guaranteed by
this Law or any other Iraqi laws in force, this individual or group shall have the right
to maintain a cause of action."); Theodore W. Kassinger & Dylan J. Williams,
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can be pitted against other constitutional rights and interests. 162 Iraq's
constitutional provisions, which were actually predominately
embodied in the CPA's TAL, were later codified in the Iraqi
Constitution with notable U.S. exhortation. 163
Provisions governing economic activity and ordering are
explicit in the Iraqi Constitution even though many of the principles
would normally comprise interpretable policy issues in consolidated
democracies. 164 Article 25 of the Iraqi Constitution affirms that the
"State shall guarantee the reform of the Iraqi economy in accordance
with modem economic principles to insure full investment of its
resources, diversification of its sources, and the encouragement and
development of the private sector." 165 Article 26 accentuates that the
"State shall guarantee the encouragement of investment in the various
sectors, and this shall be regulated by law." 166 Article 23, when
viewed in conjunction with restrictions on expropriation and
protection for property rights 167 and "national treatment" laws,
incorporates commanding protection for foreign investment. These
provisions that sanctify capitalism and private sector investment, are
included under "Section Two: Rights and Liberties" of the Iraqi
Commercial Law Reform Issues in the Reconstruction of Iraq, 33 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 217, 218 (2004) (stating that the Geneva rules are customary international
law and have been signed by all parties involved).
162. Article 44, Dustur Jumhuriyat al-'Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic
of Iraq] of2005 ("There may not be a restriction or limit on the practice of any rights
or liberties in this constitution, except by law or on the basis of it, and insofar as that
limitation or restriction does not violates the essence of the right or freedom.").
163. Robert Bejesky, CPA Dictates on Iraq: Not an Update to the Customary
International Law of Occupation but the Nucleus of Blowback with the Emergence
of ISIS, 42 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 273, 305-06 (2015).
164. For example, there is a drastic distinction in the language of the US
Constitution which does sanctify "property rights," but only in Amendment V,
which only applies to government expropriation. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No
person shall be ... deprived oflife, liberty, or property, without due process oflaw;
nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.").
165. Article 25, Dustur Jumhuriyat al- 'Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic
of Iraq] of 2005.
166. Id. art. 26.
167. See id. art. 23 ("Private property is protected .... Expropriation is not
permissible except for the purposes of public benefit in return for just compensation,
and this shall be regulated by law."). International law seemingly requires fair value
for expropriation, but there has been disagreement over measuring compensation.
See G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), art. 2, § 2(c) (Dec. 12, 1974) (emphasizing precedent
for the freedom of nationalization and expropriation and that compensation is freely
assessed domestically as a principle of sovereignty). See generally SORNARAJAH,
supra note 131, at 414-18.
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Constitution and are perversely comingled with other rights, such as
the right to life, liberty, and political freedom, 168 as the supreme
foundational source oflaw and fundamental right, calculated to prevail
over subsequent legislative agendas. 169
Perhaps the most polemical progression and the one that was
pillared on the sequence of deepening reforms was the robust
advocacy to revamp Iraq's oil industry. Iraqi defectors and CPA
appointees offered periodic public statements endorsing privatization
of Iraq's nationalized oil industry 170 and this advocacy became a
source of evidence for those who contended that the Iraq War was
driven by interest in Iraqi oil. 171 Security Council Resolution 1546
affirmed "the right of the Iraqi people freely to determine their own
political future and control their own natural resources," 172 but Article
112 of the Iraqi Constitution states that the government "shall ...
formulate the necessary strategic policies to develop the oil and gas
168. See Articles 14-46, Dustur Jumhuriyat al-'Iraq [The Constitution of the
Republic of Iraq] of 2005 (the articles that comprise "Section Two: Rights and
Liberties" of the Iraqi Constitution).
169. See id. art. 2 ("No law may be enacted that contradicts the rights and basic
freedoms stipulated in this Constitution."): see. e.g... Marbury v. Madison. 5 U.S.
137. 177 (1803) ("It is a proposition too plain to be contested. that the constitution
controls anv legislative act repugnant to it; or that the legislature may alter the
constitution by an ordinary act."); see Tom Ginsburg, Locking in Democracy:
Constitutions, Commitment, and International Law, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
707, 710 (2006) (discussing the binding nature of constitutional provisions to
"restrict the actions available to future politicians").
170. See Bejesky, Geopolitics, supra note 16, at 219, 229-32, 245, 249; see also
Sammy Ketz, Iraq's Planning Minister Wants to Slash Public Sector Worliforce,
at
available
AM),
12:00
2008,
10,
(Nov.
STAR
DAILY
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Business/Middle-East/2008/Nov-10/82371-iraqsplanning-minster-wants-to-slash-public-sector-workforce.ashx#axzz3DXQ6vb1Z
(last visited Nov. 22, 2015) (noting that Ali Baban, Iraq's planning minister,
contended that the oil and other industries were entirely suitable for full
privatization).
171. See Bejesky, Geopolitics, supra note 16, at 209, 226-27. Federal Reserve
Chairman Alan Greenspan stated that "the Iraq war [was] largely about oil." Bob
Woodward, Greenspan: Ouster of Hussein Crucial for Oil Security, WASH. POST
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpat
available
2007),
17,
(Sept.
dyn/content/article/2007 /09/l 6/AR200709160 l 287_pf.html (last visited Nov. 22,
2015). When asked to elucidate, Greenspan responded that Saddam Hussein's
"behavior" posed a threat to regional oil supplies. See Alan Greenspan vs. Naomi
Klein on the Iraq War, Bush's Tax Cuts, Economic Populism, Crony Capitalism and
2007),
24,
(Sept.
Now!
DEMOCRACY
More,
http://www.democracynow.org/2007 /9/24/alan_greenspan_vs_naomi_klein_ on
(last visited Nov. 22, 2015). Greenspan never described what that recent "behavior"
was in relation to the reasons for war.
172. S.C. Res. 1546, pmbl. (June 8, 2004).
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wealth in a way that achieves the highest benefit to the Iraqi people
using the most advanced techniques of the market principles and
encouraging investment." 173 Given that Iraqis were cash poor because
of the state of their economy during the invasion and occupation,
"encouraging investment" by default presumably meant foreign
investment. Shortly after the invasion, American and British oil
conglomerates began to entrench themselves in Iraq but waited for
four years to finally procure official exploitation rights. 174 In a
December 2005 agreement with the IMF, Iraq committed itself to
drafting a new petroleum law by the end of 2006 so that foreign oil
companies could invest in Iraq. 175 By 2008, multinational oil
companies began to be recipients of long-term licenses to exploit Iraqi
oil fields through Production Sharing Agreements. 176 In 2013, CNN
reported, "[T]he Iraq War was a war for oil, and it was a war with
winners: Big Oil." 177

D. A Fine Example of the "Rule ofLaw": Dollarizing the Iraqi
Economy

The CPA may have been able to so handily dictate unbounded
capitalist reforms because of the practical and psychological
humanitarian dependence that stemmed from the CPA' s monetary
policy. The authority to manage an occupied country's financial,
commercial, and economic system is not authorized in the Hague
Regulations, 178 but the CPA initiated a system to provide liquidity to
173. Article 112, § 2, Dustur Jumhuriyat al-'Iraq [The Constitution of the
Republic oflraq] of 2005.
174. See Mekay, supra note 63 (stating that there were hundreds of Americans
working in Iraqi government agencies and that they worked to give "full access for
U.S. companies to the nation's oil reserves").
175. Joshua Gallu, The Race For Iraq's Resources: Will Iraq 's Oil Blessing
Become a Curse?, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Dec. 22, 2006, 3:46 PM), available at
http://www.spiegel.de/international/the-race-for-iraq-s-resources-will-iraq-s-oilblessing-become-a-curse-a-456212.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2015). The Bush
administration was so interested that the USAID contracted with BearingPoint to
draft proposals for Iraq's new law. See generally BEARINGPOINT, OPTIONS FOR
DEVELOPING A LONG TERM SUSTAINABLE IRAQI OIL INDUSTRY (2003).
176. See Bejesky, Geopolitics, supra note 16, at 224-25, 240-41, 249-50 ..
177. Juhasz, supra note 25.
178. See JAMES A. TYNER, THE BUSINESS OF WAR: WORKERS, WARRIORS AND
HOSTAGES IN OCCUPIED IRAQ 82 (2006); see also LAURENCE BOISSON DE
CHAZOURNES, TAKING THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW SERIOUSLY: ECONOMIC
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the Iraqi economy by having the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank physically
transport U.S. currency to the CPA and inject the legal tender into the
Iraqi economy. 179 Most of the physical U.S. dollar transfers were
drawn from the Development Fund for Iraq ("DFI"), which the CPA
constituted and controlled 180 as the successor to the U.N. Oil for Food
Program. 181 By June 28, 2004, the date the CPA transferred authority
to the interim Iraqi government, U.S. officials had disbursed $20.7
billion into the Iraqi economy, of which $12 billion was provided in
cash, and some of those disbursements set records as the largest U.S.
Federal Reserve cash payouts in history. 182
The monetary value belonged to Iraqis, but the CPA
distributed U.S. dollars like a parent dispensing an allowance to a
child, 183 breeding a dependence on the currency for routine and
everyday transactions. 184 Iraq had three alternative circulating
currencies with different exchange rates, 185 but the high-value of crisp,
new U.S. hundred dollar bills bred frenzy and imparted a favorable
symbol of the occupation and likely made the U.S. dollar the de facto
currency, 186 which was a particularly ironic twist because Hussein's
11-12 (2005).
179. See Memorandum from the Majority Staff on Cash Transfers to the
Coalition Provisional Authority to the House of Representatives Comm. on
Oversight and Gov't Reform 1 (Feb. 6, 2007) [hereinafter HR Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform].
180. See Hmoud, supra note 64, at 449-50.
181. HR Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, supra note 179, at
1.
182. Id. at 1, 4, 5-6. Several of these shipments ($1.5 billion on Dec. 23, 2003,
$2.4 billion on June 18, 2003, and $1.6 billion on June 25, 2003) were the "largest
pay out[s] of U.S. currency in Fed history." Id. at 6-7.
183. See Mills, supra note 140, at 208 (US government funding salaries and
utility needs); Melissa Patterson, Who's Got the Title? Or, The Remnants of
Debellatio in Post-Invasion Iraq, 47 HARV. INT'L L.J. 467,471 (2006).
184. CPA fiscal transactions may have set the groundwork for imposed reforms
and an open economy because transactions involving payment for government
salaries and goods and services rendered inside Iraq and payments to external
recipients could be made in US currency or denominated in US dollars for
international transactions.
185. New Iraqi Dinar Banknotes Law Order No. 43 of 2003 § 1 (CPA, Iraq)
(listing the "Swiss dinar" (1959-89), "1990 dinar," and the "New Iraqi dinar," all of
which had different "Official Conversion Rates" but that the goal was to get to only
using the "New Iraqi dinar").
186. CPA official Frank Willis testified to Congress and stated that a "'wild
west' atmosphere prevailed and the country was awash in brand new $100 bills."
HR Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, supra note 179, at 13 (citing
Testimony of Frank Willis, An Oversight Hearing on Waste, Fraud and Abuse in
INSTRUMENTS AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY
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regime went off the U.S. dollar three years earlier as a hard currency
for denominating oil sales in favor of the Euro. 187 U.S. currency
represented buying power for the flood of new high-technology
gadgets and consumer goods, which were previously restricted
imports, not because of the lack of a currency, but because of sanctions
and poverty. 188
With the humanitarian disaster and lack of a tangible
commodity-backed or hard currency, the U.S. dollar's full faith and
credit served as the basis of currency stability. Alan Greenspan,
Federal Reserve Chairman at the time U.S. Federal Reserve payouts
were made, later remarked:
[W]hat we were involved in was essentially endeavoring to create a
viable currency for the Central Bank of Iraq. And what we did do was
- I think very successfully - create what is a viable financial system,
even under the circumstances that currently exist. There was, as far as
I can judge, a huge drain of the resources into areas that nobody to this
day can understand or follow. 189

U.S. Government Contracting in Iraq, Senate Democratic Policy Committee
Hearing (Feb. 14, 2005)). US $100 bills were juxtaposed with the comparatively
weak value of other currencies and symbolized Iraqi economic and social viability
when the country had been facing hardship. $100 bills served as a daily reminder of
the occupation (as the US dollar was the same currency used by the nation of the
occupying force) and more prosperity even though the standard of living could have
increased threefold overnight by simply dropping the restrictions on oil sales.
Likewise, there would also be an emotive psychological impact with currency
containing Saddam Hussein's image. By contrast, Iraqi banknotes, which were
denominated at a highest value of 250 Iraqi dinar, worth approximately sixteen
cents, required a "brick-like" stack of bills for purchasing daily necessities.
Hamoudi, supra note 97, at 531. The need to eliminate old currencies because of
their low value is predominantly due to the fact that Iraq's economy had been
destroyed for over a decade but was suddenly opened to international financial
transactions, currencies possess a foreign exchange value with an open economy,
there was purchasing power parity with international transactions, and the central
bank (under the direction of the current occupational authority) set monetary policy.
187. Faisal Islam, Iraq Nets Handsome Profit by Dumping Dollar for Euro,
GUARDIAN
(Feb.
15,
2003,
8:55
PM),
available
at
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2003/feb/ 16/iraq. theeuro (last visited Nov.
22, 2015).
188. Mills, supra note 140, at 204. While the imported products had long
existed, the drastic change in trade (under military occupation), may have made it
appear that it was the US that brought such opportunities.
189. "Mr. Greenspan is Flat Wrong": Pulitzer Prize-Winning Journalists
Respond to Alan Greenspan 's Claim that He Didn't Know About Federal Reserve 's
Role in Iraq's Missing Billions, DEMOCRACY Now! (Oct. 9, 2007), available at
http://www.democracynow.org/2007 /10/9/mr_greenspan_is_flat_ wrong_pulitzer
(last visited Dec. 1, 2015) Ambassador Timothy Carney remarked: "[A] capable
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Greenspan's reference to a "huge drain on the resources"
might have been attributable to the CPA's mode of cash distribution.
Both the U.N. resolution that created the DFI and CPA rules governing
the DFI specified that funds were required to be distributed "in a
transparent manner to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi
people ... and for other purposes benefiting the people oflraq." 190 At
the heart of congressional investigations in September 2007 was the
location of the Federal Reserve's $12 billion in physical cash
allocations after it was delivered to the CPA. 191 Congressional
investigations revealed that the CPA compensated recipients with
duffel bags stuffed with cash, that trucks carried off loads of cash, that
cash was stolen out of vaults, and that "ghost" employees were being
paid. 192
U .N. Resolution 1483 required that Iraq's funds be "audited by
[an approved] independent public accountant[]" 193 and CPA rule

U.S. Treasury team worked out an emergency scheme for [Iraqi] government
workers - and I became one of the deliverymen [for cash payments]. Without a
functioning banking system, cash was the only way to inject money into the
economy." HR Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, supra note 179,
at 14.
190. S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 93,, 14; see also S.C. Res. 1511, ,, 23-24
(Oct. 16, 2003) ("Emphasizes that the International Advisory and Monitoring Board
(IAMB) referred to in paragraph 12 ofresolution 1483 (2003) should be established
as a priority, and reiterates that the Development Fund for Iraq shall be used in a
transparent manner as set out in paragraph 14 of resolution 1483 (2003)"); HR
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, supra note 179, at 2
(emphasizing that CPA officials were fully cognizant that DFI funds were required
to be transferred in a transparent manner).
191. HR Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, supra note 179, at
1; The Impact of CPA Decision making on Iraq Reconstruction: Hearing Before the
H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov 't Reform, 110th Cong. 18 (2007) (noting that up
to $20 billion could have been unaccounted for).
192. HR Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, supra note 179, at
2; see also id. at 2 ("The failure to account for the $20 billion expended by the CPA
appears to have had serious consequences. Many of the funds appear to have been
lost to corruption and waste. According to the Inspector General, thousands of
'ghost employees' were receiving paychecks from Iraqi ministries under CPA's
control."); Id. at 13 (reporting that Frank Willis testified that "when contractors
needed to be paid by the CPA, they were told to 'bring a big bag' for cash payment"
(citing Interview of Frank Willis, House Committee on Government Reform,
Minority Staff (Jan. 27, 2005)); SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ
RECONSTRUCTION, HARD LESSONS: THE IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION EXPERIENCE 155
(2009) ("CPA failed to enforce adequate management, financial, and contractual
controls over approximately $8.8 billion of DFI money.").
193. S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 93,, 12.
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number 2 also stated that it would secure the "services of an
independent, certified public accounting firm." 194 The CPA did not
hire a "certified public accounting firm," 195 and post-occupation audits
discovered that there were hundreds of instances of inadequate
controls and disbursals to unverifiable recipients and for non-existent
contracts, contractors, and projects. 196 The Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction report remarked that "proper cash accountability was
not maintained, physical security was inadequate, fund agent records
were not complete, and fund managers' responsibilities and liabilities
were not properly assigned." 197
Billions of dollars in Iraqi public money, which the CPA was
required to allocate in a consuetude accordant with the fiduciary
obligations of an occupier, could not be accounted for. 198 There was
hypocrisy; federal criminal charges were filed against individuals
suspected of taking bribes and engaging in other criminal misconduct
while the U.N. administered the pre-2003 Oil for Food Program 199 and
194. HR Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, supra note 179, at
10 (citing CPA, Regulation Number 2: Development Fund/or Iraq (June 10, 2003)).
195. HR Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, supra note 179, at
11 (stating that the CPA did not hire "a certified public accounting firm," but instead
paid $1.4 million to a company called North Star Consultants that operated out of a
private residence in San Diego, and reporting that the Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction noted that North Star never performed this work). Bremer also,
through Regulation Number 3, created a Program Review Board, which was
required to report directly to Bremer, and be "responsible for recommending
expenditures of resources from the Development Fund for Iraq and other
resources ... " Program Review Board Regulation No. 3 of 2003 § 6 (CPA, Iraq).
196. SIGIR, REPORT NO. 05-004, AUDIT REPORT: OVERSIGHT OF FUNDS
PROVIDED TO IRAQI MINISTRIES THROUGH THE NATIONAL BUDGET PROCESS, 7 (Jan.
30, 2005) [hereinafter SIGIR, AUDIT REPORT].
197. HR Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, supra note 179, at
13 (citing SIGIR, AUDIT REPORT).
198. HR Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, supra note 179, at
18.
199. In 2005, U.S. officials initiated U.S. federal criminal charge investigations
against U.N. officials for criminal misconduct, including for accepting "bribes," in
the pre-2003 U.N. Secretary-General administered oil-for-food program. See John
R. Crook, Further U.S. Reactions to Abuses in UN Oil-for-Food Program; U.S.
Criminal Charges Against UN Officials, Others, 99 AM. J. INT'L. L. 904 (2005);
Russell P. McAleavey, Note, Pressuring Sudan: The Prospect of an Oil-For-Food
Program for Darfur, 31 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1058, 1088-89 (2008). In November
2007, Chevron was ordered to pay $30 million in criminal and civil penalties for
kickbacks under the U.N. Oil for Food Program. See Michael B. Bixby, The Lion
Awakens: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act - 1977 to 2010, 12 SAN DIEGO INT'L
L.J. 89, 108 (2010). For example, Aleksandr Yakovlev pied guilty to U.S. federal
charges of money laundering, conspiracy, and wire fraud for reportedly receiving
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the CPA created the Iraqi Commission on Public Integrity that was
focused on investigating historical corruption of Hussein's regime, 200
but CPA officials overtly stated that they believed that their fiscal
obligations should be above reproach because their goal was to inject
money into the economy. 201 The CPA certainly should not have been
above reproach because investigations eventually led a former CPA
official to plead guilty to multiple felony counts for stealing millions
of dollars in cash. 202
Another predicament is that the CPA had just stripped
hundreds of thousands of employees out of the Iraqi government for
Ba'ath Party association and dismantled the Iraqi military apparatus,

several hundred thousand dollars in bribes. Colum Lynch, Oil-Food Official Pleads
Guilty,
WASH.
POST
(Aug.
9,
2005),
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/08/08/AR2005080800150.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2015).
200. Corruption was not completely overlooked because a January 2004 CPA
Order created the Iraqi Commission on Public Integrity, which had a mission to
adopt and enforce anti-corruption and government accountability measures, but the
Commission was apparently unconcerned with current instances of corruption since
they set the jurisdiction for this new entity to trace back possible instances of
corruption to July 17, 1968. Delegation of Authority Regarding The Iraq
Commission on Public Integrity Order No. 55 of 2004 §§ 3-4 (CPA, Iraq).
201. David Oliver, the head of finance for the CPA, remarked: "I have no idea,
I can't tell you whether or not the money went to the right things or didn't-nor do
I actually think it is important." Mark Gregory, Baghdad's 'Missing' Billions, BBC
(Nov. 9, 2006), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6129612.stm (last
visited Dec. 3, 2015). After the interviewer criticized Oliver for his callous attitude,
Oliver remarked: "Billions of dollars of their money disappeared, yes I understand,
I'm saying what difference does it make?" Id. Oliver claimed that he gave uncertain
amounts of cash to the Iraqi government and because nothing was left, the
allocations must have been provided to the right people. Id. Most countries have
(or aspire to improve) accounting systems that require audits of corporations and
governmental entities to ensure integrity of the accounting process, to protect public
interests, and to prevent white-collar crimes from occurring, but the CPA disbursal
process seemed to be rather rudimentary and without protections that would instill
integrity. Towards a New Era in Government Accounting and Reporting, PwC 3,
14
(Apr.
2013),
available
at
http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/psrc/publications/assets/pwc-global-ipsas-surveygovernment-accounting-and-reporting-pdf. pdf (last visited Dec. 9, 2015) (assessing
in a survey of 100 countries that there needs to be "[b]etter integration and
comparability in government accounting systems" but "[t]he G20 has recently
emphasized the need for transparent, comparable public sector financial reporting,
including public sector balance sheets" and for "sound, transparent accounting
systems" in order to restore confidence and having sustainable financial
management).
202. Charles R. Babcock, Contractor Fraud Trial to Begin Tomorrow, WASH.
POST (Feb. 13, 2006), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/02/l2/AR2006021200732.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2015).
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which meant that the only semblance of government was the CPA and
the U.S.-appointed heads of ministry and appointed members of Iraqi
interim governments. 203 During the CPA' s tenure and up until the date
that the CPA authority expired, the CPA distributed billions of dollars
in cash to its appointees. 204 Congressman Henry Waxman presided
over investigations and remarked: "The CPA handed over $8.8 billion
in cash to the Iraqi government even though that new government had
no security or accounting system. No one can account for it." 205Not
to denote that this unequivocally transpired, but perhaps it is no
wonder that the appointed interim Iraqi government permitted the
CPA to do whatever it wanted; giving billions of dollars in cash would
ostensibly be one of the most straightforward methods of illegally
bribing or at least arousing loyalty from appointees. 206 The money
belonged to the people of Iraq as a whole, 207 but currency might also
just vanish and not effectively stimulate the economy despite the
humanitarian need. 208
203. DILIP HIRO, SECRETS AND LIES 312-13 (2003). Resolution 1483 required
disbursement of funds under the Development Fund for Iraq in "coordination" or
"consultation" with the governance authority, which would officially become the
IGC in October 2003. S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 93, 1113-14, 16(b); see also S.C.
Res. 1511, supra note 190, 1123- 24.
204. The CPA was apparently having so much fun distributing pallets of
bundled $100 bills without consequence or documentation that it requested another
$1 billion from the Federal Reserve just hours after its official authority expired. HR
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, supra note 179, at 9. Thankfully,
the request was denied by the Federal Reserve because "the CPA no longer had
control over Iraq's assets." Id.
205. Gregory, supra note 201.
206. The CPA actions may very well fall into the jurisdiction of a number of
international agreements that prohibit bribery of public officials and seek to prevent
corruption. See Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-43
(1998); Inter-American Convention on Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, S. TREATY Doc.
No. 105-39 (1998); Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption,
Jan. 27, 1999, E.T.S. No. 173; G.A. Res. 58/4 Convention Against Corruption (Oct.
31, 2003).
207. Government employees, private sector entities, and organizations, could
not be paid from what was earmarked as Iraq's own revenues unless the CPA made
payments in US dollars. Charles Tiefer, The Iraq Debacle: The Rise and Fall of
Procurement-Aided Unilateralism as a Paradigm ofForeign War, 29 U. PA. J. INT'L
L. 1, 45-46 (2007). In fact, the impropriety was even more direct as Ahmed Chalabi,
the Iraqi exile instrumental in producing fabricating witnesses prior to the invasion,
and his group became the direct recipients of funding when they established the Iraqi
Reconstruction and Development Council. Id. at 44.
208. The adverse consequence of "dollarizing" the Iraqi economy, not
implementing accounting controls, and being unable to locate billions of dollars,
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The next part considers the impact of occupation construction
activities. The part untangles the significance of Iraq's debt-stricken
financial status in conjunction with multinational cost of
reconstruction in section A, addresses the details of no-bid contracts
granted by the U.S. government in section B, presents instances of
fraud and greed that increased the cost to U.S. taxpayers in section C,
and accents the U.S. military's role in securing the reconstruction
process in section D. In short, resources shifted to construction
projects that benefited multinationals while burdening Iraqis with high
cost and lower employment and encumbered American taxpayers with
additional spending.
V. CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS
A. Obligation to Rebuild and the Financing of Construction

Perhaps implicitly conducted pursuant to a moral and
international law obligation to repair or replace what was destroyed
during war, 209 U.S. authorities undertook projects to rebuild
infrastructure that was damaged by bombing operations during the
1991 Gulf War and the 2003 invasion. 210 Experts estimated that
construction would cost between $55 and $90 billion. 211 Over 150
companies 212 received $21 billion for construction projects and as

would be unlikely to protect against the possibility of bundles of cash being stashed
or otherwise removed from the economy instead of being spent to stimulate the
economy. This is also a breeding ground of corruption because political appointees
could be persuaded by financial gain or be particularly amenable to the occupation's
dictates, despite broadly-based and opposing public desires. The occupation
authorities were operating like a bank and payroll officer for payees in a country in
which the vast majority of the population was impoverished and in dire need of
services.
209. See generally INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY,
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT xi, 11, 39-42 (2001) (setting forth standards for
post-conflict situations, noting that the international community must support the
intervention, and emphasizing that the intervener [and perhaps the international
community] has a "responsibility to rebuild" what was destroyed during war).
210. Bali, supra note 94, at 442.
211. Rebuilding Iraq 'Will Cost $55bn, ' BBC (Oct. 3, 2003, 1:17 PM),
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3160800.stm (last visited Dec. 4,
2015) (referring to the $55 billion World Bank estimate and the $90 billion estimate
by McKinsey consulting).
212. Blood and Oil: How the West Will Profit From Iraq's Most Precious
Commodity,
INDEPENDENT
(Oct.
22,
2011),
available
at
http://www.independent.co. uk/news/world/middle-east/blood-and-oil-how-thewest-will-profit-from-iraqs-most-precious-commodity-431119 .html (last visited
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much as $117 billion for security objectives related to
reconstruction, 213 which was a sum that was several times Iraq's GDP
in 2004. 214 Funding came from U.S. taxpayers, loans, 215 and Iraqi oil
revenues. 216
Iraq required tremendous investment because the country
lacked capital for reconstruction and had accumulated massive debt
from previous wars, sovereign obligations undertaken by Hussein's
regime, and the ridiculously excessive level of debt (up to $350
billion) imposed as damages by the Security Council following the
invasion of Kuwait. 217 Prior to the invasion in 2003, Iraq was unable
to service existing debt obligations because Security Council
restrictions prohibited oil exports starting in the early-1990s and there
were revenue limits imposed by the U.N. Oil for Food Program.
Emphasizing how Iraq's massive existing debt could undermine
reforms, 218 Joseph Stiglitz remarked that Iraq was facing further
Dec. 4, 2015).
213. SIGIR, supra note 2, at 9. $117 billion is the difference between the
estimate of $138 billion and $22 billion. Anna Fifield, Contractors Reap $138B
From
Iraq
War,
CNN
(Mar.
19,
2013),
available
at
http://edition.cnn.com/2013/03/19/business/iraq-war-contractors/ (last visited Dec.
4, 2015) (noting that $138 billion was spent on "private security, logistics and
reconstruction contracts"). However, this number could be much higher if one
assumes that reconstruction was a critical precondition to alleviating hostilities
within the Iraqi population and ending the occupation and if it is assumed that U.S.
military operations were also critical to the security of reconstruction.
214. Donor Activities and Civil Society Potential in Iraq, U.S. INST. PEACE
(July 2004), available at http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/srl24.pdf (last
visited Dec. 4, 2015) (stating that Iraq's GDP was approximately $19 billion in
2004).
215. See generally ARNOVE, supra note 85, at 74; see also IN THE NAME OF
DEMOCRACY: AMERICAN WAR CRIMES IN IRAQ AND BEYOND 63 (Jeremy Brecher,
Jill Cutler & Brendan Smith eds., 2005) [hereinafter IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY];
Juhasz, supra note 115 (reporting that through mid-January 2007, U.S. taxpayers
had already provided $50 billion in loans to reconstruct Iraq and that these
expenditures were allocated to U.S. companies and banking interests).
216. Hmoud, supra note 64, at 450 (discussing that the CPA assumed control
over the Oil-for-Food Program from the UN and that the new program, called the
Development Fund for Iraq could be disbursed for "humanitarian needs, repair of
Iraq's infrastructure, disarmament, economic reconstruction, and the costs of Iraqi
civilian administration.").
217. Bejesky, Currency Cooperation, supra note 59, at 100-02 (noting that
Kuwaitis filed 2.68 million claims, seeking more than $350 billion in compensation,
when Kuwait's annual GDP averaged $41.3 billion).
218. Shortly after the 2003 invasion, Iraqis found themselves in a position
similar to that faced by the three-decade-long debt crisis that still plagues developing
countries. See generally NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, DEVELOPfNG
COUNTRY DEBT AND THE WORLD ECONOMY (Jeffrey D. Sachs ed., 2007).
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economic travail by "[p ]iling more debt onto Iraq's already huge
obligations" and warned that "[i]f Iraq's economy falters as a result of
a misguided economic reconstruction program based on shock
therapy, the country will be further indebted with little to show for
it." 219
The reconstruction process was exorbitant and slighted
rational labor market mechanisms because Iraq was strained with high
unemployment while multinational corporations employed foreign
workers who were paid many times more than Iraqis would have been
paid. 220 Representative Henry Waxman, Ranking Minority Member
on the U.S. House Committee on Government reform, wrote in a
September 2003 memorandum that congressional investigations
revealed that "many reconstruction projects could be reduced by 90%
if the projects were awarded to local Iraqi companies rather than to
large government contractors like Halliburton or Bechtel. 221
Congressional records revealed specific procurement examples in
which multinational corporations cost between five and over one
hundred times more than an Iraqi construction firm would have
charged for the same project. 222 Had Iraqi companies been awarded
219. Stigli tz, supra note 4 5.
220. ARNOVE, supra note 85, at 15-16; Juhasz, supra note 115 (noting the
excessive cost of American companies and that "Iraqis argue that they have the
knowledge, skill and experience to conduct the reconstruction themselves").
Consequently, not only were labor market mechanisms not being pursued because
higher-paid foreign workers often executed employment tasks instead of locals, but
Iraqis had more difficulty finding employment even though much of the
infrastructure that needed to be repaired was a direct consequence of a foreign
power's bombing operations. IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 215, at 63
(emphasizing that Iraqis were prohibited from fixing critical infrastructure); Tiefer,
supra note 207, at 4-5 (stating that Iraqis were prevented, in certain industrial
sectors, from working to rebuild their own country).
221. Letter from Henry A. Waxman, Ranking Minority Member, U.S. House
of Representatives, to Joshua Bolten, Director, U.S. Office of Management and
available
at
Budget
(Sept.
30,
2003),
http://rense.com/general43/iraqicompanieswouldsave.htm (last visited Dec. 4,
2015); see also Tiefer, supra note 207, at 42 (accentuating the common complaint
that American firms do all of the work even though Iraqis do not have as high of
overhead expenditures as U.S. design-build firms); Kinan Obeidin, The Iraq
Reconstruction Contracts: Limiting the Sources for Government Contracts, 29 J.
LEGAL PROF. 259,263 (2005).
222. U.S. H. COMM. ON Gov'T REFORM, MINORITY STAFF SPECIAL
INVESTIGATIONS DIV., HALLIBURTON'S GASOLINE OVERCHARGES, 3 (2004),
available at http://www.halliburtonwatch.org/news/waxman_gas_overcharges.pdf
(last visited Dec. 4, 2015) [hereinafter Waxman] (reporting that foreign contractors
charged about $25 million to refurbish police stations in Basra while an Iraqi
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the same contracts, there might have been a lower unemployment rate,
an alleviation of social discontent caused by adverse economic
conditions, a lower cost of construction for U.S. taxpayers, and a
mitigation of the perception of a profiteering bonanza for
multinational corporations. 223
Explanations provided for the dearth of Iraqi companies
receiving contracts included that Iraqis were not sufficiently
experienced224 and that local contractors "lacked the requisite
insurance. 225 There was a heightened risk of loss due to violence and
foreign insurance companies began to deny claims for losses inside
Iraq, 226 but Iraqi companies had a fractional cost of construction at risk
irrespective of actuarial insurance calculations. Iraq also had a preinvasion tort law system to address liability in the event of faulty

company could have done the work for about $5 million); Klein, supra note 96
(reporting that the CPA purchasing concrete walls from foreign companies at a price
of $1,000 each when seventeen Iraqi state-owned cement companies could have
produced the walls at $100 each). In a case where locals were hired, Major General
David Petraeus explained to members of the House Committee on Government
Reform that he hired Iraqis to fix a cement plant for $80,000, but engineers from US
companies quoted a price of $15 million to complete the same contracts. Waxman,
supra note 222, at 2.
223. Waxman, supra note 222, at 2 ("The question we need to confront is
whether the Administration is putting the interests of companies like Halliburton and
Bechtel over the interests of the American taxpayer and the Iraqi people. When
inordinately expensive reconstruction projects are awarded to high-cost federal
contracts with close political ties to the White House, the Administration can create
a lose-lose situation: not only do U.S. taxpayers vastly overpay for reconstruction
services, but Iraqis are denied urgently needed employment opportunities.").
Multinational construction companies were not required to pay much Iraqi tax and
could repatriate profits.
224. Charles Bronowski & Chad Fisher, Money as a Force Multiplier: Funding
Military Reconstruction Efforts in Post-Surge Iraq, 2010 ARMY LAW. 50, 61 (2010)
(quoting service members who mentioned that "the United States has concerns that
Iraqis are becoming too reliant on U.S. expertise in executing reconstruction
programs rather than developing organic Iraqi capabilities").
225. Waxman, supra note 2221, at 5.
226. See. e.g. T . Christian Miller, AIG Faces Inquiry Over Medical Care for
U.S.
Contractors,
L.A.
Times
(Apr.
22,
2009),
available
at
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/apr/22/nation/na-aig22 (last visited Dec. 9, 2015)
(stating that AIG denied 44% of all serious injury claims) . The inability to attain
private insurance required more dependence on federal compensation programs.
War Hazards Compensation Act, 42 U.S.C.§§ 1701-1712 (enacted on Dec. 2, 1942);
see also Compensation for Injury, Disability, Death, or Enemy Detention of
Employees of Contractors with the United States, 20 C.F.R. pt. 61 (2005).
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construction, 227 while CPA Order 17 made contractors from coalition
countries immune from liability in Iraqi courts. 228
B. No-Bid Contracts

The occupation's procurement process was not administered
with abounding regard for competitive bidding procedures, but instead
was candidly called a "reconstruction racket," 229 the "coalition of the
billing," 230 and corruptly managed. 231 No-bid procurement contracts
were awarded to companies with close connections to Iraqi defectors
who urged for the war 232 and American corporations with links to
influential U.S. politicians.
Criticism was leveled over conflicts of interest as then-Vice
President Cheney's former company, Halliburton, 233 was awarded
227. There was a legal structure that might have provided a foundation for
liability because pre-invasion Iraqi tort law did provide causes of action that could
compensate for harms based on intent, negligence, and strict liability standards.
Civil Code of 1990 art. 202 (Iraq). The existing Iraqi tort law system was recognized
as the applicable law in a Georgia District Court case that involved two
contractors-an American plaintiff and Kuwait Gulf defendant. Baragona v. Kuwait
Gulf Link Transp. Co., 688 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1355-56 (N.D. Ga. 2007). It is not
clear why Iraqi construction companies would be required to carry additional
insurance beyond that which would normally be required in their own country.
228. Status of the Coalition Provisional Authority, MNF -Iraq, Certain
Missions and Personnel in Iraq Order No. 17 (revised) of 2004 §§ 1(11), 4(2)-(3)
(CPA, Iraq); see also §§ 1(1)-(2), 2(1) ("[u]nless provided otherwise herein, the
MNF, the CPA, Foreign Liaison Missions, their Personnel, property, funds and
assets, and all International Consultants shall be immune from Iraqi legal process.").
229. ARNOVE, supra note 85, at 78.
230. Derek Gregory, Vanishing Points: Law, Violence, and Exception in the
Global War Prison, in TERROR AND THE POSTCOLONIAL 55, 81 (Elleke Boehmer &
Stephen Morton eds., 2010) (stating term used by Peter Singer).
231. Gathii, supra note 36, at 73 7.
232. L. ELAINE HALCHIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32370, THE COALITION
PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY (CPA): ORIGIN, CHARACTERISTICS, AND INSTITUTIONAL
AUTHORITIES 22-24 (2005) (reporting that a $327 million contract was given to Nour
USA in November 2003 to equip the new Iraqi armed forces, that there were
nineteen other bidders and Nour's bid was $231 million lower than Bumar Group,
that Nour's president A. Huda Faouki is an alleged friend of Ahmad Chalabi, and
that Nour had no experience because it was formed in May 2003, but the contract
was eventually canceled because of procurement contract dispute filings). A lower
price is favorable but possible conflicts of interest and lack of experience can
undermine a legitimate procurement process.
233. Many criticized this connection between the vice president and
Halliburton as a conflict of interest. Robert Bryce & Julian Borger, Cheney is Still

Paid by Pentagon Contractor: Bush Deputy Gets Up to $Im From Firm With Iraq
Oil Deal, GUARDIAN (Mar. 12, 2003. 10:02 AM), available at
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/12/usa.iraq5 (last visited Dec. 4,
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with the contract to rebuild existing Iraqi oil production facilities in a
secretive no-bid contract two weeks before the invasion. 234 Contract
rights morphed into $2.4 billion in revenues for Halliburton over three
years 235 and Halliburton reported a 62% increase in revenues. 236 KBR,
Halliburton's subsidiary, was awarded at least $39.5 billion in federal
contracts related to the Iraq war. 237 Some funds were unaccounted for
and Halliburton and other American companies later became subject
to a series of Congressional investigations over overbilling. 238 During
2015) (noting that Cheney was still being paid up to $1 million a year in "deferred
compensation" from Halliburton while he was vice president); Aaron Blake, Rand
Paul in '09: Cheney Pushed Iraq War to Benefit Halliburton, WASH. POST (Apr. 7,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post2014),
politics/wp/2014/04/07 /rand-paul-in-09-cheney-pushed-iraq-war-to-benefithalliburton/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2015) (stating that Senator Rand Paul suggested
Cheney was clearly at the forefront of pushing for war and that his own company
(Halliburton) benefited).
234. Abigail H. Avery, Weapons of Mass Construction: The Potential Liability
of Halliburton Under the False Claims Act and the Implications to Defense
Contracting, 57 ALA. L. REV. 827, 837-38 (2006) (noting that the contract was
consummated in March 2003). This followed after Halliburton's submission of
initial planning documents for rebuilding (in fall 2002), which was also an awarded
contract. CHALMERS JOHNSON, THE SORROWS OF EMPIRE: MILITARISM, SECRECY
AND THE END OF THE REPUBLIC 144 (2004); CBS, Halliburton Defends No-Bid Iraq
Contract, INFORMATION CLEARING HOUSE (Apr. 27, 2003), available at
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/artic1e3 l 4 l .htm (last visited Dec. 4,
2015) (stating that there was no competition for contracts worth up to $7 billion and
that Cheney was instrumental in placing Halliburton into that privileged position).
235. HENRY A. WAXMAN, H. COMM. ON Gov'T REFORM, MINORITY STAFF
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS DIV., HALLIBURTON'S PERFORMANCE UNDER THE
RESTORE
IRAQI
OIL
2
CONTRACT,
3(2006),
available
at
http://www.halliburtonwatch.org/reports/RI02_audit.pdf (last visited Dec. 4, 2015)
[hereinafter House Comm. on Gov't Ref.]; See also Martha Minow, Outsourcing
Power: How Privatizing Military Efforts Challenges Accountability,
Professionalism, and Democracy, 46 B.C. L. REV. 989, 990 (2005); Erik Eckholm,
F.B.I. Investigating Contracts With Halliburton, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2004),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/ 10/29/politics/29contract.html?_r=O
(last visited Dec. 4, 2015) (stating that the FBI initiated an investigation because
many called the no-bid awards illegal procurement contracts).
236. Minow, supra note 235, at 992-93.
237. Fifield, supra note 213.
238. Neil King, Jr., Halliburton 's Iraq Cost Examined, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 12,
2004,
12:01
AM),
available
at
http://www.wsj.com/artic1es/SB10790563916l753571 (last visited Dec. 4, 2015)
(noting "significant deficiencies" in accounting for KBR billing); T. Christian
Miller, U.S. Officials Suspected ofEmbezzlement in Iraq, L.A. TIMES (May 5, 2005),
available at http://articles.latimes.com/2005/may/05/world/fg-fraud5 (last visited
Nov. 23, 2015) (reporting that $100 million dollars in US taxpayer money had
disappeared).
Among the many scandals, independent auditors found that
Halliburton was importing fuel from Kuwait at double price, thus charging US
taxpayers twice as much (as it was a "cost-plus" contract in which Halliburton
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a Congressional hearing, Marie de Young, a Halliburton employee,
testified that "we, essentially, lost control of the project and paid
between four to nine times what we needed to fund that project"
because there were two or three layers of subcontracts. 239
Bechtel was also awarded infrastructure repair contracts
pursuant to fairly open-ended terms. 240 Even as the bidding process
became more competitive, in January 2004, Sheryl Tappan, head of
Bechtel's proposal team, called the competition a "sham" and a
"farce," and opined that she had never witnessed such an "arrogant"
and "egregious" Pentagon bidding process. 241 U.S. federal law
requires competitive bidding for government procurement and WTO
Government Procurement Agreement rules mandate nondiscriminatory treatment for WTO member countries, 242 but
received whatever its costs were plus a profit)). The auditors called the Kuwait oil
purchases "highway robbery" and "outrageously high." House Comm. on Gov't
Ref., supra note 235, at 4. In a series often Pentagon audits during 2004-05, auditors
discovered that Halliburton' s overcharging resulted in $219 million in "questioned"
costs and $60 million in "unsupported costs." Id. Furthermore, Halliburton had
been warned multiple times in 2003 and 2004 and was consistently told of
"significant deficiencies" in its cost estimations and even that it "universally failed
to provide adequate cost information as required," but the Pentagon kept awarding
Halliburton new contracts. Id. at 2-5, 6-14; Avery, supra note 234, at 839-41
(describing other investigations into Halliburton, including an admission that two of
its officials had been receiving kickbacks, engaging in overcharging for food
services, and failing to perform services adequately); see also Tiefer, supra note 207,
at 12, 28-30.
239. Minow, supra note 235, at 1011.
240. 1 INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS PUBLICATIONS, USA, KUWAIT: TAXATION
LAWS AND REGULATIONS HANDBOOK 171 (2012) (USAID awarded an initial $34.6
million on April 17, 2003 to Bechtel for the "repair, rehabilitation or reconstruction
of vital elements of Iraq's infrastructure. . . . includ[ing] . . . electrical grids,
municipal water systems and sewage systems," and then left open the allocation of
additional funding); see also Elizabeth Becker, Aftereffects: The Contractors;

Feeding Frenzy Under Way, as Companies From All Over Seek a Piece of the
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
21,
2003),
available
at
Action,
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/21/world/aftereffects-contractors-feedingfrenzy-under-way-companies-all-over-seek-piece.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2015)
( stating that within a month, experts were predicting that the contract would be worth
about $20 billion).
241. House Comm. on Gov't Ref., supra note 235, at 5.
242. The CPA was acting on behalf of the Bush Administration and was an
effective unit of the US government, meaning that US obligations under WTO
Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) rules would apply. Michael Davey, To

the Victor Go No Spoils? The United States as an Invading Military Force and Its
Relationship With Economic Contracts in Occupied Iraq, 23 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV.
721, 735 (2005) (discussing Charter ofEconomic Rights and Duties of States (1974)
and emphasizing that the Charter forbids any State from discrimination based on
"political, economic or social systems").
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multinational companies from non-coalition countries were often
deemed ineligible. 243 General rules for competitive bidding were
frequently exempted by raising the "public interest exception," which
alleged that reconstructing Iraq is indispensible for national security
and defense purposes 244 and by stating that there was an "unusual and
compelling urgency" for utilizing the chosen procurement process. 245
Because financing for reconstruction came primarily from the
Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Funds, U.S. taxpayers, and loans, 246
foremost policies underlying the prudent dispersal of funds on behalf
of the U.S. taxpayer-principal, included saving costs 247 and buttressing
243. David Palmeter & Niall P. Meagher, WTO Issues Relating to U.S.
Restrictions on Participation in Iraq Reconstruction Contracts, Am. Soc'y Int'l L.
(Dec. 26, 2003 ), available at http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/8/issue/29/wtoissues-relating-us-restrictions-participation-iraq-reconstruction (last visited Dec. 4,
2015) (explaining that 63 countries were eligible); Tiefer, supra note 207, at 43
(noting the frequent ineligibility due to a MNC's home state not being a member of
the coalition).
244. U.S. Faces Backlash Over Contracts, CNN (Dec. 10, 2003, 10:40 PM),
available at http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/12/10/sprj.irq.contracts/
(last visited Dec. 4, 2015) ("It is necessary for the protection of the essential security
interests of the United States to limit competition for the prime contracts for these
procurements to companies from the United States, Iraq, Coalition partners and force
contributing nations.").
245. Other exceptions that permit granting procurement contracts without a
competitive bidding process include when only a single supplier is qualified to
provide the service or product in question; when an agency confronts an "unusual
and compelling urgency" for supply of a good or service that would otherwise
seriously injure the government; when there is a case of national emergency; when
a federal statute, treaty or the terms of an international agreement permit something
other than a competitive process; and when the head of an agency decides that
bypassing competitive procurement procedures are in the public interest. 41 U .S.C.
§ 253 (2012). It was generally the "urgency" and public interest exceptions that
were espoused as exceptions to granting sole-source contracts. See Jeffrey MarburgGoodman, USAID 's Iraq Procurement Contracts: Insider's View, 39 PROCUREMENT
LAW. 10 (2003).
246. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the
Reconstruct oflraq and Afghanistan of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-106, 117 Stat. 1225
(enacted Nov. 6, 2003); Halchin, supra note 232, at 8, 19, 21-22.
24 7. Given that contractors received appropriated federal government funds,
there could have been potential violations of Federal Acquisition Regulations, the
Competition in Contracting Act (CICA), and military procurement rule violations,
all of which require full and open competition to obtain competitive pricing and save
costs. Halchin, supra note 232, at 24, 33; 41 U.S.C. § 3301 (2015); 48 C.F.R. §
6.101 (2003); 10 U.S.C. § 2304 (2015). Although, ambiguity was created in that the
former Administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy explained that
"the CPA is not the United States Government. Accordingly, if one enters into a
contractual relationship with the CPA, one is not entering into a contractual
relationship with the United States. The rights and remedies available to parties
contracting with the United States will not be available in a contractual relationship
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public integrity, 248 and on behalf of the Iraqi public-principal, included
the obligation of the CPA to operate as a responsible fiduciary because
occupation law and Iraqi funds were at stake. 249 Journalist Naomi
Klein, author of The Shock Doctrine (2007) and a critic of the CPA's
imposed reforms and the procurement process in Iraq, confronted
former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan with Greenspan's
definition of "crony capitalism" from his book and remarked:
You said "when a government's leaders or businesses routinely seek
out private sector individuals or businesses and in exchange for political
support bestow favors on them, the society is said to be in the grip of
'crony capitalism." You say, "The favors generally take the form of
monopoly access to certain markets, preferred access to sales of
government assets, and special access to those in power." I kept
thinking about Halliburton, Blackwater, Lockheed, and Boeing. You
were referring to Indonesia at the time, but I'm wondering, according
to your definition, [whether you think the U.S. is a crony capitalist
economy] ... we're seeing [extraordinary] contracting emerging, as in
the words of the New York Times, a fourth arm of government. [The]
[f]ront page of the New York Times talks about $6 billion being
investigated for criminal activity in contract allocation in Iraq. 250

with the CPA."
SIGIR, IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS LEARNED IN
CONTRACTING AND PROCUREMENT 24 (2006); United States ex rel. DRC, Inc. V.
Custer Battles, L.L.C., 376 F. Supp. 2d 617,631 (2005) (Defendants alleging that
agents were assured that the CPA was a "separate and distinct entity from the
warring powers" and "under no circumstances was it the U.S. government").
248. S. REP. No. 99-345, at 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266,
5268 ("[F]raud erodes public confidence in the Government's ability to efficiently
and effectively manage its programs ... Even in the cases where there is no dollar
loss ... the integrity of quality requirements in procurement programs is seriously
undermined.").
249. Funding can be allocated as CPA operational expenses, but fiduciary
obligations require the occupier to act in the best interest of the principal. Hague
Regulations, supra note 120, art. 48 ("If, in the territory occupied, the occupant
collects the taxes, dues, and tolls imposed for the benefit of the State, he shall ... be
bound to defray the expenses of the administration of the occupied territory ... ");
Id. art. 49 ("If, in addition to the taxes . . . the occupant levies other money
contributions in the occupied territory, this shall be for the needs of the army or of
the administration of the territory in question."). Iraqi oil revenue is part of this
public trust; the resources belong to the Iraqi people. Because revenues were
required to be used for the benefit of the people and for the occupier to "administer"
the territory, locking in "no bid," large-scale and long-term procurement contracts
in favor of firms from the occupier's state for reconstructing the country at
approximately ten times the amount that Iraqis would have charged could violate
fiduciary obligations. Being unable to account for billions of dollars aggravates the
problem. See id.
250. Alan Greenspan vs. Naomi Klein on the Iraq War, Bush's Tax Cuts,
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Greenspan retorted that government corruption with the
private sector is not the "dominant force" in the U.S. economy, while
corruption was the dominant force in Indonesia under Suharto. 251 This
is a valid distinction, but foreign direct investment in developing
countries is known to be an environment rife with corruption252 and
the argument that elected government officials have been allegiant to
key businesses that support politicians in a manner that is detrimental
to public interest and voters, such as by lobbying and with campaign
contributions from the private sector, 253 has been a criticism of
American democracy for decades. 254 Even the purveyor of public
information-the American media-is compromised by capitalist
interests. 255
Economic Populism, Crony Capitalism, and More, supra note 171.
251. Id.
252. Clemens Fuest, Giorgia Maffini & Nadine Reidel, Do Corruption and
Taxation Affect Corporate Investment in Developing Countries?, in CRITICAL
ISSUES IN TAXATION AND DEVELOPMENT 65, 65 (Clemens Fuest & George R.
Zodow eds., 2013); Jose Godinez, Corruption in Latin America and How It Affects
Foreign Direct Investment (FD!): Causes, Consequences, and Possible Solutions,
in BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT OPPORTUNITIES AND MARKET ENTRY CHALLENGES IN
LATlN AMERICA 31, 40 (Mauricio Garita & Jose Godinez eds., 2015).
253. Timothy K. Kuhner, The Separation of Business and State, 95 CALIF. L.
REV. 2353, 2354 (2007) ("Money in politics can be viewed as an assault on political
equality - wealthy actors subjugating common citizens - and yet it can also be
viewed as a form of political expression - free speech. This is enough to cause a
rational observer to throw up her hands."); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without
Romance: Implications ofPublic Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA.
L. REV. 273, 283 (1988) (the private sector influence on government can "skew
public decision-making toward private rent-seeking and away from public interest").
254. There are debates over campaign finance. See generally ROBERT E.
MUTCH, BUYlNG THE VOTE: A HISTORY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM (2014); C.
Edwin Baker, Campaign Expenditures and Free Speech, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 1 (1998). Lobbying can be controversial. See generally DIRTY DEALS? AN
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LOBBYlNG, POLITICAL INFLUENCE, AND CORRUPTION (Amy H.
Handlin ed., 2014); RONALD DWORKlN, Is DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE?:
PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW POLITICAL DEBATE 129 (2006) ("Large campaign
contributors purchase what is euphemistically called 'access' to officials; in fact they
often purchase not merely access but control."). CPA reforms can lead to a
socioeconomic system and complaints that have long been voiced about the US
economy-that the American political system is beholden to corporate agendas
rather than to voters and the populace.
255. See generally Robert Bejesky, Press Clause Aspirations and the Iraq War,
48 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 343 (2012) (noting that dominant media organizations may
not always adequately accentuate essential political concerns to Americans even
though the media are the purveyors of information and must support US democracy,
but the media industry exists in a conglomerate structure, is driven by profitability,
and may not always effectively check government as the Framer's of the
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C. Fraud in Contracting

The procurement process for reconstruction in Iraq was not
only inefficient by demonstrating favoritism for foreign companies
over local companies and potentially operating improperly by granting
no-bid contracts to select foreign companies, 256 but the Inspector
General for Iraq Reconstruction reported that billions of dollars
allocated for construction contracts were wasted or missing under
allegations of fraud, including fraud perpetrated by U.S.
contractors. 257 Consequently, the False Claims Act ("FCA"), which
has been used for over a century to recover federal funds attained
through fraudulent means 258 (including through qui tam actions by
private citizens on behalf of the government), 259 was employed to
recoup funds acquired by fraud perpetrated in Iraq. Even though the
FCA specifies that "no proof of specific intent to defraud is required"
to impose liability, 260 which means that deliberately ignoring or
recklessly disregarding the truth will satisfy the contractor's mens rea
Constitution intended, which was a prime complaint about the media's performance
in persuading Americans to support the invasion of Iraq).
256. See supra Parts V(A)(B).
257. James Glanz, Audit Describes Misuse of Funds in Iraq Projects, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 25, 2006, at A2; An Oversight Hearing on Accountability for
Contracting Abuses in Iraq: Hearing Before the S. Dem. Pol Pol'yComm., 109th Cong.
(2006) (statement by Alan Grayson, Attorney, Grayson & Kubli, P.C.) (attorney
representing whistleblowers testifying that "[h]alf of the $18 billion in Iraq
reconstruction funds are unaccounted for. Senator Dorgan has said that there is an
orgy of greed among contractors in Iraq, and there is ample evidence to back that
up"). More recent government investigations placed missing Iraqi money at $6.6
billion. Paul Richter, Missing Iraq Money May Have Been Stolen, Auditors Say,
at
available
2011),
13,
(June
TIMES
L.A.
http://articles.latimes.com/201l/jun/13/world/la-fg-missing-billions-20110613 (last
visited Dec. 4, 2015).
258. An Act to Prevent and Punish Frauds upon the Government of the United
States, Pub. L. No. 37- Chap. 67, 12 Stat. 696 (1863) (reenacted as False Claims Act,
31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33(2000)); see also Avery, supra note 234, at 828-29; Dan L.
Hargrove, Soldiers of Qui Tam Fortune: Do Military Service Members Have
Standing to File "Qui Tam" Actions Under the False Claims Act?, 34 PUB. CONT.
L.J. 45, 47 (2004); Jessica C. Morris, Civil Fraud Liability and Iraq Reconstruction:
A Return to the False Claims Act's War-Profiteering Roots?, 41 GA. L. REV. 623,
646 (2007) (noting that between 1987 and 2002 over $6 billion was recovered
through FCA actions); Erik Eckholm, Judge Limits Statute's Ability to Curb Iraq
Contractor Fraud, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2005), available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?
res=9BOCEED6123DF931A25754COA9639C8B63 (last visited Dec. 4, 2015)
(calling the FCA a "potent weapon against contractor fraud").
259. 31 u.s.c. § 3730(b)-(d) (2012).
260. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(l)(B) (2012).
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for the statute, 261 commentators expressed that it was notably
challenging to effectively hold contractors responsible under the FCA
for missing reconstruction funds. 262 If losses cannot be successfully
recovered, a contractor could be the recipient of a windfall gain, which
is to the detriment of Americans and Iraqis.
There were periodic warnings of the ongoing danger of fraud
in Iraq 263 and over the first five years of occupation, fraud losses
aggregated into the billions of dollars. 264 Losses were attributable to
diverse shams, including outright schemes of artifice perpetrated by
foreigners who sometimes had no proven track record of success with
the business entity contracting with the CPA, 265 billing authorities
inflating invoices, 266 employees of established multinationals
261. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(l), (b)(l) (2012) (creating liability for "knowingly"
made false claims presented to the government, which includes "actual knowledge"
of falsity, acting in "deliberate ignorance of the truth," or acting in "reckless
disregard of the truth or the falsity of the information").
262. M.M. Harris, Commentary, Patriots and Profiteers: Combating False
Claims by Contractors in the Iraq War and Reconstruction, 59 ALA. L. REY. 1227,
1227 (2008).
263. Reuters, U.S. Audit Finds Fraud in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2004)
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/31 /international/middleeast/31 audi.html
(last
visited Nov. 15, 2015) (reporting that one month after the CPA was dissolved, the
CPA' s Inspector General's office explained that it had been conducting 69 criminal
investigations involving fraud, with 27 of those investigations still open). As of July
30, 2007, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction noted that there were
"57 ongoing investigations into fraud, waste, and abuse in Iraq reconstruction, 28 of
which are at the Department of Justice for prosecution," and there were five
convictions, 13 arrests, and 8 pending trials. SIGIR, QUARTERLY REPORT AND
SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO THE U.S. CONG. 13 (2007), available at
http://www.dtic.mil/get-trdoc/pdf?AD=ADA509376&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf (last visited Dec. 4,
2015); Morris, supra note 258, at 627 (referencing George Washington University
expert Steven L. Schooner warning that the "potential for chicanery is great and the
potential universe of whistle-blowers is mind-boggling.").
264. Sarah E. Barnes, Comment, Categorizing Conflict in the Wartime
Enforcement of Frauds Act: When Are We Really at War?, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 979,
991 (2010); Erin M. Brown, Note, The Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act, the
Wartime Enforcement of Fraud Act, and the War on Terror, 85 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 313, 331 (2009) (legal amendments were "presented as a way to address the
numerous accounts of fraud in the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns").
265. 60 Minutes, The Mother of All Heists, CBS NEWS (June 14, 2007)
available
at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/l0/l9/60minutes/main2109200.shtml (last
visited Dec. 4, 2015) (reporting that the CPA granted a $1.2 billion contract to a
Jordanian company that was founded just weeks earlier with $2,000 in capital, and
$750 to $800 million of that amount was stolen).
266. For example, in February 2006, the first security firm fraud case to proceed
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embezzling funds, 267 and CPA officials engaging in wrongdoing. 268
The dearth of suitable CPA auditing controls probably did not
contribute a deterrent with an expected high risk of punishment269 but
Private military
there were some successful prosecutions. 270
contractors ("PMCs") were also involved in protracted legal battles
over billing, but in many cases PMCs fared better than initial press

to trial involved the Alexandria, Virginia firm Custer Battles, which was accused of
bilking the American taxpayer for millions of dollars in overbilling in security
contracts for the Iraqi airport, the Iraqi currency exchange, and other venues.
Babcock, supra note 202. After a three-week trial, the jury found Custer Battles
liable to repay $3 million dollars in fraudulent invoices, which invoked the FCA's
tremble damage provisions. Morris, supra note 258, at 628. Several months later
Judge Ellis granted the defendant's motion for judgment as a matter oflaw and stated
that the action did not meet the element of being "presented .. .to employees or
officers of the United States acting in their official capacity." United States ex rel.
DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, L.L.C., 444 F. Supp. 2d 678, 682 (E.D. Va. 2006).
However, the case was reversed on this ground and the jury verdict was reinstated.
Ellen Nakashima, Court Revives Suit Over Iraq Work, WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 2009),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpat
available
(last
dyn/content/article/2009/04/ 10/AR2009041003448 .html ?hpid=topnews
visited Dec. 4, 2015).
267. Michael S. Devine, Procurement Fraud, 2006 ARMY LAW. 132, 134
(stating that an employee of Halliburton subsidiary, Kellogg, Brown, and Root
(KBR), and a Kuwaiti businessman, were charged with "devising a scheme to
defraud the United States of more than $3.5 million related to the awarding of a
subcontract to supply fuel tankers for military operations in Kuwait"); see also
Minow, supra note 235, at 990; Wilkinson, supra note 153, at 234-35; Paul D.
Carrington, Enforcing International Corrupt Practices Law, 32 MICH. J. INT'L L.
129, 136-37 (2010) (noting that in 2009, Halliburton was required to pay $559
million for engaging in corruption in Nigeria, Halliburton manager Albert Jack
Stanley was convicted for bribing Nigerian officials, and Halliburton moved its
corporate headquarters from Houston to Dubai apparently to attempt to reduce
liability and avoid criminal jurisdiction).
268. James Glanz, Wide Plot Seen in Guilty Plea in Iraq Project, N.Y. TIMES
at
available
2006),
2,
(Feb.
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/02/intemational/middleeast/02reconstruct.html?
n=Top%2FN ews%2Fintemational%2FCountries%20and%20Territories%2Firaq&
_r=O (last visited Dec. 4, 2015) (stating that Robert J. Stein, who was a CPA
comptroller and funding officer, pied guilty to several felonies that involved
kickbacks on lucrative contracts and embezzlement); Griff Witte, U.S. Contractor
Admits Bribery for Jobs in Iraq, WASH. POST (Apr. 19, 2006), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/04/18/AR2006041801742.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2015)
(reporting that an American businessman, Philip H. Bloom, pied "guilty to
conspiracy, bribery and money-laundering charges" related to "getting
reconstruction contract for his companies").
269. See supra Part IV(D) (discussing lack of CPA auditing controls).
270. SIGIR, supra note 2, at 9 (reporting that there were 82 convictions
resulting from investigations).
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releases of alleged wrongdoing intimated. 271 The common perception
of PMCs being implicated in improper dealings was presumptively
due to the breathtakingly lucrative contracts that awarded PMC firms
an average of $445,000 for each employee per year, while an Army
Sergeant, carrying out comparable tasks, would earn $51,100 to
$69,350 per year. 272
Perhaps the most probative and encompassing implication
from these deficits in the procurement process is that the combination
of the CPA unilaterally dictating new resource-shifting laws and
institutions on Iraq and employing entities engaged in fraudulent
practices furnished an abysmal example of American "democracy"
and remiss adherence to the "Rule of Law" 273 even though the CPA' s
newly instituted civil justice institutions and practices sought to
improve then-existing Iraqi institutions274 and provide a favorable
archetype. These episodes of departure between promise and practice,
along with CPA Order 17' s endowment of immunity to contractors
from Iraqi legal process 275 so that the Iraqi government or people did
271. Christina Wilkie, Iraq War Contractors Fight On Against Lawsuits,
Investigations, Fines, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 20, 2013 7:34 AM), available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/20/iraq-war-contractors_ n_ 2901100.html
(last visited Dec. 4, 2015) (stating that "many of the war's most controversial, and
well-paid, U.S. contractors faced relatively few repercussions for their conduct in
Iraq," but over the last two years "contractors are on the defensive against allegations
of torture, fraud, negligence and extrajudicial killings").
272. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. No. 3053, CONTRACTOR'S SUPPORT OF U.S.
OPERATIONS
IN
IRAQ
14
(2008),
available
at
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/96xx/doc9688/08-12iraqcontractors.pdf (last visited Dec. 4, 2015).
273. FINNIS, supra note 42, at 270-71 (noting that the "Rule of Law" is the
name frequently given to describe an effectively functioning legal system, which is
a system that fosters compliance with clear, coherent, and stable rules, and holds
government officials accountable).
274. Daniel Bodanky, Establishing the Rule of Law, 33 GA. J. INT'L. & COMP.
L. 119, 129 (2004) (relaying also that some US military perceptions were that Iraq
had "no rule oflaw," "Iraqis are all corrupt," and they were prone to taking "bribes").
Corruption is predominantly attributable to poverty. Michael Johnston, Poverty and
Corruption,
FORBES
(Jan.
22,
2009.
6:00
PM),
available
at
http://www.forbes.com/2009/01 /22/corruption-poverty-development-bizcorruption09-cx_ mj_0122johnston.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2015).
275. Status of the Coalition Provisional Authority, supra note 228, § 4(2)
("Contractors shall not be subject to Iraqi laws or regulations in matters relating to
the terms and conditions of their contracts .... "); Atif Rehman, Note, The Court of
Last Resort: Seeking Redress for Victims of Abu-Ghraib Torture Through the Alien
Tort Claims Act, 16 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 493,498 (2006) (Order 17 resulted
in granting "complete immunity to contractors and military personnel from
prosecution in Iraqi courts for killing Iraqis or destroying local property"); J. Stephen
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not possess a civil fraud action against wrongdoers, 276 suggest that the
"Rule of Law" might be perceived as a mere catchphrase to shift blame
for the Bush Administration policies in Iraq. 277 An Iraqi judge opined:
We don't need you to come here and tell us about what law is. We
invented law .... We are the people who figured law out, thousands of
years ago. But now your soldiers are coming in and telling us what to
do, and you're not respecting our legal traditions or legal process. The
first thing the Americans did after the war was to announce that they
were immune from Iraqi legal process. So, if an American commits a
crime, they're completely immune, there's nothing that we can do about
it. The Americans are unaccountable. How can this be the rule of
law? 278

D. Reconstruction Progress and the Role of Military Reconstruction
Engineers

With such significant deficits in the procurement contracting
process and oversight, it was not surprising that reasonable estimates
of contract completion at the expected reconstruction expense often
fell short, and this was another reason for Iraqi dismay with the
occupation. Three years into the occupation, the U.S. Inspector
General's report on reconstruction noted that while $22 billion had
been spent on water, sewage and electricity projects, the infrastructure
With poor performance on
remained at prewar levels. 279
280
Iraqis lacking essential commodities while being
reconstruction,
Shi, Comment, The Legal Status of Foreign Military and Civilian Personnel
Following the Transfer of Power to the Iraqi Interim Government, 33 GA. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 245, 255-56 (2004).
276. Morris, supra note 258, at 635.
277. Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Invoking the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict
Rebuilding: A Critical Examination, 49 WM & MARYL. REV. 1347, 1348 (2008)
("this newfound fascination with the rule of law is misplaced" as it is invoked as the
supposed causal mechanism that leads to human rights violations, threats to security,
and even economic development but it really is a "desire to escape from politics by
imagining the rule of law as technical, legal, and apolitical").
278. Bodanky, supra note 274, at 130.
279. Daniel McGrory, In The Chaos ofIraq, One Project is on Target, GLOBAL
at
available
2006),
3,
(May
POLICY
(last
https://www .globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/168/3 7122.html
visited Dec. 4, 2015) (noting that less than halfof the electricity and water projects
had been completed and only six of 150 planned health centers had been completed,
but one notable project that was on target was the massive U.S. embassy complex).
280. Iraq in Ruins, supra note 29 ("Despite Iraq being rich in natural resources
and the US pouring money into its economy for over a decade, Iraqi infrastructure
is constantly failing and people are forced to beg"); Bleak Picture ofIraq Conditions,
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confronted with a debt crisis 281 and believing that they could have
more successfully repaired their country, 282 and officials in Canada,
Iraq, Japan, and other countries chastising the American rebuilding
progress, 283 U.S. officials affixed blame on insurgencies. 284 Yet, the
existence of insurgencies may have been predominantly attributable
to the fact that a high percentage of Iraqis opposed the U.S. military
presence in the country285 and that there were poor humanitarian
conditions, which eventuated into a circular effect of violence, inferior
reconstruction, more extensive expenditures for security and
reconstruction, 286 and additional opposition to the military
occupation. 287
The Pentagon offered a surprisingly optimistic view of the
rebuilding process 288 and the Bush administration and the U.S.
BBC
(Mar.
17,
2008,
12:59
AM),
available
at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7299914.stm (last visited Dec. 4, 2015)
(reporting that while still under the U.S. occupation, the Red Cross stated that the
humanitarian situation in Iraq was "among the most critical in the world").
281. ARNOVE, supra note 85, at 78.
282. Tiefer, supra note 207, at 43 (reporting that Barham Salih, Iraq's minister
of planning and development cooperation, stated that reconstruction efforts by US
contractors had proceeded "very, very, very slowly so far" and postulated that Iraqis
could have rebuilt needed infrastructure with more success).
283. Id.
284. See generally T. CHRISTIAN MILLER, BLOOD MONEY: WASTED BILLIONS,
LOST LIVES, AND CORPORATE GREED IN IRAQ 132-50, 162-63 (Brown Little, 2006).
285. Bejesky, Politico, supra note 19, at 105; What the Iraq Public Wants: A
WorldPublicOpinion.org Poll, PROGRAM ON INT'L POLICY ATTITUDES 4 (Jan. 31,
2006),
available
at
http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/jan06/Iraq_Jan06_ rpt.pdf (last visited
Dec. 4, 2015) (noting that in January 2006, 87% of Iraqis wanted a timeline for
withdrawal (64% Kurds, 90% Shia, and 94% Sunnis supported withdrawal).
Overall, 47% oflraqis supported attacks on U.S. troops (16% Kurds, 41 % Shia, and
88% Sunnis supported attacks on U.S. troops)). Id. at 5.
286. MILLER, supra note 284, at 163; David Barstow, Security Companies:
Shadow Soldiers in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2004), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/ 19/world/security-companies-shadow-soldiersin-iraq .html ?pagewanted=all (last visited Dec. 4, 2015).
287. ARNOVE, supra note 85, at 102-03 (stating that "[t]he [U.S.] is spending
one billion dollars a week [for the U.S. military] in its occupation of Iraq, excluding
the cost of 'reconstruction"' for the benefit of US corporations and noting that "[t]his
is in addition to the tens of billions of dollars already allocated for the invasion of
Iraq, the tens of billions the [U.S.] pays to maintain its massive military arsenal in
the Middle East and Asia, and the tens of billions the government spends to support
'allies' such as Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the Emirates").
288. GARTH S. JOWETI & VICTORIA O'DONNELL, PROPAGANDA AND
PERSUASION 20-21 (4th ed. 2006) (noting that some US military authority apparently
engaged in propaganda operations to misrepresent the success of the rebuilding
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military proclaimed that nation-building was one of the U.S. military's
core m1ss1ons. In December 2005, Bush issued NSPD 44, which
sought to "promote the security of the United States through improved
coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and
stabilization" in other countries. 289 The National Security Strategy in
2006 stated that the U.S. military fights wars and rebuilds after the
war. 290 Military manuals, officials and personnel further promoted
this nation-building mission. 291 The military did undertake these
process in Iraq by sending letters, allegedly written by US troops, to US newspapers
to praise the rebuilding process, but when investigators tracked down the six troops
whose names and hometowns appeared on several of eleven identical form letters,
the six troops all denied writing the letters).
289. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NAT'L SEC. PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE
44, MANAGEMENT OF INTERAGENCY EFFORTS CONCERNING RECONSTRUCTION AND
STABILIZATION 1-2 (2005) ("The United States has a significant stake in enhancing
the capacity to assist in stabilizing and reconstructing countries or regions, especially
those at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife, and to help them
establish a sustainable path toward peaceful societies, democracies, and market
economies.").
290. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 16 (2006).
291. HEADQUARTERS, U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-07,
at
available
2008),
(Oct.
iv
OPERATIONS
STABILITY
http://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-07.pdf (last visited Dec. 4, 2015) (discussing
"joint doctrine" and the role of the US military in supporting broader government
operations: "[Stability operations encompass] various military missions, tasks, and
activities conduced outside the United States in coordination with other instruments
of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide
essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and
humanitarian relief'); HEADQUARTERS, U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL
at
available
2006),
(Dec.
forward
COUNTERINSURGENCY
3-24,
http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCWP%20333.5%20part%20l.pdf (last visited Dec. 4, 2015) (reporting that General David
Petraeus and Lieutenant General James Amos explain that "[S]oldiers and Marines
are expected to be national builders as well as warriors. They must be prepared to
help reestablish institutions and local security forces and assist in rebuilding
infrastructure and basic services. They must be able to facilitate establishing local
governance and the rule oflaw"); Peter W. Chiarelli & Stephen M. Smith, Learning
from Our Modern Wars: The Imperatives of Preparing/or a Dangerous Future, 87
at
available
(2007)
6
2,
REV.
MIL.
http://www.army.mil/professionalWriting/volumes/volume6/j anuary_2008/ I_08 l
_pf.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2015) (explaining "like it or not, until further notice the
U.S. Government has decided that the military largely owns the job of nationbuilding."); Timothy Austin Furin, Legally Funding Military Support to Stability,
Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations, 2008 ARMY LA w. 1, 13
( stating that with these new emphasized missions that there is a continuum on which
operations should be categorized between "peace to crisis to conflict" and that
"commanders must consider stability operations when planning each phase of any
military operation."); Stigall, supra, note 99, at 40 (US Army Judge Advocate
claiming: "Military assets are the preferred choice for the task of state-building ...
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obligations in Iraq, but political will might not best be represented by
adding new realms of general expertise to core U.S. military missions
because there are questions of international community and U .N.
consent to specific "nation-building" missions, Congress'
constitutional authority to assent to new military missions, 292 the U.S.
military's choice to not emphasize educating its leaders with "rule of
law" operations, 293 and the fact that the military occupation was
arguably not particularly effective in nation-building in Iraq. 294
[and are] a generally indispensable element of any state-building operation ... [T]he
modem military's diverse and robust continent of professionals ... [provide]
'combat arms' soldiers ... [and] a host of trained professionals such as physicians,
lawyers (Judge Advocates), and engineers-all of whom are uniformed service
members .... They are able to operate in post-conflict states and assist in rebuilding
or developing legal infrastructure."); J. Porter Harlow, Publishing Doctrine on
Stability Operations and the Rule of Law During Conflict, 2010 ARMY LAW. 65, 66
("Soldiers and Marines are expected to be nation builders as well as warriors.");
Perhaps this new civilian function makes logical sense given the newly-obscure roles
prevailing with the Pentagon's eagerness to privatize everything, including military
services, during the occupation. See generally Robert Bejesky, The Economics of
the Will to Fight: Public Choice in the Use ofPrivate Contractors in Iraq, 45 CUMB.
L. REV. 1 (2014/2015).
292. It is true that Congress appropriated military funds for reconstruction and
for military occupation. See Furin, supra note 291 , at 22 (stating that "the postconflict SSTR [Stabilization, Security, Transition and Reconstruction] operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq are developing well since Congress has appropriated funds to
accomplish the SSTR mission." (This might not necessarily be a general sanction
for the future.)).
293. Ronald T.P. Alcala, Vanquishing Paper Tigers: Applying Comparative
Law Methodology to Enhance Rule ofLaw Development, 2011 ARMY LAW. 5, 5, 11
("[T]he military is not the designated lead for rule of law but will frequently serve
as the de facto lead during stability operations.").
294. Secretary of Defense Gates contended that the Department of Defense
does not have sufficient personnel or the skill sets required to operate effectively in
Iraq. Eric Talbot Jensen, Post-Conflict Transition, 14 NEW ENG. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 35, 37 (2007); Tiefer, supra note 207, at 1-8 (noting that the military occupation's
"nation building" and economic rebuilding operations were a drastic failure). One
rationale for this role for the Pentagon role is that there is not enough civilian
capacity in the U.S. government to address these issues. Dan E. Stigall, The Thickest
Grey: Assessing the Status of the Civilian Response Corps Under the Law of
International Armed Conflict and the U.S. Approach to Targeting Civilians, 25 AM.
U. INT'L L. REV. 885, 900 (2010); Furin, supra note 291, at 1 ("First, DOD
formalized a new stability operations policy that elevated stability operations to a
core military mission on par with combat operations. Second, DOD broadened its
military planning guidance to more fully address pre-conflict and post-conflict
operations. Third, DOD developed a joint operations concept to serve as the basis
for how the military will further support Stabilization, Security, Transition and
Reconstruction (SSTR) operations."); Conference: From Autocracy to Democracy:
The Effort to Establish Market Democracies in Iraq and Afghanistan: Panel 2:
Building the Institutions of the Nation, 33 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 171, 189 (2004)
(Professor Wiarda stating "I think neither the United States nor the international
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Nonetheless, with CPA directives blatantly contravening restrictions
of occupation law, the best protection against the reversal of the CPA' s
initiatives, rule frameworks, and potential shifts in property rights and
power, is to ensure the security of those rules with a long-term military
occupation.
VI. CONCLUSION
The invasion of Iraq in 2003 occurred after the Bush
administration delivered six months of false allegations about Iraq
possessing chemical and biological weapons, a nuclear weapons
program, and ties to al-Qaeda, all of which were false. 295 Due to the
invasion, a humanitarian crisis unfolded and the Iraqi government was
displaced, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1483 to
affirm a mandate to administrate the country under occupation, but did
not permit the CPA to unilaterally revamp Iraq's legal system. 296 The
CPA's involvement began as a progression that contended
democratization and market economies were interdependent, but
continued with more contentious reforms, including by deepening
foreign investment, advocating for privatization, dollarizing the Iraqi
economy, and enacting over thirty new economic codes with
rudimentary and nearly unrestricted capitalist provisions. 297 The CPA
agencies are very good at nation-building or even know what they are doing in most
cases.").
295. Ackerman & Hathaway, supra note 33, at 464; Bejesky, Weapon
Inspections, supra note 33, at 350-69
296. In a March 26, 2003 memo, British Attorney General Goldsmith stated:
In short, my view is that a further Security Council resolution is needed to authorise
imposing reform and restructuring of Iraq and its Government. In the absence of a
further resolution, the UK (and US) would be bound by the provisions ofinternational
law governing belligerent occupation, notably the Fourth Geneva Convention and the
1907 Hague Regulations.

Roberts, supra note 152, at 609. Goldsmith further added that the "imposition of
major structural economic reforms would not be authorized by international law."
Id. Goldsmith is correct about occupation law restrictions, but the rest of his
statement is a red herring. Resolution 1483 permitted a temporary occupation
primarily to address humanitarian suffering and economic hardship, search for
weapons of mass destruction, and ensure that Iraqis designed viable government to
address humanitarian concerns, but absolutely nothing was said about the CPA
dictating unilateral structural economic reforms. S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 93,
1, 4, 5, 7, 8(c)(i), 9 (noting that when the Resolution mentions "institutions" and
reform initiatives, surrounding language affirms that it is the Iraqi people who
determine their "own political future" and request that all UN members, UN organs,
and "the Authority" were to "assist" Iraqis who will determine and establish their
own institutions).
297. See supra Parts II, III, IV.
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broadly construed the explicit language of Resolution 1483 and
imposed unilateral dictates without Iraqi support and without a
democratic government, while, at the same time presiding over an
abysmal rebuilding process, intensified violence and insecurity, and
corrupt relations with contractors and appointed representatives of
local Iraqi bodies. 298 The CPA assumed it possessed all the answers
to Iraqi preferences even before a democratic government was
elected. 299 A 2004 World Bank report specifically addressed this
issue, recognized the lack of Iraqi public ratification for economic
reforms, and contended that Iraqi democratic will should not alter
CPA dictates because investor confidence was paramount:
Crucial to investor confidence is the credibility of the transitional and
new governments' approach to the existing legal framework and the
predictability of their basic policies. Such sustainability will require
achieving adequate consensus at various levels on an underlying

298. NOAH FELDMAN, WHAT WE OWE IRAQ: WAR AND THE ETHICS OF NATION
BUILDING 77-80 (2004); Richard B. Bilder & Michael J. Matheson, Book Note, The

International Struggle over Iraq: Politics in the UN Security Council, 1980-2005,
102 AM. J. INT'L L. 687,691 (2008) ("[T]he essentially unilateral effort of the United
States since [the invasion] has resulted in even worse violence, insecurity, and
corruption."); Patterson, supra note 183, at 468, 474 (noting that the CPA did not
comply with occupation law, which endows a right to remedy wrongs); see also
Zahawi, supra note 7, at 2298. See generally Part IV(D), V.
299. The White House Future of Iraq project was already planning for an
occupation and reforms as much as a year before the invasion. Hassen, supra note
144. See generally Newt Gingrich & Mark Kester, A Security Strategy of

Transforming Societies: From Stabilizing to Transforming Societies as the Key to
American Security, 28 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 5 (2004) (unabashedly contending
that the US should transform societies around the world). Common Iraqis opposed
the occupation of their country and from the perspective of Americans, Mr. Bush
left office with one of the worst presidential approval ratings in history and it was
specifically because of Iraq and the economic recession, which might have been
partially due to the excessive spending for the Iraq war. Bejesky, Politico, supra
note 19, at 31, 105. The extrapolation of occupier power and unilaterally-conceived
mission of "what is best for the Iraqi people," seems to be based on distorting
occupation law and an assumption of omniscience about Iraqi desires conjoined with
myths. Roberts, supra note 152, at 601 (remarking of the depiction of the occupant
as a bastion of progress can beget a "dangerous mix of crusading, self-righteousness,
and self-delusion"). Some assumptions, in the author's opinion, during the existence
of the CPA seem to include: "We believe that we can install democratic institutions,"
"We believe that market mechanisms and capitalism are the essence of freedom,"
"We believe Iraq's public sector requires privatization for the good of the Iraqi
people," "We believe foreign investment is needed is essential for your economic
well-being and that foreign investment should be given national treatment
protections," and "We believe foreign oil company investment in needed."
Meanwhile, it was not the "Coalition" that was imposing dictates, but the "United
States," and more specifically the Bush Administration.
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economic strategy. For continuity, the sovereign Iraqi government will
need to confirm its broad support for legislation issued by the Coalition
Provisional Authority and clearly signal that pending administration
regulations critical to the implementation of fundamental legal
provisions will be developed and implemented. 300

If Iraqis had been in a position similar to other Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (with a cash-rich state-owned
oil industry) so that revenues could have been generated from their
own oil wealth, Iraqis would not have needed foreign investment.
This was actually an insurmountable possibility because of the debt
Iraq held throughout the period when the Security Council restricted
Iraqi oil sales. Because of Iraq's financial position at the time of the
2003 invasion, new laws were imposed by the CPA, including
frameworks that benefited foreign corporations, and likely became
socialized and solidified301 with a long-term military occupation. If
the populace is not content with its new society, laws, and institutions,
conditions could be ripe for insurgencies because some percentage of
the population lost power, wealth, government benefits, employment,
and habitable conditions. 302 Indignation may be even more pointed if
perceptions of disenfranchisement are attributable to a foreign
invasion and an unwarranted military occupation. 303 If commentators
concur that corruption is immoral, harmful to public interest, and
undermines justice and fair contract and property law protections, 304 it
300. Building a Sustainable Investment Climate in Iraq,, 33-34 (World Bank,
Reconstructing Iraq Working Paper No. 1, Sept. 27, 2004).
301. Mills, supra note 140, at 199.
302. See Stephens, supra note 29; Iraq in Ruins, supra note 29.
303. Perceived discrimination may be heightened when these events occurred
in a country where most of the population is poor, aspires for a better life for one's
family (which might best be attained by developing favorable connections to the
occupying authority), and is beholden to a social and economic reality that is
enforced by three hundred thousand American troops and security force personnel.
It should also be remembered that the Pentagon was attempting to covertly
manipulate Iraqi public opinion by employing advertising and consultancy firms to
place favorable pro-US occupation propaganda in Iraqi newspapers and also running
its own media outlets in Iraq. See Robert Bejesky, Public Diplomacy or
Propaganda? Targeted Messages and Tardy Corrections to Unverified Reporting,
40 CAP. U. L. REV. 967, 1029-49 (2012).
304. Omar Azfar, Young Lee & Anand Swamy, The Causes and Consequences
of Corruption, 573 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 42, 46, 53 (2001); Peter
Egger & Hannes Winner, How Corruption Influence Foreign Direct Investment: A
Panel Study, 54 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 459, 460 (2006); M. Shahid
Alam, Anatomy of Corruption: An Approach to the Political Economy of
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is no wonder that Iraq has recently been tom apart by sectoral
allegiances amid claims of discrimination and suppression. 305 Sunnis,
Kurds, and a high percentage of Shia wanted Prime Minister Maliki,
who operated as a dictator and corruptly enriched himself at public
expense, 306 to resign, 307 but he practically had to be tom kicking and
screaming from office, 308 only to be appointed vice president a few
days later. 309 Maliki has been the target of hostility, but deeper
problems must be resolved to achieve a peaceful reconciliation to the
present crisis. Economic viability for all Iraqis and ending economic
and political discrimination should be at the core of discussions.

Underdevelopment, 48 AM. J. ECON. & Soc. 441,453 (1989).
305. See Sandy Berger, U.S. Must Forge New Ties With Iraq to Tackle ISIS
Threat, TIME (Aug. 17, 2014 ), available at http://time.com/3130983/sandy-bergeriraq-isis-maliki/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2015) (Sandy Berger, national security advisor
during the Clinton administration, stating that "Maliki had governed in such an
overtly anti-Sunni fashion that the Sunni tribes in the north had come to hate him
more than they feared ISIS"); Al-Ali, supra note 30.; Maginnis, supra note 30;
Damon & Tawfeeq, supra note 30.
306. See supra Part I.
307. Renae Merle, Air Force Erred with No-Bid Iraq Contract, GAO Says,
WASH. POST (Nov. 29, 2005), available at http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P282607 .html (last visited Dec. 4, 2015) ("Our Defense Department has continued to
pay, through pliant contractors, for a flock of Iraqi political exiles as our paid
political agents in Iraq"). Perhaps it is possible to direct a foreign country's policies
after a government holds elections as elected politicians and appointed bureaucrats
may be amenable to and beneficiaries of foreign influence. Even politicians who
have been democratically-elected can become amenable because that influence is
often what empowered them in the first place. Pepe Escobar. The Roving Eve:
Behind the Anbar Mvth. ASIA TIMES (Sept. 14. 2007). available at
htto://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle East/II14Ak04.html (last visited Dec. 4,
2015) (noting how Maliki, as the US 's puppet, has abused his office).
308. See Bozorgmehr Sharafedin, Why Iran Has Finally Let Go of Maliki, BBC
(Aug. 13, 2014), available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east28777142 (last visited Dec. 4, 2015).
309. What Do Iraqi Leaders Hope to Hear From Obama's Strategy?, PBS
(Sept. 10, 2014 6:06 PM), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/iraqileaders-hope-hear-obamas-strategy/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2015).
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ABSTRACT
Information notice and data subject's consent are the current main
legal safeguards of data protection and privacy rights: they reflect
individuals' instances, such as self-determination and control over one's
own private sphere, that have been acknowledged in many jurisdictions.
However, the theoretic strength of these safeguards appears frustrated by
current online practices that seem suggesting to give-up with their most
common form of implementation: privacy notices and request for
consent. These measures are proving to be unsuccessful in increasing
users' awareness and in fostering a privacy protective-behaviour. As
recent studies have shown, although people declare privacy concerns,
their actual behaviour diverges from their statements (the "privacy
paradox"), as they seem to increasingly disclose personal data and to not
even read privacy notices available online; eventually, the current privacy
notices are not effective in regulating user's data disclosure.
Behaviourally informed approaches to regulatory problems, already
applied to different areas of information provision and public policy,
helped to clarify the reasons of similar peoples' behaviour that cannot be
reduced to a simplistic "users do not care about privacy." Highlighting
the regulatory weakness of traditional information notices, applied
behavioural science has also demonstrated to be particularly effective in
improving users' decision-making and attaining concrete policy
objectives if accompanied by ad hoc design interventions to display the
relevant, salient information. As users do not read privacy policies or act
in contradiction with them, other strategies might be more successful in
promoting, "nudging," privacy-protective behaviour.
The use of innovative information notices, like salient alerts and
nudges, seems to be a promising means of behavioural change also in the
area of digital privacy, a possible new area of application of behavioural
insights.
Building on recent studies in the field (conducted mainly in the
U.S.), this paper considers new forms of privacy notices (like "visceral"
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notices), as alternative or complement to current legal (technical)
measures for data protection. For the informed consent approach (or
"notice and choice" approach) to work, it needs to be improved with welldesigned, transparent and regulated nudging system, capable to help
citizens in their decision-making as regards their privacy.
Without disregarding the challenges and limitations of nudging
strategies in public policy in general and in the privacy area in particular,
and examining their legal grounds, the paper aims also to integrate that
branch of legal-policy research that see "nudging" methods as an
effective way to gently encourage safer behaviours in the citizens.

I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
The emergence of new digital technologies and the growth of an
information-based economy, made data protection policy a priority in the
European Union ("EU"), as well as in other countries' agenda, in which
the search for a balance between the safeguard of individual fundamental
rights and other competing interests is deemed crucial for the same
Information Communication
existence of a democratic society.
Technologies ("ICTs"), despite being a key enabler for economic
development, may also represent a threat to fundamental rights, namely
to privacy and data protection rights, as enshrined by the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the EU. 1
Safeguarding these rights plays a central role in building trust in the
online environment. As the European Commission pointed out, building
this trust is essential to economic development, 2 and it is a key objective
in the Digital Agenda for Europe ("DAE"), the EU flagship initiative on
all ICT-related activities. 3 For these reasons, the current legal framework
1. See Charter ofFundamental Rights of the European Union 326/02, art. 7-8, 2012 O.J.
(C 391) 2 (containing two separate articles for privacy and data protection rights).
2. See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation), at 1, COM (2012) 11 final
(Jan. 25, 2012) [hereinafter Proposal for GDPR].
3. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council,
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A Digital
Agenda/or Europe, at 13, COM (2010) 245 final (May 19, 2010). The DAE, which includes
more than 100 distinct actions, has as one of its goals to reinforce trust and security online.
Action 35, in particular, aims to provide guidance in implementation of new Telecoms
framework with regard to the protection of individuals' privacy and personal data (namely, of
thee-privacy Directive 2002/58/EC as modified by Directive 2009/136/EC). See Action 35:
Guidance on Implementation of Telecoms Rules and Privacy, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Oct.
25, 2010), available at https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/pillar-iii-trust-security/action35-guidance-implementation-telecoms-rules-privacy (last visited Dec. 18, 2015). Action 35
has to be read in conjunction with Action 12 (Review of the European Data Protection Rules)

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol43/iss1/1

78

et al.: JILC - Vol. 43, No. 1 (complete)

72

Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 43: 1

on privacy and data protection in Europe is under review; 4 Directive
95/46/EC is going to be replaced by the General Data Protection
Regulation ("GDPR"), which aims "to build a stronger and more coherent
data protection framework in the EU." 5
One of the main safeguards of the EU legal framework that the
Proposal for a GDPR seeks to reinforce is represented by the fair
information principles; 6 the transparency principle and consequent
information obligations for those who process personal data is now
strengthened and codified in the Draft Regulation, as a reinforcement of
individual rights protection and an instrument of user empowerment. 7
In particular, "Article 11 introduces the obligation on controllers to
provide transparent and easily accessible and understandable

aimed at reviewing the current Data Protection regulatory framework "to strengthen
individual rights and tackle emerging challenges from globalisation and new technologies."
EUROPEAN UNION: CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY AND PROGRAMS HANDBOOK: VOLUME ]
STRATEGIC INFORMATION AND REGULATIONS 64, 73 (2014).
4. The legal framework currently applicable in the field of privacy and data protection
is represented mainly by the Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard
to the processing ofpersonal data and on the free movement of such data, integrated by the
Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of
privacy in the electronic communications sector (so called e-Privacy Directive, as modified
by the Directive 2009/136/EC, the e-cookies Directive). See Council Directive 95/46, 1995
O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC); Council Directive 2002/58, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37 (EC); Council
Directive 2009/136, 2009 O.J. (L 337) 11 (EC).
5. Proposal for GDPR, supra note 2, at 2. The regulation, will apply to public and
private processing of personal data in most of the activities related to the former I pillar of EU
(the community pillar, including single market, consumer protection, social policy, etc.). The
European Commission has a parallel initiative for the data protection in the area of police and
judicial cooperation in criminal matters. See Commission Proposal for a Directive of the
European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data by Competent Authorities for the Purposes of Prevention,
Investigation, Detection or Prosecution of Criminal Offences or the Execution of Criminal
Penalties, and the Free Movement ofSuch Data, at 15, COM (2012) 10 final (Jan. 25, 2012).
Despite the adoption of these two separate legal instruments for data protection in different
areas, given that the Lisbon Treaty (2009) has abolished the Pillar structure, the EC is firmly
striving to adopt a comprehensive approach on data protection. See Communication from the
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee
and the Committee of the Regions: A Comprehensive Approach on Personal Data Protection
in the European Union, at 409, COM (2010) 609 final (Apr. 11, 2010) [hereinafter A
Comprehensive Approach on Personal Data Protection].
6. See Paul De Hert & Vagelis Papakonstantinou, The Proposed Data Protection
Regulation Replacing Directive 95/45/EC: A Sound System for the Protection of Individuals,
28 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 130, 134 (2012).
7. See Proposal for GDPR, supra note 2, at 25 ("The principles of fair and transparent
processing require that the data subject should be informed in particular of the existence of
the processing operation and its purposes, how long the data will be likely stored, on the
existence of the right of access, rectification or erasure and on the right to lodge a
complaint.").
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information. " 8 This is particularly relevant in situations such as online
advertising, where the proliferation of actors and the technological
complexity of practices make it difficult for the data subject to know and
understand if personal data relating to them are being collected, by whom
and for what purpose. 9 "Article 14 further specifies the controller's
information obligations towards the data subject." 10
This means that according to the transparency principle of the
European legislation, any data controller, including an Internet company
or an Internet Service Provider, must specify the types of data collected
and the purposes for which they may be used.
Data processing and data flow are thus allowed under a number of
conditions, namely the requirement of obtaining data subject's consent
that should be free, specific and informed.
Directly connected to the transparency principle and information
obligations, the informed (and also free and specific) consent requirement
represents a cornerstone of the EU data protection legislation: it grants
the main legal ground for personal data processing (although other legal
basis are contemplated) 11 and it has been strengthened by the Draft
GDPR, becoming now an explicit consent 12 requirement.

8. Id. at 8.
9. See id. at 43 ("Personal data must be: (a) processed lawfully, fairly and in a
transparent manner in relation to the data subject."); id. at 47 ("I. The controller shall have
transparent and easily accessible policies with regard to the processing of personal data and
for the exercise of data subjects' rights. 2. The controller shall provide any information and
any communication relating to the processing of personal data to the data subject in an
intelligible form, using clear and plain language, adapted to the data subject, in particular for
any information addressed specifically to a child.") (emphasis added); see also id. at 24
(urging, in particular for children, specific protection and a clear language).
l 0. Proposal for GDPR, supra note 2, at 8 (emphasis added).
11. Id. at 43-44.
1. Processing of personal data shall be lawful only if and to the extent that at least one
of the following applies:
(a) the data subject has given consent to the processing of their personal data for one
or more specific purposes;
(b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject
is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into
a contract ....
Id.
12. See id. at 42 ("'[T]he data subject's consent' means any freely given specific,
informed and explicit indication of his or her wishes by which the data subject, either by a
statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to personal data relating to
them being processed.") (emphasis added). The need to examine ways to clarify and
strengthen the consent requirement has been considered by the European Commission. See
A Comprehensive Approach on Personal Data Protection, supra note 5, at 8-9.
[I]n the online environment - given the opacity of privacy policies - it is often
more difficult for individuals to be aware of their rights and give informed

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol43/iss1/1

80

et al.: JILC - Vol. 43, No. 1 (complete)

74

Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 43: 1

It is understood that consent cannot be inferred implicitly, as
inaction should not be perceived as the indication of users' wishes, and
that it should be evidenced by a statement or by a clear affirmative action.
This last aspect is particularly relevant for the online environment, 13
where user's inactivity cannot be considered as consent, but where a
"click" might be accepted as valid consent (if all other conditions are
met). 14
This means that in the context of behavioural advertising (which is
becoming the principal business model for companies in the digital
economy), the informed consent requirement should be obtained, for
instance, by the third-party advertisers tracking the users, before placing
tracking cookies on a user's computer or before accessing information
stored on the user's computer. For the consent to be informed, the user
should be provided with information about, for instance, the sending and
purposes of the cookies. 15
The choice made by the European legislation is clearly for an opt-in
system, where an active action to consent is required (as opposed to optout system where the consent is presumed by default, with the possibility
for the user to change it). 16
consent. This is even more complicated by the fact that, in some cases, it is not
even clear what would constitute freely given, specific and informed consent to
data processing ...

Id. at 9.
13. In this regard, it is important to notice that European Directive 2002/58/EC, the
distinct directive for the protection of personal data in the electronic communications sector
(i.e., thee-Privacy Directive) as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC, also requires companies
to obtain the Internet users' consent, in particular before installing cookies, having the users
been provided with clear and comprehensive information . See Council Directive 2002/58,
art. 5, 2002 OJ. (L 201) 37 (EC). The relationship between the Draft General DP Regulation
and thee-Privacy Directive still needs to be clarified, however thee-Privacy Directive does
not seem affected by the reform (if not for technical adjustments) and it should work as lex
specialis with respect to the General Regulation. See Proposal for GDPR, supra note 2, at
99.
14. See Council Directive 2002/58 2002 OJ. (L 201) 31 (EC) ("Consent may be given
by any appropriate method enabling a freely given specific and informed indication of the
user's wishes, including by ticking a box when visiting an Internet website."); see also
Opinion of the Working Parking on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data on the "Definition of Consent," at 26 (July 13, 2011), available
at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2011/wp 187_ en.pdf (last visited
Dec. 18, 2015) [hereinafter Opinion on the Definition of Consent].
15. Council Directive 2009/136, 2009 O.J (L 337) 11 (EC). According to Recital 66 of
Directive 2009/136/EC, modifying e-Privacy Directive "methods of providing information
and offering the right to refuse should be as user-friendly as possible" and that, "[w]here it is
technically possible and effective, the user's consent to processing may be expressed by using
the appropriate settings of a browser or other application." Id. (emphasis added); see Opinion
on the Definition of Consent, supra note 14, at 32.
16. See, e.g., id.
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Now, it must be noticed that both the current Data Protection ("DP")
Directives and the Draft Regulation, despite establishing those
information obligations and consent requirements, contain few
indications on how information should be provided to the user or how the
latter could exercise her right to object to the processing of personal data.
The common instruments usually adopted by data controllers to be
compliant with the law are privacy policies (or notices). 17
As studies conducted both in Europe 18 and outside Europe 19 have
shown, the problem with current privacy polices is that they are not
effective, at least not concerning the purpose of increasing users privacy
awareness (risks and rights) nor of encouraging a more responsible data
disclosure. These and similar studies, 20 in fact, have demonstrated that,
although the majority of Internet users report to have concerns about
privacy and to notice the presence of privacy notices or warning
messages, most of them, especially young people, do not read these
statements and keep disclosing personal data: this phenomenon is also
called "privacy paradox."
Current privacy notices are ignored as they are often written in a not
clear and easy language. In brief, they are hardly ever read by users and
- even if read - very difficult to understand. The reality offers a scenario
characterized by a lack of understanding by users of the ways personal
data is collected, used and disclosed, as well as of potential risks with the
consequence that the provision of users' consent is not really informed.
However, even when the level of clearness and completeness of
privacy polices is satisfactory, i.e., when they fulfill the legal formal
17. Most common privacy notices attached to a webpage are usually accessible through
a hyperlink and made of a long statement; they are supposed to explain what information is
collected and for what purposes, how it is used and the choices offered to the users (e.g. how
to update personal account or to modify the default settings). Some examples, taken from
Ryanair and Google's websites, are provided here: see, e.g., Ryanair Website Privacy
Statement, RY AN AIR, available at http://www.ryanair.com/ie/privacy-policy/ (last visited
at
available
GOOGLE,
Policy,
Privacy
2015);
18,
Dec.
http://static.googleusercontent.com/media/www.google .com/it!/inti/enGB/po licies/privacy/google_privacy_policy_en-GB.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2015).
18. See, e.g., Pan-European Survey of Practices, Attitudes & Policy Preferences as
Regard Personal Identity Data Management, JOINT RES. CTR. (2012), available at
http://is.jrc.ec.europa.eu/pagesffFS/documents/EIDSURVEY_Web_001.pdf (last visited
Dec. 18, 2015) [hereinafter Pan-European Survey ofPractices].
19. See, e.g., Janice Tsai et al., What's it to you? A Survey of Online Privacy Concerns
and Risks (NET Institute, Working Paper No. 06-29, 2006); Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie
Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4 J. L. & PoL'Y FOR THE INFO. Soc'v 543
(2008).
20. Mary Madden et al., Teen, Social Media and Privacy Report, PEW RES. CTR. (May
21, 2013 ), available at http://www.pewintemet.org/2013/05/21 /teens-social-media-andprivacy/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2015).
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requirements, they fail to realize the main purpose of the law ( at least of
the European law), that is, to foster attentive users' decision-making and
eventually a conscious data-disclosure behaviour.
As users do not read privacy policies or act in contradiction with
them, other strategies might be more successful in obtaining privacyprotective behaviour. It is not enough that privacy policies are provided
in a place easy to find on a website, but they also should have an impact
on users' behaviour.
Providing simplified, standardized privacy information, although of
some benefits, has proved to be also insufficient. Insights from
behavioural economics have helped to understand why (as discussed in
the next sections).
Finally, current privacy policies do not help users in making the best
choices as regards to consent (or not) to data processing. They fail to
realize one of the objectives of DP law, i.e., to ensure that people make
pondered decisions about their data, and, as ultimate goal, to increase
trust in online services. Therefore, there may be a need of policy
intervention aimed at changing users' behaviour, introducing alternative,
more effective ways of presenting information.
Knowing how users really behave with regard to their personal data
(often in contrast with their statements) may play a relevant role in
addressing the current "privacy paradox," as well as the gap between
existing legal privacy safeguards and implementing tools.
Behavioural research has not only shown that there is a significant
relationship between the content of privacy policies and individuals'
privacy concems/trust, 21 but also that an overload of information (e.g.,
long and complex texts) is counterproductive also in the privacy field. 22
Given that people are influenced by how information (on products,
services, etc.) is presented, identifying the appropriate notice content and
design to display online privacy information should also improve users'
decision-making in this regard, helping them in attaining a greater
empowerment online. 23 By making easier, agile and thus more effective
the display of privacy information, in fact, users may be able to take more

21. Kuang-Wen Wu et al., The Effect of Online Privacy Policy on Consumer Privacy
Concern and Trust, 28 COMPUTERS IN HUM. BEH. 889 (2012).
22. See, e.g., Janice Tsai et al., The Effect of Online Privacy Information on Purchasing
Behaviour: An Experimental Study, 22 INFO. SYSTEM RES. 254 (2011); Alessandro Acquisti
& Jens Grossklags, What Can Behaviorual Economics Teach Us About Privacy, in DIGITAL
PRIVACY: THEORY, TECHNOLOGIES AND PRACTICES 363 (Alessandro Acquisti et al. eds., 2007).
23. See generally Sebastian Deterding et al. , Designing Gamijication: Creating Gameful
and Playful Experiences, in CHI '13 CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING
SYSTEMS 3263 (2013).
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informed decisions regarding the usage of their personal information
online. 24
Experiments to test users' responses (their actual behaviour) to new
type of privacy policies started to be run mainly in the U.S., 25 while in
Europe this aspect is still not enough explored. This paper gives briefly
an account of the existing behavioural studies and experiments,
including, though, the first steps undertaken by the EU in this direction:
BREVE (Behavioural Responses to Privacy Visceral Notices), a project
recently launched by the European Commission, aims at studying the
impact of different, innovative online privacy notices on users' behaviour
as regards their privacy. The aim is to encourage also in Europe the use
of behavioural research for policy making in the field of privacy.
In light of the above, this article is structured as follows: Part II
briefly recalls the main findings of the current research on privacy
policies and informed consent requirements as (ineffective) legal tools
for privacy protection also in comparison with other information
disclosure mechanisms (e.g., in consumer protection contexts). The
starting point will be the analysis of the phenomenon called the "privacy
paradox." Having learned the lessons from previous studies and
experiments on users' practices online, Part III discusses the challenges
and opportunities of behavioural sciences applied to public policy in
order to better understand the relevance of behavioural aspects in the
privacy area. The focus will be, eventually, on privacy information
provisions and users' data disclosure behaviour, with particular emphasis
on recent research conducted on Privacy Visceral Notices. Part IV,
finally, provides some recommendations on how to integrate Behavioural
Insights into privacy policy and law (hard law and/or soft law) and on
future research. In this way, this paper seeks also to integrate that
research strand that explores to what extent (and at what level of
governance) the regulatory approach could play a role in cyberspace. 26

24. Laura Brandimarte et al., Misplaced Confidences: Privacy and the Control Paradox,
& PERSONALITY Sci. 40, 41-45 (2013).
25. See, e.g., Victoria Groom & M. Ryan Calo, Reversing the Privacy Paradox: An
Experimental Study 1 passim (Social Science Research Network, Working Paper, 2011)
(experimental study on the efficacy of various techniques ofnonlinguistic notice on consumer
privacy expectations); Yang Wang et al., A Field Trial of Privacy Nudges for Face book, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIGCHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS
2367 (2014) (reporting the results of an experiment conducted on U.S. students, users of
Facebook and exposed to different privacy nudges, ranging from a "time nudge" to the
"emotional nudge").
26. See generally Oreste Pollicino & Marco Bassini, Internet Law in the Era of
Transnational Law (Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Working Paper No. 24
(2011).

4
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II. PRIVACY NOTICES AND PRIVACY PARADOX
A. Information obligations and informed consent
"Confidence in the Internet and its governance is a prerequisite for
the realization of the Internet's potential as an engine for economic
growth and innovation. . . . The [European] Commission is addressing
these challenges, notably via the reform of the EU Data Protection
framework. 27
The Draft GDPR, to which this reform has been assigned,
strengthens the consent requirement and the transparency principle, as
said in the introduction: "The controller shall have transparent and easily
accessible policies."28 This information disclosure obligation is imposed
by the European legislator to any data controller, 29 including Internet
companies/ISPs: they should provide complete and accurate information
regarding purposes, nature, conditions of online data processing and
users' privacy rights, so that the subjects can provide an "aware"
consent. 30

27. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Internet Policy
and Governance: Europe's Role in Shaping the Future of Internet Governance, at 9, COM
(2014) 72 final (Feb. 12, 2014) (EC).
28. Proposal for GDPR, supra note 2, at 47.
29. Data controller "determines the purposes, conditions and means of the processing of
personal data," as far as there purposes are legitimate. See id. at 41-42.
30. The consent to data processing that the data subject might decide to give should refer
also to the purposes for which personal data are processing. In the EU legislation, in fact, the
consent is conceived as a major instrument for individuals to keep control over the processing
(and the purposes) of their data. This also explains the relevance of the notion of free and
specific consent as well as of 'further purposes' for which data might be processed.
Interestingly, while the current Directive 95/46 states that data cannot be further processed in
a way incompatible with the purposes for which they have been collected (Art 6), the Draft
Regulation introduces a more permissible criterion. Further processing is allowed where the
purposes are compatible with those for which the data have been collected (Art 6): i.e. in case
of further processing, subject's consent is required only in case of incompatibility of the
further purposes. Internet companies certainly receive advantage from this amendment, as
they will not need to ask for consent in many ' compatible' cases. The purposes limitation
principle has its equivalent in the North American privacy literature in the concept of
'contextual integrity' and possibly in its regulation as one of the principles of what will be the
first U.S. general privacy Act. See Helen Nissenbaum, A Contextual Approach to Privacy
Online, 140 J. AM. ACAD. OF ARTS & Set. 32, 37 (2011); see also EXEC. OFFIC E OF TH E
PRESIDENT, CONSUM ER DATA PRIVACY fN A NETWORKED WORLD : A

FRAMEWORK FOR

PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTfNG INNOVATION IN TH E GLOBAL DIGITAL ECONOMY

(2012). Although it does not seem to add anything new to the European legal framework, the
context integrity principle could be a useful, interpretive instrument also for the application
of the EU Draft DP Regulation, e.g. defining the limits of data processing for further purposes,
and thus, the scope of the consent, especially online. See Kristina Irion & Giacomo Luchetta,

Online Personal Data Processing and EU Data Protection Reform, CEPS TASK FORCE REP.
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The traditional way to fulfill this obligation online is the provision
of privacy notices (or policies). More precisely, privacy notices are
statements that should help data subjects to understand how data
controllers will use their personal data, providing them with detailed
information about what, why and how personal data will be collected,
processed, stored, used and in cases, disclosed. These notices should also
provide information about the data subjects' rights (e.g., to access their
personal data) and the security measures adopted for its safe treatment.
The final goal would be to confer individuals with control over their
personal data and, through this control, to allow them to decide for
themselves how to weigh the costs and benefits of the disclosure of their
data: this approach is also called "self-management privacy." 31
These privacy notices have been gradually introduced as
implementation of mandatory regulation (that is the rule in the EU) or
adopted as self-regulation practices by businesses in response to privacy
concerns (that is the rule in the U.S.). 32 Criticisms to the self-regulation
model of privacy policies, in particular in the U.S., point out the fact that
this model has allowed a sectorial and weak approach to privacy 33 all in
favor of business interests. With a proliferation of privacy policies not
accompanied by substantial safeguards, individual protection would have
become more an appearance of privacy than a reality: users may believe
they have more privacy simply because a website has a privacy policy, 34
or they are presumed to be consenting to a website's privacy conditions

CEPS Digital FORUM (2013), available at http://www.ceps.eu/publications/online-personaldata-processing-and-eu-data-protection-reform (last visited Dec. 18, 2015).
31. Daniel Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L.
R EV. 1879, 1882 (2013).
32. While in the EU information obligations for companies and governmental entities
dealing with data processing stem from general privacy legislations, at both supranational and
national level, in the U.S. sectorial regulations and a self-regulation model prevail, as a federal
legislation is missing and a State legislation on privacy is exceptional. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE§§ 22575-79 (West 2015). For an overview on the increasing privacy concerns
in U.S. (from 43% in the 1990 to 88% in 2003) and for a critical assessment of privacy policies
use by companies see generally Allyson W. Haynes, Online Privacy Policies: Contracting
Away Control Over Personal Information?, 111 PENN. ST. L. REv. 587, 592, 624 (2007)
(claiming that U.S. privacy policies, far from being an instrument of protection, have become
one more adhesion contract for individuals to avoid, the enforcement of which might be
challenged by individuals at least for "(1) a lack of assent, as many online privacy policies
still employ browse-wrap acceptance features; and (2) unconscionability of terms"). See also
Chris J. Hoofnagle et al. , How Different are Young Adults from Older Adults When it Comes
to Information Privacy Attitudes and Policies? 20 (Apr. 14, 2010) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with the U.C. Berkeley School of Law, Berkeley Center for Law and Technology).
33. Daniel Solove & Chris J. Hoofnagle, A Model Regime of Privacy Protection, 2006
U. ILL. L. REV. 357, 357, 365-66 (2006).
34. Haynes, supra note 32, at 610.
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simply because they are visiting that website and using its services. 35
In Europe, the adoption of privacy policies derives from the
implementation of general Data Protection principles and rules (mainly,
fairness and information obligations). However, traditional privacy
policies (or notices) are criticized also in Europe as they proved to be
insufficient to realize the purposes of data protection. Despite the
theoretical value of privacy policies, the efficacy of current notice and
consent mechanisms is increasingly questioned in the privacy area, 36 as
well as in other areas, so much that someone has defined certain
criticisms, at times excessive, "notice skepticism." 37
Traditional privacy policies tend to be written, detailed and usually
long and highly complex texts; in online environments, they consist of
separate texts hardly accessible or displayed in a slightly visible part of a
website. Internet users are asked to consent to the conditions described
in the privacy policies by ticking a "yes" box at the end of the statements;
more often, this box is simply positioned beside a link (hyperlink), which
refers to another page (hypertext) containing the privacy policy: clicking
the box presumes you have read the policies.
Users are supposed to read these texts, understand them and give
their informed consent to the processing of their personal data along the
lines explained in the privacy policies. Nevertheless, this assumption
is-most of the time-flawed, as data-subjects tend to merely scroll
down the privacy policies and rush for the tick box (or simply tick the
box without even following the link).
By providing these textual information notices, however, data
controllers comply, at least formally, with their information obligations.
Like for other disclosure obligations (e.g., on products and services

35. For an overview on advantages and disadvantages of privacy ("Having too much
privacy can be as bad as having too little") see Lior J. Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory
of Privacy Law, 126 HARV. L. REV . 2010, 2010, 2039, 2041 (2013), who talks of distributive
effects of privacy (it benefits some people and damaged others) and urges, also for the U.S.,
a more proactive and non-sectorial way to protect privacy.
36. See Brendan Van Alsenoy et al., Privacy Notices Versus Informational SelfDetermination: Minding the Gap, 28 INT. REV. L. COMPUTERS & TECH. 185 (2014); Brendan
Van Alsenoy & Alessandro Acquisti, Privacy-Friendly 'Model' Privacy Policies, SECURITY
AND
PRIVACY
FOR
ONLINE
Soc.
NETWORKS
(2013),
available
at
https://lirias.kuleuven.be/bitstream/123456789/453694/1 /SPI0N_ D9 .3 .5 _Privacy_ friendly_
model_privacy_policies.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2015); see also Alessandro Mantelero, The
Future of Consumer Data Protection in the E. U. Re-thinking the "Notice and Consent"
Paradigm in the New Era of Predictive Analytics, 30 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 643
(2014).
37. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME
L. REY. 1027, 1055-57 (2012).
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quality as set in the Consumer Protection regulation 38 ), in fact, the
European data protection law does not specify the format that this
information to be provided to the users should have 39 ( or provides only
few indications). This means that, as far as the information provision
obligations are satisfied, i.e., the minimum of information required by
data protection rules has been provided, the controller is free to choose
the way to provide this information, regardless of its effectiveness.

1. Role ofprivacy policies in users' data disclosure
The role of privacy policies should be also to enable in the users a
cautious and aware willingness to disclose personal data. 40 Under an
economic perspective, willingness to disclose personal data might be
beneficial for companies (increasingly relying on an information-based
business model) and, to some extent, also for the users, who might have
personalized, higher quality services and relevant promotions. 41 It would
be about striking a balance between obtaining advantages of targeted
services and keeping control over their own personal data. According to
the neoclassic economic view of privacy, individuals would "rationally"
trade off their short term benefits (e.g., targeted services) and long terms
costs of data disclosure (e.g., risks of privacy invasion), being able to
make a pondered decision.
Some scholars have shown the relationship between the content of
privacy policies and the users' intention to interact with websites where
there is a requirement to provide personal data. 42 Privacy concerns seem
to have a negative impact on the willingness to provide personal
information, while trust seems to have a positive impact. However, if
people see benefits of disclosure (like personalized services in ecommerce or entertainment in social networks) as outweighing the
concerns for privacy risks, they would be more likely to disclose. Given
that willingness to provide personal data online is closely related to
privacy concerns, a way to reduce these concerns would be to provide
them with good privacy policies, i.e., with really informative policies,
increasing users' awareness and reassuring them about possible risks: 43
the information would be able to reduce privacy concerns and to increase
38. Consumer protection in Europe is now enshrined in the European Directive on
Consumer Rights 2011/83/EC. See Council Directive 2011/83, 2011 O.J. (L 304) 64 (EU).
39. Some indications, however, have been offered by the Opinion on the Definition of
Consent, supra note 14, at 26.
40. Proposal for GDPR, supra note 2, at 8, 25.
41. Wu et al., supra note 21, at 890.
42. Id. at 891.
43. Id.
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trust in websites. In other words, using privacy policies, which clearly
inform users about how companies treat their data and which are read by
users, according to Wu et al., would not only reduce their concerns and
increase trust, but it would meanwhile increase users' willingness to
disclose personal information. 44
However, things seem more complicated than they have just been
pictured; reducing privacy concerns through complete information is not
enough to increase trust. Other studies have shown, in fact, that often the
greater the privacy reassurances provided to individuals, the greater their
reluctance to reveal personal information because the strong privacy
reassurance primes the individuals about the sensitivity of their data. 45
Moreover, it does not guarantee a safe digital environment for
individuals, to whom a cautious, responsible behaviour is required
(regardless of the duly supervisory role of regulatory authorities). Risks
of privacy violation, illicit data practices or violations of correlated rights
(e.g., to non-discrimination, etc.) deriving from the increasing reliance on
Big Data became a worrying reality in the digital era. 46 Education and
good information are certainly important but demonstrated not to
suffice. 47 Therefore, restrictive legal intervention is sometime deemed
necessary to protect the data-subject, usually the weakest party in online
and offline relationships.
In the attempt to curb the risks for data protection (and related
concerns) arising from the massive use of digital technologies, the EU
Draft DP Regulation not only strengthens some of the existing
safeguards-like the information obligations for data controllers-but
also reaffirms the principle of minimization of data collection and
processing. 48 On the one hand, personal data collection by public and
private entities is not forbidden by the EU law, but regulated and
structured; on the other, personal data disclosure by users is not
44. Wu, supra note 21 .
45. Alessandro Acquisti, The Economics of Personal Data and the Economics of
Privacy: 30 Years after the OECD Privacy Guidelines 13 (Working Party for Info. Security
& Privacy & Working Party on Info. Econ., Background Paper No. 3, 2010), available at
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/46968784.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2015).
46. See, e.g., Opinion ofthe Working Party on the Protection ofIndividuals with Regard
to the Processing of Personal Data on "Purpose Limitation" (Apr. 2, 2013), available at
http://idpc.gov.mt/dbfile.aspx/Opinion3_2013 .pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2015); Jules
Polonetsky & Omer Tene, Privacy and Big Data: Making Ends Meet, 66 STAN. L. REV. 25
(2013).
47. Hoofnagle et al., supra note 32, at 20.
48. See Proposal for GDPR, supra note 2, at 22. "The data should be adequate, relevant
and limited to the minimum necessary for the purposes for which the data are processed; this
requires in particular ensuring that the data collected are not excessive and that the period for
which the data are stored is limited to a strict minimum." Id. (emphasis added).

Published by SURFACE, 2015

89

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 43, No. 1 [2015], Art. 1

2015]

Addressing the 'Failure' of Informed Consent

83

discouraged, yet driven to be more aware and wise.
2. Personal data disclosure: direct and indirect
It is important to stress that personal data disclosure (and its specular
activity, data collection) might occur inadvertently, especially online,
where most of people's daily activities are nowadays performed. During
their browsing, people leave continuous traces of their behaviour, private
lives and preferences without being asked, or without being aware. Data
disclosure, in fact, might be direct, i.e., on a voluntary basis (like in the
cases of filling in an online form) and indirect, as a result from other
online activities (web browsing, location moving, click stream, etc.). 49
The latter kind of data disclosure/data collection may create more
concerns as it may occur unobtrusively, out of users' control. Most of
the time, the two kinds of data collection are also combined: data
collected "indirectly" might be matched with data of direct disclosure,
allowing companies or public organizations to have a complete profile of
people.
Wide literature exists about the several issues raised by profiling
techniques 50 and by the "hidden" collection of data, not least the fear of
mass surveillance 51 and users' manipulation. Now, the problem is that
against this indirect disclosure, traditional privacy notices have very little
or any effect at all. 52
3. Data disclosure between individual autonomy and legal constraints.

In certain cases, the individual's autonomy to choose whether or not
to disclose their data is restricted by the law intervention, regardless of
users' informed consent, because it is presumed not freely given, not
genuine and therefore not valid. 53 Some privacy risks are deemed so
49. See generally Groom & Calo, supra note 25.
50. See generally PROFILING THE EUROPEAN CITIZEN: CROSS-DISCIPLINE PERSPECTIVES
(Mireille Hildebrandt & Serge Gutwirth eds., 2008). The Draft GDPR takes into account new
scenarios, acknowledging the existing practices ofusers profiling as new business models for
companies but also introducing specific limitations to them.
51. See, e.g., Roger Clarke, Profiling: A Hidden Challenge to the Regulation of Data
Surveillance, 4 J.L. & INFO. Sci. 403 (1993); Roger Clarke, Information Technology and
Dataveillance, 21 COMM. OF THE ACM 498 (1988).
52. See generally Groom & Calo, supra note 25.
53. The EU law intervenes to prohibit the collection and processing of special categories
of data, even in the presence of individual's consent and when the conditions do not allow the
individual to "freely" choose to consent. See Proposal for GDPR, supra note 2, at 22. "In
order to ensure free consent, it should be clarified that consent does not provide a valid legal
ground where the individual has no genuine and free choice and is subsequently not able to
refuse or withdraw consent without detriment." Id. (emphasis added).
Consent should not provide a valid legal ground for the processing of personal data,
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serious by the EU legislation to foresee a strong protection especially for
weaker categories of people. 54
This limitation to individual autonomy, especially in contractual
context, which might appear an excess of paternalism, can be explained
by the status of data protection and privacy as fundamental rights.55 This
approach has been strengthened with the entry into force of the Treaty of
Lisbon in December 2009 that gave to the Charter of Fundamental Rights
of7 December 2000 ("CFR") a binding force of primary law in the EU. 56
Pursuing the economic development (also) by fostering the free flow
of personal data, the European DP law aims at the "protection of
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data." 57 Privacy and
data protection is understood in Europe as not only an individual right,
but also as a public interest, a conditio sine qua non for a democratic
society, a liberty rather than a freedom: 58 essential to guarantee the right
to self-determination, it would ensure other rights, like freedom of
expression, enable diversity and prevent undue societal control. 59
where there is a clear imbalance between the data subject and the controller. This is
especially the case where the data subject is in a situation of dependence from the
controller, among others, where personal data are processed by the employer of
employees ' personal data in the employment context. Where the controller is a public
authority, there would be an imbalance only in the specific data processing operations
where the public authority can impose an obligation by virtue of its relevant public
powers and the consent cannot be deemed as freely given, taking into account the
interest of the data subject.

Id.
54. See id. at 45. Article 8 sets out further conditions for the lawfulness of the processing
of personal data of children in relation to information society services offered directly to them.
55. On a discussion on the private law approach to personal data protection see generally
Nadezhda Purtova, Private Law Solutions in European Data Protection: Relationship to
Privacy and Waiver of Data Protection Rights, 28 N ETH. Q. HUM. RTs ., 179 (2010).
56. As recalled above, the Charter contains two separate articles for privacy right and
for data protection rights. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 7-8,
Dec. 18, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C 326) 1. Moreover, article 16 of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the EU provides now the legal basis for any piece of legislation adopted by the EU on data
protection. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
art. 16, May 9, 2008 , 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47, 55.
57. See Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC); see also Proposal for
GDPR , supra note 2, at 2.
It is time to build a stronger and more coherent data protection framework in the EU,
backed by strong enforcement that will allow the digital economy to develop across
the internal market, put individuals in control of their own data and reinforce legal
and practical certainty for economic operators and public authorities.
Id.
58. See generally Antoinette Rouvroy & Yves Pullet, The Right to Informational SelfDetermination and the Value ofSelf-Development: Reassessing the Importance ofPrivacy for
Democracy, in REINVENTING DATA PROTECTION 45 (Serge Gutwirth et al. eds., 2009).
59. See generally Mireille Hildebrandt & Bert-Jaap Koops, The Challenges of Ambient
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Although many times the two statuses overlap, the concept of data subject
or user does not coincide necessarily with that of the consumer, 60 as well
as the European DP law is not a consumer protection law. 61
Legal public intervention and supervision mechanisms in favor of
individuals' privacy, which might take place regardless of the interested
subject's consent to data processing, are not rare in Europe, and are aimed
at verifying that other legal grounds (e.g., necessity, proportionality)
occur: this is not only to overcome the limitations of a merely selfregulating approach to privacy, 62 but also to guarantee the same existence
of democratic processes. 63
This public intervention, foreseen by the sui generis EU Data
Protection law64 to protect the individual's rights, may occur to limit
market practices that might jeopardize individuals' rights. The regulatory
intervention may take place by imposing information disclosure
requirements to companies that collect data, as well as conditions and
limitations to the validity of a subject's consent (presumed not valid in
cases of children or in cases of unbalanced decisional powers in the
employment area). 65 It is also reflected in the decisional, monitoring and

Law and Legal Protection in the Profiling Era, 73 MOD. L. REv. 428 (20 I 0).
60. For considerations on the consequences of this approach on the legal nature of data
subject consent, as unilateral act, like an authorization rather than as a contractual agreement,
see Daniel Le Metayer & Shara Monteleone, Automated Consent Through Privacy Agents:
Legal Requirements and Technical Architecture, 25 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY Rev. 136, 138
(2008). The issue, however, is debated in literature, reflecting two different approaches to
Data Protection mainly embraced in EU the first, mostly followed in U.S., the second.
61 . See Irion & Luchetta, supra note 30, at 21-22. This Report also stresses the
difference between DP and consumer protection, which refers to a cross-cutting EU policy
field that aims at enhancing the positions of consumers of product and services; however,
according to Irion & Luchetta (CEPS)'s Report, consumer protection regulation when
modifies contract law to the benefit of the consumer ( e.g. regarding unfair terms and practices)
would depart from the party autonomy principle, while DP framework would strongly
emphasizes the control and autonomy of individual through the instrument of consent.
Although I fully share the view of consent as enabling individual to control over her data, I
would stress the idea that the European DP regulation contains as much limitations to
individual autonomy, deemed necessary for protecting a fundamental right like data
protection that is also an essential public interest. First because the consent does not legitimize
every type of data processing and also because the interest of data subject is at the center of
the European legal framework (even more in the ongoing reform) so much that the protection
of his data and private sphere may be acknowledged and granted despite his consent to data
collection and regardless of whether he issued a complaint or not. See generally Le Metayer
& Monteleone, supra note 60.
62. Solove & Hoofnagle, supra note 33, at 385.
63. See, e.g., Rouvroy & Poullet, supra note 58; Julie E. Cohen, Privacy and
Technology: What Privacy is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1912 (2013).
64. Irion & Luchetta, supra note 30, at 22.
65. See Proposal for GDPR, supra note 2, 43-45.
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sanctioning powers granted by the EU law to DP national authorities. 66
The latter could intervene, even ex officio (i.e., without a formal claim by
the interested subject) to adopt the needed legal measures, aimed at
preventing, forbidding data processing detrimental for individual rights
or remedying its consequences. 67
This rights-based approach is also reflected in the recent case law of
the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") 68 and seems confirmed by the
Draft GDPR; conditions and bans on the use of personal data have been
strengthened, at the risk of being considered paternalistic. However, a
defensive approach to data protection and privacy rights does not need to
be also too rigidly paternalistic.
As discussed below, a different, "soft" perspective seems possible,
as well as an evolving interpretation of the DP rules, which, backed by
an integrated system of alternative regulatory mechanisms, namely
appropriate nudging strategies, would allow data protection while
preserving the individual autonomy.
4. Limitations of the current safeguards: the privacy paradox
Given the relevance of informed consent for data protection, one
could expect that it suffices to strengthen these information obligations
and foster the provision of privacy policies to enable users to give a
meaningful, informed consent. 69
The proposed GDPR reinforced this concept; however, the reality
has shown that this still valuable mechanism is not working well in
practice, especially in the digital world.
One of the main criticisms to the informed consent requirement
relates to the weakness of the link between information about data
processing and consent and to the incapacity of consent to provide

66. Id. at77-78.
67. See id. at 77-80.
68. As examples of application of this rights-based approach see Case C-275/06,
Productores de Musica de Espana (Promusicae) v. Telefonica de Espana S.A.U., 2008 E.C.R.
1-00271 (Jan. 29, 2008); Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended S.A. v. Societe beige des auteurs,
compsiteurs et editeurs S.C.R.L. (SABAM), 2011 E.C.R. 1-11959 (Nov. 24, 2011); Case C131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espanola de Protecci6n de Datos (AEPD), 2014 EURLex CELEX LEXIS 317 (May 13, 2014).
69. Although strictly connected, information obligations and informed consent are
separate concepts and requirements. Transparency principle (and consequent information
obligations) apply also in case of derogations from the consent requirements. This is
particularly relevant in all those cases in which it might be impossible to systematically collect
users' consent, but that still require the fulfilment of transparency principle about how data
are processed. See Mireille Hildebrandt, The Dawn of a Critical Transparency Right for the
Profiling Era, in DIGITAL ENLIGHTENMENT YEARBOOK 41 (Jacques Bus et al. eds., 2012).
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effective control to users over their data. 70
While Internet users usually declare to be worried about online
privacy risks and to be aware of their privacy rights, in fact, the analysis
of their online behaviour and attitudes, in terms of personal data
disclosure, seems to suggest that they do not care about privacy. From
the Special Eurobarometer 359/2011 of the European Commission
("EB"), 71 emerges that the majority of Internet users report to read these
privacy notices when joining a social network or registering for a service
online. 72 However, most users' online behaviour shows that they do not
act according to their statements, as they do not read the privacy policies
entirely or they find it difficult to obtain information about a website's
data practices. 73 A large number of people are, nevertheless, concerned
that their personal data held by companies may be used for a purpose
other than that for which it was collected. 74 Similar surveys 75 seem to
confirm this attitude. 76
In sum, even when people declare to be worried about their privacy,
they do not read privacy policies and do not stop disclosing their data,
and even when people declare to read these notices they do not seem to
reduce privacy concerns. This phenomenon is also called as "the privacy
paradox" 77 and has led to questioning the adequacy of the current privacy
and data protection mechanisms. The idea that people do not care about
their privacy, however, appears too simplistic in light of the most recent
research and it has been discarded by most privacy scholars. 78
70. Irion & Luchetta, supra note 30, at 48.
71. See Report of the Directorate-General ofJustice, Information Society & Media and
Joint Research Centre on Attitudes on Data Protection and Electronic Identity in the
European
Union,
at
137
(June
2011),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/public_ opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_ 359_ en.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2015)
[hereinafter Attitudes on Data Protection].
72. Pan-European Survey of Practices, supra note 18, at 1.
73. Tsai et al., supra note 22, at 17-18.
74. Id. at 1.
75. See Lee Raine, Aaron Smith & Maeve Duggan, Coming and Going on Facebook,
PEW
Res.
CTR.
2
(Feb.
5,
2013),
available
at
http://www.pewintemet.org/-/media//Files/Reports/2013/PIP _ Coming_and_going_ on_face
book.pdf (last visited Dec/ 18, 2015). For a user survey in mobile context (e.g., about the
consent provision in the use of Apps by young students) see generally Yue Liu, User Control
of Personal Information Concerning Mobile-app: Notice and Consent?, 30 COMPUTER L. &
SECURITY REV. 521 (2014).
76. Tsai et al., supra note 22, at 254. See also Hoofuagle et al., supra note 32, at 3.
77. See Pan-European Survey of Practices, supra note 18, at 16, 47, reporting and
building upon the European Commission's discussion of the Special Euro barometer
359/2011. See Attitudes on Data Protection and Electronic Identity in the European Union,
supra note 71, at 112-15.
78. See, e.g., Hoofuagle et al., supra note 32, at 3-4; Danah Boyd & Alice Marwick,
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Studies have shown that the reasons for the limitations of informed
consent and privacy notices should be ascribed, first of all, to the lack of
sufficient information for the users to make a pondered decision about
data disclosure, that is, an accurate cost-benefit analysis. 79 This is also
called information asymmetry between users (they are unaware or they
do not have enough information on what happens with their data) and
data controllers (companies or governmental entities that collect and
process users' data). 80 This knowledge asymmetry suffered by users
about further use of data is particularly sharpened on the Internet, where
it is easier to collect data and where "Big Data is poised to reshape the
way we live, work and think." 81 The characteristics of Big Data as new
technological trend and the entities capable to handle the power of
knowledge deriving from it are unknown to most of people, who often do
not have (or see) alternatives to consent to their data collection. In the
mobile context, then, the lack of meaningful choice to consent to the use
of Apps is even more evident when someone talks about the subject's
consent as "blind consent." 82
Regulators tried to cope with this asymmetry, imposing stricter
information requirements to data controllers before (or contextually to)
the collection of data as transparency mechanisms (like privacy notices).

Social Privacy in Networked Publics: Teens' Attitudes, Practices, and Strategies 1-29 (Sept.
available
at
2011)
(unpublished
manuscript),
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 1925128 (last visited Dec. 18, 2015);
Norberto Andrade & Shara Monteleone, Digital Natives and the Metamorphosis of the
European Information Society. The Emerging Behavioral Trends Regarding Privacy and
Their Legal Implications, in EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION: COMING OF AGE 119, 120 (Serge
Gutwirth et al. eds., 2013).
79. Acquisti, supra note 45.
80. See Frederik J. Zuiderveen Borgesius, Consent to Behavioural Targeting in
European Law - What are the Policy Implications of Insights from Behavioural Economics?
3 (July 27, 2013) (Amsterdam Law School, Research Paper No. 2013-43), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2300969 (last visited Dec. 18, 2015),
who stresses that users do not know how their data will be treated and even if they knew, they
ignore the consequences of future data use. As he notices, this information asymmetry (and
in particular the lack of knowledge about the economic 'value' of own data) would be also
the reason why consent within Data Protection regime cannot be considered only under the
economic perspective, as a trade-off between 'two parties', an exchange of free service v.
personal data. Another reason, however, may be seen in the legal significance of data
protection as a public interest in a democratic society, from which a different consideration
of consent would stem: its nature would be seen as authorization (like an administrative act)
rather than as a contractual agreement). See Le Metayer & Monteleone, supra note 60, at
137.
81. Kennet N. Cukier & Viktor Mayer-Schoenberger, The Rise of Big Data, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS (May 2013), available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/l39l04/kennethneil-cukier-and-viktor-mayer-schoenberger/the-rise-of-big-data (last visited Dec. 18, 2015).
82. Liu, supra note 75.
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The assumption is that if users receive appropriate and clear information,
they will be able to take a pondered decision about consenting or not to
their data processing by, for instance, a website or Social Network: this
may include the installation of cookies on one's own device. 83
However, even if complete and detailed information is provided by
data controllers, 84 studies have proved that current privacy notices are not
effective: they fail to help data subjects in their decision-making and
consequent behaviour as regards to their data disclosure. Traditional
privacy policies are "hard to read, read infrequently, and do not support
rational decision-making." 85
Information asymmetries seem difficult to solve, as people are
discouraged to read privacy polices (and thus interpret them in their
favor): transactional costs (namely the time needed for users to read and
interpret them, in case complete information is provided) would make
this information asymmetry even more difficult to overcome. 86 In
addition, users have to face increasing uncertainty in online environments
due to new technological capabilities of tracking systems, with
information being gathered in different ways and by new actors: lacking
common standards, privacy policies change frequently (though not
always clearly) in order to include these upgrades, making the task of
keeping abreast with the recent version even more difficult for users. 87
Some scholars go even further, claiming that even well-informed
and rational individuals could not appropriately self-manage their privacy
due to several structural problems: a) there would be too many entities
collecting and using personal data to make the self-management system
(i.e., consent) feasible and b) many privacy harms would be the result of

83. See Council Directive 2002/58 2002 O.J. (L 201) (EC) as modified by Council
Directive 2009/136, 2009 O.J. (L 337) (EC) (cookies Directive). For a recent overview on
functional and not functional cookies, see Joasia Luzak, Privacy Notice for Dummies?
Towards European Guidelines on How to Give "Clear and Comprehensive Information" on
the Cookies' Use in Order to Protect the Internet Users' Right to Online Privacy, 37 J.
CONSUMER POL'Y 547, 547-49 (2014).
84. That is assuming companies' fairness in providing true information. Whether
companies are not faithful to their privacy policies is, rather, an accountability issue, a matter
that goes beyond the scope of this paper. However, it must be noted that further use of data
by third parties is often deliberately not covered by a privacy policy, so that companies are
exempted from responsibility of third party's processing of data.
85. McDonald & Cranor, supra note 19, at 541.
86. Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 22, at 372; McDonald & Cranor, supra note 19,
at 546; Borgesius, supra note 80, at 31.
87. Kirsten Martin, Transaction Costs, Privacy and Trust: The Laudable Goals and
Ultimate Failure ofNotice and Choice to Respect Privacy Online, 18 FIRST MONDAY (Dec.
2, 2013), available at http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/frn/article/view/4838/3802 (last
visited Dec. 18, 2015).
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an aggregation of pieces of data by different entities. 88 Therefore, the
current privacy self-management "which takes refuge in consent,"89
through the notice and choice mechanism, does not seem to provide
people with meaningful control over their data.
The 'notice and choice' mechanism is especially popular in the U.S.,
but similar considerations can be made in the EU as far as informed
consent is required to process personal data.
B. Addressing the drawbacks: alternative mechanisms to traditional
privacy policies

1. A legal-technical approach
The privacy paradox emerging from users' attitudes and behaviour
online, might be explained in terms oflack of suitable and flexible legaltechnical instruments for users to safeguard their privacy, while they seek
to enjoy the advantages of innovation and technology. 90
Attempts to address this lack are not missing, especially in
multidisciplinary research environments, where scholars, since at least
two decades, have pointed out the need to achieve a more integrated legaltechnical approach to privacy. 91 The main idea is that many privacy
concerns and legal implementation issues might be addressed through a
good technical design that embeds fundamental privacy principlesbetter known as the privacy by design approach ("PbD"). 92 Privacy
88. So love, supra note 31, at 1888-89.
89. Id. at 1880.
90. A point that emerges from these surveys is that users (and in particular the
youngsters, so called 'Digital Natives') when dispose of adequate mechanisms to avoid
privacy risks they make better decisions or they create their own strategies. See Pan-European
Survey of Practices, supra note 18; see also Boyd & Marwick, supra note 78.
91. See, e.g., Yves Poullet, Pour une Troisieme Generation de Reglementations de
Protection de Donnees, 3 JUSLETTER (2005); Mireille Hildebrandt, Legal and Technological
Normativity: More (and Less) than Twin Sisters, 12 TECHNE: RES. PHIL. TECH. 169 (2008);
ANDREW MURRAY, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY LAW: THE LAW AND SOCIETY (2d ed. 2010).
On the concepts of "Transparency Enhancing Technologies," allowing citizens to possibly
anticipate how they will be profiled and the consequence of that see Gordon Hull et al.,
Contextual Gaps: Privacy Issues on Facebook, 13 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 289 (2011); Shara
Monteleone, Privacy and Data Protection at the Time of Facial Recognition: Towards a New
Right to Digital Identity?, 3 EUR. J. L. TECH. (2012). See Hildebrandt, supra note 69, at 5259.
92. See, e.g., Ann Cavukian, Privacy by Design and the Emerging Personal Data
Ecosystem,
PRIVACY
BY
DESIGN
(Oct.
2012),
available
at
http://privacybydesign.ca/content/uploads/2012/10/pbd-pde.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2015).
This approach was formally embraced in 2010 by Privacy Commissioners at their 32nd
International Conference, in Jerusalem, where an ad hoc Resolution was adopted. See
Resolution on Privacy by Design, 320 INT'L CONF. DATA PROTECTION & PRIVACY
COMMISSIONERS
(Oct.
27-29,
2010),
available
at
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enhancing technologies ("PET"), based on specific technical settings that
embed privacy principles, proved to play a relevant role in support of
privacy and data protection.
The European Commission has been promoting for years legaltechnical measures at safeguard of these rights, as essential tools for
building confidence online. The Draft GDPR now formalizes the Data
Protection by design and by default principles, introducing specific norms
and constraints (Article 23). The close and complex relationship between
ICTs and public policy became particularly evident with the development
of the Internet and of the Information Society. As stressed in the recent
EC Communication on Internet Governance: 93 "Technical details of
Internet protocols and other information technology specifications can
have significant public policy implications. Their design can impact on
human rights such as users' data protection rights and security, [and] their
ability to access diverse knowledge and information .... "
The
Commission, although welcomed the efforts of the international technical
community to establish approaches to specification setting based on
public policy concerns, 94 acknowledged that key decisions are frequently
made by technical experts in the absence of efficient mutual interactions
between technical and public policy considerations. 95
"This is
particularly important when legal rights of individuals, especially their
human rights, are clearly impacted."96
Special attention should be paid in the design of specific Internet
http://privacyconference201 l .org/htmls/adoptedResolutions/201O_Jerusalem/201 O_J5 .pdf
(last visited Dec. 18, 2015).
93. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Region, International
Policy and Governance Europe's Role in Shaping the Future ofInternet Governance, at 4, 89, COM (2014) 72 final (Dec. 2, 2014) [hereinafter Shaping the Future of Internet
Governance].
94. Internet Governance Principles, NETMUNDIAL (Apr. 23-24, 2014), available at
http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/intemet-governance-principles/176 (last visited
Dec. 18, 2015). Positive examples include recent technical guidance for privacy
considerations in new protocols. See the guidelines elaborated by the Internet Architecture
Board (IAB), Cooper et al., Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols, INTERNET
ARCHITECTURE BOARD (July 2013), available at http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc6973.pdf (last
visited Dec. 18, 2015), which are a development of many sets of privacy principles (like the
Fair Information Practices and the privacy by design frameworks that have been developed in
different forums over the years). Interestingly, in the recent JAB 's guidelines, user
participation and interaction is taken into account.
95. These considerations seem to be at the basis also of the European Commission
Decision of28 November 2011. See Commission Decision of28 November 201 l on Setting
up the European Multi-stake Platform on ICT Standardisation, 2011 O.J. (C 349) 4, in which
a plurality of different actors are called to contribute to the definition of the ICT
standardization.
96. Shaping the Future of Internet Governance, supra note 93, at 9.
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architecture, especially with the advent of new digital and smart
technologies, given that normativity of technology may be as relevant and
effective as the normativity of law (though different) and have an impact
on human behaviour and conduct. 97 Moreover, the adoption of ad hoc
legal-technical measures to improve the level of transparency online like
"Transparency Enhancing Technologies" ("TETs") is also urged. 98 Most
users are not even aware that their data are collected or that they are being
tracked and profiled while surfing the web 99 : enhanced transparency
might help individuals to understand how their personal data are used and
what the potential dangers are. Given that information flows are growing
dramatically, TE Ts might be critical. 100 The increase of transparency (on
how the data are used) and the availability of easy-to-use privacy-control
mechanisms are considered essential aspects in order to ensure a
sustainable flow of data that makes privacy to be a virtue for both
business and users:
[While transparency] might initially reduce sharing, it limits the risk
of brand damage and helps to attract more informed customers . ...
[P]rivacy controls should be available and easy to use. They will
significantly increase data-sharing by individuals, likely offsetting any
negative impact on sharing resulting from increased transparency. 101
Methods of providing information and offering the right to refuse
should be as user-friendly as possible. This seems to stem from the ePrivacy Directive 102 and also from the draft GDPR (Article 11). 103
Therefore, companies should go beyond the drafting oflong and complex
privacy policies as the most suitable way to inform users about processing
of their own data and it would be also in their own interests to resort to
alternatives to traditional notice and choice mechanisms in order to
increase trust in online practices. Consequently, rather than only using

97. See Hildebrandt, supra note 69; see also HUMAN LAW AND COMPUTER LAW:
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Mireille Hildebrandt & Jeanne Gaakeer eds. , 2013).
98. Hildebrandt, supra note 69.
99. See generally Borgesius, supra note 79; Hildebrandt & Koops, supra note 59.
100. See Claude Castelluccia & Arvind Narayanan, Privacy Considerations of Online
Behavioural Tracking, EUR. UNION AGENCY FOR N ETWORK & INFO. SECURITY (Oct. 19,
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/identity-andat
available
2012),
trust/library/deliverables/privacy-considerations-of-online-behavioural- tracking (last visited
Dec. 18, 2015).
101. The Value of Our Digital Identity, Boston Consulting Group 17 (2012), available
at http://www.libertyglobal.com/PDF/public-policy/The-Value-of-Our-Digital-Identity. pdf
(last visited Dec. 18, 2015).
102. See Council Directive 2002/58 , 2002 O.J. (L 201) (modified by Council Directive
2009/136/EC).
103. Proposal for GDPR, supra note 2, at 47.

Published by SURFACE, 2015

99

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 43, No. 1 [2015], Art. 1

2015]

Addressing the 'Failure' of Informed Consent

93

written privacy policies that the majority of users do not read, companies
should engage into alternative ways and instruments-more visual,
explicit, simple and user-friendly-to inform Internet users and help them
make aware decisions.
Among the remedies identified in literature to cope with the
"laudable goals and ultimate failure of notice and choice to respect
privacy online," 104 we can find in particular suggestions aimed to: (1)
ameliorate the current notice and choice structure through opportune
legislation, industry best practices and privacy enhancing technologies;
(2) given the limited users' empowerment due to information asymmetry
and transaction costs, focus on privacy reputation and trust, built by
companies around respecting privacy expectations; 105 and (3) building on
a stream of privacy scholarship that looks at a tort-law model of privacy
protection, 106 develop privacy rules by identifying specific harms and
consequences of data disclosure. The underlying idea is a shift from the
notification scheme to managing privacy expectations within a specific
context: a consequence-based approach to privacy that would be more
pragmatic and beneficial also for companies than the current notice and
choice, as the privacy norms would be constructed thinking to the harms
and not to abstract risks of privacy violations.
Legal-technical proposals to solve the problem of the burdensome
requirement of consent also include software personal agents, as an
automatic way to achieve the protection of privacy. The underlying idea
is that a technological architecture based on "Privacy Agents," which
meets a series of legal requirements to ensure the validity of consent
delivered through such an agent, could be useful to avoid overwhelming
the data subject with repeated requests of consent, while protecting
his/her privacy by respecting pre-settled preferences. 107
Similar measures may be included amid all those technical solutions
that embed and implement specific legal rules, also known as technoIn Ambient Intelligence contexts such as smart
regulation. 108
104. Martin, supra note 87.
105. In particular, according to Martin, firms have multiple tools at their disposal to
meet privacy expectations, through three options: increase the obscurity of data exchange so
to decrease the probability that information will be leaked; decrease the possible harm that
could come from a leakage by using 'do not use' rules, limiting the use of data; increase the
benefits of information exchange (possible uses of data) for individuals and society). Id.
106. See, e.g., Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harms, 86 IND. L.J. 1131 (2011);
Helen Nissenbaum, A Contextual Approach to Privacy Online, 140 DAEDALUS,J. AMERICAN
ACAD. ARTS & SCI. 32 (2011).
107. Le Metayer & Monteleone, supra note 60.
108. Bibi van der Berg, Colouring Inside the Lines: Using Technology to Regulate
Children's Behavior Online, in 24 INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & LAW SERIES: MINDING
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environments/cities (so called due to the capability of the sophisticated
computer systems used to mine masses of personal and not personal data),
TETs would allow citizens to anticipate how they will be profiled and
which consequences this may entail. 109 However, the complexity and
quantity of information produced by transparency enhancing
technologies could overwhelm individuals, if this information were
provided in the form of text, requiring their conscious attention:
TETs will only succeed in empowering citizens if ... [they do] not
inundate a person with detailed technical information that requires her
scrutiny in a way that nullifies all the 'advantages' of ubiquitous and
seamless computing. . . . [They] will have to communicate the relevant
information in a way that allows one to have 'a feel' of the environment's
interpretation of one's behaviour, rather than merely adding more text or
graphs to the equation. 110
That is to say that even and primarily in the imminent digitalized
and automated world, complementary mechanisms should be promoted
in order to ensure that improved information about data processing is
provided to the users. Layering of notice may be a step in this direction:
data controllers may distribute the required information over different
and progressive layers, such as, the short notice, the condensed notice and
the complete notice. 111 In general, better ways of presenting information
to people, short messages together with educational programs may
mitigate inconvenience. 112
However, providing simplified, standardized privacy information,
although of some benefits, has proved to be also insufficient (e.g., cookies
alerts): users might end up simply ignoring them and accepting all the
requests of consent, by clicking on numerous message boxes. 113
Nevertheless, it seems that "there is no limit to the ways in which
MINORS WANDERING THE WEB: REGULATING ONLINE CHILD SAFETY SERIES 67-84 (Simone
van der Hof et al. eds., 24th ed. 2014); see also Ryan Calo, Code, Nudge or Notice?, 99 IOWA
L. REV. 773 (2014).
I 09. Hildebrandt, supra note 69, at 53.
110. Id. (stressing that this, however, does not mean that a more precise access to the
technical details must not be available, for instance to enable a person being subjected to
unfair decision making on the basis of automatic profiling, to contest the application of
profiles in a court of law).
111. Opinion of the Data Protection Working Party on "More Harmonised Information
(Nov.
25,
2004 ),
available
at
Provisions"
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2004/wp I 00_ en.pdf (last visited
Dec. 20, 2015); Brendan Van Alsenoy, Privacy-friendly 'model' privacy policies, SECURITY
& PRIVACY IN ONLINE NETWORKS PROJECT [SPION] (June 2013), available at
https://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/publications/article-2363.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2015).
112. Luzak, supra note 83, 553-54.
113. Groom & Calo, supra note 25, at 8.
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transparency and autonomous decision-making can be stimulated. Future
research efforts should continue to seek out additional mechanisms to
enhance transparency, both on ex ante and post fact basis." 114 Therefore,
instead of rejecting tout court the notice and consent mechanisms as not
effectively implementing the transparency principle, we should try
understanding the underlying reasons, the actual users' attitudes and
behaviours and seek out alternative, innovative and integrated ways to
enhance them. 115
2. An integrated behavioural economic approach

PhD approach and TETs are supposed to increase user's control over
his personal data. However, advanced technical control mechanisms,
though necessary, might not be sufficient if relevant cognitive and
behavioural "biases" in online users are not taken into account: 116 several
hurdles in privacy decision-making, in fact, have been highlighted by
behavioural science. 117
Empirical and social science research demonstrates that "there are
severe cognitive problems that undermine privacy self-management.
These cognitive problems impair individuals' ability to make informed,
rational choices about the costs and benefits of consenting to the
collection, use, and disclosure of their personal data." 118 In other words,
it is not enough having complete information about costs and benefits of
disclosing personal data, as other factors intervene on the user's privacy
choice and behaviour. 119 This line of enquiry has significant policy
implications: as it has been noticed, "the modem microeconomic theory
of privacy suggests that, when consumers are not fully rational or in fact
myopic, the market equilibrium will tend not to afford privacy protection
to individuals, and therefore privacy regulation may be needed to
improve consumer and aggregate welfare." 120
This seems particularly important if we consider how people think
and act in the online environment: individuals' cognitive limitations
mentioned before as regards information explain the failure of the rational
choice model and of the informed consent (in the U.S., the "notice and
choice" model) as regulatory techniques.
114. Van Alsenoy, supra note 111, at 9.
115. See Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (an Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE
DAME L. REV . 1027, 1033 (2012).
116. Acquisti, supra note 45, at 6.
117. Id.
118. Solove, supra note 31, at 1880-81.
119. Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 22, at 9.
120. Acquisti, supra note 45, at 6.
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Behavioural insights help us understand and interpret these
limitations and fallacies. Moreover, as recent research has shown,
Behavioural Science, leveraging precisely on these cognitive limitations,
can also effectively support policy-making in identifying appropriate
mechanisms, e.g., nudging strategies, to help people's decision-making
and, eventually, achieving privacy protection in practice.
Building upon the abovementioned interdisciplinary approach in the
privacy field (integration of law and technology) a step further is
proposed here: to learn the lessons from behavioural science 121 and to
think of applying behavioural insights to policy-making in the area of
privacy, in the wake of behavioural-informed regulation already
operational in fields such as reduction of energy consumption, health
care, consumer protection, etc. 122
Cognitive psychology and behavioural economics, which provided
meaningful insights on individuals' behaviour in many domains 123-as
discussed in the next part of this article-have recently also explained
users' (apparently contradictory) attitudes and practices as regards their
privacy protection. 124 Eventually, the privacy paradox receives clearer
explanation (and possibly solutions) if looked in light of behavioural
science.
What is suggested here is, in other words, to explore not only
advanced technical versions of transparency mechanisms, but to identify
and test alternative and complementary measures for users' better
decision-making as regards data protection; a new approach that, without
discarding the notice and choice system per se and taking into account
behavioural insights, may provide more suitable, flexible and effective
privacy-enhancing mechanisms, such as privacy nudges and "visceral
notices," so called because based on certain common psychological
reactions of individuals to design, instead of engaging the slower,

121. See, e.g., the research activities conducted by the Danish 'i-Nudge-you' team,
tNUDGEYOU, available at http://www.inudgeyou.com (last visited Dec. 20, 2015). On the
increasing interest for behavioral science in policy and government management in USA, see
also Courtney Subramanian, 'Nudge' Back in Fashion at White House, TIME (Aug. 9, 2013),
available at http://swampland.time.com/2013/08/09/nudge-back-in-fashion-at-white-house/
(last visited Dec. 20, 2015); Professor Kevin Werbach, Beyond Nudges: Gamification as
Motivational Architecture, Speech at the 2013 CPDP Conference in Brussels (Jan. 23, 2013).
122. Michael S. Barr, Sendhil Mullainathan & Eldar Shafir, Behaviorally Informed
Regulation, in BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY 440, 444-45 (Eldar Shafir ed.,
2012).
123. See Cass R. Sunstein, Nudges.gov: Behavioral Economics and Regulation, in
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 719, 719 (Eyal Zamir &
Doron Teichman eds., 2014).
124. See Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 22.
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reflective way of thinking: they show, rather than tell. 125
The next part explores this line of research, after briefly considering
challenges and opportunities of applying behavioural insights to policymaking in general. These strategies, alternative to traditional privacy
notices might also represent a better implementation or at least integration
mechanisms of the Data Protection by Design approach, as codified in
the draft GDPR (Article 23).
IIII. INSIGHTS FROM BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS ON
INFORMATION PROVISION
In this part, opportunities and challenges of behavioural sciences
applied to public policy in general will be discussed, in order to better
understand the relevance of behavioural insights in the privacy area.
A. Applying behavioural science to policy: an overview
Applied behavioural science, often referred to as Behavioural
Economics ("BE"), studies human behaviour for better policy-making.
Since the 1970s, BE revealed that people, in their daily life, do not
always act "rationally," as suggested by neoclassical assumptions in
economics, making choices that lead to the best outcome for them: on the
opposite, they often have preferences and take decisions that are not in
their interests (suboptimal choices): 126 in other words, people are not
perfectly rational in their cost-benefit considerations.
These deviations from rationality in individuals' decision-making
are commonly referred to as biases (e.g., mental shortcuts or 'rules of
thumb'), such as: myopia (people prefer short term gratifications to
disadvantages in long terms); social norms (people are influenced by
what the majority of people say or do, especially if there is a certain
affinity with these people--compatriots or neighbours, etc.); status quo
(people tend to stay with the default options); and.framing or prime effect
(people are influenced on how more than what information is given to
them).
Such findings about human behaviour-very briefly recalled herestarted to be taken into consideration by policymakers in the last decades
and progressively incorporated in policy interventions focused on
structuring the "choice architecture" for people's better decisions; the
choice architecture is understood as the background against which
decisions are made and that has major consequences for both decisions

125. See Groom & Calo, supra note 25.
126. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN , THINKING,
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and outcomes. 127 Also, BE highlighted that this does not mean that
people's behaviour is always irrational, random and unpredictable: on the
contrary, it can be predicted, modeled and thus guided. 128
BE has been regarded in recent years as a promising and exciting
new development in public policymaking theory and practice. 129
Consequently, the efforts to bring more accurate understanding of human
behaviour and choice to bear on law 130 have made that BE is now
considered as the new paradigm for the study of choice behaviour and,
on its basis, for the adoption of "behavioural informed regulation" 131 in
the most different policy areas. The behaviourally-informed approach to
regulatory problems, in fact, is gaining momentum, and its instruments,
so called nudges, in the form of notices, warnings and default rules, 132 are
becoming authentic policy tools.
The informal and cheap nature of these systems makes them more
appealing as compared to traditional coercive regulatory mechanisms,
like prohibitions, bans, etc. This regulatory approach is also called
libertarian paternalism, because leveraging insights on individuals'
attitudes and behaviours, claims to preserve their freedom of choice: the
combination of paternalism and individual freedom would not be an
oxymoron. This system is also named soft paternalism as opposed to
hard paternalism. 133
A number of public and private institutions have already embraced
this approach as its instruments proved to be more effective than common
legal instruments in addressing old and new challenges, like the energy
consumptions reduction, health care, saving accounts, etc. In the U.S.,
the Obama Administration intensively counted on behavioural findings

127. Sunstein, supra note 123, at 1.
128. See Amitai Etzioni, Behavioral Economics: Toward a New Paradigm, 55 AM .
BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1099, 1102-03 (2011); Mullainathan & Shafir, supra note 122, at 440.
129. See generally Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims
Its Sails and Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1593 (2014), who, however, urge for greater awareness
of the tension between the two "seductive" dimensions of Behavioural Law and Economics
(its appeal as social science and politics) and consequent limits. Accordingly, policy-makers
can in future resort to Behavioural economics for improving the design of law and policy
(adopting choice-preserving regulatory tools) in more appropriate and context-dependent
ways, i.e. pondering advantages and disadvantages of the different regulatory mechanisms
(traditional or new) available.
130. See BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 1 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).
131. See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008).; Mullainathan & Shafir, supra
note 122, at 428.
132. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 131.
133. See Oren Bar-Grill, Consumer Transactions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 465,478 (Eyal Zamir & Doron Teichman eds., 2014).
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for a number of initiatives and in UK an ad hoc 'Behavioural Insights
team' within the Cabinet office has been created. 134 At the intersection
of"applied behavioural science, public institutions, NGO's and private
stakeholders" are initiatives such as iNudgeYou - initiated as a Danish
Nudging Network and become an international landmark. 135
European policy-making is also increasingly relying on behavioural
insights, both at its design and its implementation phases. Surveys to
collect consumers' perceptions and preferences, lab experiments and
more accurate behavioural observation methods (i.e., randomized
controlled trials) are promoted by the EU in different areas of
intervention, with the aim to foster better individuals' decisionmaking.136 Behavioural insights are, for instance, at the basis of the
recent regulation aimed to limit the default options in consumer contracts
or to improve consumer protection in booking travel packages. 137 As a
new but quite spread trend, varying communitarian goals are being
pursued through nudging strategies such as "green behaviors," 138 as well
as improvement in consumer decisions regarding, for instance, retail
investments 139 or, more recently, digital purchases. 140
B. Applying behavioural science to policy: challenges and

134.
See Who We Are, BEHAVIOURAL INSIGHTS TEAM, available at
http://www.behaviouralinsights.eo.uk/about-us/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2015).
135. See iNudgeyou - The Danish Nudge Unit, tNUDGEYOU, available at
http://inudgeyou.com/about-us/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2015).
136. See generally Rene van Bavel et al., Applying Behavioural Sciences to EU PolicyMaking, JRC SCIENTIFIC AND POLICY REPORTS EUR 26033 EN 14-19 (2013), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_consumer/information_sources/docs/30092013 jrc_ sci enti fie
_policy_report_en.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2015).
137. See Council Directive 2011/83, art. 22, 2011 O.J. (L 304) 64, 81 (EU); see also

Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council On
Package Travel and Assisted Travel Arrangements, at 4, COM (2013) 512 final (Sept. 7,
2013).
138. See, e.g., Science for Environmental Policy Future Brief Green Behaviour, EUR.
COMMISSION
(Oct.
2012),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/integration/research/newsalert/future_ briefs.htm
(last
visited Dec. 20, 2015).
139. See, e.g., Consumer Decision-Making in Retail Investment Services: A Behavioural
Economics
Perspective
(Nov.
2010),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/archive/strategy/docs/final_report_en.pdf(last visited Dec. 20,
2015).
140. See, e.g., Gabriele Esposito, Consumer Information in the Digital Online Market A Behavioral Approach, CIDOM REP., JRC SCIENTIFIC & TECHNICAL REP. 5, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/consumer-marketing/files/report_ cidom_ final.pdf (last visited
Dec. 20, 2015).
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opportunities
As said before, policy-making is increasingly relying on behavioural
studies and nudging strategies for citizens' better decision-making in
different areas of intervention.
Applying
This happens, however, not without concerns. 141
behavioural science to policy-making requires a thorough consideration
of a number of different issues. 142 At least two main categories of
problems can be identified as far as the application of the behavioural
approach to policy-making is concerned. On the one hand, the legal
grounds of its mechanisms that rely on influence and persuasion in order
to obtain a behaviour change and creates a new power, potentially subject
to abuse. On the other, their (lack of) generalized applicability: a nudge
might not have the expected outcome if used in different areas or with
different audiences.
The same legitimacy of the nudging system itself within a
democratic society might be put in doubt or at least questioned. 143 Most
existing criticisms seem to point to the fact that, while a good nudge
influences individual choices without changing freedom of choice,
sometimes the line between persuasion and manipulation is not easy to
see and goes together with the fear of being maneuvered.
Nudges can be stronger or weaker than the law and coercive as well,
but the problem is the risk that they might be adopted without the legal
safeguards proper of the legislative processes. Moreover the effect of
nudges may be very different, depending on context or on the interests of
the parties involved. 144
A substantial regulation of these alternative measures is, therefore,
urged, capable to formalize these behavioural-informed mechanisms and
141. See, e.g., Karen Yeung, Nudge as Fudge, 75 MODERN L. Rev. 122, 123-24 (2012);
see also Alberto Alemanno & Alessandro Spina, Nudging Legally. On the Checks and
Balances of Behavioural Regulation, 12 INT'L J. CONST. L. 429 (2014).
142. Neven Mimica, Applying Behavioural Insights to Policy-Making: Results,
(Sept.
30,
2013),
available
at
Promises
and
Limitations
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_consumer/information_sources/consumer_affairs_events_en.
htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2015) (discussing the opportunities and limitations of applying
behavioral science to policy making in all areas of interest at a European Commission
conference in Brussels).
143. See Pelle G. Hansen & Andreas M. Jespersen, Nudge and the Manipulation of

Choice: A Framework for the Responsible Use of the Nudge Approach to Behaviour Change
in Public Policy, 4 EuR. J. RISK REG. 3, 5 (2013); Alemanno & Spina, supra note 141, at 445.
See generally Anne van Aaken, Judge the Nudge: In Search of the Legal Limits of
Paternalistic Nudging in the EU, in NUDGE AND THE LAW: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 83
(Alberto Alemanno & Anne-Lise Sibony eds., 2015).
144. See generally Lauren E. Willis, When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults, 80 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1155 (2013).
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to guarantee an oversight system of the new kind of power they bring
Notwithstanding their informal nature, and given their
with. 145
persuasive quality, the adoption of these mechanisms cannot circumvent
basic principles of the State of Law, such as legality and impartiality. An
appropriate oversight system on behavioural-informed tools can
guarantee a smooth integration of behavioural science into public policy.
As some scholars propose:
[A] general requirement imposed to public administrations to
systematically consider formalized behavioral mechanisms at the prelegislative stage could serve to accommodate in a more principled and
consistent way these insights into policy making while at the same time
protecting them from possible abuses. 146
Their enclosure within the framework of essential legal principles
like proportionality seems necessary. These behavioural-based measures
should be pondered according to minimum criteria: their capacity of
pursuing a legitimate goal (i.e., individual, societal welfare); their
suitability; necessity (other available measures are not effective);
proportionality stricto sensu (i.e., the mildest measure have been chosen);
and foreseeability (at least as regards their purposes and consequences).
Invisible, non-transparent nudges should be considered not admissible. 147
A concrete guideline for policy-makers in order to avoid the
adoption of tools of illegitimate manipulation of people's choice, may be
the distinction between transparent and non-transparent nudges, which
might help to distinguish the manipulative use of nudges from other kinds
of uses and therefore to adopt a more responsible use of nudging approach
to behavioural change. 148 In particular, the choice of policy-makers
should fall on nudges aimed at promoting decision-making in ways that
are transparent to the people influenced, by "making features, actions,
preferences, and/or consequences salient, or by providing
feedback ...." 149 This kind of interpreting and guiding frameworks for
the use of 'nudges for good' should be endorsed so that nudges, if chosen
and adopted as policy tools, can work at the service of libertarian
paternalism. 150
Another aspect that should be borne in mind, is that alternative, nontraditional methods of changing citizens' behaviour, whether they are

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See generally id. at 1229.
Alemanno & Spina, supra note 141, at 455.
van Aaken, supra note 143, at 29-33.
Hansen & Jespersen, supra note 143, at 23.
Id. at 24.
See generally THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 131, at 5-6.
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classified as code (like in the techno-regulation), nudges, or notice
(information disclosure), may both facilitate (help) or hinder (friction)
decision-making and a certain conduct. 151
Some non-traditional public interventions, if focused on obstacles or
barriers, may be more coercive than the law; physical barriers or digital
ones (code) like Digital Right Management Systems ("ORM") to enhance
copyrights, but also psychological ones, like some new virtual speed
limits made of painted images on the road (nudges) introduce an obstacle
to a conduct, making it harder or impossible for the individual to act
differently. In this case, resisting to a nudge is not without costs, like
discomfort, time associated to overcoming the architecture of the choice;
the individual autonomy in these cases might be unreasonably
jeopardized. In other words, the problem with these alternative measures
based on friction, would consist in the fact that they may introduce costs
and burdens to citizens while, meantime, they may be adopted without
the legal safeguards and guarantees proper of the legislative processes,
i.e., to be discussed, voted on by elected representatives and in cases,
challenged.
However, as Calo stresses, alternative mechanisms for behavioural
changes do not necessary and always need to build upon friction, like
they do some technical barriers to replace the deterrence function of law
(e.g., the doors accessing to a metro station, or the DRMs for copyright
protection, or the digital filters installed on a computer for the safety of
children). 152 Alternative systems should work by helping, nudging,
citizens to arrive to their own goals; instead of studying human behaviour
and cognitive biases in order to contrast them, it is better to help them.
An example may be represented by placing fruits or other healthy food at
eye-level in the cafeteria of a working place.
If policy intervention aims at modifying the choice architecture,
altering physical or digital environment, this should be not to impede,
prevent certain conducts but to facilitate better decision-making: "the
technology should keep its capacity to enhance and not diminish certain
essential democratic processes." 153 Accordingly, regulators should
explore the possibilities for helping citizens (in using code, nudge or
notice mechanisms-or a combination of them) in achieving by
themselves their own goals, before introducing forms of alternative but
coercive mechanisms (which may lack the safeguards and the process of
the law).
151. Calo, supra note 108, at 777.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 798.
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Therefore, when deciding about changes in architecture, regulators'
preference should be, where possible, for facilitation not for imposing
barriers, according to the theory that "we should abandon the safeguards
that [support the] law only when it can be said that we are helping citizens
do what they would do if they had the right information and tools." 154
As Calo stresses, combining certain elements of different strategies
provides more possibilities for facilitation. 155 A traditional notice does
not work, but elements of code and nudge may improve notices so to
become more effective, especially when notices are provided at the point
of decision-making and this is particularly relevant in the field of privacy
and data protection, as discussed below.
An example of successful notice mechanism relying on "nudging"
is offered by initiatives seeking to curb obesity, which instead of focusing
on traditional notice mechanisms like caloric information labels to
ameliorate people's eating/drinking habits, show the physical activity
equivalent needed to bum a certain amount of calories, e.g., running,
biking, etc., 156 or seek to directly encourage people to do more
exercise. 157
This facilitation role is not an easy task either; it is difficult to
understand when and how to facilitate decision-making (and to renounce
it because it does not work). Decision-making can depend entirely on the
framing or on the context, but in doubt of what influences our
preferences, we should adopt, as a guiding principle, facilitation rather
thanfriction. 158 At the end of the day, it is not important how we label a
public intervention in the choice-architecture as code, notice or nudge,
but regulators should look at the interventions that help. This can
mitigate also the concerns mentioned before about the legitimacy of
nudging strategies.
C. Applying behavioural science to policy: from information overload
to smart disclosure in Consumer Protection and in Data Protection
As demonstrated in other sectors (marketing or organization
science), the excess of information may have a negative effect on users'
choice quality. 159
154. Id. at 800.
155. Id.
156. Sara N. Bleich et al., Reduction in Purchases of Sugar-Sweetened Beverages
Among Low-Income Black Adolescents After Exposure to Caloric Information, 102 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 329 (2012).
157. Amitai Etzioni, On Curbing Obesity, 51 Soc'y 115 (2014).
158. See Calo, supra note 108.
159. See generally Byung-Kwan Lee & Wei-Na Lee, The Effect of Information
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Insights from behavioural studies have shown, in fact, that even
when presented with full information, consumers may not always be able
to understand or use information in their interest, i.e., to make the best
choice. This can be due to not necessarily the lack of information, but to
the fact that most of the information is not good; moreover, too much
information (although correct and accurate) may be useless and even
harmful. There is a moment in the information acquisition (like for the
information that we receive when we decide to buy a product or service)
in which the cost that a consumer has to spend to process the information
is higher than the benefit of ignoring it: this is also called "information
overload." 160
Studies on information overload and its effects on consumer
decision-making suggest that what matters is not (necessarily) to provide
the consumer with more information but to provide her with the good
one. 161
This is particularly relevant in the digital environment, on the
Internet, where users are constantly exposed to tons of information
difficult or impossible to absorb, to interpret and to use. The problem
with the traditional information notices (including privacy notices) is that
they constitute in many cases an example of "information overload."
Burdening the individual with information (whether it is on products and
services or on how personal data is processed or protected), is not the
solution.
As said before, one of the main lessons that policy-makers receive
from behavioural scientists is to work on the choice architecture, the
social background against which consumer decisions are made. 162 In this
way policy-makers are called to become a sort of choice architects, able
to make the appropriate, small changes in the underlying environment
that may have a large impact on people's behaviour. "Such changes may
involve disclosure, warnings, default rules, increased salience, and use of
social norms." 163

Overload on Consumer Choice Quality in an On-Line Environment, 21 PSYCHOL. &
159 (2004).
160. Id. at 177-78.
161. See the example of the regulatory measure adopted in US to counter the level of
obesity and imposing requirements to indicate the calories information on restaurant menus,
which did not get the expected results as people ignored them. Brian Eibel et al., Calorie
Labeling, Fast Food Purchasing and Restaurant Visits, 21 OBESITY 2172 (2013).
162. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 131.
163. Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Economics, Consumption, and Environmental
Protection 1 (Harvard Kennedy Sch. Regulatory Policy Program, Working Paper No. RPP2013-19, 2013).

MARKETING
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The most important modification that should be made is salience: 164
salience of certain product's features or of a situation (like prices, sizes,
incentives), and, above all, of the information to be provided to people
about these features. Salience can work, in fact, as a nudge. 165 Therefore,
the information that people receive should be salient, upon salient
features and provided in a moment and a situation salient for these
people, enabling a process of "smart disclosure," i.e., of a more effective
information provision by those who are responsible for - that the public
policy is called to encourage.
Behavioural studies have invalidated a typical assumption
underlying many of the current public policies in consumer protection,
i.e., that individuals would make a cognitive effort to weigh costs and
benefits before taking a decision like buying or not buying a product. In
this way, they not only have shown that biases are also typical of policymakers (as made of human beings), but building upon Kahneman' s
insights about human cognitive processes, 166 have also highlighted that
people predominantly use the fast thinking system, that is, more intuitive,
more instinctive and rapid way of making decisions. 167
This suggests that traditional information policies are disregarding
important components of human cognitive process that reflect into
consumers' behaviour and that this might be the reason of their failure to
realize societal and individual best interests. This raised the question
whether a different, innovative policy intervention might be necessary to
help consumers adopt decisions in their best interests. 168
An important finding of BE (which has also shown to be useful in
order to attain a better public policy by conducting ad hoc experiments)
is that the more our activities are routinized, repeated on a daily basis, the
more we employ the fast thinking system. This is particularly interesting
for the decisions we take every day with regards to digital activities
(electronic communications, e-transactions, access to a service or
product); our activities on the Internet (and on the mobile digital
applications) are often made of repetitive and systematic gestures:
clicking a button while visiting websites, downloading applications or

164. Id. at 6, 9, 15-16.
165. Sunstein, supra note 123, at 721.
166. Kahneman, in particular, makes the distinction between thinkingfast and thinking
slow, and, as a consequence, between automatic behaviours and reflective choices. See
KAHNEMAN, supra note 126.
167. Id.
168. Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. [OECD], Enhancing Competition in
Telecommunications: Protecting and Empowering Consumers, at 39, OECD Doc.
DSTI/ICCP/CISP(2007)1/FINAL (May 24, 2008).
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documents, sharing thoughts or pictures, etc. This is particularly true
with regard to terms and conditions of an online contract, that, in most of
the cases, we accept without reading them, as well as with regard to
privacy policies.
In light of recent specialized studies on users' privacy attitudes and
preferences, in fact, what was just observed for consumer information
seems to be valid for information privacy and related users' behaviour. 169
Consumer Protection (strictu sensu) and Data Protection are two
interconnected (though distinct) areas. 17 First, because the two fields
correspond to two very close EU law domains; the status of data subject
and of online consumer are often aligned or overlapping, with the data
subject being very often also, in the meantime, a consumer; secondly,
because the information provision obligation (bearing on data controller
or on service provider, who may coincide) and its effects on the
corresponding individual's decision-making has equivalent relevance (in
one case, regarding his consumer behaviour in buying a product/service,
in the other one his citizens' behaviour in disclosing (or not) personal
data).
Given the extraordinary growth of Internet services and online
transactions, Data Protection is becoming increasingly important for
consumer. 171 The attention for it, therefore, is increasing, as it may
represent one of the instruments to realize the consumer protection. 172 In
other words, data protection is also (and in addition to its independent
status of a fundamental right) a way to attain consumer protection,
especially online; thus, similarities in the assessment of legal and nonlegal tools employed to strengthen individuals protection in the two
fields, namely information notices and nudges, may be drawn.
Recently, policy-makers started to work on minimizing detriment to
the consumer's interest resulting not only from a lack of information or
misleading information regarding services and products, but also from

°

169. See Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 22.
170. See IRIS B ENOHR, EU CONSUM ER LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 166 (2013).
171. Id.at59 .
I 72. The consumer protection has a principle status in the Charter of Fundamental Right
of the EU (Article 38), in the sense that it is intended as a legal principle rather than to have
the status of a subjective right. However, as other legal principles, this provision in the
Charter could evolve in the future and become a right (maybe with the development of the
case law). In particular it may become more concrete if it applied in combination with other
rights of the Charter. Id. (demonstrating that it is already happening). Article 38 could be
applied in combination with other rights of the Charter or constitutional provisions, for
instance with Article 8 on the right to data protection "in fact in some national cases a
cumulative application of basic provisions has resulted in successful claims for individuals."
Id. at 64.
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the "bounded rationality" of consumer decision-making. 173 If the
individual, recipient of the disclosure, is overwhelmed by information
without the possibility to discern what information is important, then
disclosure will have little positive effect. Behavioural studies have
demonstrated that alternative ways that try to induce people to behave in
their best interests may work better than traditional notice and choice or
"command and control" measures. 174 Regulators can learn how to
enhance information disclosure's effectiveness: "Disclosure has many
limitations, but there is also great opportunity for enhancing its beneficial
effects." 175
Consumer protection passes also by competition enhancing
policies 176 that focus their attention on demand side analysis (i.e., based
on insights from consumers' behaviour analysis). Policymakers and
regulators started to consider the needs and motivations underlying
consumer behaviour in communication markets, while in the meantime,
raising awareness about possible risks for consumers as well as
opportunities of protection. A main instrument to improve consumer
protection (and satisfaction) online has been identified in the quality of
information provision.
New requirements have been introduced
compelling, for instance, all major service operators to provide complete,
comparable and accurate information to consumers to reduce the
"information asymmetry" between operator and consumer and to enable
the latter to take the most suitable choices among products and services
offered online and therefore, among providers. 177
Likewise, we assisted to a proliferation of information obligations
and accountability rules in the Data Protection law, also in view of
ensuring a fair development of the digital single market, increasingly an
173. Id. at 81-82.
174. See Applying Behavioural Insights to Reduce Fraud, U.K. CABfNET OFF.
BEHAVIOURAL
INSIGHTS
TEAM
(2012),
available
at
https://www.gov.uk/govemment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/60539/BIT_FraudErrorDebt_accessible.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2015).
175. Sunita Sah, Daylian M. Cain & George Loewenstein, Confessing One's Sins But
Still Committing Them: Transparency and the Failure ofDisclosure, in BEHAVIOURAL PUBLIC
POLICY 148, 158 (Adam Oliver ed., 2013).
176. OECD, supra note 168, at 5.
177. The idea is that further developments in competition policy should serve the
consumer interest. See id. at 6. The purpose of pro-competition policy is to enhance consumer
welfare; in other words, consumer protection and empowerment should be based on procompetition policy and mechanisms that have the consumer interest as priority. Id. at 4
("[W]here consumers have little information or poor quality information ... they may end up
misled and confused by the choices on offer, may pay too much or buy the wrong service.
This may, in tum, inhibit and dampen the competitive process .... [Consumers] need to be
able to move quickly and with the minimum constraint between service providers.").
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information-rich market. Providing innovative and more effective
information mechanisms for privacy may also prove to be an innovative
and effective competition-enhancing tool, which may benefit individuals
as well as businesses and the market in general.
Insights from BE, in fact, recently proved to be helpful also to
explain the privacy paradox (i.e., even in the presence of privacy notices
and warnings, 178 users tend to disclose a large amount of data) and to find
more effective privacy-enhancing mechanisms.
A multitude of systematic deviations from rational decision-making
that seems to have an impact on users' privacy decisions-making, besides
"incomplete information" and a "bounded cognitive ability" to process
the available information ( information asymmetry and transactional
costs), has been identified. 179 These deviations can be explained through
the same cognitive biases that BE has revealed in other areas: individuals
cannot see the risks deriving in the future from their data disclosure (or
from the use of a service that implies automatic data collection) and go
for immediate gratification of, for instance, free service (myopia); users
tend to stick with default options, this highlights the relevance of default
privacy settings for the privacy online; few users change them in practice
(status quo); users' privacy behaviour seems to be more influenced by an
image or an alert than by a long, though comprehensive, text (framing
effect).
Several behavioural biases, therefore, come into play and are critical
for the effectiveness of privacy policies. Like the legal information
notices on products and services relevant in consumer transactions,
privacy policies "are important transparency mechanisms, but are not
likely to be decisive in determining user behavior.... [They] are [not]
salient to consumers .... " 180 Although these reflections on privacy
policies are related to consumer's behaviour in the context of online
transactions, they are seemingly applicable to users' privacy behaviour in

178. A clarification is needed. The concepts of information notices and warning
messages may be (legally and technically) distinct and may have different purposes that
should be taken into account when testing and assessing users ' willingness to disclose data:
basically, the first have the purpose to inform about what/how data are collected and
protected, about users' rights, about the identity of the data controller, etc., while the warning
messages work as caveats, admonitions about possible risks of data disclosure: privacy
policies may contain both type of information, but, generally, current polices are made
predominantly of the first type.
179. Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 22, at 364.
180. See Irion & Luchetta, supra note 30, at 36-37, where it is argued that only if privacy
choices are embedded in a given transaction and effectuated by rules surrounding the sign-up
are consumers likely to align with their privacy preferences: "Hence, opt-in and opt-out rules
as well as default settings have strong impacts on the level of data disclosure."
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general, when facing information provisions.
There is a need for making the access to privacy policies easier,
simpler, agile and therefore more effective, so that users may be able to
make more informed decisions regarding the (direct or indirect)
disclosure of their personal information online. 181
IV. TOWARDS REGULATED PRIVACY NUDGES?
Knowing how users really behave with regard to their personal data
(often in contrast with their statements) may play a relevant role in
addressing the gap between existing legal privacy safeguards and
implementing tools. Therefore, like for other areas of policy intervention,
a better understanding of data subjects' behaviour should be of interest
for policymakers as it can assist them to design better privacy policies
and, ultimately, to fill in this gap; behavioural insights can be applied so
to identify and adopt innovative privacy-protecting measures.
The solution to the privacy paradox, in fact, does not seem to be the
introduction of new principles and rules. Behavioural economics propose
the introduction of (tested) tools like "privacy nudges" to be applied in
contexts of behavioural advertising, location sharing and social
networks. 182 More suitable, effective privacy tools, capable to keep pace
with modem times, but especially to support users in their decisionmaking, i.e., "supporting-choice mechanisms," 183 should be introduced.
As said in the previous part, behavioural science applied to policymaking is not new to European institutions, as a number of experimental
studies in support of policy initiatives are being run by the European
Commission. Still, the consideration of behavioural insights in the
specific area of privacy is very limited in Europe, both at academic and
institutional levels and restricted to the analysis of behavioural patterns
in online users as regards their data disclosure habits.
Few experimental studies have been commenced in the EU, as
discussed below. However, there hasn't been so far, to my knowledge,
any completed experimental study in Europe testing the nudging effects
on users' behaviour, as a way to foster a privacy-protective behaviour,
nor the application of behavioural science to policy-making in the area of
privacy. Also in Europe, we should support the idea that, instead of
discarding the option of notice and choice (i.e., informed consent),
181. See generally Acquisiti & Grossklags, supra note 22.
182. Alessandro Acquisti, From the Economics to the Behavioral Economics ofPrivacy:
A Note, in ETHICS AND POLICY OF BIOMETRICS 23, 23-26 (Ajay Kumar & David Zhang eds.,
2010).
183. van Aaken, supra note 143, §III, § C.
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because it is not effective, it is worthy to try improving it with nudging
mechanisms, which help citizens to make their decisions on data
protection/disclosure, i.e., using appropriate behaviour insights to create
more effective privacy notices.
Privacy nudges, as complementary regulatory tools would seek at
encouraging, at nudging a privacy-protective behaviour, while preserving
the freedom of choice of the users, achieving the soft or libertarian
paternalism: as said before, it is not an oxymoron, if well interpreted and
implemented. 184 There seems to be enough space for its application also
in the privacy area.
Nudging privacy seems to be possible and desirable, once the
conditions for its application (similar to those applicable to other areas)
are satisfied, i.e.: (1) the privacy nudges are subject to an oversight
mechanism and proportionality test; (2) given that these mechanisms may
have a double side quality (i.e., preserving and compromising freedom at
the same time), avoid that users are heavily charged with the
responsibility of DP; (3) the privacy nudges have been proven to worki.e., to have a positive impact on a target, being it privacy-preserving
behaviour or increased awareness; and (4) ensure control mechanisms of
companies compliance with DP obligations, the latter point may entail
strengthening the powers of national DP authorities. Further research
may investigate the best and efficient way to identify and implement
these control mechanisms.
Soft paternalism and nudging strategies, under these conditions, can
be the way forward for privacy protection online.
A. Visceral notices
Against this background, and without dismissing a rights-based
approach, perhaps it is time also in Europe to build upon that strand of
international lawyers and behavioural scientists who have proposed a
new dimension of privacy notices as innovative strategies that impact
privacy-related attitudes, like the so-called "visceral notices." 185 The
main underlying idea is that information notices should have less text and
more interaction.
Unlike traditional notice that relies upon text or symbols to convey
information, "emerging strategies of 'visceral' notice leverage a
consumer's very experience of a product or service to warn or inform." 186
Moreover, they prove to be useful tools to better inform users about data
184. Sunstein, supra note 163, at 313-27.
185. See Groom & Calo, supra note 25, at 3.
186. Calo, supra note 115, at l 027.
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collection practices (i.e., hidden collection).
Some visceral notices are particularly interesting because based on
"certain common psychological reactions to design to change a
consumer's mental model of a product or service; and 'showing'
consumers instead of 'telling' them, i.e., demonstrating the result of
company practices for the specific consumer, rather than describing the
practices themselves." 187
Previous experiments 188 not only demonstrated the weakness of
traditional explicit notices, but also that visceral notices are more
successful at eliciting privacy-protective behaviour, by pulling users'
automatic responses. 189 Visceral notices, such as an interactive character
that speaks or moves her eyes while user types or moves the mouse, or
the display of the user's location or browsing history, seem to affect
privacy-related attitudes and behaviours.
Not every nudge has the same effect and is interchangeable, though.
A relevant finding of these studies is that a visceral notice represented by
an informal interface ("informal condition") to be employed, for instance,
in children's websites, prove to reduce privacy concerns, but also to
increase data disclosure by users, making the informal design problematic
for data protection and privacy policy.
User data disclosure is a complex behaviour. 190 People disclose their
information also indirectly, that is, when they are not asked (directly) to
reveal their data, when they are not alerted to the sensitivity of the
information itself and therefore not urged to "regulate" the disclosure of
information. In the indirect disclosure (very frequent in Web browsing),
the traditional notice mechanism clearly fails its goal:
The drive to regulate does not minimize passive [i.e., indirect]
disclosure. Passive disclosure is more successfully minimized with
visceral notice strategies, such as interactive agents, because they
directly affect the desire to disclose and do not rely on the more
thoughtful process of determining if privacy is threatened. 191
The use of a visceral notice such as an interactive agent (e.g., an
anthropomorphic silhouette), minimizes user's data disclosure, without
relying on service provider's privacy policy. In other words, it appears
that this kind of visceral notice has better impact on the user's "fast
thinking."
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. at 1033-34.
Id. at 1054.
See Groom & Calo, supra note 25, at 27.
Id.
Id. at 28.
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Most important, this sort of nudge seems to succeed in eliciting
privacy-protective behaviour, reducing data disclosure without creating
privacy concerns (what traditional transparency tools usually do).
1. The BREVE experimental project: Behavioural Responses to Privacy
Visceral Notices
Building upon previous research on "visceral notices" 192 and on
"privacy nudges," 193 the project Behavioural Responses to Privacy
Visceral Notices ("BREVE") has been undertaken by one of the research
institutes of the European Commission between 2013 and 2014. 194
This study examines, via an online experiment and a survey, how
users' online behaviour changes when they are exposed to visceral
notices 195 and real-time alerts about the data collection practices
associated with their online activities. 196 The underlying idea is to assert
to what extent the use of well-designed, intuitive notices effectively
change users' behaviour as regard personal data disclosure. 197 The goal

192. Id.
193. Yang Wang et al., Privacy Nudges for Social Media: An Exploratory Facebook
Study, PROC. OFTH E22 INT'LCONF. WWW COMPANION (2013). See generally Leslie K. John
et al., The Best of Strangers: Context Dependent Willingness to Divulge Personal Information
(July 6, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=l430482 (last visited Dec. 20, 2015);
Lior J. Strahilevitz, Privacy and Technology: Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, 126
HARV. L. REV. 2010 (2013); Alessandro Acquisti, Nudging Privacy: The Behavioral
Economics of Personal Information, 7 IEEE SECURITY & PRIY ACY 82, 82, 84 (2009);
Alessandro Acquisti et al. , The Impact of Relative Standards on the Propensity to Disclose,
49 J. MARKETfNG RES. 160 (2012).
Behavioral
Economics ,
JOINT
RES.
CENTRE,
available
at
194.
http://is.jrc.ec.europa.eu/pages/BE/BEindex.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2015) (for more
information about the BREVE project).
195. Groom & Calo, supra note 25, at 27.
196. In particular, a series of online experiments on EU users, in which 8 conditions,
represented by different privacy notices, is run: beside the traditional (standard and simplified
text notices), five types of more innovative notices are displayed to different groups of on line
participants, who were asked to assess a new (mock-up) search engine, in particular: an
anthropomorphic agent (static and interactive); the IP and the search history (displayed on a
side of the screen); an informal interface (colourful and youngish appearance). Wang, supra
note 193.
197. The online experiment involves, in the first phase, the construction of a mock-up
search engine that the participants are invited to evaluate through a survey; in the second part,
participants are asked to choose among some trivial questions and search for their answers
through the search engine: in this phase, the choice of the questions is what matters most.
Since these questions vary in terms of the nature and amount of personal information they
lead participants to reveal, the choice of questions by participants represents a measure of
their level of indirect disclosure of personal information. In fact, one of the three questions
in each set (randomly) is a personal data-disclosure question (such as: "What is the street
address of a post office in the town where you live?"). The differences among treatments is
given by the presentation of different privacy notices (including visceral notices), that are
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is to check if any of the treatments affects participants' privacy concerns,
if it leads to a significant different personal data disclosure (both direct
or indirect data disclosure) and what policy considerations can be
drawn. 198
B. Integrating behavioural insights into privacy policy making?
Once the issues on legitimacy of innovative privacy notices (namely
visceral notices or privacy nudges) are addressed and after having tested
their effectiveness in changing users' behaviours via ad hoc, reliable
experiments, the attention should then turn to consider when and how to
integrate these mechanisms into policy-making (and into real life).
Behavioural science can be applied to public policies whenever
there is a behavioural element to them. It can help design new policies,
suggest improvements to existing ones, or provide ex-post explanations
of why the target group of a specific policy reacted in a particular way. 199
When considering at what stages of policy-making behavioural
insights and its strategies should be introduced, 200 behavioural aspects
should be incorporated (at least) in the following phases of privacy
policy-making:
First of all, at the first stage of the policy design, where policymakers seek to understand users' behaviour surveys on online users'
practices as regards their personal data (e.g., biases explaining privacy
paradox) have been run in several countries as mentioned before and also
in the EU; an example is given in the Special Eurobarometer 359/11 and
related report published by the Eurpoean Commission ("EC") in 2011. 201
Other specific studies are not missing in Europe, like the one on privacyfriendly default settings, carried out within the SPION project. 202
However, in order to test the responses of users to innovative privacy
strategies, field trails, from which policy recommendations may be
drawn, are needed-like those started to be run in the U.S. on privacy

expected to (differently) impact users' disclosive behaviour. Id.
198. At the time of writing, the BREVE experiment is underway: results of which are
expected to be published soon.
199. See Rene van Bavel et al., supra note 136.
200. Id.; see also Alemanno & Spina, supra note 141.
201. See Pan-European Survey of Practices, supra note 18, at 6.
202. See generally Alessandro Acquisti & Fred Stutzman, Behavioral Aspects ofPrivacy
in
Online
Social
Networks,
SPION (Dec.
21,
2012),
available
at
http://www.spion.me/workpackage/behavioral-aspects-of-privacy-in-online-social-networks
(last visited Dec. 20, 2015).
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nudges 203 and visceral notices. 204 These responses are still not enough
explored in Europe and studies like BREVE (where a series of different
privacy notices are tested on EU users) are exceptional. 205
Still at the policy design stage, behavioural insights may be
employed in the context of the Impact Assessment ("IA"), as one of the
pillars of the EC better regulation strategy in different areas of policy
intervention. 206 The IA document accompanying the EC Proposal for a
GDPR makes some reference to behavioural research; however, more
could be done at this level.
As Alemanno & Spina notice, "behavioural considerations may
allow policy makers to not only consider a broader set of regulatory
options and test their effectiveness through Randomized Controlled
Trials ("RCTs"), but also to empower citizens to have a say thus
increasing the accountability of the regulatory outcome. " 207 These
considerations should include testing the policy options (via in field
experiments).
Secondly, at the formal stage of law-making process, transferring
behavioural considerations into primary or secondary law. At this step,
several issues should be considered in future research, such as: should the
law impose stricter requirements for online privacy policies, to be
'visceral' and effective 208 ( e.g., requirements related to the website
architectural design or also on the pursued behavioural change effect)?;
How detailed should the privacy law be in this regard?; Would the
introduction of specific legal requirements for effective privacy policies,
like visceral notices, be feasible and affordable for industry and
consumers?; and Would the visceral privacy notices be better introduced
with soft law instruments (e.g., recommendations), in which evidencebased models of privacy measures might be strongly urged to industry?
Third, at the implementation level:

203. See Acquisti, supra note 182, at 24-25.
204. See Groom & Calo, supra note 25, at 15.
205 . Needless to say that experiments of this kind on users' behaviour should be
conducted in compliance with legal and ethical principles, starting from informing the
participants about the purposes of the tests (at least about the general goals and before using
their data). Principles seem to not have been followed by some social networks in their recent
practices. For example, for a week, Facebook members were unwitting participants of an
experiment in direct emotional manipulation. Alex Wilhelm, Facebook and the Ethics of
at
available
2014),
29,
(June
TECHCRUNCH
Manipulation,
User
(last
http://techcrunch.com/2014/06/29/facebook-and-the-ethics-of-user-manipulation/
visited Dec. 20, 2015).
206. Impact Assessment Guidelines, at 4, SEC (2009) 92 final (Jan. 15, 2009).
207. Alemanno & Spina, supra note 141, at 456.
208. See Calo, supra note 115, at 1071-72.
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It would be possible to introduce more innovative privacy notices
through implementing acts of supranational or national legislation, like
implementing acts of the European Commission or European guidelines.
Some good examples already exist but are limited to better information
provisions. 209
Another possible integration of behavioural insights at this level
might be within the specific Data Protection Impact Assessment that any
controller will be required to run according to the Draft GDPR, when
"processing operations present specific risks to the rights and freedoms
of data subjects by virtue of their nature, their scope or their purposes"
(Article 33). 210 The use of behavioural insights might be very useful, as
it would allow to better assess the impact of risky technologies on users'
privacy and their perceptions, as well as the effectiveness of privacyprotecting measures to be adopted by the data controller.
However, this would not be painless. Several issues are at stake.
Should behavioural considerations be imposed by law at this stage?
Furthermore, should, for instance, an ISP conduct his own evaluation
about how the application of privacy nudges on his website may reduce
risks for privacy, impacting on users' behaviour and should he decide
which nudge is more appropriate? Economic considerations may bring
him to choose the less appropriate nudge; although a very informal,
youngish interface may be of negative effect on users' protective
behaviour, it might increase trust in his website and, consequently,
increase personal data disclosure (necessary for its business model). 211
A DP assessment, if any, might be made at a higher level, e.g., by
the EDPS, the European DP Supervisor, or by the national Data
Protection Authorities and for categories of data controllers (e.g., ISPs ).
In this case, visceral notices or other kinds of privacy nudges may
represent valuable options that add to a wider framework of requirements
aimed at obtaining a sort of data protection certification, like privacy
seals, 212 which are encouraged by the Draft GDPR (Article 39).
209. See Luzak, supra note 83, at 549. See also Exec. Order No. 13563, 3 C.F.R. 13563
(2011), which promotes increased public participation throughout all stages of the rulemaking
process and encourages public agencies to consider regulatory approaches such as default
rules, disclosure, and simplification that nudge citizens toward better choices while allowing
them to retain flexibility and liberty of choice.
210. Artemi R. Lombarte, The Madrid Resolution and Prospects for Transnational
PIAs, in PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT 385,395 (David Wright & Paul De Hert eds., 2012).
211. For a critical perspective on privacy nudges see Willis, supra note 144, at 1170-72.
"Nudges may not be an effective way to help people make better choices about information
privacy; accordingly, firms can use the same mechanisms and conditions that make nudges
work to make nudges fail." Id.
212. Final Report of the European Union Privacy Seals Project on the Inventory and
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Finally, behavioural insights could be introduced to evaluate ex post
the goodness of a law (or piece oflaw) to improve people's privacy life:
learn from the experience (how people reacted to a specific public
intervention in the privacy field) and take the consequent policy
decisions.
Having said that, a word of caution is required. While it would be
naive to ignore the effect of biases when setting a privacy policy that
relies on the decisions of people, we should, however, not totally rely on
the effects of biases. First, privacy choices are context-dependent.
Therefore, EU future strategies should consider and possibly guide the
choice of what privacy nudge is better for a specific context (e.g.,
informal, youngish context).
Secondly, as recent behavioural research in the law domain also
teach us, implementing nudging mechanisms might not be enough to
protect online privacy, especially in contexts such as behavioural
targeting by companies: we cannot easily rely on user's behaviour change
when personal data disclosure is the only way to obtaining a service: in
cases such as news programing or webpages targeting kids, 213
prohibitions and a duly control system of certain companies practices are
needed. 214 Recent studies have shown that many companies might not
obey what they promise in their privacy policies or that they do not
respect the users' preference, for instance, not to receive unsolicited
commercial emails. 215 Therefore, there will be always some aspects that
needs coercive regulatory tools.
In other words, privacy visceral notices might not be considered as
a panacea to protect privacy, but complementary tools. Sometimes,
coercive measures are still necessary: ( 1) when personal data is necessary
to obtain a public service; (2) in general, technical processes and
mechanisms specific ofbig data 216 make users unaware of what decisions

Analysis

of
Certification
Schemes ,
at
12
(2013),
available
at
http://www.vub.ac.be/LSTS/pub/Dehert/481.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2015).
213. See Simone van der Hof, No Child's Play: Online Data Protection for Our
Children, in MINDING MINORS WANDERING THE WEB: REGULATING ONLINE CHILD SAFETY
127, 130 (Simone van der Hof et al. eds., 2014).
214. Borgesius, supra note 80, at 5, 46.
215. Some tests with unsolicited commercial emails ("UCE") show that only one out of
three websites respect the will of the data subject not to receive commercial communications.
See Maurizio Borghi et al., Online Data Processing Consent Under EU Law: A Theoretical
Framework and Empirical Evidence From The UK, 21 INT'L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 109, 152
(2013) (reporting that their study, conducted on popular UK-based websites, "unveils that the
way in which websites obtain consent (opt-in, pre-selected opt-in, or opt-out) is not a proxy
of lawful processing of data at a later stage").
216. Cukier & Mayer-Schoenberger, supra note 81 , at 6.
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will be taken on the basis of their data; and (3) online companies might
not be compliant with their policies. Even if they advertise their website
as privacy-protective, thus increasing users' trust, their promises to
respect users' privacy preferences might be infringed, without users being
able to realize it. Privacy seals might prove to be an instrument for
competition among companies that, however, centers on privacy image
rather than privacy reality. 217 Moreover, online companies may use the
same mechanisms that make nudges work to make nudges fail, like
reframing the nudges: "a push [back] can easily overwhelm a nudge." 218
Therefore, in order to make sure that tested privacy nudges work as
expected also in real life, public policy should learn the lessons of
behavioural science, being capable to guide and check not only the
creation (design) but also the use of these nudges; it may be necessary to
impose requirements and conditions, not only on the appearance of a
privacy nudge, but on the effects it pursues. Also, for privacy seals to
work and given the difficulty for users to distinguish websites on privacy
grounds, it would be necessary to increase the driving and supervisory
powers of data protection authorities, which can verify the truthfulness of
privacy seals (or other certification model) and strengthen their effect.
1. Future research

Online companies may be non-compliant with data protection law
for different reasons, including the lack of appropriate standard of
information on what the law requires, as well as a lack adequate
supervision mechanisms. 219 On this regard, future research may explore
possibilities for nudging systems to target the companies themselves, i.e.,
to drive them to be compliant with data protection law.
For future research, cyber-security risks (besides and in addition to
those for privacy and data protection) should also be considered.
Accidental or intentional personal data breaches (e.g., as consequence of,
but not limited to, hacking activity), as well as identity thefts (perpetrated,
for instance to commit financial crimes) are still far from being defeated.
However, the security in cyberspace may be benefited and improved

217. Lauren E. Willis, Why Not Privacy by Default?, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 64,128
(2014).
218. Id. at 131.
219. Borghi et al. , supra note 215, at 110, 153 (claiming that there is a severe lack of
compliance of UK on line service providers with essential requirements of data protection law
and suggest that this might due to the existence of "an inappropriate standard of
implementation, information and supervision by the UK authorities, rather than of a conscious
infringing behavior." As they notice, "unclear or unexplained law is detrimental to the
development of a safe online environment and, ultimately, to citizens").
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precisely through nudging systems, 220 including the use of privacy and
security nudges. These might take the form of visceral notices, as
described in this text, or of other kinds of nudging mechanisms. 221
Further research should also investigate the long-term impact of visceral
notices and privacy nudges in general and observe users' privacy
behaviours over time. 222
V. CONCLUSIVE REMARKS
The behaviourally-informed approach to regulatory problems, in
fact, is gaining momentum, and its instruments, so called nudges, are
becoming authentic policy tools. To what extent behavioural insights can
be applied to policy-making in the field of privacy and how? Building
upon few existing experiments on users' attitudes and behaviour as
regards privacy, this paper aims at bringing behavioural research methods
for privacy to the attention of policymakers, exploring challenges and
opportunities of applying behavioural insights into privacy policymaking, at its different stages: from the design to the implementation
phase.
After having discussed the reasons of the failure of traditional
information notices (privacy policies) and considered the benefits of
applying behavioural insights for regulatory purposes in general (e.g.,
nudging strategies), this article claims that the introduction of privacy
nudges, as complementary regulatory tools can be considered legitimate
and worthy of policy support, also in Europe, as far as: ( 1) they seek at
encouraging a privacy-enhancing behaviour, while preserving the
freedom of choice of the users (rather than hinder it), as soft or libertarian
paternalism claims; 223 and (2) they are adopted in a transparent manner
and subject to oversight mechanisms to guarantee that base legal
principles are respected.
Also, the paper aims to trigger the discussion on the feasibility of
introducing specific legal requirements for effective privacy notices
(whether on a privacy-by-design architecture or also on the purposes to
be pursued, i.e., the behavioural change).
After all, the new Proposal for a European GDPR, 224 seeks to
reinforce the transparency and informed consent requirements in view of

220.
See Work Packages, SPION (Dec. 21,
http://www.spion.me/workpackages/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2015).
221. van der Berg, supra note 108, at 776, 783.
222. Groom & Calo, supra note 25, at 4, 28.
223. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 131, at 5.
224. See Proposal for GDPR, supra note 2.
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strengthening individual rights. Behavioural insights and nudging
systems (as visceral notices) may represent an evolving way of
interpreting and implementing the new Regulation, or a way of testing
the adequacy of its stated safeguards.

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol43/iss1/1

126

et al.: JILC - Vol. 43, No. 1 (complete)

A MULTILATERAL CONVENTION ON OUTLAWING
INCITEMENT TO ACTS OF TERRORISM UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Frederick V. Perryt & Wendy Gelmantt
CONTENT
ABSTRACT ................................................................................ 121
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................... 122
I. THELAW ............................................................................... 124
IL AD HOC TRIBUNALS ......................................................... 128
III. EXTRADITION AND JURISDICTION .............................. 129
IV. PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FREE SPEECH IN
MODERN WESTERN CULTURE .................................. 136
V. FREE SPEECH UNDER THE U.S. CONSTITUTION ........ 137
A. Background and Adoption of the First Amendment ... 13 7
B. Alien and Sedition Acts ............................................... 139
C. Civil War ..................................................................... 140
D. Red Scare ..................................................................... 141
E. The Court's Changing Perspective on Incitement ....... 143
F. Post 9/11 ....................................................................... 145
VI. FREE SPEECH UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW .......... 147
A. Sources ........................................................................ 14 7
B. Limitations ................................................................... 148
CONCLUSION ............................................................................ 152

ABSTRACT
Terrorist activities have occurred throughout history. In this paper,
we study the relationship between incitement to violence, and recruiting,
training or convincing others to commit acts of violence and the
limitation on the right to free speech as determined by the Supreme Court
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and international tribunals. We advocate bringing accused perpetrators of
such international crimes before the courts via universal jurisdiction and
offer a solution: a multilateral convention providing for the rendition of
suspects who have solicited or persuaded others to perform terrorist acts,
whether or not the acts actually occur and are successful.
INTRODUCTION
When a person persuades, encourages, instigates, pressures, trains
or solicits another person or group so as to cause that person or group to
commit an act of international terrorism, unless there is a treaty of
extradition between the state where the terrorist offense has taken place
or has been instigated etc., to take place, and the state where the person
suspected of doing such instigation etc., is found, very often the suspect
goes free. There is no legal reason or motivation for the requested state
to render the suspect to the requesting state. To overcome this problem,
we propose a multilateral convention. Such a convention would require
the arrest and extradition of individuals suspected of training, motivating,
inciting or soliciting others to engage in international terrorist activities
that have taken place or were or are planned to take place in the requesting
state. The convention would not attempt to define a "terrorist activity,"
since that has eluded international lawyers and states for generations,
rather it would work much the same way that typical bilateral extradition
treaties work today, working within the frameworks of the national laws
of the requesting and the requested state. We propose a separate
convention, and not simply amending the Statute of the International
Criminal Court, since a number of prominent states are not participants
in the ICC. 1
Under the domestic laws of many countries, a person who solicits or
entices another to commit a crime is guilty of a punishable offense and is
prosecuted for such crime. The person is arrested and tried. But how do
we bring those who incite or solicit acts of international terrorism when
they are in a far off land, outside the reach of our police and our courts?
In today's world they often go free.
The bombings in Boston on the day of the 2013 Marathon race were
generally considered an act of terrorism. 2 Some believe the Boston
1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, openedfor signature July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90. For example, China, the United States, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Turkey
Israel are not members, though the United States has signed the Statute, but not ratified it.
See id.
2. Mark Landler, Obama Calls Blasts an 'Act of Terrorism, 'N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2013),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/17 /us/politics/obama-calls-marathonbombings-an-act-of-terrorism.html?adxnnl= 1&adxnnlx= 1380121442-
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Bombing suspects received training or indoctrination outside the United
States. 3 The American press believed that a person "radicalized" at least
one of the Tsarnaev brothers, causing the Boston carnage. 4 The FBI tried
very hard to find that person. 5 According to CNN, by July of 2015, there
were more U.S. citizens charged in jihadist-style terrorism related cases
than at any time since the attacks of September 11, 2011. 6 Who inspires
such activity? Who educates or trains perpetrators to engage in such
activity? Now, many believe that the group known as ISIS is doing so to
a large degree. 7 Should we or can we do anyting about such inspiration
or even training?
The attacks on Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, 8 are reported to be
the work of Al Shabab militants from Somalia, apparently trained there
and recruited from there; others think some may have even come from
Kenya itself, 9 though as the head of Kenya's military has stated: "We are
fighting global terrorism here," 10 as many believe the group included
n99IiJGFvdB8FYupxAvC3A (last visited Dec. 20, 2015).
3. Anderson Cooper, Were Bombing Suspects Trained Overseas?, CNN (Apr. 23, 2013,
11: 14 PM), available at http://ac360.blogs.cnn.com/2013/04/23/were-bombing-suspectstrained-overseas/?ire~allsearch (last visited Dec. 20, 2015).
4. Peter Weber, Who is 'Misha,' the Armenian Muslim Who Radicalized Tamer/an
at
available
2013),
24,
(Apr.
WEEK
Tsarnaev?,
http ://theweek.com/article/index/243163/who-is-misha-the-armenian-muslim-whoradical ized-tamerlan-tsamaev (last visited Dec. 20, 2015).
5. See James Nye & David McCormack, FBI Closing in on 'Misha': Agents Identify
Mysterious Bald, Red-Bearded Armenian-American Man Accused of Radicalizing the Boston
at
available
PM),
4:08
2013,
27,
(Apr.
MAIL
DAILY
Bombers,
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2315605/Boston-bombers-FBI-reveal-theyveidentified-Misha-mysterious-bald-red-bearded-Armenian-Americanman.html#ixzz3 l cOTtOK5 (last visited Dec. 20, 2015).
6. See Peter Bergen & David Sterman, A History of Attacks Against US. Military
at
available
PM),
8:46
2015,
17,
(July
CNN
Installations,
(last
http://www.cnn.com/2015/07 /16/opinions/bergen-chattanooga-shooting/index.html
visited Dec. 20, 2015).
7. Ashley Fantz & Dana Ford, Massachusetts Man Accused of Plot to Bomb Crowded
Places on Behalf of ISIS, CNN (July 14, 2015, 10:55 AM), available at
http://www.cnn.com/2015/07 /13/us/massachusetts-isis-arrest/index.html (last visited Dec.
20, 2015).
8. Daniel Howden, Terror in Westgate Mall: The Full Story of the Attacks That
Devastated Kenya, GUARDIAN (Oct. 4, 2013, 8:12 AM), available at
http://www.theguardian.com/world/interacti ve/20 l 3/oct/04/westgate-mall-attacks-kenyaterror#undefined (last visited Dec. 20, 2015).
9. Duncan Miriri, Two Kenyan Police Killed in Attack in Northeast County, REUTERS
(Sept. 26, 2013, 6:30 AM), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/20 I3/09/23/us-kenyaattack-idUSBRE98K03V20 l30923 (last visited Dec. 20, 2015).
10. Duncan Miriri & James Macharia, Militants Hold out as Kenya Forces Try to Crush
Cross-Border Jihad, REUTERS (Sept. 23, 2013, 5:33 PM), available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/kenya-attack-idUSL5NOHJ3MV20130923 (last visited Dec.
20, 2015).
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fighters from many parts of the world. 11 Planners, plotters, instigators
and trainers prepared the militants who carried out the two attacks on the
World Trade Center in New York. 12 Terrorists often do not work by
themselves and often do not start out life as terrorists. Frequently
someone "turns" them or radicalizes them to become terrorists. Just as
often, the person or persons who have done the "turning" are found in a
state other than the one in which the terrorist incident occurred or was
planned to have occurred, rendering the suspects outside the jurisdiction
of the state that is the target of the terrorist attack. Some states simply
are frustrated by this and the perpetrators go free. Sometimes in other
cases, for example such as in the case of the United States, the state
chooses the option of its own unlawful activity and resorts to extra-legal
means, often called "extraordinary rendition," 13 Whenever one of these
two cases occurs-either doing nothing out of frustration, or resorting to
extra-legal actions-the respect for international law breaks down. We
suggest a solution: a multilateral convention providing for the rendition
of those individuals who are believed to have engaged in the activity of
persuading, encouraging, instigating, and pressuring training or soliciting
terrorist acts, whether or not the acts actually occur and are successful.
The state in which a terrorist act or planned terrorist act is to occur-the
target state-would use its own definition of an act of international
terrorism and therefore its own statutory definition for the solicitation of
such crime-if such activity is a crime under its domestic law-and
request another state party to the convention in which the suspect is
found, to extradite that person to the requesting state for interrogation and
prosecution, if prosecution is warranted. The requested state would go
through the safeguards that are normal in such treaties, as explained
below, in deciding whether or not to comply with the request, much like
they would in all other cases of extradition requests.

I. THE LAW
What do citizens expect or even demand in terms of protection under
the law? Especially when dealing with the subject of crime, the law is
11. Id.
12. See Luis Martinez, 9/ 11 Plotters Defer Pleas at Guantanamo Bay Arraignment,
ABC NEWS (May 5, 2012), available at http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/05/9l lplotters-accused-refuses-to-answer-in-guantanamo-bay-arraignment/ (last visited Dec. 20,
2015); see also Al Qaeda Chief Khalid Sheikh Mohammed Confesses to Planning Sept. 11,
Gitmo
Transcript Shows, FOX NEWS (Mar.
15, 2007), available at
http://www.foxnews.com/story/2007/03/15/al-qaeda-chief-khalid-sheikh-mohammedconfesses-to-planning-sept-l l-gitmo/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2015).
13. See infra p. 15 (discussing the United States' use of extraordinary rendition in the
case of terrorist suspects).
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considered to be an instrument of social control. 14 By enacting laws
society attempts to achieve uniform behavior, often by describing
behavior that is prohibited. 15 The desired behavior is then encouraged by
The
discouraging the undesired behavior through punishment. 16
populations of many states today consider themselves to be living under
the rule of law. 17 Those populations believe, among other things, that the
rule of law provides to them as citizens the advantages of not only
protection from would be wrongdoers, but also the prevention of arbitrary
and corrupt government, the restraint of vengeance and the provision of
individual liberty and economic prosperity. 18
Some of the very first principles of the concept of the rule of law are
that a law must be made public and must be reasonably clear in meaning
and specific in what it prohibits. 19 And, of course, it must be applied
equally to all, that is, without discrimination. 20 The rule of law is
considered an essential element of a functioning democracy and a
functioning economy. 21 This sentiment has been echoed time and
again, 22 including by the United Nations itself, which has said:
Promoting the rule of law at the national and international levels is at
the heart of the United Nations' mission. Establishing respect for the
rule of law is fundamental to achieving a durable peace in the aftermath
of conflict, to the effective protection of human rights, and to sustained
economic progress and development. The principle that everyone from the individual right up to the State itself - is accountable to laws
that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently
adjudicated, is a fundamental concept which drives much of the United
Nations work. 23

States have for a very long time generally considered themselves
united by some fundamental principles of law into a legal community,
governed by law, even though there at times may be disagreement as to

14. WILLIAM L. CLARK & WILLIAM L. MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES
1-3 (Marian Quinn Barnes ed., 7th ed. 1967).
15. Id. at 3-4.
16. Id. at 64.
17. ANDREW ALTMAN, ARGUING ABOUT LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY 18 (Peter Adams et al. eds., 2d ed. 2001).
18. Id.
19. 0. Lee Reed, Law, The Rule of Law, and Property: A Foundation for the Private
Market and Business Study, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 441, 448-50 (2001).
20. ALTMAN, supra note 17, at 18.
21. Id.
22. Id.
UN. & The Rule of Law, UNITED NATIONS, available at
23.
http://www.un.org/en/ruleoflaw/index.shtml (last visited Dec. 20, 2015).
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the meaning or substance of such law or laws. 24 Another principal tenet
of the rule oflaw is that government should maintain peace and order, for
the most part through a system oflaws or rules that specify both violations
and their corresponding sanctions accruing to violators. This leads to the
notion that no act can be regarded as a crime unless there is a specific law
prohibiting it and no one can be punished unless they have committed an
unlawful act described as a crime. Legal scholars refer to these concepts
as nullum crimen sin lege ("no crime without a law") and nulla poena sin
crimine ("no punishment without a crime"). 25 In other words, crimes
must be clearly defined. 26 As will be described below, acts generally
considered acts of terrorism, or simply acts of violence are unlawful in
most countries at the state level. Although laws prohibiting acts of
violence that are in some ways similar do exist at the state level in many
states, the "rule of law" at the international level lags behind, 27 especially
in the area of curtailing or controlling violence, notably international
terrorism. 28
It has been said that an effective legal system must be capable of
reflecting the changing needs of the society in which it exists and
functions. 29 Accordingly,just as a state's legal system must have a viable
process of continuous law-making in order to regulate the evolving
activities of its society, so must the international community have a
system of legally binding principles and norms controlling the relations
among the member states of the international community, which evolve
or grow over time, so as to reflect the changing conditions within the
international community. 30 Examples of the international community's
laws evolving and spawning new laws are areas such as human rights
law, commerce and technology treaties. These areas oflaw making their
mark increased international interdependence and cooperation in the
recent past. 31 Large areas of the Law of the Sea and of Space Law have
recently come about because of innovations in technology. 32 In other
words, societal and technological changes produce new international

24.
(1993).

GENNADII

M.

DANILENKO, LAW-MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

13

25. ALTMAN, supra note 17, at 5.
26. Id.
27. Frederick V. Perry, Multinationals at Risk: Terrorism and the Rule of Law, 7 FLA.
INT'L U. L. REY. 43, 61 (2011).
28. See generally id.
29. DANILENKO, supra note 24, at 1.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 2.
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laws. This evolving situation has caused the International Court of
Justice to say that "throughout its history, the development of
international law has been influenced by the requirements of international
life." 33 Further, in describing the sources of international law, the
International Court of Justice described at least one multilateral treaty as
constituting international legislation. 34 Of course there is no international
legislator and using the term "legislation" for international law generally
is merely a metaphor. 35 The point is that international law both changes
and expands with the times and the dominant source of international law
today is treaties, 36 particularly multilateral treaties. Indeed, "[w]e live in
the age of treaties. Increasingly, bilateral and multilateral written
agreements are used for the creation of new international legal
standards."37
Changes in the world's commercial and geopolitical realities have
given rise to new opportunities, but also new dangers. Our changing
world and its rapidly evolving technology have given rise to an increasing
proliferation of acts of international terrorism. Further, those changes
have also given rise to a concomitant and increasing fear of as well as
frustration with international terrorism, at least partly caused by the
frequent inability to arrest and bring to justice the perpetrators of acts of
international terrorism. It is for this reason that we propose the
negotiation, drafting and execution of a broad multilateral convention on
the extradition of terrorist suspects, not the perpetrators of attacks, since
that has so far proved an impossibility for a number of reasons, rather
extradition--or prosecution--of those who instigate such acts. Such a
convention could be accomplished under the auspices of the United
Nations. "A convention is a treaty on matters of common concern,
usually negotiated on a regional or global basis and open to adoption by
many nations. " 38 Conventions are very often sponsored by the United
Nations or some other intergovernmental organization within the U.N.
system. 39 We suggest therefore a multilateral convention negotiated and
drafted under the sponsorship of the United Nations. Just as contracts in
the domestic legal sense make for private law between the parties to the

33.

1949 I.C.J. 178;

see also

DANILENKO, supra note 24, at 5.

34. DANILENKO, supra note 24, at 6.
35. Id.
36. Duncan B. Hollis, A Comparative Approach to Treaty Law and
NATIONAL TREATY LA w AND PRACTICE 1, 1 (Duncan B. Hollis et al. eds., 2005).

Practice, in

37. ULF LINDERFALK, ON THE INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES 1 (2007).
38. RICHARD SCHAFFER, BEVERLY EARLER & FILBERTO AGUSTI, INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS LAW AND ITS ENVIRONMENT 251 ( 6th ed. 2006).
39. CONWAY W. HENDERSON, UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL LAW 65 (2010).
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contract, so do treaties (or multilateral conventions) make law binding
upon their signatories.
The United States is party to over 10,000 treaties still in force. 40
France has nearly 7,000 international agreements in effect and China is a
party to over 6,000 bilateral agreements and 273 multilateral
agreements. 41 Treaties, therefore, are accepted as normal practice by
countries all over the world, and a multilateral treaty is "the nearest thing
we yet have to a general statute in international law. " 42 There seems to
be widespread desire for the rule of law. In its Millennium Declaration,
the General Assembly of the United Nations stressed the need to
strengthen the international rule oflaw. 43 We believe such a convention
would do just that, by providing for international cooperation in the
capture, detention and rendition of suspects.
Intergovernmental Organizations, such as the United Nations, and
states themselves have traditionally been the prime movers in creating
treaties and in general, international organizations organize, negotiate and
conclude most multilateral treaties today. 44
Only states and
Intergovernmental Organizations can be parties to a treaty. But now NonGovernmental Organizations ("NGOs"), though not signatories, are
taking part in treaty making. 45 In fact, in general, "Civil society has
become an important participant in today's multilateral treaty-making,
thanks in large part to the considerable significance States now accord its
work."46 As an example, in the field of humanitarian law, the
International Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC") has been very active
in representing civil society. 47 It may therefore be beneficial for the
advocates of a multilateral convention of the type we propose to engage
with influential NGOs as well as the ICRC.
II. AD HOC TRIBUNALS
For certain international crimes, especially those of"grave breaches
of the Geneva Convention of 1949, violations of the laws and customs of

40. Treaty Affairs: The Office ofAssistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs, U.S. DEPT.
STATE, available at http://www.state.gov/s/1/treaty/index.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2015).
41. Hollis, supra note 36, at 1.
42. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 638 (7th ed. 2008).
43. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 65/1 (Oct. I 9, 2010).
44. ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 392-93 (2d ed. 2007).
45. See Louise Doswald-Beck, Participation of Non-Governmental Entities in TreatyMaking: The Case of Conventional Weapons, in MULTILATERAL TREATY-MAKING 41, 41
(Vera Gowlland-Debbas ed., 2000).
46. Id.
47. Id.
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war, genocide and crimes against humanity," 48 the United Nations
Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations, has established tribunals to try those accused of such acts. 49 The
creation of such tribunals and their mandates do not give them authority
to create new law, rather they are constrained to apply current
international law, that is customary international law, or principles that
are erga omnes. Erga Omnes is defined as "obligation[ s] under general
international law . . . [reflecting] common values and . . . concern for
compliance, so that a breach of that obligation enables all States to take
action. " 50 Such tribunals apply customary international law and treaty
law generally. The creation of such tribunals is however expensive,
though they often are created because of some impediment or reluctance
to prosecute on the part of the state wherein the crimes occurred or of
which the defendants are nationals. It is expected that the International
Criminal Court ("ICC") will now deal with those activities that were
formerly tried in such ad hoc tribunals. But the ICC is supposed to get
involved only when for one reason or another the domestic court of the
state in which the suspect is found either does not or cannot prosecute the
suspect. Currently the best place to try those who have incited or solicited
international terrorist activities appears to be domestic courts, but how
does a domestic court bring before it a suspect that is found in a distant
state? How does the court get not only physical presence of the suspect,
but also jurisdiction over him or her?
III. EXTRADITION AND JURISDICTION
According to Black's Law Dictionary, the term jurisdiction means:
The power and authority constitutionally conferred upon (or
constitutionally recognized as existing in) a court or judge to pronounce
the sentence of the law, or to award the remedies provided by law, upon
a state of facts, proved or ad- mitted, referred to the tribunal for
decision, and authorized by law to be the subject of investigation or
action by that tribunal, and in favor of or against persons (or a res) who
present themselves, or who are brought, before the court in some
manner sanctioned by law as proper and sufficient. 51

48. Daphna Shraga & Ralph Zacklin, The International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, 5 EUR. J. INT'L L. 360, 363 (1994).
49. See generally BROWNLIE, supra note 42, at 587-607.
50. Obligations and Rights Erga Omnes in International Law, 71 ANNUAIRE DE
L'lNSTITUT
DE
DROIT
INT'L
art.
l(a)
(2005),
available
at
http://www.justitiaetpace.org/idiE/resolutionsE/2005 _ kra_0 l _ en.pdf (last visited Dec. 20,
2015).
is
Jurisdiction?,
LAW
DICTIONARY,
available
at
51.
What
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Under widely accepted norms of International law, five grounds are
accepted as the basis on which states can base their criminal jurisdiction:
"Territorial jurisdiction" arises from offenses occurring within a state's
territory; "nationality jurisdiction" is based on the fact that the defendant
is a national of the state claiming jurisdiction; "passive personality
jurisdiction" arises when the victim of the offense is a national of the
prosecuting state; "protective jurisdiction" is based on the acts that have
an effect on important state interests or national security; and "universal
jurisdiction" is based on the notion that some international crimes are so
egregious that a violation of them by anyone, anywhere, warrants any
state taking jurisdiction. 52
Implementing the desire not to allow perpetrators of atrocities to get
away with their crimes has been an objective of the international
community for a long time. 53 In fact, that was the impetus that gave rise
to the ICC. 54 According to the work of the Internationa] Law
Commission, there are more than 60 multilateral treaties that create
universal jurisdiction and provide the alternatives of extradition or
prosecution of suspects of international crimes as defined in such
treaties. 55
So the question becomes, how do we assure that those accused of
perpetrating international crimes are brought before the courts? Of
course the maxim of being guilty until proven innocent goes without
saying, but the accused, the suspects, should at least stand trial, in other
words, they should be investigated, interrogated and possibly prosecuted
for their crimes. The issue is how to encourage states to seek them out,
arrest them and then either prosecute them or send them to a state that
will prosecute them, in other words, extradite them. The Latin term, and
the term used in international legal parlance is aut dedere aut judicare,
prosecute or extradite. The principle of aut dedere aut judicare is closely
related to universal jurisdiction, but it prohibits a state from shielding an
international criminal. 56
http://thelawdictionary.org/jurisdiction/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2015).
52. See Hari M. Osofsky, Domesticating International Criminal Law: Bringing Human
Rights Violators to Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 191 (1997); see also BROWNLIE, supra note 42, at
300-05.
53. Misa Zgonec-Rozej & Joanna Foakes, International Criminals: Extradite or
CHATHAM
HOUSE
3
(July
2013),
available
at
Prosecute?,
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/1ntemational%20L
aw/0713bp _prosecute.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2015).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Amnesty Int'l, Universal Jurisdiction: A Preliminary Survey of Legislation Around
the World, at 7, IOR 53/004/2011 (Oct. 5, 2011).
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A widely accepted method of motivating courts is through the use
of universal jurisdiction. In the estimation of Amnesty International,
"Universal jurisdiction, an essential tool of international justice, is the
ability of the court of any state to try persons for crimes committed
outside its territory that are not linked to the state by the nationality of the
suspect or the victims or by harm to the state's own national interests. 57
Universal jurisdiction is "based on the nature of the crime, not on
any nexus between the forum State and the matter under consideration.
It is normally relied upon in a criminal law context to prosecute core
international crimes. " 58 Practically speaking municipal courts take such
jurisdiction in cases of piracy and slave trading more than anything else. 59
In a 2005 resolution of the Institut de Droit International, universal
jurisdiction is discussed in the following terms:
Universal jurisdiction in criminal matters, as an additional ground of
jurisdiction, means the competence of a State to prosecute alleged
offenders and to punish them if convicted, irrespective of the place of
commission of the crime and regardless of any link of active or passive
nationality, or other grounds of jurisdiction recognized by international
law.
Universal jurisdiction is primarily based on customary international
law. It can also be established under a multilateral treaty in the relations
between the contracting parties, in particular by virtue of clauses which
provide that a State party in the territory of which an alleged offender
is found shall either extradite or try that person. 60

The trouble is that everyone has to agree on what the elements of
universal jurisdiction are and how it is to be implemented. Ian Brownlie
and Malcolm Shaw, two famous British writers on international law, like
the Institut de Droit International, also believe that domestic courts have
universal jurisdiction under customary international law 61 for certain
crimes that are "particularly offensive to the international community as
a whole."62 Resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly tell states to
extradite or prosecute offenders for certain crimes, providing for

57. Id. at 1.
58. ALINA KACZOROWSKA, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 310 (4th ed. 2010).
59. Id.
60. Universal Criminal Jurisdiction with Regard to the Crime of Genocide, Crimes
Against Humanity and War Crimes, 71 ANNUAlRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INT'L ,, 1-2
(2005), available at http://www.justitiaetpace.org/idiE/resolutionsE/2005 kra 03 en. pdf
(last visited Dec. 20, 2015).
61. See BROWNLIE, supra note 42, at 306.
62. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 668 (6th ed. 2008).
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universal jurisdiction. 63 General Assembly resolutions, while they may
provide evidence of customary international law, do not generally create
it. 64 Some are of the view that universal jurisdiction is a troublesome
concept and not widely accepted under customary international law as
being law, that is, as a norm, requiring or allowing action.65 Those people
believe that a treaty is required that provides for universal jurisdiction for
the crimes enumerated in the treaty.
In order for a state's judicial and or prosecutorial system to
prosecute a suspect for an international crime, the prosecuting state must
have the legal ability to do so, either under the state's domestic law, under
a treaty to which it is a party or both, or if the state believes that customary
international law so provides, simply under universal jurisdiction. Not
all treaties that define international crimes provide for or require
signatories to either prosecute or extradite, and even of those that do, not
all are what is known as self-executing. 66 Further, of those that have such
requirements, that is, appear to be self-executing on their face, some
states' systems do not require or allow their courts to prosecute based
merely on a treaty obligation: they require their own domestic law to
provide for it. Further, even in the case where a treaty defines the crime,
provides for the obligation to prosecute or extradite and further requires
the state signatory to create domestic implementing legislation, many
states do not implement the law to give effect to the treaty obligations.
There are further obstacles to the implementation of the concept of either
universal jurisdiction or simply jurisdiction and extradition obligations
under treaties. First is the matter that a state wishing to prosecute must
request that the state wherein the suspect is located arrest and extradite
the suspect. Will the requested state comply? There is the issue of
whether a state, which under its domestic laws or pursuant to an
international treaty, possesses the judicial and or prosecutorial will to
arrest and then extradite or arrest and then prosecute itself. Whenever
two or more states are involved with one another there are also
international relations implications. There is always the question of
63. See G.A. Res. 2840 (XXVI) (Dec. 18, 1971); G.A. Res. 3074 (XXVIII) (Dec. 3,
1973).
64. Int'] Law Ass'n London Conference, Statement of Principles Applicable to the
Formation a/General Customary International Law, 55-56 (2000); see also SHAW,supra note
62,at114.
65. Zgonec-Rozej & Foakes, supra note 53 , at 12-13.
66. Under current United States' law, a self-executing treaty is one that the courts will
enforce absent domestic implementing legislation, that is, the treaty creates a domestic legal
obligation without such legislation. Oona A. Hathaway, Sabria McElroy & Sara Aronchick
Solow, International Law at Home: Enforcing Treaties in U.S. Courts, 37 YALE J. INT'L L. l,
52-53 (2012); see also Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491,493 (2008).
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whether the state has the political will to arrest or to prosecute.
Often the answers to such questions hang on matters having little to
do with the criminality of the offense. Whether a state will arrest and
extradite or prosecute itself is a matter of international relations, that is,
politics; it is sometimes a matter of how incensed the population of the
potentially prosecuting state might be over the offense. It might be
related to how the state of citizenship of the potential defendant view the
prospect of extraditing or prosecuting its citizens for an act taking place
in another state. The decision may depend on the extent to which such
state may wish that the suspect be prosecuted.
Terrorist attacks such as that in New York of September 11, 2001,
the attack in Bali, that in London, in Madrid and others provide a serious
challenge for governments in trying to address the problem of
international terrorism. 67 Not all states have bilateral extradition treaties
between them. Not all states are signatories to multilateral treaties
requiring extradition or prosecution. No universal convention defines
international terrorism, which means that it is therefore doubly difficult,
under current international law, for someone to be guilty of the crime of
solicitation or incitement to international terrorism. Since international
terrorism, has no accepted universal definition the incitement offense can
hardly have one. The international convention that appears to come
closest to providing a definition of international terrorism and at the same
time outlawing solicitation is the International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing ofTerrorism. 68 In view of this shortcoming
in international law how do states seek out, capture and bring to justice
the suspected person or persons implicated in planning or soliciting the
attacks in the absence of an extradition treaty covering the matter between
the state seeking the suspect and the state in which the suspect is found?
Without effective lawful means at their disposal, some states engage in
extrajudicial-read unlawful-means to deal with the situation, such as
the United States practice of what is termed "extraordinary rendition."
As discussed above, normally suspects are transferred from one state
to another to answer charges against them by means of judicial processes
pursuant to extradition treaties, if there is one between the two sates
concerned. At times states will, absent a treaty, simply cooperate out of
comity. In those cases where an extradition treaty exists, the suspect has
the ability to challenge the extradition, but in the case of extraordinary

67. HELEN DUFFY, THE 'WAR ON TERROR' AND THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL
3 (2005).
68. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9,
1999, 2178 U.N.T.S. 197.
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rendition, there is an "extrajudicial transfer of a person from one State to
another," generally for the purpose of arrest, detention, and/or
interrogation by the receiving State. 69 When this occurs the suspect has
no access to the judicial system to challenge the rendition; sometimes the
rendition occurs with the consent of the state in which the suspect is found
and sometimes it does not. 70 The United States has engaged in another
related practice. The United States' policy of allegedly rendering
suspected terrorists for the purpose of arrest, detention and interrogation
to States who are known for practicing torture has been considered by
some to be a highly questionable practice. 71 Such renditions are generally
considered unlawful. 72 Torture is of course outlawed. 73
The European Parliament was concerned about the possible
involvement of European governments in such unlawful activity and
conducted an investigation. 74 A situation in which states are encouraged
to conduct unlawful activities because of a void in the law that does not
provide for lawful rendition, that is, for extradition, causes the law not to
be respected. When a large, influential state like the United States flaunts
the rule of law, states can lose respect for the rule of law, and the rule of
law breaks down.
Multilateral conventions or treaties are, as mentioned above, the
most popular way that law is created in the international realm.
69. MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32890, RENDITIONS:
CONSTRAINTS IMPOSED BY LA ws ON TORTURE, 1 (2009) (emphasis omitted).
70. Id.
71. See Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture, NEW YORKER (Feb. 14, 2005), available at
http://www.newyorker.com/rnagazine/2005/02/14/outsourcing-torture (last visited Dec. 20,
2015).
72 23 Americans Convicted of Kidnaping Italy, CHI. TRIBUNE (Nov. 5, 2009), available at
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2009-l l-05/news/0911050257_ 1_armando-spataro-judgeoscar-rnagi-abu-omar (last visited Dec. 20, 2015).
73. G.A. Res. 39/46, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Dec. 10, 1984). "The United Nations Convention
Against Torture and Other Cmel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT)
requires signatory parties to take measures to end torture within their territorial jurisdiction
and to criminalize all acts of torture. Unlike many other international agreements and
declarations prohibiting torture, CAT provides a general definition of the term. CAT
generally defines torture as the infliction of severe physical and/or mental suffering
committed under the color of law. CAT allows for no circumstances or emergencies where
torture could be permitted." MICHAELJOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32438, U.N.
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE (CAT): OVERVIEW AND APPLICATION TO INTERROGATION
TECHNIQUES summary (2009).
74. Temp. Comm. on the Alleged Use of European Countries by the CIA for the
Transport and Illegal Detention of Prisoners Working Document on 'Extraordinary
Renditions,'
at
2
(Nov.
16,
2006),
available
at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/comparl/tempcorn/tdip/working_docs/pe380593 _ en.pdf (last
visited Dec. 20, 2015).
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Extradition treaties are popular75 and they appear to work. For example,
the United States has significantly increased its law enforcement
cooperation with foreign states and extraditions involving the United
States have significantly increased in recent years. 76
Extradition treaties are in the nature of a contract and generate the
most controversy with respect to those matters for which extradition may
not be granted. In addition to an explicit list of crimes for which
extradition may be granted, most modem extradition treaties also identify
various classes of offenses for which extradition may or must be denied.
Common among these are provisions excluding purely military and
political offenses, capital offenses, crimes that are punishable under only
the laws of one of the parties to the treaty, crimes committed outside the
country seeking extradition, crimes where the fugitive is a national of the
country of refuge, and crimes barred by double jeopardy or a statute of
limitations.
Extradition is triggered by a request submitted through diplomatic
channels. In the United States, it proceeds through the Departments of
Justice and State and may be presented to a federal magistrate to order a
hearing to determine whether the request is in compliance with an
applicable treaty, whether it provides sufficient evidence to satisfy
probable cause to believe that the fugitive committed the identified treaty
offense( s), and whether other treaty requirements have been met. If so,
the magistrate certifies the case for extradition at the discretion of the
Secretary of State. Except as provided by treaty, the magistrate does not
inquire into the nature of foreign proceedings likely to follow
extradition. 77
Of course any norms or treaties that cause persons to be arrested for
political activity, which may, in some cases, be nothing more than having
voiced one's political views, or even for what the United States Supreme
Court has termed "symbolic speech," 78 is troublesome for some courts
and for some countries, since this gives rise to freedom of speech issues
in many states, or what the United States terms First Amendment issues.
So there is a potential problem in defining where the limits of free speech
ends and talk or activities that amount to incitement of another to commit
a crime-in this case terrorist acts-begins. What do states do when their
enthusiasm for protection and extradition bump up against notions of free
75. See MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA & CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-958,
EXTRADITION TO AND FROM THE UNITED STATES: OVERVIEW OF THE LAW AND RECENT
TREATIES 1 (2010). The United States has such treaties with over 100 states. Id.
76. Id. at 1 & n.3.
77. Id. at 1.
78. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,404 (1989).
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speech?
The second potential problem is the disparity in states' definitions
of terrorism. If the United States, for example, were asked to extradite a
suspect to Russia, where the law defining terrorism is so broad that
robbing a liquor store or even peaceful demonstrations could be
considered an act of terrorism, the United States would have a problem
with such an extradition (of course the United States does not currently
have an extradition treaty with Russia). The Supreme Court of the United
States, because of the nature of its Constitution, has rigorously defended
the right of freedom of speech, and the government has defended it
abroad in treaty negotiations. The problem becomes defining how the
right to freedom of expression functions and where the right begins and
ends? It is worth analyzing the right to freedom of speech.
IV. PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FREE SPEECH IN
MODERN WESTERN CULTURE
The sources for the right of freedom of speech as embodied in
modem constitutional and international law are rooted in the philosophies
of the Protestant Reformation and Enlightenment. For example, in 1644,
nearly a century and a half prior to the adoption of the U.S. Constitution,
John Milton powerfully argued that the freedom to express one's views
"can serve as a powerful force against political abuse and stagnations." 79
Also, in England, the Bill of Rights passed by parliament in 1689
included a guarantee of free speech within the confines of parliament,
providing "that the freedom of speech, and debates or proceedings in
parliament, ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place
out of parliament." 80 Likewise, the late 17th century Dutch philosopher,
Benedict Spinoza championed the basic right to free speech. 81 Perhaps
most famously Voltaire, the 18th century French enlightenment
representative "considered protection of offensive speech to be a moral
duty." 82 Inspired by Voltaire, on August 26, 1789, during the French
Revolution, the French National Assembly adopted the Declaration of the
Rights of Man, which affirmed free speech as an "unalienable right,"

79. Vincent Blasi, Milton's Areopagitica and the Modern First Amendment, YALE L.
SCH. LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY Part VI (Mar. l , 1995), available at
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yslop__papers/6
80. Act for Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, and Settling the Succession
of the Crown (Bill of Rights) 1688, 1 W. & M. c. 2 (Eng.).
81. Justin Steinberg, Spinoza's Political Philosophy, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY 10 (Edward N. Zalta et al. eds., Winter ed. 2013).
82. Winfred Brugger, The Treatment of Hate Speech in German Constitutional Law, 4
GERMAN L. J. 1, 1 (2003).
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providing that "[t]he free communication of ideas and opinions is one of
the most precious of the rights of man. " 83
Though the right to freedom of speech has a rich historical tradition
in the Western world, it was rarely thought to be an absolute right.
Though Milton argues forcefully against the evils of government
censorship, he steadfastly refused to extend the benefits of freedom of
speech to those who practiced the Catholic faith. 84 Spinoza too allowed
for the possibility that it could be counter-productive, if not "'very
dangerous,' to grant unlimited freedom of speech." 85 Also, and more
pertinently, Spinoza believed that the government should ultimately
retain "full discretion to determine which actions are acceptable and what
forms of speech are seditious. " 86 Even the leadership of the French
Revolution understood the limits of the right to free expression, providing
in the Declaration of the Rights of Man that "[ e ]very citizen may,
accordingly, speak, write, and print with freedom, but shall be
responsible/or such abuses ofthis.freedom as shall be defined by law." 87
Lastly, in the 19th century, English philosopher John Stuart Mill, who
presented "perhaps the most famous liberal defense of free speech"
likewise recognized that free speech had its limits, arguing that the
government could limit an individual's right to free expression where
such actions were designed "to prevent harm to others. " 88 It is this "harm
principle" which establishes the philosophical underpinnings for
subsequent government limitation of free speech.
V. FREE SPEECH UNDER THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
A. Background and Adoption of the First Amendment

The Constitution of the United States was signed by a majority of
delegates to the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
on September 17, 1787. 89 However, only 39 of the 55 delegates to the
Convention signed the document, many refusing to do so because the

83 . Loi du 26 aout 1789 Declaration des Droits de l 'Homme et du Citoyen [Law of Aug.
26, 1789, Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen] pmbl., art. 11 (Fr.) [hereinafter
Dec. Rights of Man].
84. See Blasi, supra note 79, Part III.
85. Steinberg, supra note 81, § 3.5.
86. Id.
87. Dec. Rights of Man, supra note 83, art. 11 (emphasis added).
88. David van Mill, Freedom of Speech, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 3
(Edward N. Zalta et al. eds. , Spring ed. 2015) (citation omitted).
89. The Constitution, WHITE HOUSE, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ourgovemment/the-constitution (last visited Dec. 20, 2015).
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document lacked a bill of rights. 90 According to the process adopted at
the Convention, the Constitution would only become effective after it had
been ratified by 9 of the 13 state legislatures. 91 Debate was contentious,
with some states approving the Constitution, but with others refusing
until the Constitution was amended to incorporate a bill of rights to codify
the rights of individuals which would be protected from intrusion by the
new government. 92
The Federalists, those who supported adopting the Constitution
without amendment, argued that there was no need for a bill of rights,
since individuals did not cede any individual liberties to the new
government by adopting the constitution. 93 Others, however, insisted on
the need for amendments enumerating certain fundamental individual
liberties. 94 Future president Thomas Jefferson, was one of the main
proponents of the Bill of Rights, arguing that:
I am one of those who think it a defect that the important rights, not
placed in security by the frame of the constitution itself, were not
explicitly secured by a supplementary declaration. There are rights
which it is useless to surrender to the government, and which yet,
governments have always been fond to invade. These are the rights of
thinking, and publishing our thoughts by speaking or writing . .. 5

Ultimately, Jefferson and the other advocates of the bill of rights
prevailed and the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, consisting of ten
amendments, were proposed to the First Congress on March 4, 1789.
This amendment, along with the other amendments comprising the bill of
rights were approved by the First Congress on September 15, 1789, and
transmitted to the state legislatures for later adoption. 96 The first of these
amendments provides, in part, as follows: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for
a redress of grievances. " 97
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

The Constitution, supra note 89.
Craig R. Smith, The Aliens are Coming: John Adams and the Federalist Attack on
the First Amendment, CTR. FOR FIRST AMEND. STUD. 1, available at
www.firstamendmentstudies.org/wp/pdf/alien.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2015) (quoting
Jefferson's letter dated March 18, 1789, to David Humphries) (emphasis added).
96.
Bill
of
Rights,
NAT'L
ARCHIVES,
available
at
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/bill_ of_rights.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2015).
97. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
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B. Alien and Sedition Acts
During the administration of President John Adams, just a few short
years after adoption of the First Amendment, the constitutionally
guaranteed right to freedom of speech the new government encountered
its first existential crisis involving international intrigue. The Adams
administration found itself engaged in an escalating conflict with the
revolutionary French government. 98 Jefferson's party, the DemocraticRepublicans, were supporters of the ideals of the French revolution. In
response to the escalating tensions with France and, perhaps
unjustifiably, fearing the encouragement of revolution in the United
States from new French immigrants and their Democratic-Republican
allies, the Federalist-controlled Congress passed the Alien and Sedition
Acts. "The Alien and Sedition Acts included the following summarized
prov1s10ns:
Naturalization Act: No alien shall be admitted to citizenship unless he
has resided within the United States for at least fourteen years. No
native, citizen, subject, or resident of a country with which the United
States is at war shall be admitted to citizenship.
Alien Act: The President may order all such aliens as he shall judge
dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States to depart.
Alien Enemies Act: When war is declared or invasion threatened, all
natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of the hostile nation or
government, being males of the age of fourteen years and upwards, who
shall be within the United States, and not actually naturalized, shall be
liable to be apprehended, restrained, secured and removed, as alien
enemies.
Sedition Act: Any persons combining or conspiring with intent to
oppose any measure or measures of the government of the United States
shall be liable to fines up to $5,000 and imprisonment up to five years.
Any person writing, uttering, or publishing any false, scandalous and
malicious writing or writings against the government, the Congress, or
the President shall be liable to fine up to $2,000 and imprisonment up
to two years. 99
The Acts were brazen violations of the First Amendment but were
ultimately never challenged in court. Empowered by the new legislation,
roughly two dozen people were arrested by the new laws, with 15 or more
being indicted and 11 cases going to trial, resulting in 10 convictions.
Perhaps the most stunning arrest was that of Congressman George Lyon
98. Smith, supra note 95, at 1 (quoting Jefferson's letter dated March 18, 1789, to David
Humphries).
99. Id.
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of Kentucky under the provision of the Sedition Act. In defiance of the
law, Lyon was re-elected while in jail and remained in Congress when
his Democratic-Republican colleagues successfully blocked the
Federalist's efforts to expel him. 100
The Democratic-Republicans, led by Jefferson and Madison, had
unsuccessfully opposed the passage of the Acts, but through legislative
arm-twisting were able to include a provision mandating that the Acts
would terminate as of March 1, 1801, the first day of the next presidential
administration. 101 After the Acts were passed and implemented, the
opposition continued to fight back ferociously. 102 Jefferson and Madison
worked to build popular support against the acts, advocating for states'
rights, limited presidential power and free speech. 103 Ultimately, the acts
became overwhelmingly unpopular and the Federalist's, who had
controlled the reins of government for a nearly a dozen years, fell from
power. Now in control, Jefferson immediately pardoned everyone who
was convicted under the Acts or waiting trial. 104 The Federalists would
never recover from this loss and ultimately disbanded as a political
party. 105
The momentous events leading to the passage and enforcement of
the Acts shattered any maximalist, utopian views of the freedom of
speech contained in the First Amendment. In the United States, the
freedom of speech could not be thought of as absolute. This incident also
established a precedent for future acts of government to suppress the
freedom of speech under circumstances of civil unrest or perceived
agitation by foreign agents.
C. Civil War
The crisis involving the Alien and Sedition Acts is just the first
example of the U.S. government responding to a foreign crisis by
expanding internal restrictions on the freedom of speech at home, thereby
"expanding an external threat into an internal threat." 106 There are
repeated examples throughout American legal history of the federal
government acting to restrain the freedom of speech to safeguard the
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 8.
103. Smith, supra note 95, at 5.
104. Id. at 8.
105. Id. at 7.
106. Craig R. Smith, The Patriot Act in Historic Context, CTR. FOR FIRST AMEND. STUD.
1, available at http://www.firstamendmentstudies.org/wp/pdf/patriot_act.pdf (last visited
Dec. 20, 2015).
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United States from actual, or perceived foreign threats. During the 1860s,
the Lincoln administration, concerned with the potential for subversive
activities of confederate sympathizers, suspended the right of habeas
corpus and jailed newspaper editors and other secessionists who opposed
Union policies. 107 Habeas corpus, Latin for "you [should] have the
body," is the right imbedded in Common Law and the U.S. Constitution
allowing a court to release a prisoner who is being held unjustly by the
government. 108 In 1861, John Merryman, a secessionist from Maryland
was taken into military custody and immediately appealed to the Supreme
Court to be released under a writ of habeas corpus. 109 In the ruling of ex
parte Merryman the Supreme Court rejected Lincoln's arguments that he
was not subject to the jurisdiction of the Court, and issued the writ. 110
Lincoln, however continued to defy the order and insist on the supremacy
of the President's ability to suspend the writ. In 1964, southern
sympathizer Lambdin Milligan was arrested in Indianapolis and brought
before a military tribunal on charges of treason and subversion. 111
Lincoln's attorneys argued that during a time of war the President's
"powers must be without limit, because if defending, the means of
offense may be nearly illimitable." 112 Only after the war, and Lincoln's
untimely death, did the Court rule that Lincoln had overstepped the
proper boundaries of presidential authority, and established that a
prisoner's right to challenge detention could only be suspended for a
limited period of time and only under exigent circumstances. 113 In
writing for the majority, Justice David Davis stated, "Martial law cannot
arise from a threatened invasion. The necessity must be actual and
present; the invasion real." 114 According to the Court, no longer should
an external threat to U.S. security be used as a pretext for suspension of
individual liberties.

D. Red Scare
Despite the Supreme Court's rebuke m Ex Parte Milligan,

107. Id.
108. ExparteMilligan, 71 U.S. 2, 3 (1866).
109. Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 147 (C.C.D. Md. 1861).
110. Id. at 152.
111. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. at 6.
112. Id. at 18 (quoting arguments of U.S. Supreme Court briefs by Attorney General
Stanberry and Benjamin Butler).
113. Alex McBride, Ex Parte Milligan (1866), PBS (2006), available at
www.pbs.org/wnet/supremecourt/antebellum/landmark_exparte.html (last visited Dec. 20,
2015).
114. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. at 127.
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subsequent presidential administrations would continue to use real or
perceived foreign threats to curtail civil liberties. Concerned with internal
opposition to the U.S. entry into World War I, President Woodrow
Wilson urged Congress to pass a series of laws, the Espionage Act, the
Trading with the Enemy Act and, finally, the Sedition Act to curtail
domestic opposition to government policies. 115 The Espionage Act,
allowed the Postmaster to suppress any journals, letters or other
publications which he believe to be a threat to national security. 116 The
Trading with the Enemy Act created a commission to publish
information, and to correct supposed disinformation, regarding the war
efforts. Lastly, the Sedition Act, amending the Espionage Act, in perhaps
the most direct assault on the freedom of speech, made it a federal crime
to "use disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language" about the
government, the Constitution, the flag or the military. 117 The laws were
intended to target the opponents of the war and "[m]ore than 2,000 people
were prosecuted under the original and amended Espionage Act,
including the Socialist spokesman and draft opponent, Eugene V. Debs,
who was sentenced to 10 years in prison." 118
Unlike the Supreme Court during the Civil War, the Court upheld
the constitutionality of the Espionage Act and its progeny. In Schenck v.
US., the court unanimously upheld the conviction of an activist who
distributed leaflets opposing the draft and urged peaceful opposition to
the law and as a result was charged with "a conspiracy to violate the
Espionage Act ... attempting to cause insubordination in the military ...
and to obstruct ... recruit[ment]." 119 In upholding the conviction, Oliver
Wendell Holmes applied a fact based analysis, stating that "[t]he question
in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances
and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they
will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent." 120 Applying this rule to Mr. Schenck's situation, Holmes
concluded that during wartime, as opposed to peacetime, the government
had far more latitude in restricting the right to free expression. 121 The
115. Smith, supra note 106, at 3.
116. Id.
117. The Espionage Act of 1917, DIGITAL HISTORY (2014), available at
http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/disp textbook.cfm?smtID=3&psid=3904 (last visited Dec.
20, 2015).
The Sedition Act of 1918, DIGITAL HISTORY (2014), available at
118.
http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/disp_textbook.cfm?smtID=3&psid=3903 (last visited Dec.
20, 2015).
119. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 4 7, 48-49, 53 (1919).
120. Id. at 52.
121. Id.
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Court later relied on its own precedent in Schenck in upholding the
conviction of Eugene Debs. 122 In establishing this rule of "clear and
present danger," Holmes echoed Mill's "harm" principle and further
established a legal precedent for subsequent government limitation of
free expression in times of war or national conflict.
E. The Court's Changing Perspective on Incitement

In the wake of the Schenck and Debs ruling, and with the nation still
caught up in the "Red Scare," the Supreme Court in subsequent rulings
in the 1920s would continue to give wide latitude to the government in
its efforts to regulate inflammatory speech. In the landmark case Whitney
v. California, 123 the Court ruled on the constitutionality of California's
Criminal Syndicalism Act, which expressly prohibited "advocating,
teaching or aiding ... terrorism as a means of accomplishing a change in
industrial ownership ... or effecting any political change." 124 The
defendant, Charlotte Anita Whitney, a 52-year old Wellesley graduate
from a prominent California family and a member of the Communist
Labor Party of California was arrested under the Act following a speech
given by Ms. Whitney on November 28, 1919, to the Women's Civic
Center of Oakland in which she spoke out against recent lynchings and
race riots. 125 Following protests from the American Legion and other
patriotic organizations, a local police inspector arrested Ms. Whitney on
the grounds that her participation several weeks prior to the speech in the
formation of the Communist Labor Party California violated the Act. 126
Whitney was later tried and convicted of violating the Act and sentenced
to 1 to 14 years in prison. 127 Whitney challenged her conviction, arguing
that the statute violated her constitutional right to free speech and the
protection of the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
amendments to the Constitution and her case eventually reached the
Supreme Court. 128 The Court upheld the conviction and, relying on the
rationale of Schenck, held that "a State .. . may punish those who abuse
this freedom by utterances ... tending to .. . endanger the foundations of
organized government and threaten its overthrow by unlawful means"

122. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211,215,217 (1919).
123. See generally Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
124. Id. at 360.
125. Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The Brandeis
Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARYL. Rev. 653, 656 (1988).
126. Id. at 657.
127. Id. at 659.
128. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 362.
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and was not open to question. 129
In his famous concurring opinion, Justice Louis Brandeis, joined by
Holmes, argued against the majority's interpretation of the First
Amendment. Brandeis argued that the government could only prohibit
speech which advocated violent revolution "only if under the particular
circumstances of the case the speech in question creates a clear and
imminent danger of serious injury to the state." 130 Brandeis was drawing
a new line in the government's power to regulate speech. Mere "fear of
serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech ... there
must be reasonable ground to believe that danger apprehended is
imminent ... that the evil to be prevented is a serious one." 131 Ironically,
though the Court used the Schenck case as a philosophical basis for its
decision, Holmes, the author of the Schenck opinion, joined with
Brandeis in his concurrence.
The ruling in Whitney would stand for over 40 years until the 1969
decision of the Supreme Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio. 132 In June of
1964, Clarence Brandenburg held a Ku Klux Klan rally on a farm in
Hamilton County, Ohio. 133 The event was televised locally and
nationally and at the event, twelve hooded figures burned a cross and
shouted Klan slogans advocating racial hatred and uttering other violent
threats. 134 Mr. Brandenburg then took the podium and threatened:
"We're not a revengent organization, but if our President, our Congress,
our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it's
possible that there might have to be some revengeance taken." 135 The
State of Ohio soon indicted Brandenburg under its own Criminal
Syndicalism Act and charged him with advocating the violence in order
to accomplish "political reform." 136 Brandenburg was convicted, fined
$1,000 and sentenced to one to ten years in prison. Brandenburg appealed
the conviction, arguing that the Act violated his First Amendment right
to free speech and Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.
The Court held that the Act violated Brandenburg's right to free

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 371 (quoting the majority opinion).
Blasi, supra note 125, at 666.
Whitney, 274 U.S. at 376.
See generally Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
Susan Gilles, 30th Annual Sullivan Lecture: Brandenburg v. State of Ohio: An
"Accidental," "Too Easy," and "Incomplete" Landmark Case, 38 CAP. U. L. REV. 517,517
(2010).
134. Id.
135. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 446.
136. See Gilles, supra note 133, at 518.
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speech, 137 and in doing so expressly overruled its decision in Whitney.
The Court employed a new, two-pronged test to evaluate speech acts.
The Court explained that speech can be prohibited by the government if
it is "directed at inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action." 138 In applying this reasoning, the
Court explained that Ohio's Criminal Syndicalism Act "purports to
punish mere advocacy and to forbid, on pain of criminal punishment,
assembly with others merely to advocate the described type of action."
139
The court considered the statute to be overly broad" since by the
statute's terms "mere advocacy [is] not distinguished from incitement to
imminent lawless action." 140
In one of the most recent Supreme Court cases construing
government restrictions on inflammatory speech, the Supreme Court
struck down a Virginia Statute which made it a crime "for any person ...
with the intent of intimidating any person or group ... to bum ... a cross
on the property of another, a highway or other public place," and which
specified that "[ a ]ny such burning ... shall be prima facie evidence of an
intent to intimidate a person or group." 141 In a plurality opinion, the
Supreme Court of Virginia held that while a state could ban cross burning
carried out with an intent to intimidate, the provision of the statute which
made cross burning in and of itself "prima facie" evidence of intent to
intimidate was unconstitutionally overbroad. 142 In doing so, the Court
was applying the Brandenburg test and finding that cross burning in and
of itself was not sufficient to tilt the balance in favor of a conviction. The
Court was also implicitly relying on Brandeis' reasoning in Whitney,
failing to see cross burning in the absence of proven intent sufficient to
prohibit expressions of opinion, regardless of how distasteful it may be.
F. Post 9/11
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2011 attacks on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon, the U.S. government, as it had done
during the Alien and Sedition Act Crisis, the Civil War and during the
Red Scare of World War I, took steps to limit civil liberties in reaction to
an external threat to the nation's security. 143 President Bush declared a

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449.
Id. at 447
Id. at 395 .
Id at Syllabus.
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343,348 (2003).
Id. at 351.
See Smith, supra note 106,passim.
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"war on terror." 144 This war was to be fought both abroad, and at home.
Similar to Lincoln, President Bush decided to use military tribunals to try
enemy combatants. 145 The most significant legislation affecting civil
liberties was the Patriot Act which significantly tightened immigration,
surveillance, money laundering and security standards. 146 Among the
key declarations of the Patriot Act, was a provision which made it a
federal crime (subject to punishment by fine and up to 15 years in prison)
to "knowingly provide material support" to any foreign organization
designated by the Secretary of State as a terrorist organization. 147 The
goal of the law was to stop terrorism before it happened by draining its
sources of funding. 148 However, much like the Alien and Sedition Acts,
the law was implemented in a wide ranging fashion. Many were
prosecuted for violating the law by providing weapons directly to known
terrorist groups. 149 However, other "prosecutions were based on sending
money to groups that engaged in both humanitarian work and violence."
150
Among the groups charged with such activities were organizations tied
to independence movements for Kurds in Turkey and Tamils in Sri Lanka
respectively. 151 The defendants, arguing that they were engaged in purely
humanitarian activities, challenged the constitutionality of the law and
claimed that the provisions of the statute were unacceptably vague and
violated their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and
association. 152 The case eventually reached the Supreme Court. In a 6-3
decision, the Court upheld the statute, deciding that the law was not
impermissibly vague and determining that the phrase "material support"
was not an inappropriate impingement on the organizations' First
Amendment rights. The Court reasoned that "material support" most
often did not involve speech and, when it does, the statute is carefully
drawn to affect a narrow range of activities. 153 Moreover, the Court
articulated that the government's interest in combatting terrorism

144. See Richard W. Stevenson, President Makes It Clear: Phrase is 'War on Terror,'
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
4,
2005),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/04/politics/04bush.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2015).
145. Smith, supra note 106, at 4, 8.
146. See id. at 8 & n.34.
147. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(l) (2012).
148. See Adam Liptak, Civil Liberties Today, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2011), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/07 /us/sept-11-reckoning/civil.html?pagewanted=all (last
visited Dec. 20 2015).
149. See id.
150. Id.
15 l. Holderv. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 9 (2010).
152. See id. at 10-11.
153. See id. at 25-26.
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outweighed any resulting and limited impact on FirstAmendment rights
caused by the statute. 154 In the Court's view, the deference to Congress
and the President under the circumstances was warranted and in passing
the law both branches had determined that even providing seemingly
"benign" support to a terrorist organization strengthened that
organization. 155
VI. FREE SPEECH UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Sources

The right to freedom of expression also "finds protection in all major
human rights systems." 156 The right to freedom of speech is specifically
guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR"),
adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948
and
by
the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
("ICCPR"),
adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1966. Article 19 of the
UNDR provides:
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek,
receive and impart information and ideas through any media and
regardless of frontiers. 157

Similarly, Article 19, Section 2, of the ICCPR provides:
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall
include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all
kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the
form of art, or through any other media of his choice. 158

The right to freedom of expression is also protected by all of the
three regional human rights treaties, the European Convention on
Human Rights ("ECHR"),
the American Convention on Human
Rights ("ACHR") and the African Charter on Human and Peoples'

154. See id. at 36.
155. See Adam Liptak, Court Affirms Ban on Aiding Groups Tied to Terror, N.Y. TIMES
(June
21,
2010),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/20l0/06/22/us/politics/22scotus.html?pagewanted=all (last visited
Dec. 20, 2015).
156. Toby Mendel, Hate Speech Rules Under International Law, CTR. FOR L. &
DEMOCRACY 1 (Feb. 2010), available at http://www.law-democracy.org/wpcontent/uploads/2010/07/10.02.hate-speech.Macedonia-book.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2015).
157. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 19 (Dec. 10,
1948).
158. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 19, 1-2,
Dec. 16, 1966,
6 I.L.M. 368,999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
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Rights ("ACHPR"). 159
B. Limitations
As with rights under national constitutions, the freedom of
expression under international law "is not an absolute right, and
it may be limited to protect overriding public and private interests
, including equality and public order." 160 The ICCPR includes specific
provisions curtailing the right under certain circumstances, including
cases where curtailment of the right is justified by national security
priorities. Article 19, paragraph 3 of the ICCPR provides:
The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article
carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be
subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are
provided by law and are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre
public), or of public health or morals. 161

It is interesting to note that the UDHR does not include a specific
limitation on the right to freedom of expression, whether generally, or in
a national security context (this perhaps reflects the fact that the UDHR
was adopted in the aftermath of World War II, when the wounds opened
by the excesses of fascism were still fresh). 162
So even though we find that "[ f]reedom of speech is a fundamental
right recognized in international law and entrenched in most national
constitutions," 163 rights to free speech are not absolute anywhere, and
there is a line between simple political speech and incitement to commit
a crime. The United States for one is ever mindful of protecting free
speech, for example the law respecting inciting a riot, which is a crime,
states:
As used in this chapter, the term "to incite a riot", or "to organize,
promote, encourage, participate in, or carry on a riot", includes, but is
not limited to, urging or instigating other persons to riot, but shall not
be deemed to mean the mere oral or written (I) advocacy of ideas or (2)
expression of belief, not involving advocacy of any act or acts of
violence or assertion of the rightness of, or the right to commit, any such
Mendel, supra note 156, at 3.
Id. at 1.
ICCPR, supra note 158, art. 19,, 3.
Mendel, supra note 156, at 1-2.
Navanethem Pillay, Freedom of Speech and Incitement to Criminal Activity: A
Delicate Balance, 14 NEW ENG. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 203,203 (2008).
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
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act or acts. 164

But inciting a riot is unlawful and incitement, or solicitation, as it is
often termed under U.S. law, is an inchoate crime, meaning that the
offense is the solicitation itself, whether or not the solicited crime is
actually carried out. Accordingly, U.S. federal law states that:
Whoever, with intent that another person engage in conduct constituting
a felony that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use
of physical force against property or against the person of another in
violation of the laws of the United States, and under circumstances
strongly corroborative of that intent, solicits, commands, induces, or
otherwise endeavors to persuade such other person to engage in such
conduct, shall be imprisoned not more than one-half the maximum term
of imprisonment or (notwithstanding section 3571) fined not more than
one-half of the maximum fine prescribed for the punishment of the
crime solicited, or both; or if the crime solicited is punishable by life
imprisonment or death, shall be imprisoned for not more than twenty
years. 165

U.S. state laws are similar. For example the Florida law states:
A person who solicits another to commit an offense prohibited by law
and in the course of such solicitation commands, encourages, hires, or
requests another person to engage in specific conduct which would
constitute such offense or an attempt to commit such offense commits
166
the offense of criminal solicitation ...

Many states have embedded in their national laws prohibitions
against solicitation or incitement to crimes, particularly in the realm of
"hate speech." 167
International law appears to have been a little muddled on the notion
of incitement or solicitation, 168 but the statute of the International
Criminal Court seems to have clarified the matter, accepting the
proposition that incitement to commit a crime or solicitation to commit a
crime are punishable offenses under the Court's statute:
Article 25
Individual criminal responsibility
3. In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally
responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction
164. 18 U.S.C. § 2102(b) (2006).
165. 18 U.S.C. § 373(a) (2006).
166. FLA. STAT.§ 777.04(2) (2015).
167. See Pillay, supra note 163, at 203.
168. See generally Wibke Kristin Timmermann, Incitement in International Criminal
Law, 88 lNT'L REV. RED CROSS 823 (2006).
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of the Court if that person:
(b) Orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime which in
fact occurs or is attempted;
(c) For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids,
abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted
commission, including providing the means for its commission;
(d) In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted
commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a
common purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall
either:
(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal
purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose involves the
commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; or
(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit
the crime. 169

As can be seen, the notion of outlawing solicitation to commit
criminal acts is widely known and punished worldwide. Further, though
many states respect the principle of freedom of expression, and provide
safeguards therefore, there are widely accepted exceptions to such
freedom. Although there is currently no universally accepted definition
of international terrorism, states around the world and their citizens speak
of it, and many states have statutes criminalizing and defining
terrorism. 170
The multilateral convention that we propose would be accomplished
under the auspices of the United Nations treaty convention making
procedure. It would not deal with suspects who have actually committed
terrorist acts-though such a convention is probably long overdue-since
defining terrorism is too difficult a task to accomplish any time soon.
Such a convention would require the arrest and extradition of individuals
suspected of training, motivating, inciting or soliciting others to engage
in international terrorist activities that have taken place or were or are
planned to take place in the requesting state. The convention would not
attempt to define a "terrorist activity," rather it would work much the
same way that typical bilateral extradition treaties work today, working
within the frameworks of the national laws of the requesting and the
requested state. The normal bilateral extradition treaty permits a
requesting state to request extradition of a person who is accused of
169. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note I, art. 25(3).
170. See Perry, supra note 27, at 63-65.
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committing a crime as defined in the laws of and committed within or
under the jurisdiction of the requesting state. Most extradition treaties
allow the requested state to refuse extradition if the alleged crime is a
political offense, if the crime is not a crime in the requested state or if the
crime carries the death penalty in the requested state (unless the requested
state receives assurances that the death penalty will not be imposed).
There are therefore safeguards in those cases where the definition of the
crime might be very broad in the requesting state, and not so broad, rather
more specific, in the requested state. Further the laws of many countries
provide that after the judiciary has approved extradition the final approval
is a political one. In the case of the United States, the Secretary of State
must approve extraditions. 171 Thus under U.S. law, the country's current
foreign relations are taken into account.
Multilateral conventions that provide for extradition and for
universal jurisdiction already exist. 172 Those conventions set forth the
obligation to extradite, and also certain safeguards. For example, the
U.N. Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of
1999 provides:
Article 9
1. Upon receiving information that a person who has committed or who
is alleged to have committed an offence set forth in article 2 may be
present in its territory, the State Party concerned shall take such
measures as may be necessary under its domestic law to investigate the
facts contained in the information.
2. Upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant, the State
Party in whose territory the offender or alleged offender is present shall
take the appropriate measures under its domestic law so as to ensure
that person's presence for the purpose of prosecution or extradition.
Article 10
1. The State Party in the territory of which the alleged offender is
present shall, in cases to which article 7 applies, if it does not extradite
that person, be obliged, without exception whatsoever and whether or
not the offence was committed in its territory, to submit the case without
undue delay to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution,
through proceedings in accordance with the laws of that State. Those
authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case of

171. GARCIA & DOYLE, supra note 75, at 18.
172. See for example, among others, the International Convention for the Suppression
of Terrorist Bombings, Dec. 15, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-6, 2149 U.N.T.S. 256, and the
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, supra note 68.

Published by SURFACE, 2015

157

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 43, No. 1 [2015], Art. 1

Syracuse J. lnt'I L. & Com.

152

[Vol. 43: 1

any other offence of a grave nature under the law of that State.
Article 11
1. The offences set forth in article 2 shall be deemed to be included as
extraditable offences in any extradition treaty existing between any of
the States Parties before the entry into force of this Convention. States
Parties undertake to include such offences as extraditable offences in
every extradition treaty to be subsequently concluded between them.
2. When a State Party which makes extradition conditional on the
existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from another
State Party with which it has no extradition treaty, the requested State
Party may, at its option, consider this Convention as a legal basis for
extradition in respect of the offences set forth in article 2. Extradition
shall be subject to the other conditions provided by the law of the
requested State.
3. States Parties which do not make extradition conditional on the
existence of a treaty shall recognize the offences set forth in article 2 as
extraditable offences between themselves, subject to the conditions
provided by the law of the requested State. 173
In this way, if there is a wide disparity between the laws defining
international terrorism of the requested and requesting state, the
requested state can refuse on the grounds that the offense in the
requesting state for which extradition is requested is not an offense in
the requested state, and the suspect will not be rendered to the
requesting state. As already mentioned, this is already widely practiced
in the international practice of extradition.

CONCLUSION

When a person persuades, encourages, instigates, pressures, trains
or solicits another person or group so as to cause that person or group to
commit an act of international terrorism, unless there is a treaty of
extradition between the state where the terrorist offense has taken place
or has been instigated etc., to take place, and the state where the person
suspected of doing such instigation etc., is found, very often the suspect
goes free. There is no legal reason or motivation for the requested state
to render the suspect to the requesting state. When such a situation
occurs, some are simply frustrated by their inability to prosecute the
felon; other states are encouraged to take the matter into their own hands,
despite the fact that extrajudicial or "extraordinary renditions" are
173. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, supra
note 68.
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unlawful. This is problematic for international law. In the former case,
a guilty party can go free. In the latter case, the law is not respected. In
both cases, the rule of law breaks down.
A possible solution might be a multilateral convention providing for
the rendition of suspects who have engaged in the activity of persuading,
encouraging, instigating, pressuring training or soliciting terrorist acts,
whether or not the acts actually occur and are successful. If such activity
takes place within a state, that state would use its own definition of an act
of international terrorism, and request another state party in which the
suspect is found, to extradite that person. The requested state would go
through the safeguards that are normal in such treaties in deciding
whether or not to comply with the request. If the world were to agree on
such a convention, it would be one step closer to closing the loopholes
that exist in international law as it pertains to terrorist offenses. If
someone somewhere, living in some state other than the United States,
did "tum" the Tsamaev brothers to conduct the bombings at the Boston
Marathon, or taught them how to make bombs, perhaps he or she would
lawfully be brought to justice.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On May 3, 2013, Marvel Studio's Iron Man 3 opened in United
States ("U.S.") theatres, pulling in a domestic total gross of
$409,013,994. 1 In foreign markets, the movie totaled $806,426,000,
bringing the film's total global gross to $1,215,439,994. 2 Of this global
total, profits from China accounted for $121,200,000, a significant
portion of the film's foreign revenue. 3 Iron Man 3 was neither the first
Hollywood film nor the last Hollywood film to be released in China, and
it was not even the highest grossing film there. 4 What is interesting about
Iron Man 3, however, is it is one of the most well-known examples of
Hollywood adapting, or in this case adding, to the content of a film strictly
to make it eligible for release in China.
There are, in fact, four extra minutes of footage in the version
released in China, footage that was not present in the domestic and global
release. 5 These four minutes include: ( 1) product placement for Gu Li
Duo, a milk drink from an Inner Mongolia-based dairy company; (2)
Chinese actress Fan Bingbing playing a nameless assistant to Dr. Wu, the
doctor who uses Chinese medicine to help Iron Man; (3) more product
placement appearances by two Chinese electronics makers, TCL and
Zoomlion; and (4) a shot of cheering, happy Chinese schoolchildren on
TV with Iron Man. 6 While it may seem strange that this extra footage,

1.
Iron
Man
3,
Box
OFFICE
Mojo,
available
at
www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=ironman3.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).
2. Id.
3.
China All
Time
Openings,
Box OFFICE Mojo,
available at
http://www.boxofficemojo.com/intl/china/opening/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).
4. At the end of 2014, that distinction belonged to Transformers: Age of Extinction,
which overtook James Cameron's Avatar and grossed $222,740,000 in only ten days. Ben
Child, Transformers: Age ofExtinction Becomes Highest-Grossing Film ofAll Time in China,
GUARDIAN
(July
8,
2014,
7: 17
AM),
available
at
http://www.theguardian.com/fi lm/20 l 4/jul/08/transformers-age-extinction-highest-grossingchina (last visited Nov. 6, 2015). The film finally topped out at a total gross of $320,000,000.
China All Time Openings, supra note 3.
5. Kirsten Acuna, The Biggest Differences In China's Version of 'Iron Man 3 ', Bus.
INSIDER (May 2, 2013, 10:58 AM), available at www.businessinsider.com/chinas-version-ofiron-man-3-2013-5 (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).
6. Id.; Joyce Lau, In China, Iron Man's Muscle is Fed by Inner Mongolian Milk, N.Y.
TIMES (May 2, 2013, 8:44 AM), available at rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/05/02/inchina-iron-mans-muscle-is-fed-by-inner-mongolian-milk/?_r=O (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).
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which did not seem to appeal to Chinese audiences much, was added,
there was a rational incentive at its heart. 7 In the end, it comes down to
the profit motive. Hollywood receives a great profit return by tapping
into the Chinese market. However, this market presents a unique set of
challenges that need to be understood and addressed for Hollywood to
fully access it.
The two major issues that will be addressed in this note, in terms of
Hollywood's access to the Chinese market, are censorship and quotas.
Censorship, here, examines each film's content to determine what must
be modified or cut to make the film eligible for screening in China.
Quotas, on the other hand, place an absolute limit on film imports, thus
making Hollywood's access to the Chinese market highly competitive.
Hollywood's access to the Chinese market provides a vast source of
revenue for its studios-a benefit to all involved in the industry-and also
opens up a new, soft power avenue in U.S.-China relations. Chinese
censorship laws have a definite impact on Hollywood studios and a better
understanding of them is necessary so the industry can continue to
efficiently access the Chinese market. The potential revenue to be gained
by accessing the Chinese market is substantial and it is easy to see why
Hollywood would want to tap China's potential, especially in light of
shrinking domestic movie theatre attendance. 8 In fact, the 2014 summer
alone witnessed a 14.6% drop in box office revenue in the U.S. and
Canada, making it one of the weakest performances in years. 9 However,
navigating China's market is tricky at best and Hollywood must surmount
several hurdles in order to ensure a foreign film is distributed in China.
The first hurdle is the import quota China places on the importation of
foreign films. The second is the State's censorship boards. By improving
their understanding of both hurdles, more Hollywood studios will have
better access to the Chinese market and gain practical solutions and
adaptations to the problems within the current system.
This note critically examines various Chinese laws and practices that
See Clarence Tsui, 'Iron Man 3 ' China-Only Scenes Draw Mixed Response,
REP.
(May
1,
2013,
1:25
PM),
available
at
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/iron-man-3-china-scenes-450184 (last visited Nov.
6, 2015).
8. See Erich Schwartze} & Ben Fritz, Fewer American Go to the Movies, WALL ST. J.
(Mar.
25,
2014,
7:43
PM),
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB 1000142405270230394970457946 l 813982237426
(last
visited Nov. 6, 2015).
9. Erich Schwartze1, Movie Chains Reel After a Summer of Few Hits, WALL ST. J. (Oct.
28, 2014, 7:58 PM), available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/movie-chains-reel-after-asummer-of-few-hits-1414540708 (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).
7.

HOLLYWOOD
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impact Hollywood studios' access to the Chinese market. Further, this
note examines the import and censorship system as it stands now. Part II
illustrates the various hurdles and issues Hollywood studios must
surmount when screening their films in China, including vague
censorship regulations and strict import quotas. Part III uses various case
studies to illustrate the vicissitudes of the Chinese censorship regime and
predicts what sort of content will likely be deemed objectionable content
by China's censorship boards. Part IV expands on the information
discussed in the preceding two sections to outline the biggest problems
faced by Hollywood studios in China today. Part V examines a recent
World Trade Organization ("WTO") ruling against China's import
restrictions on cultural products and asserts that pushing for China's
compliance with the ruling would actually have a detrimental impact on
Hollywood films in China. Finally, Part VI offers various solutions and
practices that Hollywood studios should engage in to mitigate problems
they currently face in the Chinese market.
A. What Will Be Examined
This note will only examine films produced by Hollywood studios.
Here, Hollywood studios will be defined as the full-service movie studios
geographically located in Hollywood, California. Examples of these
studios include Warner Brothers., Paramount, Sony Pictures, Universal,
Disney, The Weinstein Company, and 20th Century Fox. 10 However, this
list may eventually expand to include China's Dalian Wanda Group Co.,
which is currently in talks with Lions Gate Entertainment Group, the
studio behind The Hunger Games movie franchise, about buying Lions
Gates shares. 11 Dalian Wanda is also currently working towards building
a Chinese version of Hollywood in Qingdao, a coastal city in eastern
China, and even brought some major Hollywood stars in for the project's
announcement. 12 However, while this is certainly a project Hollywood
studios should keep abreast of, the Chinese Hollywood in Qingdao is still
under development and its full impact on Hollywood films remains to be
seen. 13

10. Sammy Said, The 10 Biggest Hollywood Studios, RICHEST(Mar. 20, 2013), available
at http://www.therichest.com/rich-list/the-biggest/the-10-biggest-hollywood-studios/ (last
visited Nov. 6, 2015).
11. Ben Fritz & Laurie Burkitt, Wanda Weighs Deal for Stake in Lions Gate, WALL ST.
J. (Dec. 1, 2014, 2:05 PM), available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/dalian-wanda-groupheld-talks-with-lions-gate-1417449561 (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).
12. Id.
13. See Laurie Burkitt, Dalian Wanda Plans Fund to Lure Movie Business to China,

Published by SURFACE, 2015

163

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 43, No. 1 [2015], Art. 1

2015]

The Import of Hollywood Films in China

159

B. State of the Chinese Film Market Today
Currently, China is the second largest market for film in the world
and, arguably, is poised to take the number one spot from the U.S. 14 In
2013, China was ranked as the number one global box office, having
grossed $3.6 billion, according to the Motion Picture Association of
America, Inc. 15 China also became the first international market to
exceed $3 billion in box office revenue. 16 Once again, given the declining
demand for film in movie theatres domestically, China's box office
statistics are very appealing for Hollywood studios and represent a
lucrative market and source of revenue.
However, while many Hollywood films have experienced success in
Chinese theatres, this success is not necessarily guaranteed to continue.
One of the things Hollywood studios needs to be aware ofis not just their
own popularity amongst Chinese viewers, but the growing domestic film
industry as well. For example, domestic Chinese films dominated the
Chinese box office in 2013, while Hollywood films only constituted only
three of the ten highest grossing movies. 17 Last year, domestic films
accounted for 71 % of the annual box office revenue. 18 One of the
possible reasons for the recent success in domestic Chinese films lies in
the increasing number of movie theatres built across China, combined
with the increasing quality, and content, of Chinese films. 19
The most popular Chinese-made films are simple, personal tales of
modem Chinese life, which lack much of the high-end special effects of
many Hollywood films and resonate more with Chinese viewers. 20 This
shift in content preference is another element that Hollywood studios
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 7, 2014, 11 :51 PM), available at www.wsj.com/articles/dalian-wandaplans-fund-to-lure-movie-business-to-china-1412740295 (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).
The Red Carpet, ECONOMIST (Dec. 21, 2013), available at
14.
www.economist.com/news/christmas-specials/21591741-red-carpet (last visited Nov. 6,
2015).
15. Theatrical Market Statistics 2013, MOTION PICTURE Ass'N AM., INC. 5, available at
http://www.mpaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/MP AA-Theatrical-Market-Statistics2013 _ 032514-v2.pdf (last visited N, 2015).
16. Id.
17
Katie Hunt, Hollywood Outshone as China Box Office Booms in 2013, CNN (Jan. 9, 2014,
1:23 AM), available at http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/09/world/asia/china-box-office-2013/
(last visited Nov. 6, 2015).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Michelle FlorCruz, China's Moviegoers Trading Up From Hollywood Explosions
to Homegrown Humor, INT'L Bus. TIMES (May 9, 2014, 5:40 PM), available at
http://www.ibtimes.com/chinas-moviegoers-trading-hollywood-explosions-homegrownhumor-l 582482 (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).
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must consider as they pursue greater access to the Chinese market. The
homegrown Chinese films do not only have the benefit of resonating with
their viewers' lives, but also more accurately reflect their experiences in
a way that Hollywood films do not. As the quality of Chinese films
increase, they will provide more competition for Hollywood films and
most of these films have the benefit of passing the state censors. 21
Going to the movies has become a large part of China's culture. It
has particularly become part of the courtship ritual and a common activity
for couples out on dates. 22 It has also become more common given that
an increasing number of Chinese citizens are experiencing an increase in
spending power and disposable income. 23 As China's economy continues
to grow and more luxury items, such as tickets to large movie theatres,
become more readily available, the demand for films will more than
likely increase, as will the viewers' standards and expectations for the
quality and content of these films. Hollywood studios need to keep these
factors in mind as they continue to direct their efforts towards the Chinese
market.
China has shown its potential as a great source of revenue, but the
rules that apply in the U.S. do not apply in China. For example,
Hollywood studios do not face content censorship from the U.S.
government-rather, it applies its own voluntary film rating system to
indicate each film's content and appropriateness for younger viewersand, in fact, the U.S. film industry has a history of fighting against
government censorship.24 Moreover, Hollywood studios can expect a
certain level of protection for their films under U.S. copyright and
intellectual property laws, which are designed to encourage creative
growth and development within the industry rather than to serve as an
instrument of control. 25 This level of personal control over content and
the protections provided by U.S. law are not the same as what may be
available in China, and these differences need to be acknowledged and
understood by the Hollywood studios that wish to access the Chinese
market.

21. See infra Part II.
22. The Red Carpet, supra note 14.
23. Id.
24. See Preserving Free Speech , MOTION PICTURE Ass'N AM. , available at
http://www.mpaa.org/preserving-free-speech/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).
25. See Why Copyright Matters , MOTION PICTURE Ass ' N AM ., available at
http://www.mpaa.org/why-copyright-matters/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).
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II. BACKGROUND & THE SYSTEM AS IT STANDS NOW
This section will examine both China's censorship regime and the
quotas it imposes on foreign films. Censorship will be addressed first, as
it has a larger impact on Hollywood films because the censorship regime
seeks to change the actual content of a film, whereas the import quotas
merely limit the number of films that can be brought into China per year.
A. Who Censors?
The Chinese government has a history of sensitivity to the influence
and impact that cultural products can have on the country's people, and
film certainly falls into this category. Movies are considered a "cultural
market," and in regards to foreign films, have been viewed as a product
of "the political, economic, military, and cultural invasions of the
West. " 26 While the view towards foreign films is not quite so extreme in
today's China, it is still an area which the government feels needs to be
regulated, censored, and subjected to strict review. 27 However, the
mechanisms through which this regulation, censorship, and review
operate tend to be rather complex and opaque.
When China acceded to the WTO in December of 2001, it agreed
that, within three years of this accession, all enterprises in China,
including foreign individuals and enterprises, even those not invested or
registered in China, would have the right to import and export all goods
not reserved for trading by designated State Owned Entities ("SOE")
throughout its customs territory. 28 While cultural or information
products, a category which includes film, were not mentioned as one of
the products reserved to SOEs, the importation and distribution of foreign
films is nonetheless still barred to those entities not given state
authorization. 29 The continued refusal to grant non-SOEs the right to
import and distribute foreign films has recently caused tensions between
the U.S. and China, where the U.S. brought a case against China to the
WT0. 30
Currently, the China Film Corporation is the country's largest film

26. SHUJEN WANG, FRAMING PIRACY: GLOBALIZATION AND FILM DISTRIBUTION fN
GREATER CHINA 61 (2003).
27. See id.

28. Julia Ya Qin, Pushing the Limits of Global Governance: Trading Rights,
Censorship, and WTO Jurisprudence- A Commentary on the China-Publications Case, I 0
CHINESE J. INT'L
L L. 1, 5 (2011 ).
29. See id. at 5-6.
30. See infra Part V.
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enterprise. 31 It is responsible for regulating film distribution throughout
the country, including import and export operations. 32 Two bodies
operate beneath it: the China Film Import and Export Corporation, which
handles the import and export of films, and the China Film Distribution
and Exhibition Bureau, which, along with its own various subsidiaries,
own the majority of movie theatres in China. 33 The China Film
Distribution and Exhibition Bureau and its subsidiaries also have the
power to dictate the contractual terms of film distribution and exhibition,
as well as the play dates, admission prices, and other aspects of film
exhibition. 34 In March of 2003, another distributor was created, the
Huaxia Film Distribution group which has the power to distribute foreign
films, but unfortunately cannot import these films. 35 Below these are the
provincial distributors and exhibitors, which are a part of the China Film
Distribution and Exhibition Association, and these bodies deal directly
with the foreign studios. 36 These bodies deal directly with film
importation and distribution, but there is a level of regulatory bodies
above them that is important to note.
Two major government organizations are above these SOEs, which
govern the operations of media industries in China: the State
Administration of Radio, Film, and Television ("SARFT") and the
Ministry of Culture. 37 SARFT is responsible for regulating film for
theatrical release and distribution, radio, and television, while the
Ministry of Culture is responsible for monitoring the home video import
and distribution business. 38 Its power to censor lies in its licensing power,
both in granting licenses and revoking them, for foreign film distributors
in China. 39 Subsequently, these are overseen by the Communist Party's
Central Propaganda Department ("CPD"), the highest body in China
responsible for media regulations and access to information. 40 The CDP

31 . WANG, supra note 26, at 61-62.
32. Id. at 62.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Firedeep & Robert Cain, How China's Movie Distribution Works, Part I,
CHINAFILMBrZ (Nov. 7, 2012), available at http://chinafilmbiz.com/2012/ l l/07/how-chinasmovie-distribution-system-works-part-l/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).
36. Id.; WANG, supra note 26, at 62.
37. WANG, supra note 26, at 62 ; see Firedeep & Cain, supra note 35.
38. WANG, supra note 26, at 62.
39. Agencies Responsible for Censorship in China, CONG.-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON
CHINA, available at http://www.cecc.gov/agencies-responsible-for-censorship-in-china#sarft
(last visited Nov. 6, 2015).
40. Michael Ting, The Role of the WTO in Limiting China's Censorship Policies, 48
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is the Communist Party's counterpart to SARFT and is responsible for
monitoring content of publications and media to ensure that nothing
inconsistent with the Party's political dogma gets disseminated. 41 This
set up allows the government to keep tight control over its film imports,
as well as ensuring that its censorship process is nontransparent to
provide systems "with the maximum level of flexibility and efficacy
desired. "42
The State Secrets Bureau is yet another agency that controls much
of the Chinese censorship regime, which uses China's state secrets laws
to designate "practically all information relating to China's government,
economy, diplomacy, technology, and military" as being a potential state
secret. 43 The State Secrets Bureau also ensures that it is the Chinese
citizens, and not the government, that are responsible for maintaining
these state secrets. 44 In other words, each citizen is responsible, by law,
for maintaining any information they have that could be construed as a
state secret, especially if they are engaged in any sort of business or
communication with foreigners. 45 Arguably, this agency and the state
secrets laws have a chilling effect on freedom of speech in China 46 and
contribute to the opaqueness of China's censorship regime.
However, as Hollywood seeks to get more of its films into the
Chinese market, it is not just the Chinese government that censors. There
have been several indications that Hollywood engages in self-censorship
when it comes to films it wants to pitch to China. 47 For example, the
1990s saw several films about Tibet produced, films such as Seven Years
in Tibet and Disney's Kundun, a biographical movie about the 14th Dalai
Lama's youth, both of which raised Beijing's hackles. 48 The Beijing
government's displeasure was so great that it is reported that Brad Pitt,
one of the Seven Years in Tibet's stars, is banned from entering China due

H.K. L. J. 285, 288 (2011 ).
41. Agencies Responsible for Censorship in China, supra note 39.
42. Ya Qin, supra note 28, at 2.
43. Agencies Responsible for Censorship in China, supra note 39.
44. Id.
45. See International Agreements and Domestic Legislation Affecting Freedom of

Expression,

CONG.-EXECUTIVE

COMMISSION

ON

CHINA,

available

at

http://www.cecc.gov/international-agreements-and-domestic-legislation-affecting-freedomof-expression#secretsonnetworkslaw (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).

46. See id.
4 7. Erica Ho, Can Hollywood Afford to Make Films China Doesn 't Like?, TIME (May
25, 2011 ), available at http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2072194,00.html
(last visited Sept. 7, 2015).
48. Id.
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to his role in the film, and the government also threatened to cut off all
future business with Disney. 49 Beijing's response to films it considers
either critical of its regime or sympathetic to a cause China opposes, such
as Tibetan independence or sympathy for the Dalai Lama, may now very
well mean that such films will no longer be produced by Hollywood
studios. 50 While self-censorship is a response to China's own censorship
regime, it remains a factor needing serious attention, as the Chinese
market is likely to continue requiring such practices.
B. Laws and Regulations Governing and Impacting Chinese
Censorship

While there is no single, omnibus censorship law in China, there are
several laws and regulations that play a large part in the Chinese
censorship regime. The Chinese censorship regime is better viewed as a
patchwork of various regulations and measures covering all forms of
media, including newspapers and periodicals, the Internet and satellite
television. 51 One of the most directly pertinent regulations to film
censorship is a circular released by SARFT in 2008, reiterating its criteria
for censoring radio, film and television. 52 The circular was released "to
give priority to protecting the healthy development of minors and social
welfare; further encourage creativity, tighten control, and purify screen
entertainment; provide healthy and rich nourishment for the mind; and
build a more harmonious and 'green' film environment." 53 The circular
succinctly lists the provisions initially laid out in the Regulations on the
Administration of Films and Provisions on the Filing of Film Scripts
(Abstracts) and Administration ofFilms and calls on all departments and
units to strictly enforce these regulations. 54 It divides content into two
broad categories: prohibited content and content that must be cut or
altered. 55 According to the circular, films may not contain content which:
(1) Violates the basic principles of the Constitution; (2) Threatens
the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state; (3) Divulges
state secrets, threatens national security, harms the reputation and
interests of the state; (4) Instigates national hatred and discrimination,
49. Id.
50. See id.
51. See CONG.-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA, supra note 45.
52. SARFT Reiterates Film Censor Criteria, H.K. TRADE DEV. COUNCIL (Apr. 1, 2008),
available at http://info.hktdc.com/alert/cba-e0804c-2.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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undermines the harmony among ethnic groups, or harms ethnic customs
and practices; (5) Violates state policies on religion, and propagates cult
religion or superstition; (6) Disrupts social order or social stability; (7)
Propagates obscenity, gambling, violence, or abets criminal activities; (8)
Insults or defames others, or infringes upon others' legitimate rights and
interests; (9) Corrupts social morality, or defames the superiority of
national culture; (10) Other contents prohibited by state laws and
regulations. 56
The circular also states that films containing certain content must be
cut or altered, including content that is:
( 1) Distorting Chinese civilization and history; seriously departing from
historical truth; distorting the history of other countries, disrespecting
other civilizations and customs; disparaging the image of revolutionary
leaders, heroes and important historical figures; tampering with Chinese
or foreign classics and distorting the image of the important figures
portrayed therein; (2) Disparaging the image of the people's army,
armed police, public security organ or judiciary; (3) Showing obscene
and vulgar content, exposing scenes of promiscuity, rape, prostitution,
sexual acts, perversion, homosexuality, masturbation and private body
parts including the male or female genitalia; containing dirty or vulgar
dialogues, songs, background music and sound effects; (4) Showing
contents of murder, violence, terror, ghosts and the supernatural;
distorting value judgment between truth and lies, good and evil, beauty
and ugliness, righteous and unrighteous; showing deliberate
expressions of remorselessness in committing crimes; showing specific
details of criminal behaviors; exposing special investigation methods;
showing content which evokes excitement from murder, bloodiness,
violence, drug abuse and gambling; showing scenes of mistreating
prisoners, torturing criminals or suspects; containing excessive horror
scenes, dialogues, background music and sound effects; (5) Propagating
passive or negative outlook on life, world view and value system;
deliberately exaggerating the ignorance of ethnic groups or the dark side
of society; (6) Advertising religious extremism, stirring up ambivalence
and conflicts between different religions or sects, and between believers
and non-believers, causing disharmony in the community; (7)
Advocating harm to the ecological environment, animal cruelty, killing
or consuming nationally protected animals; (8) Showing excessive
drinking, smoking and other bad habits; (9) opposing the spirit of the
law. 57

This ninth category is a catch-all category for any content not
56. Id.
57. SARFT Reiterates Film Censor Criteria, supra note 52.
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explicitly captured by the preceding categories, to ensure that SARFT
maintains flexibility in determining acceptability of content.
The Law of the People's Republic of China on Guarding State
Secrets ("State Secrets Law") also has a great impact on China's
censorship regime, albeit not an obvious one. Article 1 of the State
Secrets Law sets out the purpose of the law, providing "[T]his Law is
formulated for the purpose of guarding State secrets, safeguarding State
security and national interests and ensuring the smooth progress of
reform, of opening to the outside world, and of socialist construction. " 58
The law then defines state secrets as "matters that have a vital bearing on
State security and national interests and, as specified by legal procedure,
are entrusted to a limited number of people for a given period of time. " 59
While the law itself does not directly cite foreign films or the
organizations that handle them, the breadth and potential implications of
some of the law's provisions could certainly have an impact on the
Chinese entities that import and distribute foreign films. The law does
have a provision stating that "[i]n the publication and distribution of
newspapers, journals, books, maps, material with illustrations and
captions, and audio and video products and in the production and
broadcast of radio and television programmes and films, the relevant
security regulations will be complied with and no State secrets shall be
divulged. " 60
For example, the State Secrets Law applies to "all State organs,
armed forces, political parties, public organizations, enterprises,
institutions and citizens," imposing the obligation to guard state secrets
on all of these groups. 61 Given the broad scope this obligation applies to,
it is very possible for the SOEs and other Chinese organizations that
import, distribute, and exhibit foreign films to be subject to this obligation
as well. Another relevant provision of the law is the article which defines,
in further detail, what state secrets shall encompass, including secrets
concerning major policy decisions on state affairs and "other matters that
are classified as state secrets by the state-guarding department. " 62 This
provision could, arguably, extend to any censorship decision issued by

58. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo baoshou guojia mimi fa
fLaw on Guarding State Secretsl (promulgated by the Nat'l People' s Cong. Standing
Comm., Sept. 5, 1988, effective May 1, 1989), art. l [hereinafter Law on Guarding State
Secrets].
59. Id. art. 2.
60. Id. art. 20.
61. Id. art. 3.
62. Id. art. 8.
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either SARFT or the CPD, so long as it could be argued that such a
decision constitutes a major policy decision on state affairs. Further,
depending on how serious the secret divulged was, the type of
punishment attached could either fall into the criminal realm or into the
administrative realm. 63
Administrative punishments would include revoking permits or
licenses, fines, and freezing of property. 64 These punishments are handed
down by the administrative agency that promulgated the administrative
act. 65 Here, this would most likely be the State Secrecy Bureau and would
more than likely constitute a fine or the revocation of the distributor's
license. Criminal punishments, on the other hand, are much more serious
and carry much greater consequences for those being prosecuted under
this area of law. In China, the criminal law states "any act which
endangers state sovereignty and territorial integrity and security, splits
the state, jeopardises the political powers of the people's democratic
dictatorship and socialist system, undermines social and economic
orders . . . or any other act which endangers society" is liable to be
punished under China's criminal law. 66 The punishments that come from
China's criminal system include control and supervision of the convicted,
with sentences lasting anywhere from two months to two years; criminal
detention, which ranges from one month to six months; fixed term
imprisonment, lasting anywhere between six months to fifteen years; life
imprisonment; or the death penalty. 67 The Chinese criminal law also
features three other supplementary punishments: fines with no specified
limit, deprivation of political rights, and confiscation of property. 68
Given the potential consequences of revealing state secrets, it is not
surprising that censorship decisions handed down by SARFT to the SO Es
managing foreign film imports are not made readily available to
Hollywood studios.
China's State Secrets Law also works in tandem with the Measures
for Implementing the Law on the Protection of State Secrets
("Measures"), which is a set of measures providing for the retroactive
classification of information not already a state secret as a state secret if
it proves harmful to state security or interest. 69 Article 4 of the Measures
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

See Law on Guarding State Secrets, supra note 58, art. 31.
JIANFU CHEN, CHINESE LAW: CONTEXT AND TRANSFORMATION

Id. at 223.
Id. at 280.
Id. at 282.
Id.
State Secrets: China's Legal Labyrinth,

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol43/iss1/1

HUM. RTs. CHINA

224-25 (2008).

94 (2007), available at
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is the source of the law's retroactive power and it lists eight different
results that may possibly place information within the scope of state
secrets. 70 Article 4(3), provides-"[h]arming the political or economic
interests of the state in its dealings with foreign countries"-may be the
scenario most pertinent to foreign films in China, depending on how the
country views its censorship criteria at the time. 71 The strictures of the
State Secrets Law were tightened even further when the law was revised
in 2010. 72 The new revisions include provisions restricting the export of
electronic data before it can be reviewed and cleared of sensitive
information. 73 While the impact this may have on film imports is not
readily apparent, many Western companies, including Hollywood
studios, have regular dealings with China's SOEs, and therefore receive
regular information and communications from these SOEs. 74 Any
communication from an SOE regarding the censor's decision on a film
seeking release in China could possibly fall under the State Secrets Law,
particularly given the law's retroactive power. 75
C. Import Quotas
Despite China joining the WTO in December of 2001, 76 the country
still maintained a strict import quota over foreign films, permitting only
twenty foreign films to be released there per year. 77 However, following
Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to the U.S. in 2012, an agreement
was struck to allow fourteen more films into the country per year,
provided that they are in either IMAX or 3D formats. 78 This quota was
still maintained despite a WTO ruling against China in a 2009 case
brought by the U.S. over the claim that China's limit of books, songs, and

http://www.hrichina.org/sites/default/files/PDF s/State-Secrets-Report/HRI C _ StateSecretsReport. pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).
70. See id. at 96.
71. Id.
72. Michael Vella & Jerry Ling, Traps for the Unwary in Disputes Involving China,
JONES DAY (Aug. 2012), available at http://www.jonesday.com/traps_for_unwary/ (last
visited Nov. 6, 2015).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See id.
76. Ya Qin, supra note 28, at 5.
77. Mary Hennock, Boost/or Hollywood Studios as China Agrees to Ease Quota on US
Films,
GUARDIAN
(Feb.
20,
2012,
8:17
AM),
available
at
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/feb/20/china-eases-import-quota-hollywood-films
(last visited Oct. 22, 2015).
78. Id.
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movies imports violated WTO rules.79
While the ruling itself did not have a direct impact on the quota that
caps the number of foreign films allowed to enter China each year, it was
meant to permit more than just select SOEs to import foreign films into
China, including foreign companies to import and distribute films. 8 For
the U.S., the WTO ruling meant that American movie studios, among
other media distributors, would have the ability to sell their products more
directly to Chinese consumers. 81 However, China has not yet complied
with this ruling in full. 82 This is not necessarily an insufferable obstacle
for Hollywood studios, although the implications of full compliance may
have a detrimental impact on Hollywood studios' ability to maximize
their access to the Chinese market. 83

°

D. Revenue-Sharing
One of the revenue gathering methods under which a studio may
calculate its Chinese earnings is the revenue-sharing scheme. Initially,
under this system, the film's distributor and exhibitor will negotiate what
percentage of the box office receipts each will receive, as well as ensure
that the Hollywood studio receives roughly 15% of the box office
revenue. 84 This system, of course, means that the majority of the revenue
generated by a foreign film remains in China with the Chinese distributor
and exhibitor. In 2012, however, a deal was struck between China and
the U.S. that boosted the revenue percentage to 25%. 85 This new revenue
percentage still means that the majority of profits remain in China, but it
does represent a substantial increase from the prior system, where studios
were paid on a sliding scale ranging from 13% to 17% of the generated
box office revenue. 86 While 25% may not seem like a large percentage,
when one considers the amount of money generated at the Chinese box
office-2011 's Transformers: Dark of the Moon alone made U.S. $173
79. Keith Bradsher, W.T.O. Rules Against China's Limits on Imports, N .Y. TIM ES (Aug.
13,
2009),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009 /08/ 13/business/global/ 13 trade.html ?pagewanted=all&_ r=O
(last visited Nov. 6, 2015).
80. See id.
81. Id.
82. Ya Qin, supra note 28, at 2.
83. See discussion infra Part V.
84. WANG, supra note 26, at 63.
85. Patrick Frater, China's Quota Change Heralds Reform, Competition , FILM Bus.
ASIA (Feb. 23, 2012, 4:16 PM), available at http://www.filmbiz.asia/news/chinas-quotachange-heralds-reform-competition (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).
86. Id.
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million at the box office in China-a whole quarter of the profits
represents a large cash flow for U.S. studios. 87 The other system used to
import foreign films into Chinese theatres is the flat fee system, which
operates under slightly different rules than the revenue-sharing system.88
III. CASE STUDIES
To better examine the issues arising in passing the censors and
distribution, this note examines three categories of films: those rejected
outright for distribution; those accepted after certain changes have been
made to the film; and those accepted and then pulled from theatres after
distribution. It is not entirely clear why certain movies fall into one of
the three categories, but the shifting censorship standards likely provide
a partial answer.
A. Outright Rejection

For example, the film Noah, a modern film on the Biblical story of
God's great flood starring Russell Crowe, was outright rejected for
distribution. 89 While the film's producers tried to satisfy the censors by
claiming the focus of the movie is environmental issues and not religious
ones, the censors did not accept this rationale and denied permission for
distribution. 90 One explanation for the film's rejection was that certain
domestic films that were slated for release around this time and that the
government wanted to promote these films over those produced by other
However, the religious tone or at least
countries' industries. 91
background to the film was likely a large reason behind the film's
rejection. While the Chinese Constitution purports to guarantee freedom
of religion, this freedom is curtailed by the need to protect the health and
safety of the State and its people. 92 The film was intended to screen mid-

87. Id.
88. This particular system is not subject to the same strict quotas as the films imported
under the revenue-sharing system. Rather, after the 2012 deal between China and the U.S. ,
approximately 40 films are now imported into China each year under, as the name implies, a
fixed flat fee. See id.
89. Cheryl K. Chumley, 'Noah' Way! Movie Blocked in China, Banned by Muslim
WASH .
TIMES
(May
9,
2014),
available
at
Nations,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/may/9/noah-blocked-china-banned-muslimnations/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See XIAN FA art. 36 (l 982)(China) ("Citizens of the People's Republic enjoy freedom
of religious belief. No state organ, public organization or individual may compel citizens to
believe in, or not to believe in, any religion; nor may they discriminate against citizens who
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May and to be imported on a flat-fee basis, meaning it was not
constrained by the thirty-four foreign film quota of the revenue-sharing
scheme, but did not gain the censors' approval. 93
Despicable Me 2 was also outright rejected for distribution in
China. 94 Unlike with Noah, there was a bit of controversy over whether
the film was actually denied release in China or whether the film had been
presented for release at all. 95 However, one allegation as to why the film
was not released in China was that the minion characters "bore an
unfortunate likeness to erstwhile Chinese leader Jiang Zemin." 96 Others
claim that it was determined that the film simply would not perform well
in China, and therefore was not given one of the limited revenue-sharing
slots. 97 Which is actually true remains unclear, though it is interesting to
note that the first Despicable Me film was also denied release in China. 98
Nonetheless, Despicable Me 2 ultimately did not screen in China, for
reasons that are not entirely clear, exemplifying just how arbitrary and
unclear the process is.
B. Accepted After Adjustments/Self-Censorship

Further, World War Z was only accepted for distribution after certain
changes and adjustments were made to the film. 99 In this instance, the
studio decided to make certain pre-emptive changes to the film, in
anticipation that certain elements would be considered objectionable by
Chinese censors. 100 Surprisingly, it was not the film's violence that
worried the studio, but one rather small plot point instead. 101 Initially,
believe in, or do not believe in, any religion. The state protects normal religious activities.
No one may make use of religion to engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the
health of citizens or interfere with the educational system of the state. Religious bodies are
not subject to any foreign domination.").
93 . Katie Nelson, Hollywood Biblical Epic 'Noah' Denied Release Slot in China,
SHANGHAllST (May 9, 2014, 9:00 PM), available at http://shanghaiist.com/2014/05/09/noahdenied-release-slot-china.php (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).
94. Ben Child, China Denies Despicable Me 2 Ban, GUARDIAN (Aug. 6, 2013, 06:27
AM), available at http://www.theguardian.com/film/2013/aug/06/china-denies-despicableme-2-ban (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Lucas Shaw, Fearing Chinese Censors, Paramount Changes 'World War Z', WRAP
(March 31, 2013, 6:39 PM), available at http://www.thewrap.com/movies/article/fearingchinese-censors-paramount-changes-world-war-z-exclusive-83316/ (last visited Nov. 6,
2015).
100. Id.
101. Id.
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when the characters were debating the origins of the zombie virus, they
cited China as the source of the outbreak. 102 The studio, well aware of
China's mercurial censorship regime and its sensitivity to any negative
commentary on the country, advised the studio to drop the reference to
China and instead left the origins of the virus unknown. 103 This is a prime
example of the self-censorship Hollywood studios are willing to resort to
in order to better their chances of getting a film past the Chinese censors.
The change made was small, and most likely unnoticeable to American
audiences, but is a significant example of the power and influence of
China's censorship regime.
Sky/all, one of the latest James Bond films, is another film subjected
to strategic cuts. In this instance, as opposed to the small change made
to World War Z, an entire scene was omitted, along with several other
alterations to dialogue. 104 The scene cut from the original version was set
in Shanghai and featured a French hit man shooting a Chinese security
guard in the elevator lobby ofa skyscraper. 105 Another scene taking place
in Macau was edited as well. In this scene, James Bond is questioning a
woman about her tattoo, asking her if it came about as a result of being
forced into a prostitution ring at an early age. 106 In English, the lines
remained untouched but the Chinese subtitles changed the conversation
from prostitution to the tattoo resulting from being coerced into a criminal
mob instead. 107 Other moments in the film were simply removed from
the film. For example, the villain's backstory about being handed over
to Chinese authorities while working for MI6 in Hong Kong and being
subjected to extreme torture at the hands of his captors was cut from the
film. 108
C. Accepted and then Later Pulled from Theatres
Another common scenario is to see films get accepted for
distribution, pass the censors, start being screened, and then get pulled
from theatres soon after its release. A good example of this scenario is
the Quentin Tarantino film, Django Unchained. The film was set to be

102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Clarence Tsui, Chinese Censors Clamp Down on 'Sky/all', HOLLYWOOD REP. (Jan.
6, 2013, 10:06 PM), available at http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/chinese-censorsclamp-down-skyfall-413140 (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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released in China early 2013, after a few small demands to change things
such as the color and amplitude of blood, which were considered to be
too bright and too prominent, featured in the film. 109 However, on the
morning of its release, just minutes into the first screening, the film was
stopped and then pulled from theatres. 110 It was most likely the violence
or the nudity featured in the original film. 111 However, the film had
already undergone some sanitization prior to its Chinese release and the
film also already passed through the censors' hands, making it even more
unclear as to why the film was suddenly pulled. 112 The film was
eventually reapproved and rereleased three weeks later, after several
scenes containing nudity and violent murder were removed. 113 The film
also experienced reduced screening after its release was scaled back. 114
However, Django Unchained was not the only Hollywood film
subjected to this yo-yo like treatment. In fact, in some cases a film can
be pulled just before it was set to be released. An example is the film
Outcast, starring Nicolas Cage. 115 The film is about two crusaders in
China during the twelfth century and it was pulled from theatres soon
after its initial release. 116 The film was set for release on September 26,
2014, but was pulled from release the evening of September 25. 117 The
reasons for the last minute change of heart are unclear and speculation
ranges from financial difficulties on the Chinese film group's end to the

109. Richard Brody, "When Night Falls" and "Django Unchained": Movie Censorship
in
China,
NEW
YORKER
(May
23,
2013),
available
at
http://www.newyorker.com/culture/richard-brody/when-night-falls-and-django-unchainedmovie-censorship-in-china (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).
110. Jonathan DeHart, Django Unchained (Again) With Cuts in China, DIPLOMAT
(April 30, 2013), available at http://thediplomat.com/2013/04/django-unchained-again-withcuts-in-china/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See also id.; Clarence Tsui, 'Django Unchained' Reopens in China with Nudity and
Screenings Reduced, HOLLYWOOD REP. (May 13, 2013, 2:51 AM), available at
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/django-unchained-reopens-china-nudity-5 21650
(last visited Nov. 6, 2015).
114. Tsui, supra note 113.
115. Richard Verrier & Julie Makinen, Nicolas Cage Movie, 'Outcast, ' Pulled from
Theaters in China, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2014, 1:02 PM), available at
http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/envelope/cotown/la-et-ct-china-film-dispute20140926-story.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).
116. Id.
117. Patrick Frater, Nicolas Cage's 'Outcast' Gets China Relaunch, eOne as US.
Distributor,
VARIETY
(Nov.
4,
2014,
7:55
AM),
available
at
http://variety.com/2014/film/news/nicolas-cages-outcast-gets-china-relaunch-eone-as-u-sdistributor-exclusive-1201347000/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).
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censors reconsidering their approval given the film's alleged high body
count and graphic battle images. 118 As of now, the film has still not been
released in China, but is slated to be in Chinese theatres in January
2015. 119
D. Accepted With No Issues
One notable example of a film that was smoothly accepted, at least
from the censorship regime's perspective, was the fourth Transformers
movie, Transformers: Age of Extinction. The film took the top spot as
China's number one grossing film only ten days after its release in
theatres, raking in a total of U.S. $222.7 million. 120 In fact, the film
performed better in China than it did in its own domestic market. 121 It
premiered in Hong Kong and closed at the Shanghai International Film
Festival, registering 338,793 screenings across China. 122 Much of the
film's success can be attributed to its innate appeal to Chinese audiences.
For example, the film used many highly visible sites in Beijing and Hong
Kong throughout the film, as well as a scenic spot near the city of
Chongqing. 123 A couple of famous actors and actresses have roles in the
film as well, including actress Li Bingbing and actor Han Geng, both very
famous Chinese actors. 124 There was even a slew of product placement
throughout the film for "everything from Chinese milk and PCs to Red
Bull and authoritarian styles of government." 125
However, while the film did not experience any serious troubles
from the Chinese censorship regime, it did not come through its Chinese
experience unscathed. The film was threatened by two different lawsuits,
one prior to the film's screening and one after. 126 The first threatened
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Clifford Coonan, China Box Office: 'Transformers: Age of Extinction' is No. I
Film of All Time, HOLLYWOOD REP. (July 7, 2014, 8:54 PM), available at
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/transformers-age-extinction-becomes-chinas717083 (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).
121. See id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Coonan, supra note 120.
126. See Brent Lang, 'Transformers: Age of Extinction' China Sponsor Demands $1.8
Mil Investment Back, VARIETY (Jun. 24, 2014, 8:08 AM), available at
http://variety.com/2014/fi Im/news/transformers-age-of-extinction-china-sponsor-demandsl -8-mil-investment-back-1201244725/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2015); see also Ji Jin & Cao Yin,
Transformers' Producers Hit With Breach of Contract Suit, CHINA DAILY USA (Jul. 25, 2014,
available
at
http://usa.chinadaily.corn.cn/epaper/20147:20
AM),
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lawsuit came from one of the film's Chinese sponsors, Beijing Pangu
Investment Co., a real estate development company, and was against two
of the film's other sponsors, though not against the studio itself. 127 While
the suit may not have been a direct threat to the studio itself, it did threaten
to delay the film's theatrical release. 128 In contrast, the second lawsuit,
post-release, was aimed at the studio and involved a Chinese tourism
company, the Chongqing Wulong Karst Tourism Group. 129 The Wulong
Karst Tourism Group claimed that the studio breached a contract by
failing to show the logo of a Chongqing scenic spot in the film. 130 The
tourism company filed suit in Chongqing No. 3 Intermediate People's
Court, which has accepted the case. 131 However, while these issues
complicated the film's release, in terms of China's censorship regime,
Transformers: Age ofExtinction experienced a relatively smooth release
journey in China.
IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT SYSTEM
A. Factors that will Predictably Lead to Rejection Based on Past
Experience
Despite SARFT's circular, which concisely reiterates the
administration's censorship criteria, there is still a fair amount of
uncertainty over what content will meet with rejection the censors and
what content will pass. 132 However, these somewhat vague guidelines do
still allow certain insights into what sort of content will most likely be
rejected by the state censors. For example, anything that blatantly
disparages Chinese culture would likely fall under the category of
defaming the superiority of China's national culture. 133 It is also more
than likely that any film overtly critical of the Chinese Communist Party
or the Chinese government would be struck down by the censors.
It is difficult to determine what constitutes overt criticism. What
07/25/content_l 7924587.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).
127. Lang, supra note 126.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.; Brenda Goh, Chinese Tourism Company Sues Paramount Over Transformers
REUTERS
(Jul.
25,
2014,
4:07
AM),
available
at
4
Scenes,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07 /25/flim-china-transformersidUSL6NOQ013420140725 (last visited Dec. 7, 2014). No other information on the case
appears to be available as of yet.
132. See SARFT Reiterates Film Censor Criteria, supra note 52.
133. Id.
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constitutes criticism of the Chinese Communist Party or the Chinese
government is not readily apparent from SARFT's criteria. Certain films
have made it past the censors and were screened in China, such as The
Hunger Games. 134 At first glance, it seems a bit surprising that The
Hunger Games, a film about a totalitarian government which forces its
people to send their children into an arena to fight to the death every year,
did not get condemned by the censors. It would be easy to envision the
possible parallels between the Capitol government in The Hunger Games
and the political elite situated in Beijing. 135 Not only did the first film in
the series make it onto Chinese screens, but the sequel did as well. 136
Perhaps it had something to do with the idea that the film was set in an
imaginary society and was considered far enough removed from modem
China to deem it safe. Yet, unexpectedly, or perhaps not unexpectedly,
the third film in the franchise is facing issues with its release in China. 137
The film's release date was cancelled indefinitely, likely because of the
movie's plot to overthrow the govemment. 138 When the subject matter is
remote enough from Chinese life, it passes the censors, but once the
subject matter begins to touch on something the present Chinese
government arguably fears, the censors will refuse permission.
Another theme that is likely to face rejection is religious themes, as
seen with the censors' rejection of Noah. 139 However, a blanket claim
that no films with religious themes will pass the censors would not
necessarily be accurate. Kung Fu films, such as The Shao/in Temple
starring Jet Li, are widely popular in China and many are produced
domestically. 140 More accurately, films with predominately Western
134. See Etan Vlessing, 'Hunger Games: Catching Fire' Gets Nov. 21 China Release,
REP.
(Oct.
22,
2013,
6:41
AM),
available
at
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/hunger-games-catching-fire-gets-649996
(last
visited Nov. 7, 2015).
135. For example, viewers could possibly draw parallels between China's alleged
suppression of freedom and expression and assembly and the fictional Capitol's authoritarian
regime.
136. See Vlessing, supra note 134.
137. See Michelle FlorCruz, 'The Hunger Games: Mockingjay- Part I' China Premiere
Canceled: Rebellion Plot Could Cost Movie Millions in China Market, INT'L Bus. TIMES
(Nov. 18, 2014, 12:27 PM), available at http://www.ibtimes.com/hunger-games-mockingjaypart-1-china-premiere-canceled-rebellion-plot-could-cost-1725591 (last visited Nov. 7,
2015).
138. Id.
139. See Chumley, supra note 89.
140. See IMDB Top 250 Martial Arts Movies of All Time, IMDB, available at
http://www.listchallenges.com/imdb-top-250-martial-arts-movies-of-all-time (last visited
Nov. 7, 2015); see generally The Shao/in Temple, IMDB, available at
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0079891/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2015).
HOLLYWOOD
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religious themes are more likely denied approval by the Chinese censors.
Conversely, films that deal with the more traditional Chinese religions,
such as Confucianism, Daoism, or Buddhism, however, are likely
acceptable.
Films that are too gory or violent are also likely to face rejection
from the Chinese censors; however, the rejection of this content begs the
question of where the line between acceptable gore and violence is. For
example, Django Unchained was not only accepted by the censors after
the director toned down the film's violence and nudity, but even began to
screen before being abruptly yanked from theatres only minutes into its
first screening. 141 Anyone who has seen the film is aware ofits somewhat
over-the-top displays of violence, featuring dozens of killings where
"blood explodes off the bodies in little bursts of red," and yet, it initially
passed the censors with relatively small adjustments. 142 Inevitably, there
is a line between acceptable and unacceptable levels of violence, but that
line is not always so clear.
A time travel theme could also upset the censors. 143 On its face, this
seems to be a rather silly criteria to ban but is actually taken quite
seriously in China. Chinese officials view time travel as being
disrespectful of history. 144 However, the implications of time traveling
characters are readily apparent once one thinks about them. Traveling in
time means escaping from the current era and, in China, this means
escaping from the Communist Party-dominated state. 145 Traveling back
in time poses an even greater risk should the protagonist seek to change
history. This particular sub-genre of science fiction runs the risk of being
a vehicle to criticize the Chinese state. It is not surprising that the censors
and government are unwilling to allow this sort of storyline into Chinese
theatres. While it is true that China produces its own historical films, for
example, about the Nanjing Massacre of World War II, 146 other historical

141. See Brody, supra note 109; see also DeHart, supra note 110.
142. David Denby, "Django Unchained": Put-on, Revenge, and the Aesthetics of Trash,
NEW YORKER (Jan. 22, 2013), available at http://www.newyorker.com/culture/culturedesk/django-unchained-put-on-revenge-and-the-aesthetics-of-trash (last visited Nov. 7,
2015).
143. See Richard Brody, China Bans Time Travel, NEW YORKER (Apr. 8, 2011),
available at http://www.newyorker.com/culture/richard-brody/china-bans-time-travel (last
visited Nov. 7, 2015).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See, e.g., Top 10 Nanjing Massacre Movies, China WHISPERER (Dec. 4, 2012),
available at http://www.chinawhisper.com/top-10-nanjing-massacre-movies/ (last visited
Nov. 7, 2015).
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topics are still not permitted in Chinese cinema, such as any negative
portrayal of Mao Zedong and his role in the Cultural Revolution. 147
Allowing films about time travel, then, could subtly show the Chinese
Communist Party in a negative light.
Essentially, it does not seem possible to contrive a hard and fast list
of factors that will lead to the censors' rejection. Even though SARFT
has released a fairly long list of the type of content that is impermissible
or requires cutting or alteration, their descriptions are broad and rather
vague, offering overarching categories with no concrete details. While
this lack of concrete detail may not offer a set of definitive instructions
for Hollywood studios on questionable content, the SARFT guidelines at
least identify areas where studios know they will have to tread carefully,
applying these guidelines in the context of experiences with previous
films. The studios are accustomed to risk-there is never a guarantee that
any film will find favor with an audience, even if the film is the sequel to
a major blockbuster. Therefore, it would not be a tough step for studios
to use these guidelines to prepare its products for Chinese approval.
B. Arbitrary
The inherent arbitrariness of the censorship regime is another
problem with the current system that beleaguers Hollywood studios.
Studios are left to rely on a list of vague proscriptions and examples from
past films. Examples such as Django Unchained, Outcast, and Hunger
Games: Mockingjay-Part 1 are prime illustrations of the Chinese
censor's fickle nature. 148 Even gaining approval from the censors is not
enough to guarantee a smooth screening in Chinese theatres and, often
times, the reasons for the backpedaling are unclear, allowing for
speculation to run wild as to the censors' change of heart. 149 Of course,
much of the underlying reasoning for the system's arbitrariness is the
government's desire to keeps its censorship criteria flexible and able to
respond to the society's shifting and the "perceived danger of the day." 150
While this arbitrariness may very well suit the needs and goals of the
Chinese government, the fact still remains that this flexibility comes
14 7. Lilian Lin, Chinese Director Fires Back at Oliver Stone, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 22,
2014. 7:13 PM), available at http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/04/22/chinesedirector-ning-haofires-back-at-oliver-stone/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2015).
148. See DeHart, supra note 110; see also Verrier & Makinen, supra note 115; FlorCruz,
supra note 137.
149. See DeHart, supra note 11 O; see also Verrier & Makinen, supra note 115; FlorCruz,
supra note 137.
150. Ya Qin, supra note 28, at 7.
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across as arbitrariness to the studios that are subject to the changing tides
of Chinese censorship.
C. Lack of Transparency
A third prominent issue with the current system is its complete lack
of transparency. Despite the 2012 agreement between Chinese Vice
President Xi Jinping and U.S. Vice President Joe Biden and the
expectation that it would improve system's transparency, these hopes
have not been fully met. 151 Not only did the agreement increase the
number of revenue-sharing slots available for foreign films each year, it
also promised a new national distributor that would be able to compete
with the state-owned China Film Group Corporation in a way that the
much more limited Huaxia Film Distribution Co. could not. 152 While the
import quota has been expanded, it was not until just recently that China
began to discuss the possibility of a new national distributor. 153 It is still
unclear if this second distributor will actually compete against the
existing China Film Group or if the two groups will divide the existing
import quota between themselves. 154
The agreement also stated that the transparency of the system would
be improved by allowing the foreign rights owners access to censorship
decisions-which they are not currently given-and to the terms of deals
struck between the import companies, distributors, and exhibitors. 155 The
idea is that the studios would be able to negotiate directly with the censors
when an issue arises to address problems or substitute alternative films
under the terms of their previously signed import agreements. 156 The
experiences of several recent films, however, seem to indicate that this
new level of transparency is not implemented. 157
China's State Secrets Law and its recent revisions may also
contribute to the system's lack of transparency. If the State should decide
that its censorship decisions impact China's national interests and
therefore become classified as a state secret, the various SOEs that
151. See Frater, supra note 85.
152. Id.
153. Patrick Frater, China Expected to Confirm Second Theatrical Distribution License,
VARIETY (March 23, 2014, 4:31 PM), available at http://variety.com/2014/biz/asia/chinaexpected-to-confirm-second-theatrical-distribution-license-exclusive-1201143916/
(last
visited Nov. 7, 2015).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See DeHart, supra note 110; Verrier & Makinen, supra note 115; FlorCruz, supra
note 137.
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contract directly with the studios would not be permitted to divulge the
reasons a film failed the censors. 158 Censorship decisions are also
considered a part of major policy decisions, as they serve to regulate the
content of all media forms that reach Chinese citizens, including the film
medium. 159 SOEs, understanding that the State Secrets Law may very
well apply to them, may not wish to risk divulging censorship decisions
to the studios, instead simply citing a vague issue with the censors when
seeking to breach their contracts with the studios. To make matters more
complex, depending on the seriousness of the breach of a state secret, the
consequences could either fall under administrative punishments or
criminal punishments, leaving the spectrum of possible punishments very
broad. 160 Also, the law's retroactive nature has not increased the
transparency of censorship decisions. 161
D. Failure to Pay
Another issue with the current system that arose in the wake of the
2012 Xi-Biden agreement was China's attempt to impose a Value Added
Tax ("VAT") to the studios' 25% revenue share of the Chinese box
office. 162 Many studios, trying to avoid a dangerous precedent, refused
to accept payment rather than allow the VAT to take a chunk of the
studio's earnings. 163 This attempted imposition of a VAT was especially
frustrating to U.S. studios, who already deal with the rather mercurial
moods of Chinese officials when it comes to foreign films' access to the
Chinese market, given the promised 25% cut of the box office profits had
been a relatively recent concession on the part of China. 164 While it
appears that the dispute was resolved because the studios will not be
responsible for the VAT, the incident just serves as another illustration of
the problems in the current system. 165
158. See generally Law on Guarding State Secrets, supra note 58, arts. 1, 2.
159. See id. art. 8.
160. Id. art. I 1.
161. See State Secrets: China 's Legal Labyrinth, supra note 69.
162. Rachel Abrams & Andrew Stewart, Hollywood Studios Denied Payments from
China,
VARIETY
(July
29,
2013 ,
03 :35
PM),
available
at
https ://variety .com/2013/fi Im/news/ho llywood-studios-denied-payments-from-china1200503744/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2015).
163. Id.
164. See id.
165. See Michael Cieply & Brooks Barnes, Dispute Over Value-Added Tax on Movie
Tickets in China Appears Near End, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2013), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/08/business/media/dispute-over-value-added-tax-onmovie-tickets-in-china-appears-near-end.html?pagewanted=all&_r=O (last visited Nov. 7,
2015).
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V. WTO RULING & IMPACT-SHOULD WE PUSH FOR CHINA'S
COMPLIANCE?
On January 19, 2010, the WTO's Appellate Body's report, China-

Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain
Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products ("ChinaAudiovisual Services"), became formally accepted by the WTO's Dispute
The Appellate Body, and the
Settlement Body ("DSB"). 166
accompanying panel report, found that China was in violation of the
WTO law by failing to allow non-SOEs to import cultural products, such
as books, magazines, newspapers, and films. 167 China was also found in
violation due to its prohibition on foreign entities from engaging in
distribution services for cultural products, such as film, in China. 168 The
WTO found China's restrictions on the right to import inconsistent with
its commitments to liberalize trading rights under its Accession
Protocol, 169 that its restrictions on distribution services are inconsistent
with its obligations under the General Agreement on Trade in Services
("GATS"), and that its restrictions on distribution services are also
inconsistent with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT"). 170 In this ruling, the WTO judges also refused to accept
China's defense that its restrictions on trading rights are necessary for the
operation of its censorship regime, which should be justified under the
"public morals" exception of the GATT. 171 The WTO granted China
until March 19, 2011 to comply with its rulings, but China has failed to
fully comply. 172
The GATT's fundamental principles are non-discrimination, market
access and transparency and it contains binding commitments on tariffs
and quotas for goods. 173 The GATT is a powerful tool to restrict
members' censorship efforts, especially under Article XI, which states
that:
166. Liying Zhang & Xiaoyu Hu, Liberalization of Trade and Domestic Control on
Cultural Products: The Application of Public Morals Exception in China- Audiovisual
Services, 45 REVUE JURIDIQUE THEMIS 403,407 (2011).
167. Ya Qin, supra note 28, at 1-2.
168. Id. at 2.
169. Protocols of Accession for New Members Since 1995, Including Commitments in
Goods and Services, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Apr. 26, 2015), available at
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/completeacc_e.htm#list (last visited Nov. 7,
2015) (affirming China's membership to the WTO).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Ting, supra note 40, at 293.
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[N]o prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other
charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export
licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any
contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of
any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of
any product destined for the territory of any other contracting party. 174

In short, this article proscribes the use of quotas and bans on the
trade of goods. 175 Article XX, however, provides a series of exceptions
to the general GATT commitments. 176 The one most pertinent to China's
case is the exception laid out in Article XX( a), the public morals
exception. 177 Using this exception, China could justify its film censorship
and limits on importation and distribution.
The problem China encountered in trying to use the public morals
exception comes from its original accession to the WTO in December
2001. 178 In its accession commitments, China agreed that all enterprises
in China, as well as all foreign individuals and enterprises, including
those not invested or registered in China, would have the right to import
and export goods throughout the country's customs territory within three
years, except for a list of products reserved for trading by designated
SOEs. 179 China listed these reserved products in Annex 2A of its
Accession Protocol, but amongst the eighty-four products for importation
and 134 products for exportation, cultural or information products are
completely absent. 180 This absence did not help China's case when the
WTO Panel sought to determine whether or not China satisfied the public
morals exception in Article XX( a) of the GATT. 181 The Panel ultimately
concluded that the measure prohibiting all private domestic and foreign
entities from importing cultural products was too severely restrictive for
these measures to be necessary to protect public morals and that China
needed to grant the right to import cultural products in accordance with
its trading rights commitments. 182
While full compliance with the WTO ruling would allow foreign

174.
U.N.T.S.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. 11, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
194 [hereinafter GATT].
Ting, supra note 40, at 293.
Id.
GATT, supra note 174, art. XX(a).
Ya Qin, supra note 28, at 5.
Id.
Id.
/d.at9.
Jd.atll,13.
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companies to sell their products directly to Chinese consumers, and
therefore allow studios greater access to Chinese theatres, it would
require China to alter the way it conducts censorship on imports. 183 The
Panel pushed for what it saw as a "reasonably available alternative" to
the system, which had been proposed by the U.S. 184 This suggestion
would give the Chinese government sole responsibility for content
review, rather than allowing SOEs to review such content. 185 Under the
current system, the individual SOEs perform content review on the films
they import based on their own internal review process. 186 In some ways,
this is a fairly efficient system from the Chinese government's
perspective, as it is able to delegate the task of censoring imported films
to trustworthy government controlled SOEs. 187 However, centralizing
this system could have some negative impacts on Hollywood's access to
the Chinese market.
Currently, the SOEs involved in importing films enjoy a fair amount
of discretion when it comes to interpreting the vaguely worded guidelines
issued by SARFT. 188 On the one hand, these SO Es have a financial
incentive to interpret these guidelines as broadly as possible as it is in
their economic interest to bring in films that are likely to bring in the most
revenue. 189 However, centralizing the censorship mechanism could then
have a cooling effect and result in much more cautious applications of the
censorship criteria. It would result in a much more rigorous and strict
screening process, making the barriers Hollywood films face even higher
than they are now. 190 After all, government bureaucrats are not affected
by the profit motive and would instead be inclined towards behavior that
would ensure their continued existence. Also, if the Chinese government
switches over to a centralized review system, it is possible that it will also
impose a legal duty on the private importers to self-censor and "when
private businesses are required by law to practice self-censorship, they
tend to err on the side of caution and over-censor content that does not
clearly violate the rules." 191 Ultimately China is under no obligation to
183. Ya Qin, supra note 28, at 15.
184. Id. at 11.
185. Id. at 12.
186. Id. at 16 (elaborating that SOE approval does not necessarily mean a higher
authority will not step in and reverse the SOEs decision, as has likely happened in the cases
of many Hollywood films in China).
187. Id. at 18.
188. Ya Qin, supra note 28, at 19.
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. Id. at 20.
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fill even its current quota of foreign films and complying with the WTO
ruling could result in fewer foreign films entering the Chinese market.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
This final section will be dedicated to outlining possible solutions to
some of the problems that plague the current censorship and importation
regime under which Hollywood films are screened in China. First, it will
examine liquidated damages clauses under Chinese contract law. Next,
this section will examine joint productions between Hollywood and
Chinese studios. Thirdly, this section will examine the feasibility of
Hollywood studios planning for film modifications prior to submitting
them to the Chinese censors. Finally, this section examines the various
ways Hollywood studios should lobby the U.S. government to negotiate
with China on their behalf.
A. Contractual Enforcement/Liquidated Damages

There are relatively simple solutions to situations where films are
given the green light to screen and then later delayed or pulled from
theatres. Hollywood studios, when entering into contracts with SOEs that
handle the importation of foreign films, should build a liquidated
damages clause into their contracts in the event that the contract is
breached via approval recall. A liquidated damages clause would not
only ensure that the studio insulates itself from a large loss of revenue,
but would also give the Chinese SOEs better incentive to carefully
consider what the film may need to alter or eliminate from the outset,
rather than subject the studio to later, unanticipated alteration
requirements. 192
The Contract Law of the People's Republic of China 193 ("Contract
Law") itself has an entire section dedicated to liability for the breach of
contract, stating at its outset that "[ e]ither party that fails to perform its
obligations under to contract or fails to perform them as contracted shall
bear the liability for breach of contract by continuing to perform the
obligations, taking remedial measures, or compensating for losses." 194
192. See, e.g., DeHart, supra note 110 (stating Django Unchained producers had already
made minor alterations to the film prior to its acceptance by the Chinese censors only to be
pulled minutes into its first screening and subjected to further alterations before it was rereleased).
193. For the purposes of this note, I am assuming that these contracts are entered into
under Chinese Jaw with Chinese courts as the chosen forum, as well as that the contracts are
not conditioned on approval by the censors.
194. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Hetong Fa
[Contract
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The Contract Law also has a specific section allowing for liquidated
damages specifically, stating that "[t]he parties may stipulate that in case
of breach of contract by either party a certain amount of penalty shall be
paid to the other party according to the seriousness of the breach, and may
also stipulate the method for calculating the sum of compensation for
losses caused by the breach of contract." 195 The studios should build
these liquidated damages clauses into their Chinese contracts based on a
percentage of calculated lost revenue.
The studios can also point to the fact that they have been subject to
lawsuits from Chinese companies in the past, such as the lawsuit brought
by the Chinese tourism company over Paramount's alleged breach of
contract for the film Transformers: Age of Extinction. 196 In this dispute,
the Wulong Krast Tourism Group claims that Paramount Studios
breached their contract by not making it clear that the scenic scenes
featured in Transformers: Age of Extinction were shot in the Wulong
Scenic Area, which the Wulong Krast manages, because the studio failed
to include the firm's logo in the shot. 197 The tourism firm demanded that
the studio show their logo in all DVDs, TV, and digital platforms on
which the movie will be shown, as well as a return of the 4.8 million yuan
they made in contract payments. 198 The tourism firm also requested 12
million yuan in expected profit losses as it was required to shut the scenic
spot down for several days due to filming. 199 If the studios are going to
be vulnerable to law suits from the various Chinese companies they
contract with in the process of readying their film for a Chinese audience
on top of the well-known vicissitudes of China's censorship regime,
building in some semblance of protection into their contracts with the
SOE is a simple but effective measure that should be taken.
B. Joint Productions
Hollywood studios can reduce their exposure to the problems with
the current system by entering into joint productions with Chinese studios
or companies. Such ventures would be governed by the China Film CoProduction Corporation ("CFCC"), which is a special organization solely
authorized by SARFT to administer affairs relating to Chinese-foreign
Law] (promulgated by the Nat'l People's Cong. Standing Comm., Mar. 15, 1999, effective
Oct. 1, 1999), art. 107 [hereinafter Contract Law].
195. Id. art. 114.
196. See Jin & Yin, supra note 126.
197. See Goh, supra note 131.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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°

film co-productions. 20 CFCC assesses and approves international coproduction applications, conducts reviews of completed co-production
films, supervises the performance of co-production agreements between
the co-producing parties, provides relevant services, and assists in
negotiations of governmental agreement on film co-production between
China and other countries. 201 CFCC also handles much of the logistical
concerns that arise when filming in China, such as facilitating entry visas
for foreign crews participating in co-productions. 202
CFCC lists the particulars of its detailed, three part process that must
be followed when applying for a co-production. 203 These guidelines put
the burden of approval seeking on the co-production's domestic partner
and it is done under a Domestic Film Review and Approval Form,
meaning that the film will be able to be registered as a domestic film and
therefore not subject to the foreign film import quota. 204 While coproductions will still be subject to the Chinese censors, it will undergo
review as a domestic Chinese film and it is likely that the Chinese
production partner will be able to give the foreign production partner a
better sense of what will pass and what will not pass the Chinese censors.
Formally, co-productions are defined as films "which are jointly
produced by co-financing, assisting or commissioning in and/or outside
of China between the Chinese film producers (hereinafter referred to as
the Chinese Side) who have obtained 'The Film Production Permit' or
'The Film Production Permit (Single Film)' in a lawful manner and the
overseas film producers (hereinafter referred to as the Foreign Side)."205
These co-productions can take one of three forms:
1. Co-production, referring to a film which is co-financed (including
funds, labor or in kind) and jointly produced by the Chinese and Foreign
Sides, with sharing of benefits and risks; 2. Assisted Production,
referring to a film which is solely financed by the Foreign Side and shot
in China with paid assistance by the Chinese Side by providing

200. About China Film Co-Production Corporation, CHINA FILM Co-PRODUCTION
CORP., available at http://www.cfcc-film.com.cn/introeg/intro.html (last visited Nov. 7,
2015).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See Guidelines Film Co-Production Corporation, CHINA FILM Co-PRODUCTION
CORP., available at http://www.cfcc-film.com.cn/introeg/busine.html (last visited Nov. 7,
2015).
204. See Id.
205. Zhongwai Hezuo Shezhi Dianying Pian Guanli Guiding
[Administrative Regulations on Sino-Foreign Film Co-Production] (promulgated by
the St. Admin. for Radio, Film and Television, July 6, 2004, effective Aug. 10, 2004), art. II.
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equipment, facilities, locations, labor and etc.; and 3. Commissioned
Production. referring to a film which is commissioned by the Foreign
Side to be made in China by the Chinese Side. 206

Entering into a co-production with a Chinese partner actually leaves
the Hollywood studio with a wide range of production options. This
arrangement also does not limit Hollywood studios to filming in China
only, as The Stipulation of Administration on Chinese-Foreign Film Coproduction ("Stipulation"), the main policy governing these coproductions, allows for "films in and/or outside China." 207 While the
Stipulation does restrict the composition of the total cast, stating that it
can only be two-thirds non-Chinese actors, failing to indicate the types of
roles the Chinese and non-Chinese actors must fill, and while it does
mandate that a Putonghua208 version of the film be made, these extra
requirements may very well be worth it to Hollywood studios in the long
run, since it allows them to bypass the import quota and possibly have a
better, insider's view towards the censorship regime. It would also give
the studios an actual, physical presence in China, which could then lead
to a better relationship with the relevant governmental bodies at play in
China's film industry.
Recently, one potential joint venture has been getting some
journalistic attention. Warner Bros. Studio is currently in talks with
China Media Capital about forming a joint venture which will aim to
produce local-language films. 209 Should this partnership go through, it
would provide for a longer-standing relationship between the two parties,
one which would seek to produce a number of films, as opposed to a
relationship formed to produce simply one film. 210 Other studios should
seek to engage local studios and investment companies in the way Warner
Bros. is engaging with China Media Capital in order to fully capitalize
not just on China's market for foreign films, but the growing market for
locally produced films as well.
C. Planning/or Modifications
Another relatively simple step Hollywood studios could take in
206. Id. art. V.
207. Id. art. III.
208. The official language of China.
209. Ben Fritz & Shalini Ramachandran, Warner Bros. in Talks to Make Movies in
China,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Aug.
25,
2015,
12:01
AM),
available
at
http://www. wsj .com/articles/wamer-bros-in-talks-to-make-movies-in-china-1440475260
(last visited Nov. 7, 2015).
210. See id
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trying to mitigate the effects of China's current censorship regime is to
plan for modifications before the film even goes up for approval in China.
Of course, to plan for appropriate modifications the studios and producers
will need to gain a better understanding of the current climate and culture
in China. Pre-emptive adjustments have appeared to pay off in several
cases already, such as with the film World War Z. 211 Iron Man 3 is
another great illustration of pre-emptive modifications leading to a
successful run in China. 212 Iron Man 3 is also a prime example of a
Hollywood studio being prepared to pay out a little more to produce a
version of its film that is geared towards China to reap the benefits of
having it screen in the country that constitutes the second largest market
for film in the world.
Hollywood studios should even consider sprinkling a few Chinese
product placements into their film's Chinese version or giving small, bit
parts to famous Chinese actors or actresses. Again, this sort of tactic
worked well for Iron Man 3 in terms of getting it approved by the Chinese
censors. 213 In fact, this tactic worked so well for Marvel studios in Iron
Man 3 that it was used again inX-Men: Days ofFuture Past, which casted
famous Chinese actress Fan Bingbing as Blink, in the character's debut
appearance in the X-Men films. 214 Casting popular Chinese actors and
actresses also has the potential benefit of not just appeasing the censors,
but of appealing more to the film's Chinese audience as well. There is a
growing acceptance of Asian actors performing as Asians, as evidenced
by films such as X-Men: Days of Future Past, and this is a trend
Hollywood studios would be wise to take advantage of. If possible,
perhaps studios could even keep a collection of stock footage-which is
known to be acceptable to the Chinese censors-from China that can be
inserted into films aimed at the Chinese market.
D. Lobbying for Negotiations
A final possible solution for Hollywood studios to consider is
lobbying the government to continue its negotiations with China,
particularly in terms of getting China to conform to the terms of
agreements already made. The 2012 Xi-Biden agreement was a good
start, particularly in light of the WTO ruling against China, but
See Shaw, supra note 99.
See Acuna, supra note 5.
See Lau, supra note 6.
Xinhua, Face of Future Past: Fan Bingbing Proud to be X-Men 's Blink, WANT
CHINA TIMES (May 23, 2014, 11 :48 AM), available at http://www.wantchinatimes.com/newssubclass-cnt.aspx?id=20140523000058&cid=l l04 (last visited Nov. 7, 2015).
211.
212.
213.
214.
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Hollywood studios should lobby for more. 215 Studios should urge the
government to take the ground that was gained in these negotiations and
use it to keep pushing for continued improvements to the system, such as
increased transparency. 216 Hollywood studios and the Motion Picture
Association of America ("MPAA"), a major representative of Hollywood
studios, should also continue to stress to lawmakers that China is an
important and fully developed market for U.S. films, a market that
promises a lucrative revenue stream, and that the U.S. government needs
to keep putting pressure on China to continue opening up. 217 This would
constitute a win-win situation for both China's government and the U.S.
studios. China's agreement to increase the number of revenue-sharing
films imported each year was certainly a victory, but there is more that
can be done.
Opening up the Chinese market even further could even produce
positive impacts that go beyond revenue. As MP AA Chairman and CEO,
Senator Chris Dodd has said, "Sino-foreign and other international coproductions provide an opportunity for creators to view their craft
through scopes that they might not otherwise consider, boosting
creativity, technological advancements and the viewer experience."218 It
would not be a huge leap to extrapolate this understanding out for an
increased understanding between the U.S. and China as a whole. The
potential to use the U.S. film industry as a vehicle for cultural export and
a form of "soft power," as well as a means for greater understanding on
both sides, is just one of the many reasons Hollywood studios can bring
to the table when lobbying the U.S. government to increase its
negotiations with China on their behalf.

215 . See Frater, supra note 151.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. 4th MPA-China Film Screenings Underscores Expansive Partnership Between
U.S. & Chinese Motion Picture Industries, MOTION PICTURE Ass'N AM . (Nov. 3, 2014),
available at http://www.mpaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11 /4th-MP A-CHINA-FILMSCREENINGS-UNDERSCORES-EXP ANSIVE-PARTNERSHIP-BETWEEN-U.S.CHINESE-MOTION-PICTURE-INDUSTRIES.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2015).
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INTRODUCTION
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("Universal
Declaration") was adopted and signed by the United Nations ("U.N.")
General Assembly in 1948. 1 The Universal Declaration guaranteed the
rights of every individual everywhere. 2 The Universal Declaration states
that all "persons have the right to life, liberty, and security of person." 3

t Syracuse University College of Law, J.D. Candidate, 2016. The author would like to
thank her family and friends for all of their continued support. The author would also like to
express gratitude to Professor Peter Bell, and to Professor Cora True-Frost for their wisdom
and guidance throughout this process.
1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights: History of the Document, UNITED NATIONS,
available at www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/history.shtml (last visited Nov. 15, 2015).
2. Id.
3. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights art. 3 (Dec. 10, 1948)
[hereinafter Universal Declaration]. In Article 2, the Declaration sets out the basic framework
of the document. The Declaration eliminates any form of discrimination against persons.
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without
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Even after declaring that all persons would be afforded these protections,
there was still a need for more explicit language in providing those rights.
Despite the existence of the Universal Declaration, those promises were
not made to all individuals. Although the Universal Declaration is not a
treaty and it did not directly create legal obligations for states, it has
become binding as a part of customary international law. 4 Its many
successors include the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, both of which are treaties that have been ratified by states
to increase the quality of life. 5 There have also been treaties and
conventions that pertain to labor restrictions in order to protect persons
and children in the work environment. 6 In November of 1989, the
Convention on the Rights of the Child ("CRC") was open for signature
and ratification. 7 As is stands, the CRC fails to address the gaps that still
exist and has a long way to come before providing adequate protection
that children need.
This paper will address the changes that States must make to fulfill
the intentions and purposes behind the ratification of the CRC. As the
CRC stands today, it has failed to provide all the protections promised
and due to those failed promises, compliance has not been met and many
gaps have been created. This paper will outline the language of the
CRC's amendments and discuss how the lack of explicit, mandatory
requirements has created problems of interpretation and left large gaps to
be filled. It proposes language changes and additions to current
amendments that will unambiguously prohibit certain actions and give
the CRC's Committee the authority to levy fines against violations. It
will also propose additional amendments that should be adopted by
member states to provide better enforcement and protection of children
throughout the world. It will bring light to the issues of enforcement of
distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no
distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international
status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent,
trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.
Id. art. 2.
4. What is the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, AUSTRALIAN HUM . RTs.
COMMISSION , available at https://www.humanrights.gov.au/publications/what-universaldeclaration-human-rights (last visited Nov. 15, 2015).
5. Id.
6. /LO Conventions and Recommendations on Child Labour, INT'L LABOUR ORG.,
available at http://www.ilo.org/ipec/facts/ILOconventionsonchildlabour/lang- en/index.htm
(last visited Nov. 15, 2015).
7. Convention of the Rights of the Child, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3.
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the CRC, and the Committee's continued struggle to have all of the
proper data to correctly analyze the reports submitted by each committee.
With the changes and proposals suggested in this paper, the true intention
and purpose of the CRC can be provided and the gaps will be filled.

I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
A. History and Evolution of Children's Rights
The first recognition of children's basic needs was addressed in the
Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child ("Geneva Declaration") in
1924. 8 The Geneva Declaration made early recognitions that "'mankind
owes to the Child the best that it has to give' and that 'men and women
of all nations' accept it as their duty to fulfill their obligations toward the
child 'beyond and above all considerations of race, nationality, or
creed. "'9 The Geneva Declaration focused on five major areas of
children's rights: (1) material and spiritual development; (2) "help when
hungry, sick, disabled, delinquent or orphaned; (3) to a first call on relief
in times of distress;" (4) earn a livelihood free from exploitation; and (5)
"an upbringing that instills social responsibility." 10 Unfortunately, the
Geneva Declaration did not create an international legally binding treaty
that was recognized by a large number of member states.
As mentioned above, the Universal Declaration was adopted in
1948. 11 The Universal Declaration briefly discussed the needs of children
by stating that they were entitled to special care and assistance. 12 But
there was no further effort made in providing protection to children. It
merely recognized the importance of providing special protections to
children, but failed to provide and take action for any additional guidance.
In 1959, the U.N. General Assembly adopted an expanded version of the
Geneva Declaration. 13 The expanded version included the spirit of the
Universal Declaration, but expanded it to affirm children's rights to
"protection against neglect, cruelty, and exploitation; to prohibition of
8. Kirsten Sandberg, The Genesis and Spirit ofthe Convention on the Rights ofthe Child,
in UNICEF, 25 YEARS OF THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILO: Is THE WORLD A
PLACE
FOR
CHILDREN?
59,
59
(2014),
available
at
BETTER
http://www.unicef.org/publications/files/CRC_at_25 Anniversary_Publication_compilation
5Nov2014. pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2016). See Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child,
adopted Sept. 26, 1924, League of Nations [hereinafter Geneva Declaration].
9. Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child, adopted Sept. 26, 1924, League of
Nations [hereinafter Geneva Declaration]. See also Sandberg, supra note 8.
10. Universal Declaration, supra note 3. See also Sandberg, supra note 8.
11. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 3.
12. Id. art. 25
13. G.A. Res. 1386 (IX) (Nov. 20, 1959). See also Sandberg, supra note 8.
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employment that could prejudice the child's health, education or
development; to the opportunity for play and recreation; and to special
treatment, education and care for children with disabilities." 14 Although
the Geneva Declaration brought awareness and recognition to these
essential children's rights, the document was not legally binding on
nations, and it failed to provide specific details of such rights. 15
In 1978, a doctor by the name of Janusz Korczak wrote and educated
people on the importance of children's rights. 16 This new international
recognition prompted Poland to begin the drafting of a convention for
children's rights. 17 The growing awareness encouraged the U.N. to
declare the following year as the International Year of the Child. 18
Poland's draft was similar to the Geneva Declaration but was more
specific in its details; the country hoped to create principles that would
be binding on all the states. 19 In 1979, the U.N. created a committee to
consider whether or not to accept Poland's proposal. 20 It took ten years
of redrafting and revisions before States finally accepted it and developed
it into the CRC. 21
B. The Convention on the Rights of the Child

"The [C]RC is the most rapidly and widely ratified international
human rights treaty in history." 22 It has been either signed or ratified by
all U.N. member nations except the United States. 23 Somalia most
recently ratified the treaty in January of 2015. 24 It is the first legally
binding international human rights treaty to give norms and standards for
the protection of children. 25 Although the treaty has been ratified by 194

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

G.A. Res. 1386, supra note 13. See also Sandberg, supra note 8.
Sandberg, supra note 8, at 59.
Id. at 60.

Id.
See id. at 62.
Id.
Sandberg, supra note 8, at 62.
21. Id.
Convention on the Rights
22.

of the Child, UNICEF, available at
http://www.unicef.org/crc/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2015).
Convention on the Rights of the Child, AMNESTY USA, available at
23.
http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/issues/children-s-rights/conventio n-on-the-rights-ofthe-child (last visited Nov. 15, 2015).
24. See UN Lauds Somalia as Country Ratifies Landmark Children's Rights Treaty, UN
at
available
2015),
20,
(Jan.
CENTRE
NEWS
www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=49845#.VPS*SfuF9xO (last visited Sept. 13,
2015).
25. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 7.
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member nations, 26 there are still many gaps and inequalities that exist for
children. 27 Children are still exploited in many of the countries that have
ratified the CRC. 28 Problems with enforcement and funding are major
issues that need to be addressed in order for the CRC to be more effective.
Until the adoption and ratification of the CRC, children's rights were
not explicitly recognized by any treaty, nor was there any legally binding
international authority. 29 For the first time, children would possess
"innate rights, equal to those of adults: rights to health, to education, to
protection, and to equal opportunity ... " 30 The CRC inspired changes in
laws to protect children and policies to help them reach their full
potential. "More broadly, it has provided a clear mandate to translate the
right of every child to health, protection and hope into practical
[programs] and services. " 31
The CRC provides for the creation of a Committee on the Rights of
the Child ("Committee"). 32 The Committee is made up of eighteen
experts who are responsible for monitoring implementation of the CRC
by its State parties. 33 Every five years, each state that is a party to the
26. Kevin Watkins, The Convention on the Rights of the Child: Delivery on the Promise
for Children is Long Overdue, in UNICEF, 25 YEARS OF THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF
THE CHILD: Is THE WORLD A BETTER PLACE FOR CHILDREN? 67, 72 (2014), available at
http://www.unicef.org/pub1ications/files/CRC_at_25_Anniversary_Pub1ication_compilation
_5Nov2014.pdf(last visited Jan. 24, 2016).
27. See UNICEF: Progress for Children Rights in South Asia, but Inequalities Exist,
UNITED NATIONS SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT NETWORK (Sept. 12, 2014), available at
http://unsdn.org/unicef-progress-for-children-rights-in-south-asia-but-inequalities-exist/ (last
visited Nov. 15, 2015).
28. See Katie Hunt, The JO Worst Countries for Child Labor, CNN (Oct. 15, 2013, 3:09
AM), available at http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/15/world/child-labor-index-2014/ (last
visited Nov. 15, 2015).
29. See Anthony Lake, Children's Rights, Equity and our Common Future, Foreword
to UNICEF, 25 YEARS OF THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: Is THE WORLD A
BETTER
PLACE
FOR
CHILDREN?
1,
1
(2014 ),
available
at
http://www.unicef.org/publications/files/CRC_ at_25 _ Anniversary_publication_compilation
_5Nov2014.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2016).
[T]he advance of civilization has been closely tied to the idea that all people have
rights: universal, inalienable entitlements to freedom, dignity and security, to be
treated fairly and to live free from oppression. The health and soul of all societies
depend on how these human rights are recognized - and acted upon.
Id.
30. Id. Conforming with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention recognizes that the rights are "the
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world." Convention on the Rights of the
Child, supra note 7, at preamble.
31. Lake, supra note 29, at 4.
32. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 7, art. 43.
33. UNICEF, Is the World a Better Place for Children?: A Statistical Analysis of
Progress Since the Adoption of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, in UNICEF, 25
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CRC must submit a follow-up report to address their progress, and any
problems they are fixing to meet compliance. 34 The Committee is
responsible for reviewing the reports that the states are required to
provide. 35 The reports must reflect the progress they are making to
comply with the CRC, and to their legal responsibility to protect the
children of their state. 36 The Committee focuses on four areas of
comment when making their observations; legislative reform,
independent institutions, child-focused budgets and participation. 37 The
Committee, after review of the reports, must then submit observations
which contain concerns and recommendations that each State must
address over the succeeding five-year period. 38
The CRC gives children the right to assemble and have the same
rights of expression, as well as freedom of thought, conscience, and
religion, regardless of their parent's beliefs. 39 This conforms to the key
area of participation the Committee sets out. Although the focus of the
CRC was to provide children a way to be treated equal in the eyes of the
law, no child was present during the drafting of the CRC. 40 As
participation is one of the guiding principles, if the document had been
drafted today, or if there were any new impending changes to the CRC,
YEARS OF THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF TH E CHILD: Is THE WORLD A BETTER PLACE FOR
CHILDREN? 7, 41 (2014).
34. Id.; Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 7, art. 43, 44. Article 44 of
the CRC states "[r]eports . . . shall indicate factors and difficulties, ifany, affecting the degree
of fulfilment of the obligations under the present Convention. Reports shall also contain
sufficient information to provide the Committee with a comprehensive understanding of the
implementation of the Convention in the country concerned." Id. art. 44(2).
35. UNICEF, supra note 33, at 41.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 7, art. 12-14. Article 12 states
that:
States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views
the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of
the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the
child . . . For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to
be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either
directly, or through a representative or an appropriate body .. .
Id. art. 12. Article 13 provides that:
The child shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of
frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other
media of the child's choice.
Id. art. 13. Finally, article 14 provides that "State parties shall respect the right of the child to
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion." Id. art. 14.
40. Sandberg, supra note 8, at 60.
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the author believes children would be involved in the process. Children
should be allowed to voice their opinions without the fear of repercussion
and without barriers impeding their way to full participation. Increased
participation would allow for organizations to work more closely with
and for the children. 41 The CRC "provides both the legal grounding and
the impetus for children's meaningful participation in the drafting of any
and all legislation that affects their well-being."42
It is discouraging however, that children were not included in the
drafting process of the CRC, and the author believes it is one of the major
problems surrounding the idea of the CRC. Cambodia made headway
when it allowed the children the opportunity to discuss possible drafting
and policy considerations of trafficking and sexual exploitation laws
when involving children. 43 But, it did not allow the children to voice their
concerns about opposition to traditional cultural and religious legislative
concems. 44
The CRC was drafted as an emphasis on children as subject ofrights;
they are human beings in their own rights, they are not owned by their
parents or any other individual person. 45 If children cannot be heard, then
the spirit of the CRC will serve no purpose. If children can be seen as
individuals, then their voice can be heard and they will have a voice in
their rights. It is impossible for every child to be able to speak on what
they believe is right, or where they believe they have been wronged. But,
it would be possible to solve those questions of capacity by including
provisions in the CRC stating that the child must be of a certain age to
participate in any forums and discussions about child legislation. Similar
provisions allowing the persons who are most affected by the laws to be
involved in the drafting process are seen in other treaties as well. The
U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities ("CRPD")
allowed for persons with disabilities to have a say in the drafting process
of the CRPD. 46
The CRC sets guiding principles for what States must provide to
children, 47 yet, in the author's opinion, the States often makes decisions

41. Watkins, supra note 26, at 67.
42. Sandberg, supra note 8, at 60.
43 . Watkins, supra note 26, at 95.
44. Id.
45 . Sandberg, supra note 8, at 61.
46. See Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, INT'L JUST. RESOURCE
CTR., available at http://www.ijrcenter.org/un-treaty-bodies/committee-on-the-rights-ofpersons-with-disabilities/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2015).
4 7. See Sandberg, supra note 8, at 61.
[I]t is not up to the State to decide, for instance, which children go to school, whether
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as if it is optional, therefore not complying with the CRC. Children are
still being exploited for their labor. Children are still being trafficked
across borders and being sexually exploited. 48 Children are still being
forced into soldier positions 49 and they are still being forced to marry at
young ages at the wishes of their parents. 50 It is the author's contention
that these continued violations have negative impacts on children's lives
and it cannot be said that they are being protected to the fullest extent
while these activities still continue. In a world where almost 250 million
children are being forced to work and over 150 million of them are being
forced to work in hazardous conditions, it should be a major, if not top
priority that states should be addressing. 51 It is not just that children are
being exploited at young ages, but they are being forced to work in
conditions that no person under eighteen should be forced into.
Noting that child labor exploitation is extremely hazardous and
should be eliminated, the CRC turned to education as an answer to the
problem by making it mandatory that the State provide a public education
for all children. 52 The CRC mandates that children cannot be exploited
for child labor and sets some parameters for the actions of child
recruitment for military and hostile purposes. 53 Most importantly, the
to include children with disabilities in educations or leisure activities or whether to
avoid discriminating against girls. The State cannot choose whether it should provide
health care to children seeking asylum, or whether to protect children from corporal
punishment, sexual abuse or other forms of violence. All of these are the rights of
every single child.

Id.
48. Child Protection from Violence, Exploitation and Abuse, UNICEF, available at
www.unicef.org/protection/57929_58005.html (last visited Dec. 7, 2015). See also Watkins,
supra note 26, at 91-92.
49. Child Recruitment by Armed Forces or Armed Groups , UNICEF, available at
www.unicef.org/protection/57929_58007.html (last visited Dec. 7, 2015). See also Watkins,
supra note 26, at 91-92.
at
available
UNICEF,
Marriage,
Child
50.
www.unicef.org/protection/57929 _58008.html (last visted Jan. 20,2016). See also Watkins,
supra note 26, at 91-92.
at
available
HUMANIUM,
World,
the
in
Labor
Child
51.
http://www.humanium.org/en/child-labour/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2015).
52. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 7, art. 28. "States Parties
recognize the right of the child to education, and with a view to achieving this right
progressively and on the basis of equal opportunity, they shall, in particular .. .make primary
education compulsory and available free to all ... " Id.
53. See id. art. 32-34.
State Parties recognize the right of the child to be protected from economic
exploitation and from performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or to
interfere with the child's education, or to be harmful to the child's health or physical,
mental, spiritual, moral or social development ... State Parties shall in particular: (a)
[p]rovide more a minimum age for employment; [and] (b) [p]rovide for appropriate
regulation of the hours and conditions of employment.
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CRC also dictates that governments take all available measures to ensure
these protections are enforced and complied with within their countries, 54
such as providing appropriate funding of sources to maintain their social
services, legal, health, and educational systems. 55 "They must help
families protect children's rights and create an environment where they
can grow and reach their potential." 56 Unfortunately, many of the goals
of the CRC have yet to be complied with, and although it addresses many
of the problems, in the author's opinion it seems to be more successful at
bringing some light to these problems, rather than providing solutions.
C. Problems with the Convention on the Rights of the Child
It is difficult for any treaty to have widely effective enforcement and
compliance for an array of reasons. "The strength of the [CRC] cannot
be measured in ratifications, national laws or government declarations.
Ultimately, the real test is whether or not its provisions make a difference
in the lives of children." 57 The CRC has yet to draw in strong advocacy
worldwide. There is little debate about its importance on the international
stage. But the CRC lacks the media coverage that other treaties and
policy implications have in today's society. 58
States that are parties to the CRC either refuse to be serious about
their intent in adopting the amendments of the CRC, or they fail to pass
legislation that has the necessary enforcement mechanisms to be
effective. 59 The Parties pass the CRC, but make numerous reservations
or objections, watering down the effect it was intended to have. 60 The
States pass laws, but the laws do not provide for enforcement, monitoring,

Id. art. 32.
1. State Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for rules of international
humanitarian law applicable to them in armed conflicts, which are relevant to the
child. 2. State Parties shall take all feasible matters to ensure that persons who have
not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities.
Id. art. 38.
54. See id. art. 4.
55. Fact Sheet: A Summary of the Rights Under the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, UNICEF, available at www.unicef.org/crc/files/Rights_overview.pdf (last visited
Nov. 15, 2015) [hereinafter Fact Sheet].
56. Id. "In some instances, this may involve changing existing laws or creating new
ones." Id.
57. Watkins, supra note 26, at 69.
58. See id. at 70. "If the Convention is to become a force for change, it needs to be seen
as a reference point for advocacy, campaigning and policy engagement." Id.
59. Watkins, supra note 26, at 70.
60. William Schabas, Reservations to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 18.2
HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 4 72, 4 72-73 ( 1996).
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or funding for resources. 61 The author believes that ambiguities in
interpretation of its text are another problem that undermines the spirit of
the CRC. Methods of enforcement need to change, and avenues for
turning the principles of the CRC into practical policy need to be
scrutinized closer. The CRC as a whole needs to be renewed and
reformed to adjust for the continuing injustices to which children are
subjected. "In a world where six million children die before their fifth
birthday, where 161 million are stunted, and where more than 250 million
are denied even the most basic opportunities for learning, business as
usual is unacceptable." 62
Lack of funding is a major problem when it comes to international
treaties. Without funding, it is difficult for many states to provide the
necessary reform, afford to maintain the reform, and meet compliance
standards. Without wider resource availability and awareness, it is
unrealistic that all States will be able to comply with the CRC. It is often
difficult for formal legal reforms to keep pace with the substantive
activities which support developing countries .. As a result, "[i]ntegrating
the [CRC]'s principles into legislation does not guarantee child rights." 63
Without awareness and campaigning to help provide the funding to
incentivize these countries to implement the laws, it is unlikely that the
goals of the CRC will ever be realized. Funding for resources helps close
the gap between substantive activities and formal laws, and addresses the
problems that exist with inequalities of wealth among countries.
Developing countries lack even more of the resources to make
compliance with the CRC possible. 64
The CRPD provides language in the treaty to create an awarenessraising provision. 65 Article 8 of the CRPD provides that State parties are
responsible to "adopt immediate, effective and appropriate measures ...
to raise awareness throughout society ... " 66 It also requires that "public
awareness campaigns" be initiated and maintained on a regular basis. 67
61. Id.
62. Id. at 71.
63. Watkins, supra note 26, at 72.
The gap between legal form and institutional substance helps to explain why, in a fast-growing
country such as India, child labor laws have little tangible effect on child labor practices. It
also helps to explain the failure of governments around the world to act on the commitment
to equalize opportunity.
Id.
64. Id.
65. G.A. Res. 61/106, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities art. 8 (Dec.
13, 2006).
66. Id.
67. Id.
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Such provisions could be included in the CRC to encourage even larger
developments in children's rights. Bringing attention to the problems
children are faced with every day can change the attitudes and stereotypes
that currently exist toward children. They are constantly faced with
barriers to their health, lifestyle, and education. 68 If state parties to the
CRC are required to have similar obligations to those of Article 8 of the
CRPD, then more awareness and campaigns could be organized.
Through awareness-raising campaigns, it is possible that promotions
could be made to show the effects such negative attitudes have on the
children, and how change is not only necessary, but needed immediately.
Increased awareness will also help improve understanding of the CRC,
and why its proper implementation is important. Awareness-raising
campaigns can take the form of events or publications that show interest
in the CRC and the protection of children's rights. The more awareness
that exists, the better the CRC can be mainstreamed into implementation.
Continuing to promote the importance of equality for children should be
the main focus for all State parties to the CRC. The greater cooperation
in an effort to create awareness, the more issues will be brought to the
surface, and the more the imminent need for change will be realized by
all states.
Without the proper funding, the disparities and inequalities will only
grow larger between the wealthy and more disadvantaged countries of the
world. 69 In the poorer countries of the world child labor laws are poorly
enforced. 70 It is the author's contention that the lack of funding makes it
difficult to implement and enforce new policies in order to comply with
the CRC. Compliance with the CRC is even worse in poor countries,
because they lack the funding to implement new policies, and
enforcement of those policies that attempt to comply with the CRC.
Countries with high poverty rates fare badly in the index due to the need
for children to supplement their family income ... but economically
important countries like China, India, Russian and Brazil were also
found to have extreme risks because child labor laws are often poorly
enforced. 71

If funding could be made more readily available, that might
encourage developing countries to comply with the CRC. By requiring
better compliance, these countries might have the enforcement incentives
and mechanisms to stop all forms of child labor exploitation.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Watkins, supra note 26, at 84.
Id. at 70.
Hunt, supra note 28.
Id. (Referring to the Child Labor Index of 2014).
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Another reason the CRC has not seen the success many had hoped
for is because state parties can make reservations and declarations to the
treaty. When countries make reservations and declarations to the CRC
they are picking what parts they will choose to enforce. 72 The procedures
governing reservations to treaties have changed over time. The
traditional rule was that any reservation a State made would not be
accepted if it was not affirmatively accepted by all parties. 73 If the
reservation was not accepted by all States, the State making the
reservation was excluded from the treaty. 74 The modem custom,
however, imposes a duty on States to protect the human rights of its own
citizens. 75 The many reservations made to the Genocide Convention, "all
but gutt[ ed] its protections. " 76 Concerned about whether or not the
reservations should count toward bringing the Genocide Convention
"into force," the U.N. requested an advisory opinion of the International
Court of Justice ("ICJ"). 77 The ICJ held that States need to be allowed to
make any reservation they so choose, as long as it is not contrary to the
"object and purpose" of the CRC. 78 This ruling loosened the rules and
restrictions, making it easier for a state to attach a reservation to a treaty. 79
Because the rules were relaxed, no longer requiring unanimous
acceptance of a reservation, the ICJ allows States to make reservations
and not be cut off from the legal force of the treaty. When a State makes
a reservation, it leaves the remaining members of the treaty to either
choose to accept the reservation, reject the reservation and refuse to join
the treaty with the reserving State, or the objecting State can refuse to
sign on to the section of the treaty to which the reservation is made. 80
This not only makes it easy for the States making reservations to pick and
choose which parts of the treaty they will accept, but also which parts
they will refuse to comply with, making it the decision of the rest of the

72. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 7, art. 28. Afghanistan, Egypt,
Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Maldives, and Qatar are States that have ratified the CRC, but have
reserved all rights to express reservations on all provisions of the convention that are
incompatible with the laws oflslamic Shari'a and the local legislation in effect. See id. at
Reservations and Declarations Made Upon Signature.
73. DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 32 (3rd ed. 2010).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See generally id. at 33. See infra Part II for further reference to the Genocide
Convention and how similar actions could be taken to help enforcement issues of the CRC.
77. Id. at 33.
78. BEDERMAN, supra note 73 , at 33.
79. David S. Jonas, The Object and Purpose of a Treaty: Three Interpretive Methods,
43 V AND. J. TRANSNAT' L L. 565 , 583 (2010).
80. Id. at 585.
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States to either enforce the treaty or choose to not ratify those parts. This
creates gaps, as well as attitudes for the States willing to agree to all the
terms of the treaty, while letting other States who make reservations off
the hook. It is a frustrating process, and in the Advisory Opinion that the
ICJ released, they created an objective test for whether or not a
reservation violates the object and purpose of the treaty, which rarely
finds reservations invalid. 81
Countries that have ratified the CRC make these reservations or
declarations because they believe the treaty will conflict with their own
laws or traditions, and because it may provide issues of enforcement and
monitoring. Other states make a reservation or declaration to certain
aspects of the Convention simply because they may disagree with them.
As with reservations made to the Convention to Eliminate all forms of
Discrimination Against Women ("CEDA W"), 82 religious reservations
were made to the CRC where the amendments conflicted with the
principles of Islamic Sharia law. 83 The other States party to the CRC
should have objected more sternly to these reservations, arguing that they
were clearly contradictory to the object and purpose of the CRC. The
Maldives made a reservation to CEDAW, stating that Sharia law
superseded any contradictory protections afforded by CEDAW. 84 This
reservation created a virtually complete exception to the purpose of
CEDAW. 85 In response to this reservation, the remaining parties to
CEDAW sought to its nullification. 86 Finally, the Maldives chose to drop
the reservation and replaced it with a less "far reaching one." 87
Algeria also made an interpretive declaration to the CRC stating that
Article 14 shall be interpreted by the Algerian Government in compliance
with the basic foundations of the Algerian legal system. 88 Andorra also
made a declaration stating its disproval of Article 38 of the CRC and its
failure to prohibit the use of children in armed conflicts. 89 Additionally,
81. See id. at 583-89. "[T]he ICJ explicitly rejected the unanimous consent rule and
intrudes the object and purpose test as an alternative limit on reservation making. Some limit
was necessary, the Court explained, because to hold otherwise would 'sacrifice the very
object' and 'frustrate the purpose' of a treaty." Id. at 588-89.
82. Id. at 590.
83. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 7, art. 28, Reservations and
Declarations Made Upon Signature.
84. Jonas, supra note 79, at 590-91.
85. Id. at 591.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 7, Declarations and Reservations
Made Upon Signature.
89. Id.
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Andorra expressed disagreement with allowing the participation and
recruitment of children of ages fifteen or older. 90 Furthermore, Singapore
made a reservation in regards to complying with Article 37, which fails
to explicitly prohibit the use of capital punishment on children. 91
Although the CRC is the most widely adopted international law, it has
failed to have the effect that was intended. States cannot be stopped from
making reservations or declarations, so it becomes even more important
for the CRC to be renewed and reformed so as to provide better protection
against the existing gaps.
Similar actions to those against the Maldives reservation to the
CEDAW should have been taken when identical reservations were being
made to the CRC. There is no explanation for why such pushback against
the Maldives was made, but when it came to similar reservations to the
CRC, such pushback was nowhere to be found. States should have taken
a harsher position when going forward with the ratification. It is the
author's belief that the reservations that were made to preserve the
superiority of Islamic Sharia law clearly violate the purpose of the CRC.
Sharia law allows for the denial of education to women, compulsory child
Such
marriage, and discrimination against women in general. 92
allowances conflict with numerous articles of the CRC. Article 3 refers
to the absolute protection of the best interests of the child. 93 The Article
also explicitly requires that the states look to their existing laws and
assess the changes that are necessary for compliance. 94 Article 12 focuses
on respecting the views of the children and allowing them to make
decisions on matters that affect their lives, also in direct conflict with
reservations that have been made due to Sharia law. 95 Finally, in direct
conflict with Sharia law, Articles 28 and 29 are the requirements that deal
with education. 96 All children have the right to a primary education97 and
to develop their abilities to the fullest. 98 The same pressure that was
applied to the Maldives' when they objected to CEDAW should have
been applied in the situation here. Similar alternatives could and should

90. Id. art. 28. l(a). Singapore also made a reservation concerning Article 37 in the way
that it does not make primary school compulsory. Id. at Declarations and Reservations Made
Upon Signature.
91. Id.
92. Jonas, supra note 79, at 591.
93 . Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 7, art. 4.
94. Id.
95. Id. art. 12.
96. Id. art. 28, 29.
97. Id. art. 28.
98. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 7, art. 29.
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have been made by states who follow Islamic Sharia law. By applying
pressure, forcing the States to stick to the CRC's purpose, and keeping
the CRC coherent, many gaps could have been avoided, and many issues
of non-compliance would be moot.
The CRC fails to provide the protections children need in regards to
child labor exploitation. The CRC does not stand for the idea that
children should be prohibited from performing any type of work during
childhood. A common misconception that leads to confusion over the
scenarios in which the child is actually being exploited is found in the
difference between child work and child labor. 99 Child work is defined
as an economic activity that does not negatively affect the health of the
child, nor can it interfere with their education. 10 Child labor refers to
any child who is working in contravention of ILO standards "engaged in
more than light work," and any child "engaged in the worst forms of child
[labor]." 101 These distinctions are important because States are not
prohibited from allowing children to work, but they cannot exploit the
children to work in conditions that are hazardous to their health. But,
with the confusion, States are still forcing children to perform duties and
work in environments that they deem to be hazardous, even when they
are blatantly violating the CRC. 102
Although the CRC provides for the protection of children in the
labor environment in Article 32, it failed to effectively prohibit those
exploitations from happening in countries that have ratified the CRC. 103
States that have ratified the treaty are still exploiting the labor of children.
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Burundi, Nigeria, Yemen, and Zimbabwe are all
countries that are on the top ten list of worst child labor conditions on
record in the world. 104 Problems will continue if change doesn't take
effect soon. "We cannot afford to continue at the same pace for the next
25 years. Unless efforts are stepped up, the rights of millions of children
will continue to be violated." 105 The CRC has clearly failed on many
levels to provide the necessary protection to children. The next section

°

99.
Factsheet:
Child
Labour,
UNICEF,
available
at
www.unicef.org/protection/files/child_labour.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2015).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Watkins, supra note 26, at 90.
103. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 7, art. 32.
104. Hunt, supra note 28.
105. Lake, supra note 29, at 50. Lake expresses his continued concern that the CRC has
failed on many levels to provide the protection that it promised to children. Id. The losses
are still felt by children and their families worldwide, especially in countries that have ratified
the Convention. Id. at 3. "[W]e cannot claim that children's rights are being upheld when
17,000 children under the age of five die every day." Id.
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of this paper will address changes that can be made to the CRC to give it
more enforcement power and propose amendments that will help fill the
gaps that States have been able to create.
II. CHANGES TO THE CRC
The changes proposed here will address the concerns that States
have made in either their reservations or their declarations to the CRC.
In a perfect world, these changes would be accepted without reservation
and enacted with full force, but that is a feat which is impossible.
International law is a complex area that makes it difficult to provide for
a utopian world. Although there will be pushback for the proposals and
changes that are absolutely necessary, the blowback should be minimal,
and even though imperfect, will be one step closer to providing the
protection that should be afforded to the children of the world.
Some States, such as Cambodia, Bulgaria, Iraq, Iran, and Nigeria to
name a few, have been open to changes and amendments to the CRC,
signing and ratifying optional protocols. 106 Three optional protocols have
been ratified since the original ratification of the CRC in 1989. 107 These
optional protocols, the third one being the most recent, ratified in April
of 2014, have been an attempt to fix the vagueness and looser articles of
the CRC. 108 The first optional protocol was focused on affording more
protection to children in armed conflicts. 109 Article 3 of the Protocol
requires states to raise the minimum age for voluntary recruitment into
the armed forces. 110 The Protocol mandates that no person under the age
of eighteen can be recruited or used in hostilities. 111 This Protocol was
created because Article 38 of the Convention sets the age at fifteen. 112
The second optional protocol dealt with matters of child sex
exploitation. 113 The Protocol's purpose is to extend protection beyond
that of Articles 1, 11, 21, 32, 33, 34, 35, and 36 of the CRC. 114 Finally,
the most recent optional protocol deals with allowing children, who are
106.
See
Advancing
the
CRC,
UNICEF,
available
at
http://www.unicef.org/crc/index_protocols.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2015).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. G.A. Res. 54/263, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child
on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict and on the Sale of Children, Child
Prostitution and Child Pornography, art. 3 (May 25, 2000) [hereinafter Optional Protocol].
111. Id. art. 1.
112. See id.; Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 7, art. 38.
113. Advancing the CRC, supra note 106.
114. See Optional Protocol, supra note 110. See Convention on the Rights of the Child,
supranote7,art.1, 11,21,32-36.
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citizens of a state party to the CRC, to have their grievances addressed. 115
The third protocol allows children subjected to violations to submit these
violations directly to the Committee to seek redress. 116 These protocols
are optional only in the sense that, because they are changes to the CRC,
they will legally bind only States that also ratify the individual
protocols. 117 With the hope that states are willing to change and are open
to change, hopefully more protections will be extended and afforded to
the children.

A. Compromissory Clause
Even when ratified, a treaty is still open to change and amendment.
"There is a need for change in international law, and treaties would not
be an effective source of international legal obligation if anachronistic
rules were forever graven in stone." 118 Many treaties are drafted with the
intention of later amendments and changes being made. 119 It is
"exceedingly common" that states choose to provide new conditions to
the treaty. 120 Any proposed changes cannot be amended into the treaty
until all parties have expressed approval. 121
Although there is no international police force that can arrest and
bring every State who violates the CRC into court, there are other means
by which the threat of punishment and enforcement can be provided. 122
Instead of international police, there is a World Court. 123 The ICJ was
created as part of the U.N., with the hope of creating an international
adjudicatory body to provide for the enforcement of international law. 124
The ICJ is the forefront vehicle in helping to dissolve international law
disputes and helping to provide enforcement of agreements that are made
between parties. 125 The problem with the ICJ is that, similar to a treaty,
no state can be forced to consent to the Court's jurisdiction. 126
The first proposal that should be added to the CRC is a clause in the

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Advancing the CRC, supra note 106.
Id.
Id.
BEDERMAN, supra note 73, at 37.
Id. at 38.
Id.
Id. at 37-38.
Id. at 9.
BEDERMAN, supra note 73, at 255.
Id.
See id. at 257.
Id.; Maurice Mendelson, The Formation of Customary International Law, 272
RECUEIL DES COURS 155, 169 (1998).
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treaty, which would bind each state to give their consent to have all
matters heard before the ICJ. The clause would simply provide that "any
such dispute which cannot be settled shall be referred, at the request of
any one of the States party to the dispute, to the ICJ for a decision." These
types of agreements are described as compromissory clauses. 127 Such
clauses are becoming increasingly accepted in the international society,
and are ways of making it easier for the ICJ to invoke jurisdiction. 128
Such a clause would waive a State's objections to consenting to
jurisdiction to the ICJ. The ICJ has the authority to make decisions in
accordance with international law for "disputes of a legal nature that are
submitted to it by States .. . and it gives advisory opinions on legal
questions at the request of the organs of the [U.N.] ... " 129 By waiving
their objections, the ICJ would have jurisdiction to hear all the matters
that dealt with the enforcement of the CRC. Allowing the ICJ to hear
these disputes provides an international forum that although is not a
police force, would still allow for better protection and enforcement.
Of course, in order to make such a clause binding on the States, it
would have to be ratified and all the member parties would have to agree
and sign the addition. Giving the ICJ such authority might provide a
neutral forum to work out disputes dealing with enforcement and
compliance with the CRC. Consenting to the Court's jurisdiction might
also provide a backbone to the CRC, an overarching notion that
compliance with the CRC will be mandatory. By consenting to the
jurisdiction, the States are allowing the ICJ to resolve the dispute and
demand them to comply. It would also be a statement that states are
willing to take serious actions to stop any offenses and violations to the
CRC. It might pressure other States to do the same until they all agreed.
Embarrassment in the international community is often avoided at all
costs. Calling out States that refuse to make the same serious
declarations, could create an additional source of pressure. The CRC
would have to provide a provision that would prohibit any state from
making a reservation to the consent of ICJ jurisdiction. If not, it is likely
that states could object to consenting to the jurisdiction, failing to allow
the Court to provide relief for violations.
Allowing the ICJ to have jurisdiction to hear the disputes could
provide a uniform system in which matters will be resolved. Although
127. BEDERMAN supra note 73, at 257. "Compromissory clauses are included in
bilateral and multilateral conventions. Such provisions allow, in the event ofa dispute arising
under the treaty, that the matter will be submitted to the Court." Id.
128. Id.
129.
Jurisdiction,
INT'L
CT.
JUSTICE,
available
at
http://www.icjcij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p l =5 (last visited Nov. 16, 2015).
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some resistance can be expected, such clauses are not unheard of. Many
treaties have such clauses consenting to ICJ jurisdiction; it would not be
a stretch to amend the CRC to require the same type of compromissory
clause. 130 It creates clarity and consistency amongst states, and will
ensure that every State party to the Convention will comply with the
promises they made.

B. Universal Jurisdiction
A second approach that can be taken to provide for better
enforcement would be allowing member States to the CRC to police the
other states.
Such practices already exist, not only codified in
international law, but as a practice of customary international law, giving
states the power and responsibility to hold accountable states who violate
treaties they have ratified. 131 The Geneva Convention requires member
States to search for persons who have made grave violations to the CRC,
extradite them, and prosecute them ifpossible. 132 Not only do states have
the ability to engage in policing states to the CRC who are committing
war crimes or genocide, but it confers upon them the absolute
responsibility that they must investigate any breaches, and bring to justice
those states committing the violations. 133
Universal jurisdiction is a long-standing notion of international law
when it comes to punishing violations of such egregious human rights. 134
It is the principle that requires states to police and bring criminal

130. Practical Information, INT'L CT. JUSTICE, available at http://www.icjcij.org/information/index.php?p1=7&p2=2 (last visited Nov. 16, 2015) (noting that over 300
treaties contain similar compromissory clauses giving the ICJ jurisdiction to hear disputes that
the States to the treaty may submit).
131. Rule 158. Prosecution of War Crimes, INT'L COMMIITEE RED CROSS, available at
https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v 1_cha_chapter44_ rule 158 (last visited Nov.
16, 2015). "Rule 158. States must investigate war crimes allegedly committed by their
nationals or armed forces, or on their territory, and, if appropriate, prosecute the suspects.
They must also investigate other war crimes over which they have jurisdiction and, if
appropriate, prosecute the suspects." Id.
132. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 49, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31;
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 50, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75
U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 129, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 146, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
133. Rule 158. Prosecution of War Crimes, supra note 131.
134. The Scope and Application of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, UNITED
NATIONS,
available
at
http://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/65/ScopeAppUniJuri_ StatesComments/Kenya.pdf
(last
visited Nov. 15, 2015).
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proceedings against international crime violations. 135 It acknowledges
that some crimes are such large violations of human rights, that they
cannot go unpunished.
Making states obligated to bring such
proceedings, and to take such actions to extradite persons who are
committing the violations, despite their nationality or location, creates the
notion that human rights are being given heightened priority and will not
be compromised. 136 It allows for the prosecution of international crimes
committed by anybody anywhere. 137
If the same obligations were put upon the members of the CRC, then
even if a state refuses to ratify the compromissory clause, enforcement of
violations can still take place. Crimes against any child are a serious and
egregious act that cannot go unpunished. There is no reason as to why
the same weight cannot be afforded to the protection of children as is to
the violation of war crimes and genocide. They both are actions that
greatly impact the future of the world and society. Young children are
impressionable and all precautions should be taken to ensure they have a
healthy and positive upbringing. 138 If the states have agreed to such
obligations and mandatory duties previously, the same should be done
here.
Allowing universal jurisdiction, and the requirement and
responsibility to protect all children of the international community,
would help to ensure that children are not being exploited in any part of
the world.
A change of this magnitude would not only help to fill the gaps that
have been left by the drafters of the CRC, but would also create a sense
of responsibility and awareness to the continued violations and
exploitations of children. By allowing states to police the other states
who are party to the CRC, more children will be afforded protection, and
the ultimate goals and purposes of the CRC will be upheld. It would
create greater international awareness of the issues that are often swept
under the rug on a daily basis. By calling out state actors who choose to
violate the CRC, which they have signed and ratified as a member, more
pressure can be put on them, and they can ultimately be prosecuted for
their violations. It may cause those who are committing the violations to

135. Id.
136. See id.
13 7. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court pmbl., July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90. "Affirming that the most serious crimes of concern to the International
community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be
ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing international cooperation."
Id.
138. See generally Louise Lemyre et al., Psychosocial Considerations about Children
and Radiological Events, 142 RADIATION PROTECTION DOSIMETRY 70 (2010).
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think twice: not only if they are convicted for their crimes, but also when
they are thrust into the public eye.
If a state refuses to comply with the obligations of the CRC,
implementing policing mechanisms would create better compliance with
the CRC. This would put the pressure on the members of the international
community who chose to ratify the CRC, to fulfill their obligations as a
necessary step to go forward with the changes and reform that are
necessary. It is the author's belief that the threat of cutting off aid and
support, as well as the awareness that their actions are being monitored,
will push states towards compliance, therefore protecting the children
who are the most vulnerable to the decisions of others.
Being part of the international community, and choosing to sign and
ratify treaties needs to stand for something more serious and concrete. It
should not be enough for a State to put their name on a piece of "legally
binding" paper, and then violate the very principals they promised to
uphold. Unless states are willing to hold each other accountable for their
actions, and create better enforcement mechanisms, no degree of
specificity will ever be the answer. Universal jurisdiction and consent of
waiver to jurisdiction before the ICJ, are steps that must be taken to give
the CRC more teeth, and to ensure that if violations are committed, those
persons and states will be held to answer for their actions.
C. Budget Proposal to Article 4

The first article that should be added/amended to the CRC, is one
that addresses funding, and provides aid and supplies to the states that are
parties to the CRC. Article 4 of the CRC focuses on the governments'
responsibility to take all measures to assess and make sure that social
services, legal services, and educational systems have the appropriate
funding to provide the requisite needs to the citizen children. 139 In
addition to Article 4, additional paragraphs should be mandated as
follows:
2. States Parties shall undertake all measures appropriate to make sure
that a certain percentage, to be set by the Committee, is being allocated
to the social, legal, and educational services of the State. To the
maximum extent possible, annual budget allocations for these services
will be mandated, before spending can be allocated elsewhere, so far as
it does not interfere with funding that is allocated to the defense and
infrastructure of the State. States shall make sure that all barriers
impeding the accessibility to the resources are removed, so as to make

139. Convention of the Rights of the Child, supra note 7, art. 4; Fact Sheet, supra note
55.
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the resources accessible to all citizen children, so that they can take full
advantage of the systems, allowing them to use them to develop into
better citizens.
3. States will be required to submit their budget and spending
allocations annually to the Convention's Committee to be reviewed and
approved. If State's fail to pass the Committee's review, they shall be
required to take the necessary adjustments within 90 days to allocate
their resources as the Committee deems appropriate.
4. The committee will set the sliding percentage scale to determine,
based off the Member State's gross income, what allocations will be
deemed appropriate.
5. Failure to comply with any part of the Convention will lead to a fine,
which will be paid to an account that is held by the Committee, and then
allocated to States who need additional funding, as seen fit by the
Committee.

The additional provisions to Article 4 of the CRC can help the states
who are a party to the treaty in many ways.
First, by setting strict budget percentage requirements, states will be
required to provide funding to support children in all of the public
services the states are required to provide. As the CRC stands now, the
Article only requires that the states, as they see fit, make sure that services
are available to children. 140 By allowing states to pick and choose when
and where to allocate their services, they often nickel-and-dime the
services that are necessary to further the best interests of children. Not
only are they providing little funding and aid toward these services and
programs, but often provide none at all, claiming that they do not have
the resources available to provide to these services. 141 Such relaxed
policies occur when states are allowed to choose what the maximum is
that they will allocate. 142 This also leads to one of the major reasons why
non-compliance issues still arise on a daily basis.
Second, the provisions this paper proposes are better than the
existing language of Article 4, because it will help address the issue of
the wealth inequality and distribution among the Member States. It is the
author's belief that a major concern is that the CRC, as it is written, fails
to fix the problem of the wealth inequalities among the states. 143 Poorer
states do not have the funding, so their maximum extent available does
140. Convention of the Rights of the Child, supra note 7, art. 4; Fact Sheet, supra note
55.
141. Watkins, supra note 26, at 70.
142. Convention of the Rights of the Child, supra note 7, art. 4; Fact Sheet, supra note
55.
143. Watkins, supra note 26, at 70, 73.
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little, if nothing, to provide the necessary resources to keep services
necessary to promote the development of children. 144 By allowing poorer
states to slip by without enhancing public services to the children, it
makes it difficult to mandate that the wealthier states, which can afford
to allocate more funding and resources to the program, to do so. That
should be a major red flag in the mind of any person who reads the CRC.
These wealth disparities are issues that can be addressed and fixed, yet
they have not been. Wealth disparities among the states are a problem
because it makes it difficult for poorer states to comply with the CRC.
The poorer the states, the worse off the conditions are for the children of
that state. 145
It is extremely unfortunate that where a child is born, in a wealthier
or poorer state, affects their life expectancy. A child born in Chad has an
increased risk of mortality by a factor of thirty-five relative to France. 146
These disparities matter immensely, and they are at the heart of the CRC.
These disparities take away a child's basic opportunity to education,
health, and survival. 147 "They violate the letter and the spirit of the
[CRC]. Under article 4 of the [CRC], governments around the world have
a responsibility to advance child rights and combat the unjust inequalities
inherent in discrimination." 148 Such changes to Article 4 would make
other aspects of the CRC more realistic and easier to comply with. Article
24 of the CRC requires states to "strive to ensure that no child is deprived
of his or her right of access to such health care services" and to "take all
appropriate measures ... [t]o diminish infant and child mortality." 149
Article 28 also requires that states provide an equal opportunity for
children to have access to education. 150 If states are required to provide
a certain percentage of their resources to furthering these fundamental
rights, they will be better equipped to provide resources to the children.
"Research by UNICEF found that scaling up low-cost interventions
aimed at eliminating the coverage gap between rich and poor households
could save two-million lives between 2012 and 2015, cutting child
mortality by 13%." 151 These changes can make a huge difference in the
lives of many children. It is impossible to fix all of the wealth disparity
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

See Hunt, supra note 28.
See id.
Watkins, supra note 26, at 72.
Id. at 73.
Id.
Convention of the Rights of the Child, supra note 7, art. 24; Fact Sheet, supra note

55.
150. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 7, art. 28.
151. Watkins, supra note 26, at 78.
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gaps that exist internationally, but little steps over time can make a
difference that is necessary. In the long run these changes will be
beneficial to all persons, not just the children of these states.
Finally, giving the Committee more control over these matters, and
giving them the ability to set the requirements, puts the control into a
neutral body whose only purpose is to advance the purposes of the CRC.
The Committee has the better resources to research and gather
information on the wealth disparities and to know what percentages of
allocations are appropriate so that the necessary enhancements to public
services are made. Also, by requiring yearly compliance checks, it also
gives them more authority over making sure the sources are being
provided every year and not just every five years. Finally, by imposing
a fine on any state who fails to comply with the CRC adds another sense
of consequence and accountability for their actions. States will be more
apprehensive to commit the violations if they know they are required to
pay additional fines, on top of the resource allocations they are already
required to make. Creating more caution against committing violations
will clearly further the purpose of the CRC, and further the best interests
of the children. If wealthier states continue to commit the violations, they
will be subject to punishment and fines, providing more funding not only
to allocate to the poorer states, but also more funding for the Committee
to look into violations, and expand their control and authority over the
CRC.
Now is an appropriate place to discuss the impact that UNICEF
could have in furthering the spirit of the CRC, by requiring them to
provide funding and requiring them to play a bigger role in enforcing the
CRC. The CRC is the first human rights treaty that allows a specialized
agency, such as UNICEF, to have a role in the enforcement and
implementation of the treaty. 152 UNICEF plays a large part in the
advocacy and funding for humanitarian acts in the international
community. 153 In 2012, UNICEF was able to raise close to $1.5 billion in
humanitarian funds, worldwide. 154 UNICEF could take affirmative steps
to team up with the Committee and not only help provide funding for
enforcement and wealth issues, but it could help bring greater awareness
to the CRC and its purpose. Greater awareness means larger amounts of
funding, which means a greater chance of having more teeth for

152. Monitoring the Fulfillment of States Obligations, UNICEF, available at
http://www.unicef.org/crc/index_30210.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2015).
See
Overall
Funding
Trends,
UNICEF,
available
at
153.
http://www.unicef.org/appeals/funding_ trends.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2015).
154. Id.
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enforcement. If more states are aware of the requirements of the CRC,
they are more willing to act and notice violations, and be more willing to
report those violations. 155 If UNICEF, the U.N., and other international
actors are willing to help create awareness and funding for the CRC, a
step towards filling the gaps would be made.

D. Language Changes and Clarification to Article 32
The second proposal this paper will address is to Article 32 of the
CRC. Article 32 refers to the CRC's requirements for child labor. 156
Article 32 focuses on child labor exploitation and why protections must
be put in place. 157 It prohibits States from allowing children to perform
any work "that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child's
education, or to be harmful to the child's health or physical, mental,
spiritual, moral or social development." 158 But the Article fails to
provide, with any clear specificity, as to what the law is. Paragraphs 2(a)
and 2(b) fail to clarify a specific age limit, or a specific number of hours
allowed. 159 Finally, it concludes by providing that appropriate penalties
or sanctions must be provided by the State to ensure the effective
enforcement. 160 Article 32 is extremely vague, 161 and it is clear why the
percentages of child labor exploitation are still running high throughout
the international community. 162 Instead, a new proposal with a few
language changes to the Article that would read as follows should be
implemented:
2(a). States Parties shall provide for a minimum age, or ages for
admission to employment, the minimum age not being younger than 14.
2(b ). States Parties shall provide for appropriate regulation of the hours
of employment, the maximum allowance not being more than 20 hours
per workweek.
2(c). States Parties shall provide a minimum wage for payment that
cannot be less than the minimum wage requirements for any person
employed in the State.
2(d). States Parties shall undertake all measures possible to ensure that
children are not being permitted to work in any conditions that are

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

See Watkins, supra note 26, at 94.
Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 7, art. 32.
See id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 7, art. 32.
Watkins, supra note 26 at 68-70, 90.
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deemed hazardous to the well-being of the children.
3. The Convention's Committee will provide a list of employment
conditions that any child will be prohibited from being subjected to.
The list will not be exhaustive, and will be subjected to additions at any
time the Committee deems it necessary and appropriate to do so. Some
prohibited activities will include; slavery, child trafficking, bondage,
sexual exploitation, illicit/illegal activities or crimes, and any work
which is likely to harm the health, safety, or morals of children. The
Committee will also provide for the appropriate penalties and sanctions
for any non-compliance violations.
3(a). The States Parties shall comply with the listed employment
conditions that the Committee finds prohibited from child employment.
If the States Parties fail to comply with the Convention, or the
Committee's stated purpose, they will be subjected to any penalty or
sanction the Committee has deemed appropriate for the violation. The
Committee has the authority when levying fines to consider the State's
wealth, the seriousness of the violation, and whether or not the State has
repeated issues of non-compliance. 163

Such changes are necessary because children are still being
exploited through their labor, throughout the international community.
Watkins states that:
215 million children worldwide are involved in child labour, with more
than half of them under age 15 and 91 million less than 12 years old.
Many of these children are involved in hazardous employment, working
long hours in dangerous occupations such as artisanal mining, sugar
cane cutting and unregulated informal activities. 164

Not only is this a concern that aims toward eliminating any dangers
and hazards to the health and well-being of any child, but it also has a
ripple effect throughout other areas of the CRC as well. If States are
allowing children to be exploited for their labor for long hours per week,
whether it be under hazardous conditions or not, they are taking that child
out of school, which, directly contradicts Article 28 of the CRC. 165 This
may potentially have a long standing effect on not only a child's
intelligence level, but also on their ability to develop fundamentally,
socially and morally. By allowing states to take children out of school,
and allowing them to work long workweeks, they are going against the
163. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 7, art. 32
164. Watkins, supra note 26, at 90.
165. See Convention of the Rights of the Child, supra note 7, art. 28; Watkins, supra
note 26, at 74. Noting that Article 28 is the recognizing the importance of education, and the
States Parties obligations to ensure that children are being provided with a primary education
that is compulsory and available free to all. Id.
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purpose of the CRC, which is to ensure the best interests of the children
are being protected.
Child labor exploitation has always been a growing concern in the
international community, and it lacks the awareness that it should be
attracting. The issue of child labor exploitation is a sensitive one that
creates difficult problems. There is no perfect solution to fixing and
stopping all child labor exploitation throughout the world, but if more
steps and efforts are made, it can be combated, and the percentages could
drastically drop. Child labor exploitation should be one of the top focal
points when it comes to children's rights. There are serious negative
effects that child labor exploitation has on children, whether it is work
that is not dangerous, or work that is extremely hazardous. Serious
problems with premature aging, malnutrition, depression, and drug
dependency are all impacts that can be linked to child labor
exploitation. 166 There is absolutely no protection for children who are
subjected to such conditions. "Their employers do whatever necessary to
make them completely invisible and are thus able to exercise an absolute
control over them." 167
Similar to the pros of the budget proposal to Article 4, giving the
Committee more authority, and the ability to get more involved in
mandating compliance is an added advantage. The Committee is not only
more involved in issuing the penalties and sanctions, but they are also
closer to the problems and better able to observe them. With the
implication of the changes addressed in this paper, the Committee will be
better set to gather truthful statistics and percentages of the continued
exploitations of children. By creating greater awareness and seeing
firsthand the violations that are taking place, the Committee can not only
themselves sanction the state parties, but they can also report them to
other agencies in charge of punishing the violations. 168

E. Application
If the proposed changes were applied, they would afford better

166. Child Labor in the World, supra note 51.
167. Id. Going on to further state that "children work in degrading conditions,
undermining all principles and fundamental rights based in human nature." Id.
168. Watkins, supra note 26, at 91.
Child labour in India is a good example. While official data place the figure as low
as 5 million, credible civil society sources suggest that the real figure may be 10 times
this level. Meanwhile, prosecution of firms and individuals responsible for child
labour has been limited: An analysis by one NGO suggests that just 0.7 per cent of
reported cases result in conviction.
Id.
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protections to children and create better enforcement and compliance
mechanisms. The application of the proposed CRC will be used in the
scenario of child labor exploitation in Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Burundi,
China, Russia, and Brazil, all of which are states that have signed and
ratified the CRC. Zimbabwe, Nigeria, and Burundi are countries that
considered to be developing still, 169 while China, Russia, and Brazil are
considered countries that are economically developed. 170
In compliance with the budget proposal to Article 4, all states should
be required to allocate a certain percentage of their funding, as
determined by the Committee to the social, legal, and educational
services of the state. China, Russia, and Brazil, having more wealth to
distribute, should be required to allocate a larger amount of funding than
the developing countries of Zimbabwe, Nigeria, and Burundi. 171 With
these allocations, states will ensure that educational and health services
are being given top priority, and that children's access to them is not
being impeded. Better education systems will allow for education to be
free and mandatory for all children in the States. It is my argument that
the better the education infrastructure, the more likely children will attend
school, which in tum, will make it so more children are getting an
education, and less children are being forced into child labor. By having
more funding available, it will not only be free for families, but more of
their burdens of transportation and uniform costs will be provided
through the funding for developing countries.
A large reason why states argue they are unable to provide a free
education made available to the children is because they cannot afford to
allocate their resources to education and the related costs, because it takes
away from other areas of the budget they would wish to allocate their
spending. 172 But with the required allocation of funding, no state, no
matter what their economic wealth is, will be allowed to forgo the
mandatory funding for education. If states make education free, it could
promote the seriousness of educating children, and make sure that an
education is beneficial. In developing countries, more funding for
education means that educational reform can take place. It may mean
169.
Developing Countries, INT'L STAT. INST., available at http://www.isiweb.org/index.php/news-from-isi/20018-dc014 (last visited Nov. 16, 2015).
170. See Hunt, supra note 28.
171. Developing Countries, supra note 158. Similar to a flat tax rate, countries would
be required to allocate a certain percentage of their resources to education and these social
services. For example, both Zimbabwe and Russia would be required to each allocate 7% of
their funding. Because Russia is the wealthier country, they will be allocating a larger amount
of funding in comparison to Zimbabwe.
172. See Mark J. Epstein & Kristi Yuthas, Redefining Education in the Developing
World, 10 STAN. Soc. INNOVATION REV. 19, 19 (2012).
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that the infrastructure of the system be more focused on independent
living and financial responsibility, in contrast to the educational systems
in more developed countries.
Because Article 4 of the proposed CRC mandates a fine to any state
party who refuses to comply with the Article, 173 the CRC can impose
fines on them. The Committee through the authority of the CRC can use
its discretion on where to allocate the fines that are received through the
violations. In this scenario, it would allow States such as Zimbabwe,
Nigeria, and Burundi, to receive additional funding to allocate directly
into the education and social services infrastructure. With regards to
China, Russia, and Brazil, by mandating that they provide funding for
education, whether they already have a system in place allowing for free
education, under the newly proposed CRC, they are still required to
allocate further funding to their education systems. That funding may be
received in the form of uniforms or transportation reimbursements for
families to get their children to school. They will not be able to allocate
the resources to wherever they choose; the article doesn't impose a
sliding scale ration based on the quality of their education, but it is based
on their gross income. Education can only be improved and made better
under these proposals. The main focus is to get the children into school,
and not have them working in hazardous environments.
With the changes and clarifications being made to Article 32 of the
CRC, child labor exploitation is explicitly prohibited. This will have
major effects on all states, whether developing or not. Zimbabwe,
Nigeria, Burundi, China, Russia, and Brazil, all are states that have high
percentages of child labor exploitation, yet they have all signed onto the
CRC. 174 In compliance with the changes to Article 32, no child, under no
exception, will be allowed to work at an age younger than fourteen, nor
will they be allowed to work more than twenty hours per week. So, under
the proposed condition, if a twelve-year-old girl from Russia is found to
have been working in a crop spraying pesticides, Russia will be in
violation of the CRC. Not only has Russia allowed for the exploitation
of a twelve-year-old child, but they have also allowed for her to be
working in an environment that is extremely hazardous to her health.
Zimbabwe is considered one of the top ten worse countries for child labor
exploitation. 175 But, under the new CRC, it would no longer be allowed
to employ children in tobacco fields. Children will no longer be able to
be used as drug smugglers, or for sexual exploitation if the new CRC
173. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 7, art. 4.
174. Hunt, supra note 28.
175. Id.
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were to be adopted.
Russia and Zimbabwe, clearly in violation of the CRC, will be
forced to face some consequences under the new treaty. Not only does
the Committee have the discretion to now fine both Zimbabwe and
Russia, but both states have also consented to the jurisdiction of the ICJ
and will be forced to answer for their violations. There are more
repercussions and serious offenses for their violations. By consenting to
the ICJ, all state parties to the CRC will be considered serious offenders
of the treaty in front of the entire international community. As mentioned
before, not only are they subjected to sanctions from the ICJ, but also the
Committee can still choose to impose fines upon them for their serious
The Committee has the discretion to determine the
violations.
appropriate fine in balance with the offense. The Committee then has the
authority to allocate those fines to countries who are in dire need of more
funding so that they can comply with the CRC. The Committee also has
the discretion to allocate some of the fines to campaign awareness
activities to further the purpose of the CRC. States will now have some
fear for their violations and non-compliance. The CRC has more teeth
and enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance by all states.
III. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the CRC is not a complete failure at providing
protection for children. The CRC has made significant strides at bettering
the world for children, and has been successful at eliminating many of
the dangerous threats they are constantly faced with. But, just because
there is a body oflaw that exists, with the goal of eliminating dangers and
creating additional safeguards does not mean it is having the effect that it
was meant to have.
By amending the CRC to include the changes proposed, it will not
only close the gaps in enforcement, but it will create more specificity to
existing amendments, extending the sphere of protection. One of the
major problems with the CRC is that it is too vague, and allows states
wiggle room to pick and choose which provisions to enforce. By
changing the language and requiring States to comply with the specific
requirements, it will eliminate the relaxed provisions, and mandate
compliance. Second, by giving the Committee more authority to oversee
issues of compliance, it creates a larger police force, making sure that the
CRC is being upheld to the maximum extent possible. The ability to
handle issues of monetary funding is also another way of giving the
Committee the power and resources to police the States to the best of their
ability. More resources and funding is the ultimate answer to make the
biggest changes to reach the real purposes of the CRC. More resources
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol43/iss1/1
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creates more awareness, which creates more authority and more
accountability. States will be more aware of the issues and be more
willing to make sure every party is complying with the CRC and hold
each other accountable. With the new CRC, the gaps will be filled and
children will be protected and provided the same equalities as every other
person.
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